譯者 | 蔡錚真 南京大學法律碩士
一審 | 趙文磊 波士頓大學 LL.M.
二審 | 曾梓栩 萊頓大學碩士 LL.M. Candidate
編輯 | Susan 中國政法大學碩士生
Izzy 美國西北大學LL.M.
責編 | Susan 中國政法大學碩士生
United States Securities & Exchange Commission v. Elon Musk
美國證券交易委員會訴埃隆·馬斯克
案件背景介紹
2018年9月，美國證券交易委員會（The Securities and Exchange Commission，以下簡稱 “SEC”）對埃隆•馬斯克（Elon Musk，以下簡稱“馬斯克”）就涉嫌證券欺詐及誤導投資者一事提起訴訟。SEC在提交的訴狀中指控馬斯克違反了1934年《證券交易法》第10(b)節及其項下規定的10b-5規則和《美國法典》第15編第78u條。[1]SEC稱，馬斯克在2018年8月利用推特（Twitter）釋出了一系列虛假和誤導性宣告。馬斯克曾在推文中聲稱，他“正考慮以每股420美元的價格對特斯拉進行私有化收購”且“資金已經到位”，儘管馬斯克後來也聲稱他“根本沒討論過任何潛在資金來源，更不用說確認包括價格在內的關鍵交易條款”。他的這條推文導致特斯拉股價在2018年8月7日暴漲超過6%，引發了嚴重的市場混亂。2018年9月底，SEC和馬斯克達成和解協議，規定馬斯克和特斯拉公司（Tesla）各自向SEC支付2000萬美元的罰款，同時，馬斯克辭去公司董事長職務，並在此後三年內不得擔任該職務。特斯拉還承諾建立企業傳播機制，監督馬斯克以各類形式釋出的與特斯拉及其證券相關的資訊，包括在推特上釋出的推文。2018年10月16日，法院正式簽署了該和解協議。
2022年3月，馬斯克請求法院撤銷SEC發出的行政傳票的部分內容，並終止雙方此前簽訂的和解協議。2022年4月27日，美國紐約州南區聯邦地區法院駁回了馬斯克的訴求。2023年5月15日，美國聯邦第二巡迴上訴法院宣佈維持地方法院判決。2024年4月29日，美國聯邦最高法院駁回了馬斯克向美國聯邦第二巡迴上訴法院申請調卷令的請求。
判決書及譯文
2023 WL 3451402
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
美國聯邦第二巡迴上訴法院
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Elon MUSK, Defendant-Appellant.
美國證券交易委員會訴埃隆•馬斯克
22-1291
|
May 15, 2023
2023年5月15日
Appeal from an April 27, 2022, opinion and order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Liman, J.).
上訴人對2022年4月27日美國紐約州南區聯邦地區法院的判決意見和命令提出上訴（原判法官：Liman, J.）。
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
經慎重考量，特此下令、判決並裁定維持地區法院的判決。
Attorneys and Law Firms
代理人及律師事務所
For Appellee: Jeffrey A. Berger, Senior Appellate Counsel (Michael A. Conley, Solicitor, John R. Rady, Appellate Counsel, on the brief), for Dan Berkovitz, General Counsel, Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington, DC.
For Defendant-Appellant: Ellyde R. Thompson, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP, New York, NY and Washington, DC (Alex Spiro, William A. Burck, Rachel G. Frank, on the brief).
Present: Debra Ann Livingston, Chief Judge, Reena Raggi, Maria Araújo Kahn, Circuit Judges.
SUMMARY ORDER
即決命令
Defendant-Appellant Elon Musk (“Musk”) appeals from an April 27, 2022, opinion and order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Musk argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to modify or terminate a consent decree he entered into with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”).[2] Musk argues that the consent decree warrants modification both because of changed circumstances and because the decree contains a “prior restraint” that violates the First Amendment; he further contends that he did not validly waive his First Amendment rights in the consent decree and that even if he had, the waiver is unenforceable. He therefore argues that a pre-approval provision should be struck from the consent decree or, alternatively, that the decree should be modified or terminated.
被告/上訴人埃隆•馬斯克（Elon Musk）（以下簡稱 “馬斯克”）對2022年4月27日美國紐約州南區聯邦地方法院的判決意見和命令提出上訴。馬斯克辯稱，地區法院濫用自由裁量權，駁回了修改或終止他與美國證券交易委員會（以下簡稱“SEC”）達成的和解協議的動議。[2]他辯稱，由於情況的改變，且和解協議中的“先行制止”違反了憲法第一修正案，因此有必要修改和解協議；他還稱，他並未在和解協議中有效地放棄第一修正案賦予他的權利，即使他放棄了，該棄權行為也不能強制執行。因此，他認為應該刪除和解協議中的一項預批條款，或者修改或終止和解協議。
We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.
假定雙方當事人熟悉基本事實、案件程序以及上訴的事項。
(圖片源自網路）
I. Rule 60(b)(5)
I. 美國聯邦民事訴訟規則第60條(b)款
We review a district court’s decision on a Rule 60(b) motion for abuse of discretion, granting relief only in “exceptional circumstances.” Paddington Partners v. Bouchard, 34 F.3d 1132, 1142 (2d Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sec’y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 239 F.3d 211, 216 (2d Cir. 2001).
根據一項依照美國聯邦民事訴訟規則第60條(b)款（即僅在“例外情況”下提供救濟，參見Paddington Partners v. Bouchard, 34 F.3d 1132, 1142 (2d Cir. 1994)）所提出的濫用自由裁量權的動議，本院審查了一份地區法院所做出的判決，見Sec’y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 239 F.3d 211, 216 (2d Cir. 2001)。
“Rule 60(b) allows a party to seek relief from a final judgment, and request reopening of his case, under a limited set of circumstances,” operating as “an exception to finality.” Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 528–29 (2005). As relevant here, the rule provides that “the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment” where “applying it prospectively is no longer equitable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5). To determine whether a modification or termination is equitable, the movant must first show “either a significant change … in factual conditions or in law.” Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cnty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 384 (1992).[3]
“第60條(b)款規定當事人在特定情形下可以獲得對最終判決的救濟，並有權要求重新審理其案件”，這被視為“判決終局性的例外”，Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 528–29 (2005)。與此相關的是，該規則規定當“判決將來適用會不公正”時，Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5)，“法院可豁免當事人或其法定代表人的最終判決。”要確定修改或終止是否公正，申請人必須先證明有“現實條件或法律上重大變化”，Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cnty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 384 (1992)[3]。
Significant changes in factual conditions may warrant equitable relief where (1) “changed factual conditions make compliance with the decree substantially more onerous”; (2) “a decree proves to be unworkable because of unforeseen obstacles”; or (3) “enforcement of the decree without modification would be detrimental to the public interest.” Id. “Once a moving party has met its burden of establishing either a change in law or in fact warranting modification of a consent decree,” the district court must then “determine whether the proposed modification is suitably tailored to the changed circumstance.” Id. at 391.
發生以下情況，現實條件的重大變化才可能帶來衡平法上的救濟：(1) “現實條件的變化使得遵守判決的難度大大提高”；(2) “由於不可預見的阻礙，無法執行判決”；或 (3) “判決若不經修改就執行將損害公共利益”。“一旦申請人能夠證明法律或現實發生變化，從而有理由對和解協議進行修改”，地區法院就必須“確定其關於修改的提議是否與情況的變更相適應”。
(圖片源自網路）
Musk argues that the SEC’s methods of enforcing the consent decree constitute changed circumstances that have made compliance with it substantially more onerous. We disagree. “Ordinarily, … modification should not be granted where a party relies upon events that actually were anticipated at the time it entered into a decree.” Id. at 386. The consent decree Musk entered into with the SEC expressly required his compliance with “procedures implemented by Tesla” regarding corporate communications, including those “made in any format, including, but not limited to, posts on social media (e.g., Twitter).” The Tesla communications policy in turn required that covered communications would be subject to a pre-approval process such that certain senior executives, including Musk, would not be “authorized to post or publish” without first consulting with Tesla’s General Counsel or an in-house securities lawyer. Id. at 55.
馬斯克辯稱，SEC執行和解協議的方法使得遵守和解協議的難度大大提高，構成了情況的改變。對此，本院不予支援。“通常情況下，……若一方當事人所依據的事件實際上在其達成協議時就已預料到，則不應准予修改”。馬斯克與SEC簽署的和解協議明確要求他遵守“特斯拉執行的”涉及企業傳播的機制，包括 “以任何形式進行的傳播，包括但不限於在社交媒體（如 Twitter）上釋出的推文”。特斯拉的傳播策略反過來又要求相關傳播必須經過預先批准，若未事先諮詢特斯拉法務總裁或內部證券律師，包括馬斯克在內的某些高管“無權釋出或出版言論”。
Initially, only tweets “that contain, or reasonably could contain, information material to [Tesla] or its shareholders” were covered. Id. at 45. Later, the parties amended the agreement to replace the materiality standard with a list of specified subjects. See id. at 231–32. The consent decree also required certification of compliance in the form of written reports and provided that the SEC “may make reasonable requests for … evidence of compliance.” Id. at 45. Musk agreed to “provide such evidence.” Id. The SEC subpoenas that gave rise to this litigation therefore “actually were anticipated” by Musk. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 386.
最初，這僅針對“包含或有理由認為包含對特斯拉或其股東有重大影響的資訊”的推文。後來，雙方修改了協議，用一份特定主題清單取代了實質性標準。和解協議還要求其提供書面報告形式的合規證書，並規定SEC“可合理要求…… （特斯拉）證明其合規”。馬斯克同意“提供此類證據”。因此，引發此次訴訟的SEC的傳票 “實際上已被馬斯克預料到了”，見Rufo, 502 U.S. at 386。
We see no evidence to support Musk’s contention that the SEC has used the consent decree to conduct bad-faith, harassing investigations of his protected speech. To the contrary, the record indicates that the SEC has opened just three inquiries into Musk’s tweets since 2018. The first resulted in the consent decree that is the subject of this appeal. See App’x 16–17, 31 (tweet in which Musk claimed that he was “considering taking Tesla private at $420” with “[f]unding secured,” although Musk had allegedly “not even discussed, much less confirmed, key deal terms, including price, with any potential funding source”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78j, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (making it unlawful to “make any untrue statement of a material fact … in connection with the purchase or sale of any security”).
馬斯克聲稱SEC利用和解協議對他的應受保護的言論進行惡意的、騷擾性的調查，本院並沒有查到相關證據。相反，記錄顯示，自2018年以來，SEC僅對馬斯克的推文展開了三次調查。第一次導致了本次上訴所涉及的和解協議。（馬斯克曾在推文中聲稱，他“正考慮以每股420美元的價格對特斯拉進行私有化收購”，“資金已經到位”，儘管馬斯克後來也聲稱“根本沒討論過任何潛在資金來源，更不用說確認包括價格在內的關鍵交易條款”）；另見《美國法典》15編78章j節、《美國聯邦法規》17編240章10b-5條（規定“在任何證券的購買或銷售過程中，對重要事實作出任何虛假陳述……”屬違法）。
(圖片源自網路）
Two subsequent investigations sought information regarding tweets published in 2019 and 2021. See App’x 57–58 (seeking documents regarding tweet that misstated Tesla’s annual production of vehicles); id. at 232, Confidential App’x 24–25 (seeking documents regarding Twitter poll in which Musk proposed selling 10% of his Tesla stock, an “event[ ] regarding [Tesla’s]securities (including Musk’s acquisition or disposition of the Company’s securities)”); see also id. at 27–28 (describing legal justifications for investigating the transactions). Each tweet plausibly violated the terms of the consent decree. See Kozlowski v. Coughlin, 871 F.2d 241, 245 (2d Cir. 1989) (explaining that it is “the parties’ consent [that] animates the legal force of a consent decree” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
隨後的兩項調查針對馬斯克於2019年和2021年釋出的推文。見附錄57-58（謊報特斯拉汽車年產量的推文）；見機密附錄24-25（馬斯克在推特上發起的內容為出售10%的特斯拉股票的投票，這“有關特斯拉的證券（包括馬斯克收購或處分公司的證券）”）；同上，見第 27-28 頁（調查這些交易的法律依據）。每條推文都可被視為違反了和解協議的條款。參見Kozlowski v. Coughlin, 871 F.2d 241, 245 (2d Cir. 1989)（解釋了“當事人的同意[才]能使和解協議生效”（內部引號和引用省略））。
Accordingly, the SEC made a “reasonable request” for information in order to investigate Musk’s compliance with the decree, as provided for in the parties’ agreement. Whether or not the consent decree may have “provide[d] broader relief than the court could have awarded after a trial” does not detract from the SEC’s ability to enforce the agreement Musk voluntarily signed, the terms of which plainly “[came] within the general scope of the case made by the pleadings” and “further[ed] the objectives of the law upon which the complaint was based.” Loc. No. 93, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, AFL-CIO C.L.C. v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 525 (1986).
因此，SEC提出了“合理的請求”，以調查馬斯克遵守協議的情況，正如雙方的協議中規定的那樣。無論和解協議是否“提供了比法院的審判所能給予的更廣泛的救濟”，都不會削弱這份由馬斯克自願簽署的和解協議的效力，該協議的條款顯然“屬於訴狀中提到的案件的一般範圍”，並且 “進一步實現了訴狀的法律目的”。參見Loc. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, AFL-CIO C.L.C. v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 525 (1986)。
And even if we agreed that any factual conditions had changed outside the contemplation of the parties—which we do not—the SEC’s limited, appropriate inquiries in this case have not made compliance with the consent decree “substantially more onerous” than could have been reasonably anticipated when Musk agreed to the consent decree’s terms. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 384. “The exercise of equity … does not permit a court to indulge a party’s discontent over the effects of its bargain.” Kozlowski, 871 F.2d at 246.
即使承認現實條件發生了超出雙方預期的變化，遵守和解協議也並未因SEC在本案中進行的有限、適當的調查而比簽訂該協議時能預見的“難度大大提高”。見Rufo，502 U.S. at 384。“行使衡平法……不允許法院縱容一方當事人對其協議效果的不滿”。見Kozlowski, 871 F.2d at 246。
(圖片源自網路）
Nor does the public interest require modification of the consent decree. If anything, it cuts in the other direction, given the importance of the public’s interest in the enforcement of federal securities laws and because “[o]ur Court recognizes a ‘strong federal policy favoring the approval and enforcement of consent decrees.’ ” SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Markets, Inc., 752 F.3d 285, 293 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting SEC v. Wang, 944 F.2d 80, 85 (2d Cir. 1991)). We conclude therefore that the district court was well within its sound discretion to deny Musk’s motion to modify the terms of the consent decree.[4]
修改和解協議也與公共利益的需要無關。假設與公共利益有關，考慮到執行聯邦證券法過程中的公共利益的重要性，這也是與其背道而馳的，因為“我們的法院認同‘強有力的聯邦政策有利於和解協議的批准和執行’”。見SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Markets, Inc., 752 F.3d 285, 293 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting SEC v. Wang, 944 F.2d 80, 85 (2d Cir. 1991))。因此，地方法院否決馬斯克修改和解協議的動議是在合理的範圍內行使自由裁量權。[4]
II. Waiver
II 棄權行為
Musk’s argument that the consent decree is effectively a “prior restraint” on his speech does not change this conclusion. Parties entering into consent decrees may voluntarily waive their First Amendment and other rights. See SEC v. Romeril, 15 F.4th 166, 172 (2d Cir. 2021). Indeed, every consent decree by definition involves waiver of the right to trial, which saves the parties “the time, expense, and inevitable risk of litigation.” United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681 (1971).
馬斯克辯稱和解協議實際上是對其言論的“預先限制”，該說法並不能改變本案的結論。達成和解協議的當事人可能會自願放棄他們的第一修正案權利和其他權利。見SEC v. Romeril, 15 F.4th 166, 172 (2d Cir. 2021)。事實上，每一份和解協議本質上都包含審判中的棄權行為，這有利於當事人節省“時間和開銷，降低訴訟風險”。見United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681 (1971)。
Had Musk wished to preserve his right to tweet without even limited internal oversight concerning certain Tesla-related topics, he had “the right to litigate and defend against the [SEC’s] charges” or to negotiate a different agreement—but he chose not to do so. Romeril, 15 F.4th at 172. Having made that choice, he may not use Rule 60 to collaterally reopen a final judgment merely because he has now changed his mind.[5] We express no view as to the substance of his underlying First Amendment claims.
如果馬斯克希望保留自己的權利，釋出推文談論與特斯拉相關的一些話題而不受限制——哪怕是有限的內部監督——那麼他“有權針對SEC的指控提起訴訟並辯護”，或者與其協商達成不同的協議，但他並未如此。見Romeril, 15 F.4th at 172。既然他做出了選擇，他就不能僅僅因為現在改變了主意，就利用第60條規則以致重審最終判決。[5]本院對其提出的有關第一修正案的訴求的實質不發表任何意見。
* * *
We have considered Defendant-Appellant’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
本院經考慮並查明，被告/上訴人其餘的主張並無依據。據此，本院宣佈維持地方法院判決。
腳註：
[1] 譯者注：本案一審判決表述為“Section 10(b)(5) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“the Exchange Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 78u, and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder”，但後文和本案附件中的其他檔案則表述為“Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder,” 即“第10(b)節及其項下規定的10b-5規則”。10b-5規則是SEC根據1934年《證券法》制定的針對證券欺詐的法規。
[2] 譯者注：“changed circumstances”，此處指單純語義上的情況的改變，結合下文，馬斯克此處應是指SEC執行和解協議的方法使得遵守和解協議的難度大大提高，有別於事由不可歸責於雙方當事人的情勢變更制度。
[3] The “flexible standard” adopted by the Supreme Court in Rufo made less stringent the test imposed by United States v. Swift & Co., which required “a clear showing of grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen conditions.” 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932). Because the parties both apply the Rufo standard, we assume without deciding that it applies here, arguably outside its traditional context of institutional reform litigation. 最高法院在Rufo案中採用的“靈活標準”顯得United States v. Swift & Co.案所施加的測試沒那麼嚴格，該測試要求“一個明顯是由新的和不可預見的情況所引發的嚴重錯誤”。286 U.S. 106, 119（1932）。由於Rufo標準適用於雙方當事人，本院推定它也適用於此，或許超出了其傳統的機構改革訴訟的背景。
[4] It follows that the district court also acted within its discretion to deny Musk’s motion to terminate the decree altogether, an argument Musk appears to have abandoned on appeal. Musk in any event makes no showing that the objective of the consent decree “has been achieved,” nor that a “durable remedy has been implemented” such that “continued enforcement of the order is not only unnecessary, but improper.” Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 450 (2009); see also United States v. Eastman Kodak Co., 63 F.3d 95, 101 (2d Cir. 1995) (requiring that a movant show that the “basic purposes of the consent decrees … have been achieved”).
由此可見，地區法院對馬斯克終止該協議的動議的拒絕是在其自由裁量權範圍內，而馬斯克似乎在上訴中放棄了這一論點。無論如何，馬斯克都沒有展示出和解協議的目標“已經實現”，也沒有展示“已經採取了持續的補救措施”以至於“繼續執行該命令不僅沒必要，而且不合適”。Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 450 (2009);另見United States v. Eastman Kodak Co., 63 F.3d 95, 101 (2d Cir. 1995)（這要求有上訴人證明“和解協議的基本目的……已經實現”）。
[5] Musk also argues that any waiver of his First Amendment rights is unenforceable. Having not made that argument before the district court, Musk has forfeited it. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 413 (2012).
馬斯克還辯稱，任何對他的第一修正案權利的放棄都不能被執行。由於馬斯克沒有在地區法院提出這一論點，他已經無法藉此立論了。參見United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 413 (2012)。
原文連結：
https://casetext.com/case/sec-exch-commn-v-musk