譯者 | 董明月 北京大學J.D. & J.M.
審稿 |富揚 北京師範大學法律碩士
汪晨涵 復旦大學法律碩士
編輯 | 陳珏雯 西南政法大學本科
鄭梓萱 澳門科技大學LL.B.
責編 | 馮雨萱 北京大學J.D. & J.M.
Vidal v. Elster
韋德爾訴埃爾斯特案
01
案情概述
Steve Elster sought to register the trademark “Trump too small”[1] for use on shirts and hats, drawing from a 2016 Presidential primary debate exchange. The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) refused registration based on the “names clause” of the Lanham Act, which prohibits the registration of a mark that identifies a particular living individual without their written consent. Elster argued that this clause violated his First Amendment right to free speech. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board affirmed the PTO’s decision, but the Federal Circuit reversed.
史蒂夫·埃爾斯特（Steve Elster）試圖註冊“川普太小”的商標，以便在T恤和帽子上使用，該商標靈感源於2016年總統初選辯論中的一次對話。專利商標局（PTO）根據《蘭哈姆法》的“姓名條款”拒絕了該註冊申請，該條款禁止在未經特定在世個人書面同意的情況下注冊具備可識別該個人特徵的商標。埃爾斯特認為該條款侵犯了他依據《第一修正案》享有的言論自由權。商標審判和上訴委員會（TTAB）確認了專利商標局的決定，但聯邦巡迴上訴法院推翻了該決定。
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The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the Federal Circuit’s decision, holding that the Lanham Act’s names clause does not violate the First Amendment. The Court found that while the names clause is content-based, it is not viewpoint-based, as it does not discriminate against any particular viewpoint. The Court also noted that the names clause is grounded in a historical tradition of restricting the trademarking of names, which has coexisted with the First Amendment. The Court concluded that this history and tradition are sufficient to demonstrate that the names clause does not violate the First Amendment. The Court emphasized that its decision is narrow and does not set forth a comprehensive framework for judging whether all content-based but viewpoint-neutral trademark restrictions are constitutional.
美國最高法院推翻了聯邦巡迴上訴法院的判決，裁定《蘭哈姆法》的姓名條款不違反《第一修正案》。法院認定，該條款適用的基礎是基於姓名的內容，而非對此人的觀點，因為它並沒有針對特定的觀點進行歧視。法院還指出，姓名條款有著禁止註冊姓名商標的歷史傳統，這一傳統與《第一修正案》共存。法院得出結論，這種歷史和傳統足以證明姓名條款不違反《第一修正案》。法院強調，這一決定是有限的，並且還沒有設定一個全面的框架來判斷所有基於內容但不涉及觀點的商標限制是否符合憲法。
[1]“川普太小”這個短語起源於2016年的美國總統初選電視辯論，辯論中對方取笑唐納德‧川普，說他的手太小。
02
判決結果
Steve Elster sought to register the trademark “Trump too small.” But, the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) refused to register the mark because the Lanham Act prohibits registration of a trademark that “consists of or comprises a name . . . identifying a particular living individual except by his written consent.” Elster contends that this prohibition violates his First Amendment right to free speech. We hold that it does not.
史蒂夫·埃爾斯特試圖註冊“川普太小”的商標，但專利商標局（PTO）拒絕了該申請，理由是《蘭哈姆法》禁止註冊“包含或構成姓名的商標，且該商標具備可識別該姓名持有者的特徵，除非經該姓名的特定在世個人書面同意。”埃爾斯特認為這一禁令侵犯了他依據《第一修正案》享有的言論自由權。我們認為並非如此。
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A trademark is “a symbol or a device to distinguish the goods or property made or sold by the person whose mark it is, to the exclusion of use by all other persons.” As we have explained, “the principle underlying trademark protection is that distinctive marks—words, names, symbols, and the like—can help distinguish a particular artisan’s goods from those of others.” So “one who first uses a distinct mark in commerce thus acquires rights to that mark,” which “include preventing others from using the mark.”
商標是“用於區分製作或出售的商品或財產的符號或裝置，由其持有者使用並排除他人使用。”正如我們所解釋的，“商標保護的基本原則是，獨特的標識——文字、名稱、符號等——可以幫助將特定工匠的商品與他人的商品區分開來。”因此，“最先在商業活動中使用顯著商標的人理應獲得該商標的權利，”這些權利包括“阻止他人使用該商標。”
Trademark rights are primarily a matter of state law, but an owner can obtain important rights through federal registration. The Lanham Act creates a federal trademark-registration system administered by the PTO. Federal “registration of a mark is not mandatory,” and “the owner of an unregistered mark may still use it in commerce and enforce it against infringers.” Federal registration, however, “confers important legal rights and benefits.” For example, a registrant may rely on registration in litigation as prima facie evidence of his exclusive right to use the mark. And, registration provides nationwide constructive notice of the registrant’s claim of ownership of the mark.
商標權主要受州法管轄，但商標所有人可以透過聯邦註冊獲得重要權利。《蘭哈姆法》建立了由專利商標局管理的聯邦商標註冊系統。聯邦“商標註冊並非強制性”，且“未註冊的商標所有人仍可在商業活動中使用該商標並對侵權者提起訴訟。”然而，聯邦註冊“賦予了重要的法律權利和利益。”例如，註冊人可以在訴訟中以註冊作為其專有權利的初步證據。同時，註冊提供了全國範圍的關於所有權主張的推定通知。
Only marks that meet certain criteria are federally registerable. Among other criteria, the Lanham Act contains what we will call the “names clause”—a prohibition on the registration of a mark that “consists of or comprises a name . . . identifying a particular living individual except by his written consent.” The names clause excludes from registration “not only full names but also surnames, shortened names, and nicknames, so long as the name does in fact identify a particular living individual.”
只有符合某些條件的商標才可以進行聯邦註冊。在其他標準之中，《蘭哈姆法》包含我們稱之為“姓名條款”的規定，禁止註冊“包含或構成姓名的商標，且該商標具備可識別該姓名持有者的特徵，除非經該姓名的特定在世個人書面同意。”該條款不僅排除了完整姓名，還包括姓氏、縮寫名和暱稱，只要該名稱確實識別出特定的在世個人。
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Steve Elster sought to register the trademark “Trump too small,” accompanied by an illustration of a hand gesture, to use on shirts and hats. The mark draws on an exchange between then-candidate Donald Trump and Senator Marco Rubio during a 2016 Presidential primary debate.
史蒂夫·埃爾斯試圖註冊“川普太小”的商標，附有一個手勢插圖，計劃將其用於T恤和帽子。該商標源自2016年總統初選辯論中時任候選人唐納德·特朗普與參議員馬可·魯比奧之間的對話。
The PTO examiner refused registration under the names clause because the mark used President Trump’s name without his consent. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board affirmed, and it also rejected Elster’s argument that the names clause violates his First Amendment right to free speech. The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the names clause violated the First Amendment. The court first concluded that the names clause is a viewpoint-neutral, content-based restriction on speech subject to at least intermediate scrutiny. It next concluded that the Government could not satisfy even intermediate scrutiny because the names clause does not advance any substantial governmental interest.
專利商標局審查員依據姓名條款拒絕了該註冊申請，理由是該商標使用了特朗普總統的姓名而未取得他的同意。商標審判和上訴委員會（TTAB）對此予以確認，同時也駁回了埃爾斯特關於姓名條款違反其《第一修正案》言論自由權的主張。聯邦巡迴上訴法院推翻了該決定，裁定姓名條款違反了《第一修正案》。該法院首先認定，姓名條款是一種內容中立但基於內容的言論限制，需至少接受中度審查。隨後，法院認為，政府無法證明該條款能夠透過中度審查，因為姓名條款並未推進任何實質性政府利益。
We granted certiorari to resolve whether the Lanham Act’s names clause violates the First Amendment.
我們批准移審令以解決《蘭哈姆法》的姓名條款是否違反《第一修正案》的問題。
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” In general, we have held that the First Amendment prohibits the Government from restricting or burdening “expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.” “When enforcing this prohibition, our precedents distinguish between content-based and content-neutral regulations of speech.”
《第一修正案》規定：“國會不得制定任何法律……限制言論自由。” 一般來說，我們認為《第一修正案》禁止政府因“其資訊、思想、主題或內容”而限制或加重“表達行為的負擔”。“在執行這一禁令時，我們的先例區分了基於內容的和內容中立的言論規制。
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A content-based regulation “targets speech based on its communicative content,” restricting discussion of a subject matter or topic. “As a general matter,” a content-based regulation is “ ‘presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government proves that it is narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.’ ”
基於內容的規制“以其表達的內容為目標”，限制某一特定主題或話題的討論。“通常情況下”，基於內容的規制“‘被推定為違憲，只有在政府證明其狹義地服務於不可抗拒的國家利益時才可以成立’。”
Our precedents distinguish further a particularly “egregious form of content discrimination”—viewpoint discrimination. A viewpoint-based regulation targets not merely a subject matter, “but particular views taken by speakers on a subject.” It is also generally subject to heightened scrutiny, though viewpoint discrimination’s “violation of the First Amendment is . . . more blatant.” Because our precedents dictate that these distinctions inform our assessment under the First Amendment, we start with them to evaluate the names clause.
我們的先例還進一步區分了一種特別“惡劣的內容歧視形式”——觀點歧視。觀點歧視不僅僅針對某一特定話題，而是“針對發言者對該話題所持的特定觀點”。這一類規制通常要接受更嚴格的審查，儘管觀點歧視對《第一修正案》的“侵犯更加明顯”。由於我們的先例要求這些區分需要在《第一修正案》下進行評估，我們從它們開始評估姓名條款。
In the trademark context, we have twice concluded that trademark restrictions that discriminate based on viewpoint violate the First Amendment. In Matal v. Tam, we held that the Lanham Act’s bar on disparaging trademarks violated the First Amendment. All Justices in Tam agreed that this bar was viewpoint based because it prohibited trademarks based only on one viewpoint: “giving offense.” And, in Brunetti, we held that the Lanham Act’s bar on trademarks containing immoral or scandalous matter likewise violated the First Amendment. We concluded that the bar was viewpoint based because it prohibited trademarks based only on one viewpoint, immoral or scandalous matter, while permitting trademarks based on other viewpoints.
在商標背景下，我們曾兩次裁定基於觀點的商標限制違反了《第一修正案》。在馬塔訴塔姆案中，我們認為《蘭哈姆法》對“貶損性”商標的禁令違反了《第一修正案》。在塔姆案中，所有法官一致認為該禁令是基於觀點的，因為它僅基於一種觀點禁止商標：“冒犯他人。”在布魯內蒂案中，我們裁定《蘭哈姆法》對包含非道德或醜聞性內容的商標禁令同樣違反了《第一修正案》。我們認為，該禁令是基於觀點的，因為它僅禁止基於非道德或醜聞性內容的商標，而允許基於其他觀點的商標。
The names clause does not facially discriminate against any viewpoint. No matter the message a registrant wants to convey, the names clause prohibits marks that use another person’s name without consent. It does not matter “whether the use of the name is flattering, critical or neutral.” The Government is thus not singling out a trademark “based on the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker.”
姓名條款在表面上並未對任何觀點進行歧視。無論申請人想要傳達的是什麼資訊，姓名條款禁止未經同意使用他人姓名的商標。無論姓名的使用是討好、批評還是中立，結果都一樣。因此，政府並未針對某種“特定的意識形態或發言者的觀點”對商標進行挑選。
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Elster suggests that the names clause verges on viewpoint discrimination in practice. According to Elster, it is easier to obtain consent for a trademark that flatters a person rather than mocks him. This Court has found that a law can discriminate based on viewpoint in its practical operation. But, here, there are many reasons why a person may be unable to secure another’s consent to register a trademark bearing his name. Even when the trademark’s message is neutral or complimentary, a person may withhold consent to avoid any association with the goods, or to prevent his name from being exploited for another’s gain.
埃爾斯特主張，姓名條款在實際操作中接近觀點歧視。據埃爾斯所言，要獲得一個討好他人的商標的同意比嘲弄他人的商標要容易。本院曾裁定，一項法律在實際操作中可能基於觀點進行歧視。但在這裡，有許多理由可以解釋為什麼有人無法獲得他人同意註冊包含其姓名的商標。即便商標的內容是中立或讚美的，一個人可能會因為不想與商品產生任何關聯，或者不想讓其姓名被他人獲利利用，而拒絕同意。
Although the names clause is not viewpoint based, it is content based. As we have explained, a restriction on speech is content based if the “law applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed.” The names clause turns on the content of the proposed trademark—whether it contains a person’s name. If the trademark does contain a person’s name, and the registrant lacks that person’s consent, then the names clause prohibits registration. Because trademarks containing names “are treated differently from trademarks conveying other types of ideas,” the names clause is content based.
儘管姓名條款並非基於觀點，但它確實是基於內容的。正如我們所解釋的，如果一項規制因為討論的主題或表達的想法而適用於某一特定言論，那麼該規制就是基於內容的。姓名條款依賴於擬註冊商標的內容——即該商標是否包含某個人的姓名。如果商標包含某個人的姓名，而申請人沒有得到該人的同意，那麼姓名條款將禁止註冊。因為包含姓名的商標“與表達其他型別思想的商標的處理方式不同”，因此姓名條款是基於內容的。
We thus confront a situation we did not address in Tam or Brunetti. In Tam, we were careful to “leave open” the framework “for deciding free speech challenges to provisions of the Lanham Act.” And, in Brunetti, we declined to “say anything about how to evaluate viewpoint-neutral restrictions on trademark registration.”
我們因此面對一個我們在塔姆案或布魯內蒂案中沒有解決的情境。在塔姆案中，我們謹慎地“留出了空間”用於“決定對《蘭哈姆法》條款的自由言論挑戰”。而在布魯內蒂案中，我們拒絕“就如何評估商標註冊的觀點中立限制發表意見。”
We have acknowledged that trademark rights and restrictions can “play well with the First Amendment.” In this case, we do not delineate an exhaustive framework for when a content-based trademark restriction passes muster under the First Amendment. But, in evaluating a solely content-based trademark restriction, we can consider its history and tradition, as we have done before when considering the scope of the First Amendment.
我們已承認，商標權以及對商標權的限制與《第一修正案》可以“很好地共存”。在本案中，我們沒有為透過《第一修正案》檢驗基於內容的商標限制制定詳盡框架。但在評估僅基於內容的商標限制時，我們可以像以往那樣考慮其歷史和傳統，以確定其是否符合《第一修正案》的範圍。
The Lanham Act’s names clause has deep roots in our legal tradition. Our courts have long recognized that trademarks containing names may be restricted. And, these name restrictions served established principles. This history and tradition is sufficient to conclude that the names clause—a content-based, but viewpoint-neutral, trademark restriction—is compatible with the First Amendment. We need look no further in this case.
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《蘭哈姆法》的姓名條款根植於我們的法律傳統中。我們的法院長期以來承認，包含姓名的商標可以被限制。而且這些姓名限制遵循既定的原則。這段歷史和傳統足以證明，認為“姓名條款”——一種基於姓名的內容但對此人的觀點中立的商標限制——與《第一修正案》相容。在本案中，我們無需進一步探討。
Restrictions on trademarking names have a long history. Such restrictions have historically been grounded in the notion that a person has ownership over his own name, and that he may not be excluded from using that name by another’s trademark. As the Court has explained, “a man’s name is his own property, and he has the same right to its use and enjoyment as he has to that of any other species of property.” It is therefore “an elementary principle that every man is entitled to the use of his own name in his own business.” “The notion that people should be able to use their own name to identify their goods or business is deeply rooted in American mores.”
對姓名註冊商標的限制歷史悠久。歷史上，這些限制基於這樣一種觀念：一個人對自己的姓名擁有所有權，不能因為他人的商標而失去使用自己姓名的權利。正如法院所解釋的，“一個人的名字是他自己的財產，他有權利像對待其他任何財產一樣使用和享受它。”因此，有一個基本原則是“每個人都有權在自己的業務中使用自己的名字。”“人們應該能夠用自己的名字來標識自己的商品或業務，這一觀念深深植根於美國社會。”
Recognizing a person’s ownership over his name, the common law restricted the trademarking of names. It prevented a person from trademarking any name—even his own—by itself. In “the early years of trademark law,” courts recognized that “there can be no trade-mark in the name of a person, because . . . every person has the right to use his own name for the purposes of trade.”
承認了一個人對其姓名的所有權，普通法對姓名的商標註冊進行了限制。它禁止一個人僅憑姓名註冊商標——即使是他自己的名字。在“商標法的早期”，法院認識到“人名不能作為商標，因為……每個人都有權將自己的名字用於商業目的。”
The common law did, however, allow a person to obtain a trademark containing his own name—with a caveat: A person could not use a mark containing his name to the exclusion of a person with the same name. “A corollary of the right to use one’s own name and identity in trade is the right to stop others from doing so—at least those who don’t share the same name.” Consider the case of John L. Faber and John H. Faber, two men who independently manufactured lead pencils near Nuremberg, Germany. Both men stamped the pencils they manufactured with their shared surname. After recognizing that each man “had the right to put his own name on his own pencils,” the New York Supreme Court declined to allow one man to effectively trademark the other man’s name.
然而，普通法允許一個人獲得包含自己名字的商標，但有一個前提：該人不能排除與他同名的人使用包含自己名字的商標。“在貿易中使用自己姓名和身份的權利的一個推論是，有權阻止他人這樣做——至少是那些與他沒有同名的人。”考慮約翰·L·法伯和約翰·H·法伯的案例，這兩個人在德國紐倫堡附近獨立製造鉛筆。他們都在各自制造的鉛筆上印上了相同的姓氏。紐約最高法院在承認兩人“都有權在自己的鉛筆上使用自己的名字”後，拒絕某一方將對方的名字作為商標的行為。
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We see no evidence that the common lawafforded protection to a person seeking a trademark of another living person’s name. To the contrary, English courts recognized that selling a product under another person’s name could be actionable fraud. Even in the absence of fraud, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to square such a right to trademark another person’s name with our established understanding that “a person may have a right in his own name as a trade-mark, as against a person of a different name.” Relatedly, one could contract for the use of another person’s name in his business. Such contracts would make little sense if one could use another living person’s name in business at will. The common-law approach to trademarking names thus protected only a person’s right to use his own name.
我們沒有看到普通法賦予某人註冊另一個在世之人姓名的商標的保護。相反，英國法院認為以他人的名字銷售產品可能構成可訴的欺詐。即使在沒有欺詐的情況下，也很難，即便不是不可能，將這種註冊他人姓名的權利與我們已確立的觀點——即“一個人可以對自己的名字享有商標權，如果一個人已經將他的名字註冊為商標，那麼他有權阻止其他人在相同或相似的商品和服務上使用相同或可能會引起混淆的名字”——相調和。類似的，一個人可以透過合同在其業務中使用他人的名字，但如果一個人可以隨意使用他人的名字，這種合同將毫無意義。因此，普通法對姓名註冊商標的處理只保護一個人使用自己名字的權利。
This common-law understanding carried over into federal statutory law. The first federal trademark law contained a requirement that a trademark contain more than merely a name. A few decades later, federal trademark law emphasized “that nothing herein shall prevent the registration of a trade-mark otherwise registerable because of its being the name of the applicant.” And, the Lanham Act later “incorporated the principal features of common law trademark protection,” thereby “declaring . . . existing law” rather than writing trademark law from scratch.
這種普通法的理解被延續到了聯邦成文法中。第一部聯邦商標法要求商標必須不止包含一個名字。幾十年後，聯邦商標法進一步強調“本法不應阻止以申請人名字註冊的商標。” 隨後，《蘭哈姆法》“納入了普通法商標保護的主要特徵”，因此“宣佈了現有法律”，而不是從零開始制定商標法。
It is thus unsurprising that the Lanham Act included the names clause, prohibiting the registration of a mark containing “a name . . . identifying a particular living individual except by his written consent.” The names clause reflects the common law’s careful treatment of names when it comes to trademarks.
因此，《蘭哈姆法》包括姓名條款，禁止註冊包含“名字……識別某個特定在世個人，除非得到其書面同意”的商標，這並不令人驚訝。姓名條款反映了普通法在處理商標中涉及名字時的謹慎態度。
The restriction on trademarking names also reflects trademark law’s historical rationale of identifying the source of goods. Trademark protection ensures that consumers know the source of a product and can thus evaluate it based upon the manufacturer’s reputation and goodwill. By barring a person from using another’s name, the names clause reflects the traditional rationale of ensuring that consumers make no mistake about who is responsible for a product.
對名字進行商標註冊的限制也反映了商標法識別商品來源的歷史性理由。商標保護確保消費者瞭解產品的來源，從而可以基於製造商的聲譽和商譽來評估產品。透過禁止他人使用某人的名字，姓名條款體現了傳統的理念，即確保消費者不會誤解是誰對產品負責。
Moreover, the names clause respects the established connection between a trademark and its protection of the mark- holder’s reputation. We have long recognized that a trademark protects the markholder’s reputation. This protection reflects that a mark may “acquire value” from a person’s “expenditure of labor, skill, and money.” A person’s trademark is “his authentic seal,” and “if another uses it, he borrows the owner’s reputation, whose quality no longer lies within his own control.”
此外，商標法中的姓名條款旨在維護商標與其持有者聲譽之間的緊密聯絡。我們一直承認，商標保護持有人的聲譽。這種保護反映了商標可能透過某人“投入的勞動、技能和資金”而“獲得價值”。 一個人的商標是“他的真實印章”，如果別人使用它，那麼他就是在借用所有者的聲譽，而這種品質不再處於他自己的控制之下。
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This connection between a trademark and reputation is even stronger when the mark contains a person’s name. “Is not a man’s name as strong an instance of trade-mark as can be suggested?” In fact, the English common law of trademarks arose from the fact that “those who sold goods . . . that were the fruit of their own labor or craftsmanship began to identify those products . . . with their own names.” As we have explained, virtually up until the Fourteenth Amendment’s adoption, a trademark “really denoted only the name of the manufacturer.” The names clause thus protects “the reputation of the named individual” by preventing another person from using his name.
當商標包含某人的名字時，商標與聲譽之間的聯絡更為緊密。“難道一個人的名字不是商標的最有力例項嗎？” 事實上，英國商標、法正是源於這樣一個事實：“那些出售商品的人……是他們自己勞動或工藝的成果，他們開始用自己的名字來標識這些產品。” 正如我們所解釋的，幾乎直到第十四修正案透過時，商標“實際上僅僅表示製造商的名字。” 因此，姓名條款透過防止他人使用某人的名字來保護“被命名個人的聲譽”。
Applying these principles, we have recognized that a party has no First Amendment right to piggyback off the goodwill another entity has built in its name. The Court rejected the argument that the consent requirement violated the First Amendment because “Congress reasonably could conclude” that the value of the word “ ‘Olympic’ was the product of the USOC’s ‘own talents and energy.’ ”
應用這些原則，我們已認識到某一方沒有第一修正案權利來借用另一個實體在其名字中建立的商譽。法院駁回了同意要求違反了第一修正案，因為“國會可以合理地得出結論”認為，“‘奧林匹克’一詞的價值是美國奧委會透過‘自身的才華和努力’獲得的。”
Although the petitioner certainly had a First Amendment right to speak on political matters, it lacked the right to “exploit the commercial magnetism” of the word “Olympic” and the USOC’s hard-won efforts in giving that word value. The names clause guards a similar interest. By protecting a person’s use of his name, the names clause “secures to the producer the benefits of his good reputation.”
儘管請願人確實擁有在政治問題上發言的第一修正案權利，但它沒有權利來“利用‘奧林匹克’一詞的商業吸引力”以及美國奧委會在賦予該詞價值方面的努力。姓名條款捍衛了類似的利益。透過保護個人對其名字的使用，姓名條款“確保生產者享有其良好聲譽的好處”。
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We conclude that a tradition of restricting the trademarking of names has coexisted with the First Amendment, and the names clause fits within that tradition. Though the particulars of the doctrine have shifted over time, the consistent through line is that a person generally had a claim only to his own name. The names clause reflects this common-law tradition by prohibiting a person from obtaining a trademark of another living person’s name without consent, thereby protecting the other’s reputation and goodwill.
我們得出結論，限制為姓名註冊商標的傳統與第一修正案並存，姓名條款符合這一傳統。儘管該學說的具體內容隨著時間的推移有所變化，但始終如一的主線是，一個人通常只能對自己的名字提出主張。姓名條款反映了這一普通法傳統，透過禁止某人未經同意獲得另一位在世個人名字的商標，保護了後者的聲譽和商譽。
None of this is to say that the Government cannot innovate when it comes to trademark law. A firm grounding in traditional trademark law is sufficient to justify the content-based trademark restriction before us, but we do not opine on what may be required or sufficient in other cases. To be sure, as Justice Barrett observes, a case presenting a content-based trademark restriction without a historical analogue may require a different approach. But, we need not develop such a comprehensive theory to address the relatively simple case before us today.
這並不是說政府在商標法方面不能創新。我們面前基於內容的商標限制，有充分的理由依據傳統的商標法來證明其合理性，但我們不對其他案件中可能需要或足夠的條件發表意見。當然，正如巴雷特法官所指出的，一個沒有歷史類比的內容限制型商標案件可能需要採用不同的方法。但我們無需為處理今天這個相對簡單的案件而發展出全面的理論。
We conclude that the names clause is of a piece with a common-law tradition regarding the trademarking of names. We see no reason to disturb this longstanding tradition, which supports the restriction of the use of another’s name in a trademark.
我們得出結論，姓名條款與限制名字作為商標的普通法傳統是一致的。我們沒有理由因為它支援限制在商標中使用他人的名字而打破這個長期存在的傳統。
原文連結：
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/602/22-704/