譯者 | 黃元亨 北京大學
一審 | 俞悠悠 國際關係學院
二審 | 趙逸之 北京大學
編輯 | 戴鈺 蘭州大學
蘇桐 華中科技大學
責編 | 馮雨萱 北京大學
一、引言
2022年4月，Dream Big Media, Getify Solutions和Sprinter Supplier在加州北區法院起訴谷歌及其母公司Alphabet。在本案中，谷歌被指控濫用其在GPS導航領域的優勢地位，依託谷歌地圖及相關服務進行（消極）搭售，意圖將使用者“圈禁”於其生態之中。2024年7月，加州北區法院Richard Seeborg法官駁回谷歌《服務條款》消極搭售（指禁止使用者將競爭對手的地點和路線APIs與谷歌地圖搭配使用）的論點，永久性地駁回了該訴訟。
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二、案情概述
Plaintiffs Dream Big Media, Getify Solutions, Inc., and Sprinter Supplier, LLC, allege they use mapping products provided by defendants Google, LLC and Alphabet, Inc. (collectively, “Google”), including application programming interfaces (“APIs”), to display or use maps or maps-related information on their websites or mobile applications. Plaintiffs contend the Terms of Service (“TOS”) Google imposes on customers seeking to use those APIs give rise to claims for unlawful tying, bundling, exclusive dealing, and monopoly leveraging in violation of the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and California’s Unfair Competition Law.
原告 Dream Big Media、Getify Solutions等和 Sprinter Supplier等聲稱他們使用被告Google，LLC和Alphabet（以下統稱“谷歌”）提供的地圖產品，包括應用程式程式設計介面（以下簡稱“API”），在其網站或移動應用程式上顯示或使用地圖或與地圖相關的資訊。原告認為，谷歌針對尋求使用這些API的客戶所強制實施的《服務條款》（Terms of Service）引起了非法搭售、捆綁銷售、排他交易行為和壟斷槓桿的索賠，違反《謝爾曼法（Sherman Act）》、《克萊頓法（Clayton Act）》和《加利福尼亞州不正當競爭法（California’s Unfair Competition Law）》。
Plaintiffs’ original and First Amended complaints presented a novel tying theory: because Google’s TOS purportedly prohibit customers who buy any one of its “Maps,” “Routes,” or “Places” APIs from using either of the other two categories of APIs provided by any other supplier, each of those three APIs could be either the “tying” product or the (negatively) “tied” product. [1]The order dismissing the First Amended Complaint with leave to amend did not preclude plaintiffs from continuing to pursue that theory, but cautioned that they would have to show how it was viable legally and factually.
原告在最初和第一次修正後的訴狀中提出了一個新穎的搭售理論：由於谷歌的《服務條款》據稱對購買其“地圖”、“路線”或“地點”APIs任何一種的客戶作出了限制，禁止其使用任何其他供應商提供的其餘兩類APIs，這三種APIs中的每一種都可能是“搭售”產品或（消極）“被搭售”產品。駁回第一次修正後的訴狀並允許繼續修改的命令並未阻止原告繼續提出這一理論，但告誡他們必須證明這一理論在法律上和事實上的可行性。
In the Second Amended Complaint, plaintiffs instead elected to pursue a conventional (negative) tying theory. Plaintiffs Dream Big and Getify allege “after purchasing Google’s Maps APIs” they were forced through the negative tying effects of Google’s TOS to purchase Google’s Places APIs and Routes APIs, despite their preferences for competitors’ APIs that provide places and routes data and functions. Plaintiff Sprinter, which does not allege to have purchased Google Maps APIs, does not advance claims for an unlawful tying arrangement, but nonetheless contends it may pursue relief under exclusive dealing or other theories.
在第二次修正後的訴狀中，原告選擇了傳統的（消極）搭售理論。原告Dream Big和Getify聲稱，“在購買谷歌地圖API之後，由於谷歌《服務條款》的消極搭售效應，儘管他們更傾向於使用谷歌競爭對手提供的位置APIs和路線APIs的資料和功能，他們也被迫購買了谷歌的位置APIs和路線APIs。另一原告Sprinter並未聲稱其已購買谷歌地圖的APIs，因此並未針對非法搭售安排提出訴求，但它仍然認為其可以根據排他性交易或其他理論尋求救濟。
Although the Second Amended Complaint eliminates the prior basis for dismissal that plaintiffs had not shown a product could be either tying or tied, their election to declare now that “Maps APIs” is the tying product is seriously undermined by their prior—and continuing—assertions that Google competitors offer superior maps APIs. Plaintiffs also have not shown at the outset that the Google TOS prohibits its customers who purchase Maps APIs from using APIs provided by Google competitors to provide “places” or “routes” data and functions. For these and other reasons discussed below, the Second Amended Complaint must be dismissed. No further leave to amend is warranted.
儘管第二次修正後的訴狀刪除了此前被駁回的理由，即原告未能證明某產品既可作為搭售產品，也可作為被搭售產品，他們現在選擇宣佈“地圖”APIs是搭售產品的行為，卻因之前持續的主張——谷歌的競爭對手提供更優質的地圖APIs——而遭到嚴重削弱。原告起初也未證明谷歌《服務條款》禁止購買其地圖APIs的客戶使用谷歌爭對手提供的APIs來提供“位置”或“路線”資料和功能。基於上述原因及下文討論的其他原因，第二次修正後的訴狀必須被駁回，且沒有理由允許其再進一步修改。
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三、案件背景
The Second Amended Complaint describes APIs as software code, sold as products, that enable one computer application to retrieve and utilize data from another computer application. As relevant here, Google offers (for cash or certain kinds of “credits”) access to various APIs that allow its customers to use Google maps and related information on their own websites or in other applications. Plaintiffs allege three separate markets, which they claim align with categories Google itself uses：
(i) APIs that retrieve and display a digital map (“maps APIs”);
(ii) APIs that retrieve and display information on a digital map about establishments, locations, and other points-of-interest (“places APIs”); and,
(iii) APIs that retrieve and display navigational information, such as directions, navigation, and travel time, on a digital map “routes APIs”).
第二次修正後的訴狀將APIs描述為作為產品出售的軟體程式碼，允許一個應用程式獲取和使用另一個應用程式的資料。與此相關的事，谷歌（透過現金或某種形式的“積分”）提供許多APIs的介面，允許它的客戶在自己的網站和其他應用上使用谷歌地圖及相關資訊。原告聲稱有三個獨立市場，他們聲稱這與谷歌自身使用的分類相同：
（i）收集並顯示數字圖的APIs（“地圖APIs”）；
（ii）收集並顯示數字地圖上關於機構、地點和其他興趣點的資訊（“地點API”）；
（iii）收集並顯示數字地圖上的導航資訊，如方向、導航和旅行時間（“路線API”）。
Google markets its own Maps APIs, Places APIs, and Routes APIs under what it calls the Google Maps Platform. The TOS on which plaintiffs’ claims are based governs use of the Maps Platform as a whole. The provision of the TOS in dispute appears under section 3.2.3, entitled “Restrictions Against Misusing the Services.”
谷歌在其所謂的“谷歌地圖平臺”推廣它的“地圖APIs”、“地點APIs”和“路線APIs”。原告的訴訟請求所基於的《服務條款》規範了整個地圖平臺的使用。受爭議的《服務條款》在第3.2.3條，標題為“防止濫用服務的限制”。
Paragraph (e), labeled “No Use with Non-Google Maps” states：“To avoid quality issues and/or brand confusion, Customer will not use the Google Maps Core Services with or near a non-Google Map in a Customer Application. For example, Customer will not (i) display or use Places content on a non-Google map, (ii) display Street View imagery and non-Google maps on the same screen, or (iii) link a Google Map to non-Google Maps content or a non-Google map.”
其中標記為“不能使用非谷歌地圖”的第（e）項規定：
為避免質量問題和/或品牌混淆，客戶不得在客戶應用程式中將谷歌地圖核心服務與非谷歌地圖一起或在其附近使用。例如，使用者不得（i）在非谷歌地圖上顯示或使用地點內容，（ii）在同一螢幕上顯示街景影像和非谷歌地圖，或（iii）將谷歌地圖連結到非谷歌地圖內容或非谷歌地圖。
The TOS defines “Google Maps Core Services” as including various APIs falling within the category of Maps APIs, Places APIs, and Routes APIs. The TOS also defines “Street View” as a Core Service. Paragraph (e) and its examples therefore unambiguously purport to prohibit a customer from buying Google’s Places or Routes APIs and using them on maps generated from competitors’ APIs. A customer is also precluded from using Google’s Street View (a specific API within the “maps APIs” category as defined by plaintiffs) “on the same screen” as a non-Google map.
《服務條款》將“谷歌地圖核心服務”定義為包括地圖APIs、地點APIs和路線APIs類別的各類API。《服務條款》還將“街景”定義為核心服務。第（e）項及其示例明確禁止客戶購買谷歌的地點或路線API，並將其用於競爭對手API生成的地圖上。同時，客戶也不得將谷歌的“街景”（原告定義的“地圖API”類別中的一個特定API）與“非谷歌地圖”在“同一螢幕上”一起使用。
The Second Amended Complaint, however, is premised on the theory that Google’s Maps APIs is the tying product, and places and/or routes APIs are the (negatively) tied product(s). The fact that the TOS purports to prohibit Google’s products in the allegedly tied markets from being used with competitor’s products in the alleged tying market does not give rise to an unlawful tying claim, and plaintiffs do not argue otherwise. Similarly, Google’s insistence that one of its products in the purported tying market (Street View) may only be used with other Google products in the same alleged market does not support an unlawful tying claim.
然而，第二次修正後的訴狀的前提是，谷歌的地圖APIs是搭售產品，而地點APIs和/或路線APIs是（被）搭售產品。儘管《服務條款》看起來禁止在所謂的搭售市場中將谷歌的產品與競爭對手的產品一起使用，但這並不構成非法搭售，原告也未提出異議。與之相似的是，谷歌堅持認為其產品之一在所謂的搭售市場中（街景）只能與同一搭售市場中谷歌的其他產品一起使用，也不足以支援非法搭售的主張。
Accordingly, the parties’ dispute centers on paragraph (e) (iii), purporting to restrict a purchaser of Google Maps APIs from “link[ing] a Google Map to non-Google Maps content or a non-Google map.” Plaintiffs contend this must be interpreted as prohibiting a person who has purchased Google Maps APIs from using a competitor’s routes and/or places APIs in conjunction with a Google Map. Google insists its Maps customers are free to use a competitors’ routes or places APIs with their Google maps, as long as they do not link those the Maps to non-Google content or non-Google maps, such that an end user would be redirected from the Google Map to non-Google content.
因此，雙方的爭議焦點是第（e）款第（iii）項。該條款旨在限制購買谷歌地圖APIs的使用者“將谷歌地圖連結到一個非谷歌地圖的內容或一個非谷歌地圖上”。[2]原告主張，該條款必須被解釋為禁止一個購買谷歌地圖APIs的人將競爭對手的路線APIs和或地點APIs和谷歌地圖一起使用。谷歌則認為其地圖客戶可以在其谷歌地圖中自由地使用競爭對手的路線或地點APIs，只要這些地圖不會連結到非谷歌內容或非谷歌地圖，從而將終端使用者從谷歌地圖轉到非谷歌內容。
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四、法律依據
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”. While “detailed factual allegations” are not required, a complaint must have sufficient factual allegations to state a claim that is “plausible on its face.” A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” This standard asks for “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” The determination is a context-specific task requiring the court “to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”
訴狀必須包含“簡短明確的訴訟請求陳述，表明原告有權獲得救濟”。[3]雖然並不需要“詳盡的事實指控”，訴狀仍然必須有充分的事實指控，以表明其訴訟請求是“表面上合理的”。[4]當“原告提出的事實內容能使法院合理推斷出被告應對其所指控的不當行為負責時”，該主張即為表面上合理。[5]這一標準要求“不僅僅是被告可能非法形事的純粹可能性。[6]這一判定需要結合具體情境，由法院“運用其司法經驗和常識”。[7]
A motion to dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civi Procedure tests the legal sufficiency of the claims alleged in the complaint. Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) may be based on either the “lack of a cognizable legal theory” or on “the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” When evaluating such a motion, the court must accept all material allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
根據《聯邦民事訴訟規則》第12條第（b）款第（6）款項出的駁回起訴的動議，是對訴狀中指控的訴訟請求的法律充分性進行檢驗。[8]根據第12條第（b）款第（6）項提出的駁回起訴可以基於“缺乏可認知的法律理論”或“在可認知的法律理論下缺乏足夠的事實指控”。[9]在評估此類動議時，法院必須接受訴狀中的所有實質性指控為真，並從最有利於非動議方的角度作出解釋。[10]
五、法律分析
（一）《服務條款》
Google insists that even though the TOS restrict using Google mapping content “with or near a non-Google Map,” the plain language permits developers to use or display non-Google places or routes APIs with or near a Google Map. Thus, Google contends, there is no negative tie because its customers are perfectly free to use competitors’ versions of the allegedly tied products (routes and places APIs) with the alleged tying product (Google Maps APIs). As noted above, the dispute turns on section 3.2.3(e)(iii), which prohibits “linking” a Google Map to non-Google content. Google argues plaintiffs are improperly asking the court to read the word “link” to mean “use” or “display,” thereby expanding the scope of clause (iii) to prohibit developers from using Google Maps and competitors’ routes or places APIs “even near each other [or] even in the same app.”
谷歌堅持認為，儘管《服務條款》限制了“在非谷歌地圖上或附近使用”谷歌地圖內容，但其文義允許開發者在谷歌地圖上或附近使用或顯示非谷歌的地點或路線APIs。因此，谷歌辯稱，不存在消極搭售，因為其客戶完全可以自由地將據稱搭售的產品（路線和地點APIs）的競爭對手版本與據稱的搭售產品（谷歌地圖APIs）一起使用。如上所述，爭議的核心在於第3.2.3條第（e）款第（iii）項，該條禁止將谷歌地圖與“非谷歌內容”進行“連結”。谷歌辯稱，原告要求法院將“連結”一詞解讀為“使用”或“顯示”是不恰當的，從而擴大了第（iii）款的適用範圍，禁止開發者在谷歌地圖和競爭對手的路線或地點APIs“相互靠近時”或“甚至在同一個應用程式中”使用谷歌地圖。
Google contends clause (iii) prohibits only “link[ing] a Google Map to non-Google Maps content or a non-Google map” and that it does not refer to “use” or “display,” which are expressly used in other parts of section 3.2.3(e). Google relies on the “blackletter contract interpretation principles” that different words must be given different meanings, particularly when they appear in the same section.[11]
谷歌認為，第（iii）款僅禁止“將谷歌地圖連結到非谷歌地圖內容或非谷歌地圖”，並未提及“使用”或“顯示”，而這兩個詞在第3.2.3條第（e）節的其他部分已明確使用。谷歌依據的是“普遍接受的合同解釋原則”，即不同的詞語必須賦予不同的含義，特別是當它們出現在同一節時。
Google argues the principle applies with particular force here, because plaintiffs’ proposed reading would “transform section 3.2.3(e) from a narrow, one-directional prohibition into a far broader two-directional prohibition” and because plaintiffs have pointed to no instance of Google claiming the TOS means non-Google mapping API services (e.g., maps APIs, routes APIs, or places APIs) cannot be used with or near a Google Map.
谷歌辯稱，這一原則在此處尤其適用，因為原告提出的解釋將“把第3.2.3（e）節從一個狹窄的單向禁令轉變為一個更廣泛的雙向禁令”，而且原告沒有指出主張《服務條款》意味著非谷歌地圖API服務（如地圖APIs、路線APIs或地點APIs）不能與谷歌地圖一起使用或在谷歌地圖附近使用的任何例項。
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Plaintiffs have not shown how a prohibition on “linking” a Google Map to non-Google Maps content or a non-Google map reasonably can be understood to prohibit the use of competitors’ routes and/or places APIs in conjunction with a Google Map. While there might be circumstances where a negative tying claim could be supported by mere uncertainty as to the possible scope of terms of service, plaintiffs have not presented plausible factual allegations that Google has precluded its Maps APIs customers from turning to its competitors for their routes and places API needs, either by the express terms of the TOS, or through some chilling effect arising from ambiguity or possible implication, or through any other means.
原告沒有說明，為什麼將谷歌地圖與“非谷歌地圖內容或非谷歌地圖”進行“連結”的禁令，可以合理地被理解為禁止在谷歌地圖中結合使用競爭對手的路線和/或地點APIs。雖然在特定情況下，消極搭售可能僅僅因為服務條款的可能範圍不確定而成立，但原告並沒有提出合理的事實指控，證明谷歌透過《服務條款》的明確條款，或透過模糊性或可能含義產生的寒蟬效應，或透過任何其他方式，阻止其地圖APIs客戶使用競爭對手路線和地點APIs。
Google has acknowledged its TOS expressly prohibit using its Places APIs with non-Google Maps. Were plaintiffs alleging Google was using market power in a validly defined places API market to coerce purchases of its products in a validly defined tied market for maps APIs, negative tying claim likely would be viable. Because Google does not preclude its Maps APIs customers from using competitors’ places or routes, however, the negative tying claim plaintiffs are attempting to advance fails.
谷歌承認了其《服務條款》明確禁止將地點APIs與非谷歌地圖一起使用。如果原告指控谷歌在有效定義的地點APIs市場中利用市場支配力強迫客戶購買其在有效定義的地圖APIs搭售市場中的產品，那麼消極搭售的主張可能是可行的。然而，由於谷歌沒有阻止其地圖APIs客戶使用競爭對手的地點或路線，因此原告試圖提出的消極搭售主張不成立
（二）強制性
Plaintiffs do not disavow their previous allegations that competitors offer “better” and “cheaper” maps APIs than Google. To the contrary, their opposition repeats that assertion. Opp. at p. 20 (“competitors offer[] maps APIs . . . that are better or cheaper than Google’s Maps APIs”); Opp. at p. 21 (“competitors offered better or cheaper maps APIs”). Plaintiffs insist they appropriately “no longer focus on” those allegations now that they have revised their theory in light of the prior dismissal order.
原告並未否定他們此前的指控，即競爭對手提供的地圖APIs“更好”且“更便宜”。相反，他們的反對意見一再重申這一觀點。反對意見第20頁（“競爭對手提供的地圖API……比谷歌的地圖API更好或更便宜”）；反對意見第21頁（“競爭對手提供了更好或更便宜的地圖API”）。原告堅持認為，既然他們已經根據之前的駁回令修改了他們的理論，他們“不再關注”這些指控是恰當的。
Plaintiffs have explained why they have omitted, or de-emphasized, those prior allegations, but they have not provided a basis for disregarding them. Even putting aside the prior complaints, plaintiffs’ opposition brief continues to maintain that there are equivalent or superior maps API suppliers. See Resendiz v. Cnty. of Monterey, 2015 WL 3988495, at *6 (N.D. Cal. June 30, 2015) (plaintiffs’ statements in opposition brief to motion to dismiss were “a binding judicial admission” warranting dismissal of complaint).
原告已解釋了為何省略或淡化了這些此前的指控，但他們沒有提供不考慮這些指控的依據。[12]即使拋開先前的訴狀，原告在反對意見中仍堅持認為存在同等或更優的地圖APIs供應商。[13]
Plaintiffs cannot advance a plausible tying claim while simultaneously alleging that there are equal or better competitors in the alleged tying market. This same principle defeated the prior complaint’s theory that the same product could be either tied or tying. A tying arrangement gives rise to potential antitrust liability only when the seller has coerced the purchase of a tied product. See Rick-Mik Enterprises, Inc. v. Equilon Enterprises LLC, 532 F.3d 963, 971 (9th Cir. 2008). The requisite coercion cannot exist where, as plaintiffs allege here, “the buyer can obtain the tying product on equally advantageous terms from other sources.” P. Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 1700d3 (updated Aug. 2023).
原告不能一方面提出合理的搭售主張，同時又聲稱在所謂的搭售市場中存在同等或更好的競爭對手。同一原則也否定了先前訴狀中的理論，即同一產品既可以是被搭售的，也可以是搭售的。只有在賣方強迫購買搭售產品時，搭售安排才可能產生潛在的反壟斷責任。[14]原告所聲稱的“買方可以從其他渠道以同樣有利的條件獲得搭售產品”，因此不存在必要的強制。[15]
Plaintiffs attempt an end run around this fundamental defect by arguing that Dream Big and Getify could not purchase alternative routes or places APIs “after purchasing Google’s Maps APIs.” Coercion, however, must be evaluated as of the time before the plaintiff makes its purchase— not after. Otherwise, the plaintiff is merely complaining of being bound to a condition that it knowingly and voluntarily accepted.
原告試圖透過主張Dream Big和Getify在“購買谷歌地圖APIs後”無法購買替代的路線或地點APIs來規避這一根本缺陷。然而，強制行為必須在原告購買之前進行評估，而不是之後。否則，原告只是在抱怨自己明知並自願接受的條件。
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（三）市場定義與市場權勢
Google correctly observes that, a plausible market definition requires explaining “why the products included in the market are substitutes for one another.” Plaintiffs contend each of the individual APIs in each of the three alleged markets (maps, places, and routes APIs) are designed to support the “same, overarching purpose.” As Google observes, however, such allegations do not bear on substitutability.
谷歌正確地指出，合理的市場定義需要解釋“為什麼市場中的產品可以相互替代”。[16]原告聲稱，在每個所謂的市場（地圖、地點和路線APIs）中的每個單獨API都是為了支援“相同且總體性的目的”而設計的。然而，正如谷歌所指出的，這些指控與可替代性無關。
Google also correctly notes it is plaintiffs’ burden to allege with supporting facts a valid market, including showing the propriety of grouping together disparate products or services into a market. It is unclear that they have done so here, because they have not shown purchasers need to buy all the products or services in the group. [17]While plaintiffs argue Google has failed to show that the individual API services in each alleged market “are complements as opposed to substitutes,” the complementary nature of the APIs follows from plaintiffs’ own allegations that they are used together to support the same overarching purpose. [18]
谷歌還正確地指出，原告有責任用支援性事實來證明一個有效的市場，包括證明將不同的產品或服務歸入一個市場的合理性。目前尚不清楚原告是否已經做到了這一點，因為他們沒有證明購買者需要購買該組中的所有產品或服務。雖然原告主張谷歌未能證明每個所謂市場中的單獨API服務“是互補的而不是可替代的”，但API的互補性源於原告自己的指控，即它們被共同用來支援相同的總體目的。
Google contends the SAC’s allegations of market power fail because: (1) plaintiffs fail to allege plausibly a high share of the relevant market, because their market-share allegation is based on an anonymous source referring to an unknown market that does not equate to the maps API market plaintiffs define here; and (2) plaintiffs do not plausibly allege any barriers preventing the twelve alleged competitors from taking market share from Google if it behaved anti-competitively.
谷歌認為，SAC關於市場支配力的指控不成立，因為：（1）原告未能合理地聲稱其在相關市場中佔有高份額，因為他們的市場份額指控是基於一個匿名來源，該來源指的是一個未知的市場，這並不等同於原告在此定義的地圖APIs市場；（2）即便谷歌採取反競爭行為，原告也未能合理地指控有任何障礙阻止12個所謂的競爭對手從谷歌那裡奪取市場份額。
Standing alone, Google’s arguments about the sufficiency of the allegations regarding market definitions and power might not warrant dismissal at the pleading stage, even if plaintiffs have not fully rebutted all of the points. The failure to support maps APIs as a relevant market in which Google exercises power, however, is intertwined with the issues discussed above, and further supports dismissal.
僅憑谷歌關於市場定義和權勢指控充分性的論點，即使在原告沒有完全反駁所有論點的情況下，也可能不足以在訴狀階段就駁回起訴。然而，谷歌未能證明地圖API是其行使權力的相關市場，與上述討論的問題相互交織，並進一步支援了駁回起訴的決定。
（四）其餘指控
Plaintiffs’ exclusive dealing claim rests on the same predicate as their tying claim. Because the allegations of a negative tie fail, so does the exclusive dealing claim.
原告的排他交易行為指控與其捆綁銷售指控基於同樣的前提。由於消極搭售的指控不成立，因此排他交易行為的指控也不成立。
Plaintiffs’ Section 2 claim similarly fails because they have not plausibly allege exclusionary or anticompetitive conduct.[19] Plaintiffs’ contention that “[n]egative tying, exclusive dealing, and self-preferencing in totality” cause anticompetitive harm in the relevant markets fails with the tying claim. To the extent plaintiffs contend Google has engaged in other anticompetitive conduct in the relevant markets, they have not offered sufficient non-conclusory factual allegations to support a Section 2 claim.
原告的第二條指控同樣不成立，因為他們沒有合理地指控出排擠性或反競爭行為。原告聲稱“總體上，‘消極搭售、排他交易行為和自我優待’在相關市場中造成了反競爭危害”，但這一指控隨著搭售指控的失敗而失敗。就原告聲稱谷歌在相關市場中從事了其他反競爭行為而言，他們沒有提出足夠的非結論性事實指控來支援第二條指控。
Finally, the sole basis plaintiffs offer for their UCL claim is that they have alleged an antitrust claim. The failure of their antitrust claim thus defeats their UCL claim as well.
最後，原告提出其《不正當競爭法》指控的唯一依據是他們已經提出了反壟斷指控。因此，他們反壟斷指控的失敗也導致了其《不正當競爭法》指控的失敗。
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六、結論
The Second Amended Complaint is dismissed without leave to amend. A separate judgment will be entered.
駁回第二次修訂後的訴狀，且不允許再次修訂。判決將另行作出。
七、案件評析
近年來，隨著企業跨界日益頻繁，培育“產品生態”已成為網際網路企業乃至傳統行業的下一個增長點，在細分領域佔據優勢地位的企業可能會透過免費或低價搭售額外的產品，將自己的優勢地位外溢。[20]這一搭售行為極易給行業生態及消費者利益造成負面影響，亟需有效規制。然而，2022年至今的“谷歌地圖反壟斷案”歷經兩年，最後以谷歌大獲全勝收場，一定程度上反映出美國法院在規制網際網路企業為構建生態而採取的搭售行為仍面臨一定的障礙。
例如，針對網際網路企業的搭售行為，其強制性難以認定。強制性是搭售行為反壟斷審查中的關鍵要件，構成強制性需要證明賣方利用其市場優勢地位迫使消費者購買或不購買特定產品。在本案中，原告所主張的是谷歌利用其谷歌地圖的優勢地位，不允許其消費者使用其他競爭對手的地點或路線APIs。然而原告未能證明做法限制了它們選擇競爭對手產品的能力。法院一方面基於原告自身主張認為市場上並非不存在競爭，仍然有同等水平的優秀產品，另一方面指出即便因選擇谷歌而無法選擇其他競爭對手的APIs，也是原告自身意思自治的結果。法院特別指出，對於強制性的判斷是事前判斷，而非事後判斷，當用戶對選擇谷歌地圖仍有選擇權時，則難以得證存在強制性。這一判斷方式或對一般商品有效，但對於網際網路企業而言則不然。網際網路產品的搭售行為往往採用“技術捆綁”，透過系統升級等較為隱蔽的方式逐步形成一個大而全的多功能產品集合體。在這種情況下，消費者被搭售的行為並不是在選擇該產品時就存在或能夠被感知的，而是在日後使用中潛移默化地形成的。因此，該法院採用事前標準判斷強制性，仍然將網際網路產品視為普通產品交易的“一錘子買賣”，顯然限制其規制網際網路公司搭售行為的能力。
誠然，本案起訴被駁回的原因並非孤立單一，而是多維度、多層次因素共同作用的結果。除了上述提及的關於脅迫行為的證明不足這一核心因素外，還包括對《服務條款》的解釋規則、相關市場的界定以及被告市場權勢的評估等具有鮮明個案特性的考量點，均在不同程度上對法院的最終裁決產生了影響。雖然本案已永久性地令谷歌地圖免於因此被訴，但在“萬物互聯”的時代，法律如何應對企業對消費者生活所有方面的培養和訓導仍然值得進一步思考。
原文連結：
https://casetext.com/case/dream-big-media-inc-v-alphabet-inc-2
參考文獻：
[1] References to Google’s products will be capitalized “Maps,” “Routes,” and “Places,” in contrast to maps, routes, and places APIs offered by Google’s competitors.
[2] Google has preserved its argument that the complaint is still subject to dismissal under the reasoning of Sambreel Holdings LLC v. Facebook, Inc., 906 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (S.D. Cal. 2012). For the reasons set out in the order dismissing the First Amended Complaint, any rights Google may otherwise have to “dictate the terms on which it will permit its customers to use and display its mapping services,” do not insulate it from potential antitrust liability for improper tying practices. To the extent Sambreel suggests otherwise, it is not persuasive
[3] Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)
[4] Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007)).
[5] Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556)
[6] Id.
[7] Id. at 679
[8] See Conservation Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1241-42 (9th Cir. 2011).
[9] Id. at 1242 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
[10] In re Quality Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., 865 F.3d 1130, 1140 (9th Cir. 2017)
[11] See Queen Villas Homeowners Assn. v. TCB Prop. Mgmt., 149 Cal. App. 4th 1, 9 (2007)
[12] See Morales v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 603 F. Supp. 3d 841, 846–47 (N.D. Cal. 2022) (dismissing complaint as implausible where plaintiff omitted prior bad facts rather than explaining them in light of new theory).
[13] Resendiz v. Cnty. of Monterey, 2015 WL 3988495, at *6 (N.D. Cal. June 30, 2015(plaintiffs’ statements in opposition brief to motion to dismiss were “a binding judicial admission” warranting dismissal of complaint).
[14] Rick-Mik Enterprises, Inc. v. Equilon Enterprises LLC, 532 F.3d 963, 971 (9th Cir. 2008)
[15] P. Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 1700d3
[16] Reilly v. Apple Inc., 578 F. Supp. 3d 1098, 1109 (N.D. Cal. 2022)
[17] Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1203 (9th Cir. 1997).
[18] See P. Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 565 (updated Aug. 2023) (“complements are goods that are most efficiently made or used together”).
[19] See SmileCare Dental Grp. v. Delta Dental Plan of California, Inc., 88 F.3d 780, 783 (9th Cir. 1996) (“predatory or anticompetitive conduct” required for attempted monopolization).
[20] 吳太軒，肖健華. 網際網路搭售行為違法性認定的困局及紓解[J].競爭政策研究，2024，（01）：5-15.