譯者 |阮婧研 中國政法大學本科
一審 |富 揚 北京師範大學法律碩士
二審 |汪晨涵 復旦大學法律碩士
編輯 | 戴 鈺 蘭州大學本科
Loca 中國社會科學院大學碩士
責編 | 馮雨萱 北京大學J.D.&J.M.
The University of Chicago Law Review Volume 91.4, Number 2 | June 2024
《芝加哥法律評論》第91.4卷第2篇
The Information Costs of Exclusion
排他權的資訊成本
Jonathan Sarnoff
ABSTRACT 摘要
The appropriate scope of the right to exclude is among the most contentious topics in property theory: while some defend direct state regulations that override owners’ right to exclude unwanted uses from their property, others defend greater deference to owners’ authority, implemented by stringent enforcement of the right to exclude.
排他權的適當範圍是財產理論中最具爭議的話題之一：一些人支援國家透過制定直接規定來排除所有者對於其財產的多餘的權利；而另一些人則支援透過嚴格執行排他權以對所有者的權利給予更大尊重。
In recent years, scholars who favor exclusion have developed novel arguments to support it by focusing on the information costs of property. Because everyone must respect property rights, those rights must be simple enough for everyone to understand their content. And the right to exclude, which requires everyone to keep off property unless the owner allows them on, is simple enough to be understood easily by those who must respect it. Thus, these theorists conclude, the information costs of property favor respecting the right to exclude.
近年來，支援排他權的學者們透過關注財產的資訊成本提出了新的論點。因為每個人都必須尊重財產權，所以這些權利必須足夠簡單以使每個人都能理解其內容。而排他權要求除得到所有者的允許以外，所有人都要與財產保持距離，這一權利足夠簡單，以至於必須尊重它的人都能輕易理解。因此，這些學者得出結論，財產的資訊成本有利於尊重排他權。
（圖片源於網路）
This Article defends an alternative analysis of how the information costs of property bear on the proper scope of exclusion. Legal rules generate two kinds of information costs: the costs of learning rules and the costs of applying them. While simpler rules may be easier to learn, they need not be easier to apply. Instead, a rule is easy to apply if individuals can easily determine whether a particular action would violate it, which requires the rule to define violations in terms of facts that are easy for individuals to ascertain. Once the costs of applying the right to exclude are considered, I claim, the law sometimes reduces information costs not by respecting exclusion but rather by restricting it.
本文對財產資訊成本如何對排他權的適當範圍產生影響提出了另一種分析。法律規則會產生兩種資訊成本：學習規則的成本和應用規則的成本。雖然簡單的規則可能更容易學習，但它們並不一定更容易應用。相反，如果個人能夠輕易判斷某一特定行為是否違反規則，那麼該規則就易於應用，這就要求規則以個人易於確定的事實來定義違規行為。筆者認為，一旦將應用排他權的成本納入考量，那麼法律有時就會透過限制排他權而非尊重排他權以降低資訊成本。
The right to exclude prohibits nonowners from crossing property boundaries without the owner’s consent. Thus, it defines violations primarily in terms of two facts—whether an action crosses a boundary and whether the owner has consented. While it can thus be applied cheaply if these facts are easy to ascertain, it will be costly to apply if not. When individuals would struggle to determine whether an action would cross a parcel boundary, direct regulation of permissible uses may reduce information costs even though it overrides exclusion—as has occurred with activities ranging from airplane overflights to oil and gas production and urban land development.
排他權禁止非所有者在未經所有者同意的情況下越過財產邊界。因此，它主要根據兩個事實來定義侵犯行為——行為是否越過邊界以及所有者是否同意。如果這些事實易於確定，那麼排他權的執行成本就會很低，否則執行成本就會很高。當個人難以確定某項行為是否會越過地塊邊界時，對允許使用的直接監管可能會降低資訊成本，即使它優先於排他權——正如從飛機飛越領空，到石油和天然氣生產，以及城市土地開發等活動所發生的那樣。
Similarly, because owners’ mental states are often difficult to identify, rules conditioning property access on owner consent can impose substantial information costs, which can be reduced by mandating access to property open to the public at large, regardless of owner consent. Information costs do not uniformly support greater exclusion, then, as exclusion’s defenders have argued; rather, those costs sometimes favor restricting it.
同樣地，由於所有者的心理狀態往往難以確認，以所有者同意為條件的財產訪問規則可能會產生大量的資訊成本，而無論所有者是否同意，強制要求向公眾開放財產的訪問許可權可以降低此成本。因此，資訊成本並不像排他權的捍衛者所主張的那樣，一致支援更大的排他權；相反，這些成本有時會傾向於限制排他權。
INTRODUCTION 引言
A central dispute within property theory concerns the proper scope of owners’ authority over their property. Some scholars defend government regulations that directly specify permissible activities—regulations that may sometimes override owners’ prerogatives to determine how their things shall be used. Others, by contrast, emphasize the importance of the right to exclude nonowners from property, which defers to owners’ authority by enforcing their decisions concerning who may use their things.
財產理論中的一個核心爭議涉及所有者對其財產的適當權利範圍。一些學者支援政府直接規定可被允許的活動的法規——這些法規有時可能會優先於所有者決定如何使用其財產的權利。相比之下，另一些人則強調將非所有者排除在財產之外的權利的重要性，該權利透過執行所有者關於誰可以使用其財產的決定來尊重所有者的權利。
The most prominent defenses of exclusion developed in recent years, most notably those presented in the joint and individual writings of Professors Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith, have focused primarily on the information costs of property. No matter which substantive ends property law pursues, Merrill and Smith argue, the individuals bound by property’s rules must bear the costs of learning them. Because simple, standardized rules may be learned more cheaply, the simple and uniform right to exclude—which defers to owners’ authority—imposes lower information costs than more complex rules that displace owners’ authority by directly regulating the activities nonowners may perform on or with property.
近年來，對排他權最突出的辯護是托馬斯·梅里爾和亨利·史密斯教授在其合著與獨著中提出的辯護，這些辯護主要集中在財產的資訊成本上。梅里爾和史密斯認為，無論財產法追求的是哪種實質性目的，受財產規則約束的個人都必須承擔學習這些規則的成本。由於簡單、標準化的規則可能更容易學習，因此簡單統一的排他權（是尊重所有者權利的體現）比更復雜的規則產生的資訊成本更低，因為後者透過直接規範非所有者可能對財產進行的活動或使用財產的活動來取代所有者的權利。
（圖片源於網路）
In this Article, I develop a novel account of the information costs of exclusion in property law. While exclusion theorists take information costs to favor exclusion, I will argue that oftentimes the opposite is true: abrogating owners’ right to exclude and directly regulating permissible activities may lower information costs rather than increasing them.
在這篇文章中，筆者提出了一個關於財產法中排他權資訊成本的新觀點。雖然排他權學者認為資訊成本有利於排他權，但筆者認為情況往往相反：廢除所有者的排他權並直接監管其允許活動可能會降低資訊成本，而非增加資訊成本。
To comply with legal rules, individuals must possess two kinds of information: (1) knowledge of what the rules are and (2) knowledge of how those rules apply to their own conduct. But while the simplicity of the right to exclude may reduce the former costs, which have been the primary focus of exclusion theorists’ analysis, exclusion often increases the latter costs.
為了遵守法律規定，個人必須擁有兩種資訊：（1）知道規則是什麼；（2）知道這些規則如何適用於自己的行為。儘管排他權的簡單特性可能會降低前者的成本，且這也是排他權學者分析的重點，但排他權往往會增加後者的成本。
Under the right to exclude, individuals must keep off property unless the owner permits them to enter. Though this rule is easy to learn, it defines when conduct is permissible in terms of two facts—the location of conduct and the consent of the owner—that in some contexts are difficult to ascertain. When they are, the right to exclude will be costly to apply, despite its simplicity, because of the costs of learning the facts individuals must know in order to apply it. Supplanting exclusion with direct regulation may therefore reduce information costs if those regulations make the permissibility of actions depend on facts that are less costly for individuals to ascertain.
根據排他權，除非所有者允許進入，否則個人必須與財產保持距離。雖然這條規則很容易學習，但它根據行為發生的位置和所有者的同意兩個事實來定義行為何時是被允許的，而這些事實在某些情況下很難確定。當這些事實確定時，儘管排他權很簡單，但由於個人需要了解必須知曉的事實以應用它，因此應用排他權的成本很高。如果這些規定使行為的可允許性取決於個人確定成本較低的事實，那麼用直接監管取代排他權可能會降低資訊成本。
（圖片源於網路）
Part I analyzes the information costs of property. I first distinguish two kinds of information costs created by legal rules governing conduct: the costs of learning those rules and the costs of applying them to determine whether a particular action is permitted. Exclusion theorists, who focus on the former, argue that simple rules produce low information costs because they are easy to learn. I will argue, by contrast, that the costs of learning rules are less important than the costs of applying them: because a rule need be learned only once but must be applied to every action it governs, a difficult-to-apply rule increases the marginal costs that individuals face whenever they act.
第一部分旨在分析財產的資訊成本。首先，筆者區分了由法律規則指導行為所產生的兩種資訊成本：學習這些規則的成本以及應用這些規則來確定特定行為是否被允許的成本。關注前者的排他權學者認為簡單的規則會產生較低的資訊成本，因為它們易於學習。相比之下，筆者認為學習規則的成本不如應用規則的成本重要：因為規則只需要學習一次，但必須應用於它所管轄的每一項行為，因此難以應用的規則會增加個人每當在行動時所面臨的邊際成本。
Rules best reduce application costs not through their simplicity but rather by defining the permissibility of conduct to depend on facts that are easy to ascertain. The cheapest source of information about one’s own conduct, in turn, is one’s own intentions: when we act intentionally, we normally know with no further inquiry that our actions will have the features we intend them to have.
降低規則應用成本的最佳方式不是簡化規則，而是基於易於確定的事實來定義行為的可允許性。反過來，關於個人行為的最便利的資訊來源是個人意圖：當我們有意行動時，我們通常無需進一步探究就知道我們的行為將具有我們打算具有的特徵。
Rules under which the permissibility of conduct depends on its intentionally chosen features may therefore reduce the information costs individuals face by capitalizing on information they already possess. But individuals ordinarily intend different features of their conduct when engaged in different activities. Thus, directly regulating different activities through different rules may reduce total information costs, despite the increased complexity of such rules and the attendant increased costs of learning them.
因此，根據行為可允許性取決於其有意選擇特徵的原則，可以透過利用個人已經擁有的資訊來降低個人面臨的資訊成本。但是，當從事不同的活動時，個人通常會意圖採取不同的行為特徵。故而儘管這些規則的複雜性增加，學習它們的成本也隨之增加，但透過不同的規則直接規範不同的活動可能會降低總的資訊成本。
（圖片源於網路）
After Part I introduces this theoretical explanation of how exclusion can sometimes increase information costs, Parts II and III apply it, each focusing on one of the two facts—whether an action crosses a property boundary and whether the owner consented— that determine whether the right to exclude has been breached.
在第一部分展開介紹排他權有時會增加資訊成本的理論解釋後，第二部分和第三部分將應用這一理論，分別關注以下兩個事實——行為是否跨越了財產邊界以及所有者是否同意——這兩個事實決定了排他權是否被侵犯。
Part II considers boundary crossings. According to exclusion theorists, prohibitions on boundary crossings reduce information costs because of their simplicity. I will instead propose an alternative analysis grounded in application costs. On my view, rules regulating activities by their spatial location often impose low information costs because individuals often choose the spatial locations of their activities intentionally and, therefore, can easily apply rules that regulate conduct based on its location.
第二部分關注的是跨越邊界這一要素。根據排他權學者的觀點，禁止跨越邊界可以降低資訊成本，因為這種做法簡單明瞭。然而，筆者將提出一種基於應用成本的替代分析。在筆者看來，透過空間位置來規範活動的規則通常會帶來較低的資訊成本，因為個人通常會故意選擇活動的空間位置，因此可以輕鬆地應用基於位置來規範行為的規則。
But some activities do not involve intentionally choosing to cross a spatial boundary. Information costs can decline if property displaces the right to exclude in those circumstances and instead regulates those activities through features that their participants typically do intentionally choose, thereby exploiting information—inaccessible to most—that those bound by the rule already possess. Because it can shape the rules regulating an activity based on information participants in that activity possess, direct regulation can sometimes impose lower information costs than the right to exclude.
但是，有些活動並不涉及故意選擇跨越空間邊界。如果財產權在這種情況下取代了排他權，並透過參與者通常有意選擇的特點來規範這些活動，從而利用那些受規則約束的人已經擁有的、大多數人無法獲取的資訊，那麼資訊成本可能會下降。由於直接監管可以根據活動參與者所擁有的資訊來塑造規範活動的規則，因此有時直接監管更能降低資訊成本。
（圖片源於網路）
Having considered the costs of boundary crossings in Part II, I consider owner consent in Part III. Doctrinal disputes over the right to exclude have most often arisen concerning public access to private property, and in those contexts exclusion theorists have generally argued that information costs rise when property law limits owners’ right to exclude specific individuals from property that is otherwise accessible to the public.
在第二部分討論了越界成本後，筆者在第三部分討論了所有者的同意。關於排他權的理論爭議往往出現在進入私人財產的公共渠道的情況下，而在這些情況下，研究排他權的學者們通常認為，當財產法限制所有者將特定個人排除在原本對公眾開放的財產之外時，資訊成本就會上升。
Certainly, a rule forbidding entrance absent owner consent is simple and easy to learn. But I will argue that it is often costly to apply. Because it defines prohibited conduct in terms of owner consent—the mental state of another individual—nonowners cannot apply it without knowing what the owner has consented to. And like many facts about the mental states of others, facts about the owner’s consent will frequently be costly for strangers to ascertain. Such costs may be trivial when property is used chiefly by its owner because strangers will rarely have cause to access the property and thus will rarely bear the costs of investigating the owner’s mind. But if property is generally open to the public, requiring owner consent for entrance will impose often-substantial costs on the public at large.
當然，禁止未經所有者同意進入的規定簡單易學。但筆者認為，實施起來往往成本高昂。因為它以所有者的同意——即另一個人的心理狀態——來定義被禁止的行為，非所有者若不知道所有者同意了什麼，就無法適用這一規定。而且，就像許多關於他人心理狀態的事實一樣，關於所有者同意的事實，陌生人往往需要付出高昂的成本才能確定。如果財產主要由所有者使用，這種成本可能微不足道，因為陌生人很少有理由接觸該財產，因此也很少會承擔調查所有者想法的成本。但如果財產通常向公眾開放，要求所有者同意進入，就會給廣大公眾帶來往往相當大的成本。
Thus, the law reduces information costs by mandating universal access to property that is generally accessible to the public, thereby disallowing owners from imposing individualized, potentially idiosyncratic restrictions on entrance. Since under that rule individuals may access property if it is generally used by the public, they may determine whether a particular action would be permitted so long as they know whether the public may generally access the property they seek to enter—information they ordinarily will already possess. Doctrines that restrict the right to exclude by mandating public access therefore decrease information costs despite the complexity they add to the law.
因此，法律透過強制開放通常向公眾開放的財產以降低資訊成本，從而禁止所有者對進入施加個性化的、可能具有特殊性的限制。根據該規則，如果財產通常由公眾使用，個人就可以進入，只要他們知道公眾是否可以進入他們試圖進入的財產，而這屬於他們通常已經擁有的資訊，他們就可以確定是否允許某一特定行為。因此，限制排他權並強制公眾訪問的理論，儘管增加了法律的複雜性，但確實降低了資訊成本。
In analyzing the information costs of rules that define prohibited conduct in terms of boundary crossings and owner consent, I rely on examples of how property law limits information costs by restricting the right to exclude.
在分析界定禁止越界和所有者同意規則的資訊成本時，筆者依賴於財產法如何透過限制排他權來限制資訊成本的例子。
As those examples will show, the theoretical account I develop of the information costs of exclusion entails practical consequences for the design of property entitlements. The low information costs of applying prohibitions on boundary crossings explain why such prohibitions play a central role in defining rights to land. Those information costs also help to explain why property law has sometimes overridden such prohibitions in regulating activities on land, including airplane overflights, oil and gas production, and urban land development, whose participants ordinarily lack information about whether their conduct will involve crossing parcel boundaries. In such contexts, property law has reduced information costs by redefining owners’ entitlements in terms of facts typically known by nonowners participating in those activities, such as the altitude of flights, the location of wells, and the height and function of buildings.
正如這些例子將展示的那樣，筆者對排他權資訊成本的理論闡述對財產權利的設計產生了實際影響。對越界禁令的低資訊成本解釋了為什麼此類禁令在界定土地權利方面起著核心作用。這些資訊成本也有助於解釋為什麼財產法有時會推翻此類禁令來規範土地活動，包括飛機飛越、石油和天然氣生產以及城市土地開發，這些活動的參與者通常缺乏關於其行為是否會涉及越界地塊邊界的資訊。在這種情況下，財產法透過重新定義所有者的權利，以參與這些活動的非業主通常知道的事實，如飛行高度、井的位置以及建築物的高度和功能，來降低資訊成本。
For example, since property developers already know the intended size and use of the buildings they develop, zoning rules based on building size and function may be applied at no additional cost, while the law of nuisance cannot be applied without additional information about how various possible land uses might cause invasions across parcel boundaries. These examples of how to define property entitlements without relying on parcel boundaries reveal when and why property law can successfully respond to information costs by modulating its reliance on exclusion, not solely by enforcing the right to exclude.
例如，由於房地產開發商已經知道他們開發的建築物的預期大小和用途，因此可以應用基於建築物大小和功能的分割槽規則而無需額外成本，而妨害法則不能在沒有關於各種可能的土地用途如何可能造成越界地塊邊界侵入的額外資訊的情況下應用。這些關於如何在不依賴地塊邊界的情況下定義財產權利的例子揭示了財產法何時以及為何可以透過調節其對排他權的依賴來成功應對資訊成本，而不僅僅是執行排他權。
The practical significance of application costs is even more apparent concerning prohibitions on entering publicly accessible property absent owner consent, which are often fiercely contested by both property theorists and policymakers. Some such rules are no longer controversial—say, the prohibition on racial discrimination in public accommodations—but others remain contentious. Perhaps most prominently, in a line of cases the New Jersey Supreme Court has held that owners of property generally accessible to the public cannot bar particular individuals from engaging in specific activities on that property.
在禁止未經所有者同意接觸公共財產的法規中，應用成本的現實意義更為明顯，這些法規往往受到財產學者和政策制定者的強烈質疑。其中一些規則已不再具有爭議性，例如禁止在公共場所進行種族歧視，但其他規則仍存在爭議。
（圖片源於網路）
Exclusion theorists typically reject rules like New Jersey’s, arguing that information costs weigh decisively against mandating access to private property and in favor of enforcing the right to exclude. Only in rare cases, such as discrimination in public accommodations, do they concede that some limits on exclusion are justified despite any resulting increase in information costs.
最突出的可能是，在新澤西州最高法院在一系列案件中裁定中所體現的那樣，通常向公眾開放的財產的所有者不能禁止特定個人在該財產上進行特定活動。排他權學者們反對新澤西州及類似規則，他們認為資訊成本對強制進入私人財產具有決定性的負面影響，而支援執行排他權。只有在極少數情況下，例如在公共場所的歧視，他們才會承認，儘管資訊成本增加，但對排他權的一些限制仍然是合理的。
By contrast, I will argue that mandating public access to publicly accessible private property can allow individuals to avoid the costs of ascertaining the scope of owner consent, which they would face when applying the right to exclude to govern their own conduct. In particular, this argument will generate a novel defense, grounded in information costs, for the New Jersey decisions—an argument, I will suggest, that in fact better tracks the reasoning that the court itself employed in justifying its holdings. And that argument suggests that information costs can cut both ways in contentious debates over public access to private property, rather than always favoring exclusion.
相比之下，筆者認為，強制公眾進入可公開訪問的私人財產，可以讓個人避免確定所有者同意範圍的成本，而當他們試圖利用排他權來管理自己的行為時，他們將面臨這一成本。特別是，這一論點將為新澤西州的裁決提供一種基於資訊成本的新辯護——筆者認為，這一論點實際上更好地回應了法院在證明其裁決合理時所採用的推理。這一論點表明，在關於公眾進入私人財產的爭議性辯論中，資訊成本可能具有雙重作用，而不僅僅是支援排他權。
CONCLUSION 結論
Any one individual’s autonomy must be limited by the rights of others; though we are each given a broad freedom to act, we cannot cross the boundaries that protect others from our conduct. But determining where those boundaries lie is often difficult: individuals ought not interfere unreasonably with the interests of others, but it is often very unclear just which actions actually constitute such interference and thus must be avoided. That question must somehow be answered if individuals are to know what to do.
任何人的自治權都必須受到他人權利的限制；儘管我們每個人都有廣泛的行動自由，但我們不能越過保護他人免受我們行為影響的界限。然而，確定這些界限在何處往往是一件困難的事：個人不應無理干涉他人的利益，但哪些行為實際上構成了這種干涉從而必須被避免，這一點往往非常不明確。如果個人要知道該怎麼做，這一問題就必須以某種方式被回答。
On one approach, the law might delegate that task to individuals themselves, who would thereby be forced to determine which actions do interfere with the interests of others. Because it is often difficult to acquire information about the nature of others’ interests and their susceptibility to harm, though, this approach would impose considerable information costs on ordinary individuals.
一種方法是，法律可以將這項任務委託給個人自己，從而促使他們確定哪些行為確實干涉了他人利益。然而，由於獲取有關他人利益性質及其易受傷害性的資訊往往很困難，這種方法會給普通個人帶來相當大的資訊成本。
Alternatively, if the law seeks to limit those information costs, it could instead itself identify the limits on the permissible range of individuals’ conduct. On that approach, the state would bear information costs that might otherwise be left for individuals to pay. But this approach involves a state that is far more active in directly regulating individual conduct: if the state itself determines which actions impermissibly threaten the interests of others, then it will enact detailed rules that specify precisely which actions, in which contexts, are prohibited.
另一種方法是，如果法律試圖限制這些資訊成本，它也可以自行確定個人行為允許範圍的界限。在這種方法中，國家將承擔資訊成本，否則這些成本可能會由個人支付。但這種方法需要一個在直接監管個人行為方面更為活躍的國家：如果國家自己確定哪些行為不允許威脅他人利益，那麼它將制定詳細的規則，明確規定在哪些情況下禁止哪些行為。
If the state does aim to reduce information costs by itself determining which particular actions are permitted, then the rules it produces must be applicable to individuals’ conduct without further inquiry.
如果國家確實旨在透過自行決定允許哪些特定行為來降低資訊成本，那麼它所制定的規則必須適用於個人的行為，而無需進一步調查。
（圖片源於網路）
Such rules, I have argued, should prohibit conduct based on information individuals already possess—namely, information about the intentionally chosen features of their conduct. This account explains both the advantages and the limits of the right to exclude. Participants in many activities choose their spatial location, but in some activities participants do not; securing owner consent may often be unimportant or easy, but not when the public at large accesses private property. To regulate behavior in these contexts by requiring individuals to keep off absent owner consent would impose considerable information costs, making such activities impractical or even impossible. Rather, participants in such activities require rules that efficiently clarify their obligations.
筆者認為，這樣的規則應該禁止基於個人已經擁有的資訊，即關於他們行為中故意選擇的特徵的資訊的行為。這一解釋既說明了排他權的優勢，也說明了其侷限性。許多活動的參與者會選擇他們的空間位置，但在某些活動中，參與者不會選擇；獲取所有者同意可能通常不重要或容易，但當廣大公眾進入私人財產時則不然。透過要求個人在缺少所有者同意的情況下保持距離以規範這些環境中的行為，將產生相當大的資訊成本，使這些活動變得不切實際甚至不可能。相反，這些活動的參與者需要有效澄清其義務的規則。
Reducing the information costs of property is a task for an active state, not a passive one: when it is unclear whether particular actions would cross boundaries or contravene an owner’s consent, the state must itself actively provide more complex rules that more clearly identify which actions are permitted or prohibited.
降低財產的資訊成本是積極國家的任務，而不是消極國家的任務：當不清楚特定行為是否會越界或違反所有者的同意時，國家必須自己積極提供更復雜的規則，更明確地識別哪些行為是被允許或禁止的。
原文連結：
https://lawreview.uchicago.edu/print-archive/information-costs-exclusion