譯者｜黃逸凡 北京大學法律碩士
一審｜peipei 布里斯托大學LL.M
二審｜應 寧 同濟大學法律碩士
編輯｜高藝芸 西北政法大學本科
責編｜劉一賢 國際關係學院本科
The Dispute Over Whistleblower Eligibility
in Securities Enforcement:
Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers
證券執法中“吹哨人”資格之爭：
數字房地產信託公司訴薩默斯案
I. SUMMARY 總結
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 protected whistleblowers reporting criminal fraud, SEC rules, or federal fraud laws. The 2010 Dodd-Frank Act provided narrower protection, defining whistleblowers as those reporting securities law violations to the SEC. SEC rules offered anti-retaliation protection if the whistleblower reasonably believed the information related to a securities violation, including disclosures required or protected by law.
對於舉報刑事欺詐行為、涉證券交易委員會（SEC）規則欺詐行為、違反聯邦反欺詐法規行為的舉報人，2002年薩班斯-奧克斯利法案（Sarbanes-Oxley Act）保護其免受報復。同時，2010年多德-弗蘭克華爾街改革和消費者保護法案（Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act）也包含了對舉報人的反報復保護（“吹哨人條款”[1]）。然而，多德-弗蘭克法案對舉報人的定義更為狹窄，將其定義為“向SEC舉報違反證券法的主體”。但是，根據SEC的規則，如果舉報人合理認為所提供的資訊（包括受到法律要求或保護的披露行為）與證券法違法行為有關，則有權獲得反報復保護。
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Paul Somers, a former Digital Realty Trust, Inc. employee, sued the company under Dodd-Frank, claiming he was fired for informing management of securities law violations. Digital Realty sought to dismiss the case, arguing Somers wasn't a whistleblower since he didn't report to the SEC. The district court denied the motion, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, granting the SEC Chevron deference on its rules. The Supreme Court reviewed the case. Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court.
Paul Somers（原告）曾是Digital Realty Trust, Inc.（被告）的員工。原告根據多德-弗蘭克法案的“吹哨人條款”起訴被告，聲稱其因向管理層舉報被告違反證券法而被解僱。被告試圖要求法院駁回此案，主張原告因沒有向SEC提供資訊而不具備多德-弗蘭克法案下的舉報人資格。地區法院駁回了該抗辯。第九巡迴上訴法院維持了原判，認為SEC的規定體現了對Chevron原則[2]的尊重。最高法院重新審理了本案。 金斯伯格大法官發表了法院的意見。
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II. Opinion 法院意見
A
Statutory Interpretation
法律解釋
Justice Ginsburg emphasized that the Court must follow the explicit definition provided in a statute. According to Dodd-Frank, a "whistleblower" is defined as an individual who provides information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the SEC. This definition must be applied throughout §78u–6, including the anti-retaliation provision in § 78u–6(h).
金斯伯格大法官強調，法院必須遵循法規規定的明確定義。根據多德-弗蘭克法案，“舉報人”被定義為向SEC提供證券法違法行為相關資訊的個人。這一定義必須適用於整個《1934年證券交易法》第u-6節（“第u-6節”[3]），包括第u-6節第h條中的反報復條款。
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The Court interpreted the term "whistleblower" in § 78u–6(h) to align with the definition in § 78u–6(a)(6). For an individual to be protected under Dodd-Frank's anti-retaliation provision, they must provide information "to the Commission" (the SEC). Those who do not meet this criterion are ineligible to seek redress under the statute, regardless of their other actions.
法院將第u-6節第h條中的“舉報人”一詞解釋為與第u-6節第a條第6款中的定義一致，即舉報人必須向SEC舉報才能獲得多德-弗蘭克法案的反報復條款的保護。不滿足這一標準的個人，無論其採取了其他什麼行動，都沒有資格根據該法規尋求救濟。
B
Purpose and Design
立法意旨
The opinion highlighted that the core objective of Dodd-Frank's whistleblower program is to motivate people with knowledge of securities law violations to report to the SEC. The protections against retaliation are designed to encourage this reporting and complement the financial incentives provided for SEC reporting.
法院強調了多德-弗蘭克法案中“吹哨人”保護制度的核心目標是激勵那些獲悉證券法違法行為的知情人向SEC舉報。防止報復的保護措施旨在鼓勵這種舉報行為，同時為舉報人提供物質激勵。
Justice Ginsburg rejected the argument that the definition of "whistleblower" should apply only to the award program and not to the anti-retaliation provision. She maintained that the statutory text clearly includes the reporting requirement for the anti-retaliation protections.
金斯伯格大法官駁回了“舉報人”的定義只應適用於獎勵計劃而不適用於反報復條款的論點。她堅持認為，法規文字清楚地包含了反報復保護的報告要求。
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C
Consequences of the Statutory Definition
釋法效應
The Court acknowledged that applying the statutory definition would shield fewer individuals from retaliation compared to alternative interpretations. However, Justice Ginsburg argued that this outcome is consistent with Congress's intent to encourage reporting to the SEC and does not render any part of the statute absurd or without meaning.
法院承認，與其他可選擇的解釋相比，適用法律字面的定義只能保護較少的人免受報復。然而，金斯伯格大法官認為，這一結果與國會鼓勵向SEC舉報的意圖一致，並不會使得法規的任何部分變得荒謬或毫無意義。
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The Court declined to defer to the SEC's broader interpretation of "whistleblower" in Rule 21F–2, stating that the statute's clear definition precludes the SEC from expanding the term beyond its statutory meaning. According to the Court, when a statute includes an explicit definition, it must be followed, and courts are not at liberty to dispense with the conditions that Congress has imposed.
法院拒絕接受SEC在規則21F-2[4]中對“舉報人”更廣泛的定義，指出法規的明確定義不允許SEC將該術語的含義擴充套件到其法定含義之外。根據法院的說理，當一項法規包含了明確的定義時，必須遵循這一定義，法院無權超越國會所設定的條件。
III. Conclusion 結論
In conclusion, Justice Ginsburg's opinion held that, to qualify as a whistleblower under Dodd-Frank's anti-retaliation provision, an individual must report suspected securities law violations to the SEC. This ruling limited the protections available to whistleblowers who only report internally or to entities other than the SEC.
總結來說，金斯伯格大法官的意見認為，要符合多德-弗蘭克法案反報復條款下的舉報人資格，個人必須向SEC報告疑似違反證券法律的行為。這一裁決限制了僅向內部舉報或向SEC以外的實體舉報的舉報人可獲得的保護。
IV. Concurring Opinion 附議意見
A
Concurring Opinion of Justice Sotomayor
索托馬約爾大法官的附議意見
Justice Sotomayor joined the majority opinion fully but wrote separately to express her disagreement with the notion that a Senate Report or legislative history should not be considered when interpreting a statute.
索托馬約爾大法官完全同意多數意見，但單獨撰寫意見書以表達她不同意參議院報告或立法歷史在解釋法規時不應被考慮的觀點。
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She emphasized that legislative history, particularly committee reports, can be a reliable source for understanding Congress's intent and should be considered, especially when it comes to complex matters or when a statute's text is ambiguous.
她強調，立法歷史，特別是委員會報告，可以是理解國會立法意圖的可靠來源，應該被考慮，特別是在涉及複雜問題或法規文字含糊不清時。
Sotomayor argued that legislative history can help corroborate and fortify the Court's understanding of the statutory text and that it shows respect for and promotes comity with Congress, a coequal branch of government.
索托馬約爾大法官認為，立法歷史可以確證和鞏固法院對法規文字的理解，並且表現出對國會這個平等政府部門的尊重，並促進與其之間的和諧關係。
B
Concurring Opinion of Justice Thomas
托馬斯大法官的附議意見
Justice Thomas concurred with the Court's decision based solely on the text of the Dodd-Frank Act.
托馬斯大法官僅基於多德-弗蘭克法案的文字而同意法院的判決。
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He did not join the parts of the majority opinion that relied on the Senate Report or legislative history to determine the intent of Congress, arguing that the statute's text was clear and unambiguous.
他並沒有認同多數意見中依賴參議院報告或立法歷史來確定國會立法意圖的部分，他認為該法案的文字清晰且明確，無需額外解釋。
Justice Thomas expressed skepticism about the reliability of committee reports as a source for discerning Congress's intent, citing the fact that these reports are not voted on by Congress and may not reflect the views of all members.
托馬斯大法官對委員會報告作為判斷國會意圖的可靠性表示懷疑，他指出這些報告並非由國會投票透過，可能無法反映所有議員的觀點。
He maintained that the Court should focus on the statutory text and not consider legislative history, especially when the law's meaning is clear from the text itself.
他堅持認為，法院應該專注於法規文字，而不考慮立法歷史，特別是當法律文字的含義已然明確的情況下。
譯者注
[1] 譯者注。
[2] 譯者注：美國最高法院在1984年的一個具有里程碑意義的案例——Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.中確立了Chevron原則，即當一個聯邦法律條文不夠明確，以至於法院無法確定國會的具體意圖時，法院應當尊重負責執行該法律的行政機構對該法律的合理解釋。這一原則於2024年6月28日被美國最高法院在Loper BrightEnterprises v. Raimondo and Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce案的判決中推翻，美國聯邦行政機構解釋其所執行的監管法的權力被大幅削減。
[3] 譯者注。
[4] 譯者注：SEC Rule 21F-2是SEC根據多德-弗蘭克法案制定的一條規則。其目的是實施多德-弗蘭克法案中關於舉報人的條款，確保那些揭露證券違規行為的人能夠得到法律的保護，並在符合條件時獲得獎勵。這個規則是SEC執行多德-弗蘭克法案相關條款的關鍵工具之一。
原文連結：
[1]https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/preliminaryprint/583US2PP_final.pdf#page=199
[2]https://www.quimbee.com/cases/digital-realty-trust-inc-v-somers
