譯者 | 霍秋璇 西南政法大學 LLB
一審 | 李梓源 英國布里斯托大學 LL.M.
二審 | 田昕琪 英國布里斯托大學 MA Law
編輯 | 馬語謙 武漢理工大學
扎恩哈爾 新疆農業大學
責編 | 劉一賢 國際關係學院
Mihaljević v. Croatia:Abuse of Rights and Nationality Planning by Natural Persons
Mihaljević訴克羅埃西亞案：自然人濫用權利和國籍規劃
Javier Garcia Olmedo
一、 介紹
This case comment examines the 19 May 2023 Award and Concurring Opinion in Mihaljević v. Croatia, a dispute submitted to ICSID by Mr Marko Mihaljević (the Claimant) under the Croatia–Germany bilateral investment treaty (BIT). Croatia challenged the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, arguing that the Claimant did not comply with the requirements of Article 25 of the ICSID Convention. As part of this objection, Croatia averred that the Claimant had consented to ICSID arbitration when he gave his Notice of Dispute to Croatia. The State then argued that, on the date of consent and at the time of the registration of the request for arbitration, the Claimant was a citizen of Croatia. As such, Croatia concluded, the Claimant did not qualify as a ‘national’ of another Contracting State for the purposes of Article 25(2)(a) of the ICSID Convention. Croatia also objected to jurisdiction on the ground that the Claimant committed an abuse of process (or abuse of rights) by attempting to revoke his host State nationality after the dispute had arisen, with the sole purpose of circumventing ICSID’s host State nationality restriction.
本案例評論審查了2023年5月19日Mihaljević v. Croatia案的裁決和協同意見書，該爭議由Marko Mihaljević先生（申請人）根據《克羅埃西亞-德國雙邊投資條約（以下簡稱“BIT”）》提交給International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes（國際投資爭端解決中心，以下簡稱“ICSID”）。克羅埃西亞對仲裁庭的管轄權提出異議，認為申請人沒有遵守《解決國家和他國國民之間投資爭端公約》（以下簡稱“《ICSID公約》”）第25條的要求。作為反對意見的一部分，克羅埃西亞主張，申請人在向克羅埃西亞發出爭議通知時已同意接受國際投資爭端解決中心的仲裁。克羅埃西亞繼續辯稱，申請人在同意之日和登記仲裁請求之時是克羅埃西亞公民。因此，克羅埃西亞得出結論，就《ICSID公約》第25(2)(a)條而言，申請人不符合另一締約國“國民”的條件。克羅埃西亞反對管轄權的另一理由是申請人濫用程式（或濫用權利），在爭端發生後試圖取消其東道國國籍，其唯一目的是規避ICSID的東道國國籍限制。
Although the Tribunal did not address Croatia’s position on the issue of consent, it declined jurisdiction on the basis that the Claimant was a Croatian citizen at the relevant times for assessing nationality under Article 25(2)(a). The Tribunal also considered it unnecessary to rule on Croatia’s abuse of rights objection, given its decision on the Claimant’s nationality status and eligibility. However, one of the arbitrators, Ms María Vicien-Milburn, issued a Concurring Opinion in which she observed that, even if the Tribunal had upheld its jurisdiction under the ICSID Convention, the way in which the Claimant instituted the arbitration constituted an abuse of process requiring the dismissal of all his claims.
儘管仲裁庭沒有討論克羅埃西亞在同意問題上的立場，但仲裁庭拒絕給予管轄權，理由是根據第25(2)(a)條評估國籍時，申請人是克羅埃西亞公民。仲裁庭還認為，鑑於其關於申請人國籍地位和資格的決定，沒有必要對克羅埃西亞濫用權利的反對意見做出裁決。然而，仲裁員之一，María Vicien-Milburn女士發表了一份協同意見，她在意見中指出，即使仲裁庭根據《ICSID公約》支援了其的管轄權，申請人提起仲裁的方式也構成了濫用程式，因此需要駁回其所有請求。
Mihaljević v Croatia is one of several recent cases where tribunals have encountered abuse of rights objections involving claims by individual investors. This case, however, stands out on several fronts. Principally, it is striking because of the tactics employed by the Claimant to divest himself of his Croatian nationality after submitting a Notice of Dispute and even after he had filed a request for arbitration in order to bring a claim before the Tribunal. In addition, this is the first time a tribunal has faced an abuse of rights objection concerning the renunciation, rather than the acquisition, of a nationality to obtain investment protection. Another noteworthy aspect of the case is the Concurring Opinion, for it offers valuable insight into the role of the abuse of rights doctrine outside the specific context of corporate restructuring.
Mihaljević訴克羅埃西亞案是仲裁庭最近遇到濫用權利的異議案件之一，其涉及個人投資者的索賠。不過，該案在幾個方面都很突出。它之所以引人注目，主要是因為申請人在提交爭議通知後，甚至他提交仲裁請求以便向仲裁庭提出索賠後，採取了放棄其克羅埃西亞國籍的策略。此外，這是仲裁庭首次面對關於放棄而非獲得國籍以獲得投資保護的濫用權利異議。該案另一個值得注意的方面是協同意見，它對濫用權利理論在公司重組特定背景之外的作用提供了寶貴的見解。
This case comment analyses the Award and Concurring Opinion and seeks to place them within the broader context of the jurisprudence on nationality planning. It begins by setting out the facts that prompted Croatia to challenge jurisdiction and the parties’ arguments. It then covers the Tribunal’s findings, followed by an examination of the Concurring Opinion. The case comment concludes by providing some observations on the Tribunal’s reluctance to address Croatia’s abuse of rights objection.
本案例評論分析了裁決和協同意見，並試圖將其置於國籍規劃判例的更廣泛背景下。本評論首先闡述了促使克羅埃西亞對管轄權提出異議的事實以及雙方的論點。然後介紹了仲裁庭的調查結果，接著審查了協同意見。案例評論最後就仲裁庭不願處理克羅埃西亞針對濫用權利提出的反對意見提出了一些看法。
（圖片源自網路）
二、背景和各方立場
A. The Facts Prompting Croatia’s Objections
A. 促使克羅埃西亞反對的事實
By letter of 6 February 2019, the Claimant gave his Notice of Dispute to Croatia (with the English translation sent on 11 March 2019). The letter was entitled ‘Notice of Dispute and Acceptance of Offer to Arbitrate Disputes under the Germany–Croatia Bilateral Investment Treaty’.
申請人於2019年2月6日致函克羅埃西亞發出爭議通知（英文譯文於2019年3月11日發出）。這函件的標題是“根據《德國-克羅埃西亞雙邊投資協定》提交的爭議通知和接受爭議仲裁的要約”。
On 18 October 2019, the Claimant filed a request for arbitration (First Request) pursuant to the BIT and the ICSID Convention. It was common ground that, on the date of the Notice of Dispute and of the First Request, the Claimant was a dual national of Germany and Croatia. The ICSID Convention contains a clear rule excluding individual claimants who also hold the nationality of the host State. Article 25(2)(a) provides that the Convention does not cover any person who had the nationality of the ‘State party to the dispute on the date on which the parties consented to submit such dispute to conciliation or arbitration as well as on the date on which the request was registered’. It goes without saying that this ‘negative’ nationality requirement placed the Claimant in a difficult position given his status as a Croatian national.
2019年10月18日，申請人根據《雙邊投資條約》和《ICSID公約》提出仲裁請求（第一份請求）。一個正常的情況是，在爭議通知和第一份請求書發出之日，申請人具有德國和克羅埃西亞雙重國籍。《ICSID公約》載有一項明確的規則，將同時擁有東道國國籍的個人申請人排除在外。第25(2)(a)條規定，《ICSID公約》不適用於“在雙方同意將爭端交付調停或仲裁之日以及將請求予以登記之日具有爭端當事國國籍”的人。很明顯，鑑於申請人的克羅埃西亞國民身份，這一“消極”國籍要求使其陷入困境。
On 14 November 2019, the Claimant withdrew his First Request. In a letter entitled ‘Reaffirmation of Acceptance of Offer to Arbitrate Disputes under the Germany–Croatia Bilateral Investment Treaty’, the Claimant’s counsel notified the president of Croatia that the First Request ‘was ultimately withdrawn on account of Article 25(2)(a) of the ICSID Convention upon the Claimant coming to understand that he potentially could be deemed a dual national of Germany and Croatia’. The Claimant’s counsel also informed the president that, on 5 November 2019, the Claimant ‘appeared before the Croatian Interior Ministry in Zagreb and formally renounced his Croatian citizenship’ and that, accordingly, ICSID’s negative nationality requirement was satisfied as of that date. The letter was followed by the filing of a second request for arbitration (Request for Arbitration) on 6 December 2019. The Request for Arbitration was registered by ICSID on 31 December 2019.
2019年11月14日，申請人撤回其第一份請求。在一封題為“重申依據《德國-克羅埃西亞雙邊投資條約》接受爭議仲裁的要約”的信中，申請人的律師通知克羅埃西亞總統，“根據《ICSID公約》第25(2)(a)條，在申請人瞭解到他有可能被視為德國和克羅埃西亞的雙重國籍時，最終撤回了第一份請求”。申請人的律師還告知克羅埃西亞總統，2019年11月5日，申請人‘前往薩格勒布的克羅埃西亞內政部，正式放棄其克羅埃西亞公民身份’，因此，自該日起，ICSID的消極國籍要求得到滿足。隨後，申請人於2019年12月6日提交了第二份仲裁請求（仲裁請求）。ICSID於2019年12月31日登記了該仲裁請求。
B. The Parties’ Positions
B.雙方立場
Against this background, Croatia argued that the Claimant did not qualify as a ‘national’ of another Contracting State under Article 25(2)(a) because he held the citizenship of Croatia ‘(a) at the time when he consented to ICSID arbitration and (b) at the time of the registration of the Request for Arbitration’. As to the first requisite date, Croatia argued that the Claimant consented to ICSID arbitration on 11 March 2019, when he submitted his Notice of Dispute accepting the State’s offer to arbitrate. In support of this argument, Croatia submitted a legal opinion by Prof Christoph Schreuer, who observed that ‘the consent in writing that the Claimant gave in his Notice of Dispute, accepting the Respondent’s offer of ICSID arbitration in the BIT, constituted consent for the purposes of Article 25 of the ICSID Convention, and his nationality is determined as of that date’. As previously mentioned, it was undisputed that the Claimant was a Croatian national on 11 March 2019. According to Croatia, although this nationality status forced him to refile a request for arbitration ‘reaffirming’ his acceptance of Croatia’s offer to arbitrate, ‘his act of giving consent in writing, in March 2019, cannot be “simply disregarded as if it never happened”, nor can it “be later cured by a revocation of Croatian nationality in an attempt to gain access to ICSID arbitration in a circumvention of its rules”’.
在此背景下，克羅埃西亞辯稱，根據第25(2)(a)條，申請人不符合另一締約國“國民”的條件，因為他“(a)在同意ICSID仲裁時和(b)在登記仲裁請求時”擁有克羅埃西亞國籍。關於第一個必要日期，克羅埃西亞辯稱，申請人於2019年3月11日同意ICSID仲裁，當時他提交了爭議通知書，接受了國家的仲裁提議。為支援這一論點，克羅埃西亞提交了Christoph Schreuer教授的法律意見，他認為“申請人在其爭議通知書中書面同意接受被申請人在雙邊投資條約中提出的ICSID仲裁提議，構成了《ICSID公約》第25條所指的同意，其國籍自該日起確定”。如前所述，申請人在2019年3月11日是克羅埃西亞國民，這一點毋庸置疑。克羅埃西亞認為，雖然這一國籍身份迫使他重新提交仲裁請求，“重申”他接受克羅埃西亞的仲裁提議，但“他在2019年3月以書面形式表示同意的行為不能被簡單地視為從未發生過而不予考慮”，也不能“事後透過撤銷克羅埃西亞國籍以試圖規避ICSID的仲裁規則而得到補救”。
As to the second relevant date, Croatia contended that the Claimant was also a Croatian national when ICSID registered the Request for Arbitration on 31 December 2019. It was Croatia’s position, therefore, that the Claimant did not validly renounce his Croatian nationality on 5 November 2019. According to Croatia, the Claimant applied to ‘discharge’, rather than to ‘renounce’, his Croatian citizenship before the Ministry of the Interior, an application that was ‘only effective on 18 May 2020, when he was served with the approval of his request for discharge’.
關於第二個相關日期，克羅埃西亞辯稱，當ICSID於2019年12月31日登記仲裁申請時，申請人也是克羅埃西亞國民。因此，克羅埃西亞的立場是，申請人在2019年11月5日沒有有效放棄克羅埃西亞國籍。據克羅埃西亞稱，申請人向內政部申請“解除”而非“放棄”其克羅埃西亞國籍，該申請“僅於2020年5月18日生效，是他收到解除國籍申請的批准書之日”。
Croatia also challenged the Tribunal’s jurisdiction on the ground that the Claimant’s attempt to relinquish his host State nationality with the aim of ‘manufactur[ing]’ ICSID jurisdiction after filing the Notice of Dispute and the Request for Arbitration constituted a ‘manifest abuse of process’. Croatia relied on the approach taken by tribunals that have applied the abuse of process doctrine when an investor changed its corporate structure to gain the protection of an investment treaty after the dispute arose or was foreseeable. In his Legal Opinion, Prof Schreuer also supported Croatia’s argument, observing that the ‘policy considerations’ that have led arbitrators to decline jurisdiction in cases involving abusive corporate restructurings ‘apply with equal force to the manipulation of the nationality of individuals’.
克羅埃西亞還對仲裁庭的管轄權提出質疑，理由是申請人在提交爭議通知和仲裁 請求後試圖放棄東道國國籍，目的是“製造”ICSID的管轄權，這構成了“明顯濫用程式”。克羅埃西亞依據的是在爭端發生後或可預見的情況下，當投資者改變其公司結構以獲得投資條約的保護時，仲裁庭所採取的適用濫用程式原則的方法。Schreuer教授在其法律意見中也支援克羅埃西亞的論點，他指出，導致仲裁員拒絕對涉及濫用公司重組的案件行使管轄權的“政策考慮”“同樣適用於操縱個人國籍”的案件。
In response to Croatia’s objections, the Claimant first argued that the date of consent to assess nationality under Article 25(2)(a) should be the date by which the conditions for jurisdiction ratione personae are met. Accordingly, the date of consent in this case could only be the date of the Request for Arbitration (14 November 2019), for he was no longer a host State national and therefore satisfied ICSID’s jurisdictional requirements. The Claimant’s position was, consequently, that his application before the Croatian Ministry of the Interior on 5 November 2019 had the effect of an immediate revocation of his Croatian citizenship. In other words, according to the Claimant, the filing of the Notice of Dispute was a ‘defective’ attempt to consent to ICSID arbitration, which did not prevent him from ‘perfecting’ consent through the Request for Arbitration. It follows that, in the Claimant’s view, he was not a host State national when ICSID registered the Request for Arbitration on 31 December 2019. Accordingly, the Claimant satisfied the ‘negative’ test under Article 25(2)(a).
針對克羅埃西亞的反對意見，申請人首先辯稱，同意根據第25(2)(a)條評估國籍的日期應為滿足屬人管轄權條件的日期。因此，本案中的同意日期只能是仲裁請求日期（2019年11月14日），此時他不再是東道國國民，故滿足了ICSID的管轄權要求。因此，申請人的立場是，他於2019年11月5日向克羅埃西亞內政部提出的申請具有立即撤銷其克羅埃西亞公民身份的效力。換言之，根據申請人的說法，提交爭議通知是同意ICSID仲裁的“有缺陷”的嘗試，這並不妨礙他透過仲裁請求“完善”同意。因此，申請人認為，當ICSID於2019年12月31日登記仲裁請求時，他不是東道國國民。因此，申請人符合第25(2)(a)條規定的“消極”檢驗標準。
As for Croatia’s abuse of process objection, the Claimant argued that there was no room for applying the abuse of process doctrine. The decisions relied on by Croatia, he claimed, did not ‘involve relinquishment of nationality’ but rather the ‘acquisition of a new [corporate] nationality for “purposes of creating jurisdiction over the dispute”’. He emphasized that ‘there is a significant difference between revocation of nationality and acquisition of nationality’. The Claimant, nonetheless, acknowledged that he had revoked his Croatian nationality to ‘remove a procedural obstacle’ established in the ICSID Convention. In his view, however, ‘there [was] nothing abusive about such an action’.
關於克羅埃西亞濫用程式的反對意見，申請人認為，沒有適用濫用程式原則的餘地。他聲稱，克羅埃西亞所依據的裁決並不“涉及放棄國籍”，而是“‘為了對爭端產生管轄權’而取得新的[公司]國籍”。他強調說，“取消國籍和取得國籍之間有很大區別”。儘管如此，申請人承認，他取消克羅埃西亞國籍是為了“消除”《ICSID公約》規定的“程式性障礙”。但他認為，“這種行為沒有任何濫用”。
三、仲裁庭的調查結果
The Tribunal first examined the parties’ positions on Article 25(2)(a). For the Tribunal, ‘the critical enquiry [was] the question of when the Claimant ceased to be a Croatian national’. The Tribunal noted that this question was chiefly governed by Croatian law. In its analysis, the Tribunal relied on the report submitted by Croatia’s expert, Dr Sanja Otocan, which was not disputed by the parties. According to her report, Croatian law provides two methods of relinquishing citizenship: ‘discharge’ and ‘renunciation’. The Tribunal highlighted the crucial difference between these two mechanisms, which lies in ‘the effective date of the relinquishing of citizenship’. In case of a discharge, the loss of Croatian citizenship is effective upon a decision to that effect from the Ministry of the Interior. In case of renunciation, the loss of nationality is effective from the date a declaration on the renunciation of Croatian citizenship is submitted to, and approved by, the Ministry of the Interior.
仲裁庭首先審查了雙方關於第25(2)(a)條的立場。仲裁庭認為，“關鍵問題[是]申請人何時不再是克羅埃西亞國民”。仲裁庭指出，這個問題主要適用於克羅埃西亞法律。仲裁庭在分析時依據的是克羅埃西亞專家Sanja Otocan博士提交的報告，雙方對此沒有爭議。根據她的報告，克羅埃西亞法律規定了兩種放棄國籍的方法：“解除”（discharge）和“放棄”（renunciation）。仲裁庭強調了這兩種機制的關鍵區別在於“放棄國籍的生效日期”。在解除國籍的情況下，克羅埃西亞公民身份的喪失在內政部作出相關決定後生效。在放棄國籍的情況下，國籍的喪失自向內政部提交放棄克羅埃西亞公民身份宣告並經內政部獲得批准之日起生效。
Turning to the facts, the Tribunal found that ‘the Claimant had clearly and consistently requested a discharge of citizenship from the Croatian authorities on 5 November 2019’. The evidence also indicated that the Claimant’s request for discharge was approved on 30 April 2020 and delivered to his designated legal representative on 18 May 2020. Accordingly, the Tribunal concluded that, pursuant to Croatian law, he ceased to be a Croatian national as of 18 May 2020. Based on these conclusions, the Tribunal considered ‘it unnecessary to express a definitive view on the date of consent for the purposes of Article 25(2)(a)’ given that ‘the Claimant remained a Croatian national on the date the Request for Arbitration was registered’. The Tribunal ruled that the Claimant did not satisfy ICSID’s rationae personae requirements and declined jurisdiction.
關於事實，仲裁庭認為，“申請人於2019年11月5日明確並一致地要求克羅埃西亞當局解除國籍”。證據還表明，申請人的解除國籍申請於2020年4月30日獲得批准，並於2020年5月18日送交其指定的法律代表。因此，仲裁庭得出結論，根據克羅埃西亞法律，他自2020年5月18日起不再是克羅埃西亞國民。基於這些結論，仲裁庭認為“鑑於‘在仲裁請求登記之日，申請人仍為克羅埃西亞國民’，‘就第25(2)(a)條而言，沒有必要就同意日期發表明確意見’”。仲裁庭裁定，申請人不符合ICSID的屬人管轄要求，因此拒絕給予管轄權。
As to Croatia’s abuse of process objection, the Tribunal stated that it was ‘troubled by the Claimant’s conduct’. Nevertheless, the Tribunal did not ‘consider it necessary to rule on whether [his] claim was an abuse of process in light of [its] decision to decline jurisdiction’ on the basis of the Claimant’s nationality status. Yet, as the Tribunal noted, ‘the facts strongly suggest[ed] that the sole reason for the Claimant’s application to relinquish his citizenship was so that he could pursue arbitration against the Respondent’. The Claimant himself admitted that he attempted to revoke his host State nationality to ‘remove [the] procedural obstacle’ posed by Article 25(2)(a). This prompted arbitrator Ms Vicien-Milburn to address the question of abuse of process in a Concurring Opinion.
至於克羅埃西亞濫用程式的反對意見，仲裁庭指出，它“對申請人的行為感到不安”。然而，仲裁庭“認為鑑於[其]拒絕管轄權的決定，沒有必要‘根據申請人的國籍身份’裁定[其]申訴是否濫用程式”。然而，正如仲裁庭所指出的，“事實有力地表明，申請人申請放棄國籍的唯一原因是為了能夠對被申請人提起仲裁”。申請人自己也承認，他試圖取消東道國國籍是為了“消除”第25(2)(a)條所造成的“程式性障礙”。這促使仲裁員Vicien-Milburn女士在協同意見中討論了濫用程式的問題。
（圖片源自網路）
四、協同意見
Ms Vicien-Milburn began her analysis by emphasizing that the sole motive behind the Claimant’s intent to renounce his Croatian nationality was to access the ICSID Convention. She then noted that, to her knowledge, this is the first time an investment tribunal was faced with the question ‘whether it constitutes an abuse of process for a claimant to renounce nationality in order to gain access to international arbitration’. Abuse of process objections have, indeed, mainly focused on the acquisition of nationality through corporate restructuring. This is unsurprising since legal persons are the most frequent claimants in the field. In her view, however, the abuse of process doctrine can cover other situations. She cited the Tribunal in Orascom v. Algeria, which observed that ‘as a “general principle applicable in international law as well as in municipal law”, the prohibition of abuse of rights may equally apply in contexts other than’ investment restructuring.
Vicien-Milburn女士在分析時首先強調，申請人打算放棄克羅埃西亞國籍的唯一動機是適用《ICSID公約》的管轄。她隨後指出，據她所知，這是投資仲裁庭第一次面臨“申請人為獲得國際仲裁而放棄國籍是否構成濫用程式”的問題。事實上，對濫用程式的反對意見主要集中在透過公司重組獲得國籍的問題上。這並不奇怪，因為法人是該領域最常見的申請人。但她認為，濫用程式原則可以涵蓋其他情況。她援引了仲裁庭在Orascom v. Algeria案中的觀點，即“作為‘適用於國際法和國內法的一般原則’”，禁止濫用權利同樣適用於“投資重組”以外的情況。
In line with the position taken in Phoenix Action v. Czech Republic, Ms Vicien-Milburn continued that, all in all, tribunals have an obligation to prevent ‘an abusive manipulation of the system of international investment protection under the ICSID Convention and the BITs’. In her view, ‘[s]uch an abuse’ can equally arise in cases of acquisition as well as of renunciation of nationality by natural persons, ‘since both [may] entail an alteration of form designed to obtain a right that would not otherwise exist’. In this context, Ms Vicien-Milburn argued that ‘what matters is the timing of the change in nationality of the claimant’. She drew a parallel between this case and Philip Morris v Australia, where the Tribunal held that ‘the initiation of a treaty-based investor-State arbitration constitutes an abuse of rights (or an abuse of process, the rights abused being procedural in nature) when an investor has changed its corporate structure to gain the protection of an investment treaty at a point in time when a specific dispute was foreseeable’. According to her, ‘[t]he only necessary adjustment to this well-known holding is to replace the words “corporate structure” with “nationality”’, an adjustment that ‘does not represent a departure from the reasoning in a long line of cases’.
與在Phoenix Action v. Czech Republic中所採取的立場一致，Vicien-Milburn 女士繼續說，總而言之，仲裁庭有義務防止“依據《ICSID公約》和雙邊投資條約，對國際投資保護體系的濫用性操縱”。她認為，“這種濫用”同樣可能出現在自然人取得和放棄國籍的情況中，“因為兩者都[可能]需要改變形式，以獲得本來不存在的權利”。在這方面，Vicien-Milburn女士認為，“重要的是申請人改變國籍的時間”。她將本案與Philip Morris v Australia案相比較，在後者中，仲裁庭認為，“當投資者在可預見具體爭端的時間點上改變其公司結構以獲得投資條約的保護時，提起投資者與國家間基於條約的仲裁構成濫用權利（或濫用程式，濫用的權利是程式性的）”。她認為，“對這一眾所周知的裁決唯一必要的調整是將‘公司結構’改為‘國籍’”，這一調整‘並不意味著背離一系列案例的推理’。
She added that the abuse of rights doctrine played an even greater role in the present case in view of the clear ICSID automatic bar to actions instituted by host State nationals. She referred to Prof Schreuer’s testimony, in which he explained that the drafting history of Article 25(2)(a) is unequivocal about the concern expressed by many States that did not want actions instituted by their own nationals. As such, she did not consider the ‘negative’ nationality test of the ICSID convention as a mere ‘procedural obstacle’, as labelled by the Claimant, but rather as an ‘absolute and explicit requirement linked to the Convention’s object and purpose’. In her view, ‘[f]or an individual to renounce his or her nationality in order to gain the protection of the ICSID Convention could therefore … constitute an abuse of process’. She concluded that, even if Claimant had secured jurisdiction under Article 25(2)(a), ‘his institution of this arbitration would still have amounted to an abuse of process rendering his claims inadmissible’.
她補充說，鑑於ICSID明確自動禁止東道國國民提起訴訟，濫用權利理論在本案中發揮了更大的作用。她提到Schreuer教授的證詞，Schreuer教授在證詞中解釋說，第25(2)(a)條的起草歷史明確表明，許多國家不希望本國國民提起訴訟。因此，她並不認為《ICSID公約》的“消極”國籍檢驗標準只是一個“程式性障礙”，正如申請人所標榜的那樣，這是一個“與公約目標和宗旨相關的絕對和明確的要求”。她認為，“因此，個人放棄國籍以獲得《ICSID公約》的保護……可能構成濫用程式”。她的結論是，即使申請人根據第25(2)(a)條獲得了管轄權，“他提起仲裁仍將構成濫用程式，使他的請求不可受理”。
原文連結：
Mihaljević v Croatia:1Abuse of Rights and Nationality Planning by Natural Persons | ICSID Review – Foreign Investment Law Journal | Oxford Academic