法律翻譯｜KennethT.SIMEONE訴華特迪士尼公司案

譯者 | 鄒昀彤上海交通大學

一審 | Ellen Chen Cornell LLM

二審 | 劉寅 UCLA LLM

編輯 | 賈雙銘北方工業大學

loca. 中國社會科學院大學

責編 | 馮雨萱北京大學J.D.&J.M.

302 A.3d 956

Court of Chancery of Delaware.

特拉華州衡平法院

Kenneth T. SIMEONE, Plaintiff,

The WALT DISNEY COMPANY, a Delaware corporation, Defendant.

Kenneth T. SIMEONE訴華特迪士尼公司案

C.A. No. 2022-1120-LWW

案件編號：C.A. No. 2022-1120-LWW

Date Submitted: March 15, 2023

提交日期：2023年3月15日

Date Decided: June 27, 2023

裁判日期：2023年6月27日

Synopsis 概要

Memorandum Opinion 備忘錄意見

Footnotes 腳註

Synopsis

概要

Background | 背景

Stockholder of entertainment company that operated theme park in Florida brought action for inspection of corporate books and records relating to company's decision to publicly oppose Florida law limiting instruction on sexual orientation or gender identity in Florida classrooms. The matter proceeded to a bench trial on a paper record.

在佛羅里達州經營主題公園的娛樂公司的股東提起訴訟，要求檢查公司的賬簿和記錄，這些賬簿和記錄與公司決定公開反對佛羅里達州限制在課堂上教授性取向或性別認同的法律有關。法官根據書面記錄對該案進行了獨任審理。

Holdings｜裁決結果

The Court of Chancery, Lori W. Will, Vice Chancellor, held that:

衡平法院，Lori W. Will，副首席法官認為：

[1] stockholder lacked a proper purpose to inspect company's books and records;

股東沒有檢查公司賬簿和記錄的正當目的；

[2] assuming that stockholder had a proper purpose, he would not be entitled to further inspection because company had already furnished to him relevant records of company's board; and

即使股東有正當目的，他也無權進一步查閱，因為公司已經向他提供了公司董事會的相關記錄；以及

[3]ordering a deposition of a company representative to testify about the existence of documents, their location, and whether company asserted privilege over them was not warranted because it would not be proportionate to the needs of the case.

命令公司代表出庭作證，就檔案的存在、位置以及公司是否對這些檔案主張特權提供證詞，是不必要的，因為這不符合案件的需要。

Request for inspection denied; judgment entered for company.

檢查請求被駁回；判決公司勝訴。

Procedural Posture(s)｜案件審理歷程

Motion to Compel Discovery. 強制發現動議

Memorandum Opinion

備忘錄意見

WILL, Vice Chancellor

WILL, 副首席法官

This books and records action originates from The Walt Disney Company's response to Florida House Bill 1557. Disney initially took no public position on the bill, which limits instruction on sexual orientation or gender identity in Florida classrooms. After facing criticism from its employees, Disney reversed course and spoke out against the legislation. Florida's Governor took issue with Disney's stance and Florida's legislature voted to dissolve a special tax district encompassing the Walt Disney World Resort.

這項賬簿和記錄訴訟源於華特迪士尼公司對佛羅里達州第1557號眾議院法案的回應。該法案限制在佛羅里達州的課堂上進行有關性取向或性別認同的教學，迪士尼最初未就該法案公開表態。在受到其員工的批評後，迪士尼公司改弦更張，公開反對該法案。佛羅里達州州長對迪士尼的立場提出異議，佛羅里達州立法機構投票解散了包括沃爾特·迪士尼世界度假區的特別稅區。

Afterwards, the plaintiff—a longtime Disney stockholder—was solicited by counsel to serve a books and records demand. The demand asserts that Disney's directors and officers may have breached their fiduciary duties to the company and its stockholders by opposing HB 1557. The plaintiff's theory of wrongdoing is that Disney's fiduciaries either put their own beliefs ahead of their obligations to stockholders or flouted the risk of losing rights associated with the special district.

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之後，原告——一位長期的迪士尼股東——被律師勸說提出查閱公司賬簿和記錄的要求。該要求聲稱，迪士尼的董事和高管反對第1557號眾議院法案可能違反了他們對公司及其股東的信義義務。

Disney told the plaintiff that he lacked grounds to obtain books and records because its directors and officers had not engaged in mismanagement. Nevertheless, Disney produced certain board minutes and corporate policies to the plaintiff. The plaintiff was unsatisfied and filed litigation.

迪士尼告訴原告，他沒有理由獲取賬簿和記錄，因為董事和高管並未管理不善。儘管如此，迪士尼向原告出示了某些董事會會議記錄和公司政策。原告不滿並提起訴訟。

Weighty public policy questions surround the margins of this lawsuit. But when they are stripped away, the case becomes quite simple. The court must determine whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a proper purpose to inspect books and records. He decidedly has not.

本案的邊緣地帶存在著重大的公共政策問題。但當這些問題被剝離後，案件就變得非常簡單。法院必須查明原告是否證明了檢查賬簿和記錄的正當目的。他顯然沒有。

Delaware law vests directors with significant discretion to guide corporate strategy—including on social and political issues. Given the diversity of viewpoints held by *959 directors, management, stockholders, and other stakeholders, corporate speech on external policy matters brings both risks and opportunities. The board is empowered to weigh these competing considerations and decide whether it is in the corporation's best interest to act (or not act).

特拉華州法律賦予董事很大的指導公司戰略——包括社會和政治問題的自由裁量權。【*959】鑑於董事、管理層、股東和其他利益相關者所持觀點的多樣性，公司對外部政策問題的言論既帶來了風險，也帶來了機遇。董事會有權權衡這些相互競爭的考慮因素，並決定採取行動（或不採取行動）是否符合公司的最佳利益。

This suit concerns such a business decision by the Disney board—a decision that cannot provide a credible basis to suspect potential mismanagement irrespective of its outcome. There is no indication that the directors suffered from disabling conflicts. Nor is there any evidence that the directors were grossly negligent or acted in bad faith. Rather, the board held a special meeting to discuss Disney's approach to the legislation and the employees’ negative response. Disney's public rebuke of HB 1557 followed.

這起訴訟涉及迪士尼董事會的一項商業決定——無論該等決定的結果如何，都不能以之為可信的依據去懷疑迪士尼可能管理不善。沒有任何跡象表明董事之間的衝突使他們無法正常工作，也沒有任何證據表明董事們嚴重失職或惡意行事。相反，董事會召開了一次特別會議，討論迪士尼對立法的態度和員工的負面回應。隨後，迪士尼公開批評第1557號眾議院法案。

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The plaintiff and his counsel may disagree with Disney's position on HB 1557. But their disagreement is not evidence of wrongdoing. Regardless, the plaintiff has all necessary and essential documents relevant to his purpose. Judgment must be entered for Disney.

原告及其律師可能不同意迪士尼對第1557號眾議院法案的立場。但他們的不同意見並不能作為不當行為的證據。無論如何，原告擁有與其目的相關的所有必要的檔案。必須判決迪士尼勝訴。

Background｜背景

This case was tried on a paper record consisting of 48 exhibits, including a transcript of the plaintiff's deposition.[1]The facts described below have been proven by a preponderance of the evidence, are drawn from admitted allegations in the pleadings or stipulated facts in the pre-trial order, or are not subject to reasonable dispute.[2]

本案是依據由包括原告證言記錄在內的48項證據組成的書面記錄進行審理的。下文所述事實或已由大量證據證明，或摘自訴狀中已被承認的指控或預審令中明確說明的事實，或不存在合理爭議。

A. HB 1557 and Disney's Initial Silence

A.第1557號眾議院法案和迪士尼最初的沉默

On February 24, 2022, the Florida House of Representatives voted to approve House Bill 1557, titled the “Parental Rights in Education” bill.[3]HB1557 prohibits teachers from discussing certain topics related to sexual orientation and gender identity in kindergarten through third grade classrooms.[4]For students in higher grades, the legislation prohibits lessons on these topics that are not “age-appropriate or developmentally appropriate … in accordance with state standards.”[5]

2022年2月24日，佛羅里達州眾議院投票通過了名為“家長教育權利”的第1557號眾議院法案。第1557號眾議院法案禁止教師在幼兒園至三年級的課堂上討論與性取向和性別認同相關的某些話題。對於更高年級的學生，該立法禁止有關“根據州標準……不符合年齡或發展需要”的話題的課程。

Defendant The Walt Disney Company quickly came under scrutiny for its financial backing of HB 1557's sponsors.[6]Disney, a leading media and entertainment company incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in California, has a substantial presence in Florida where its Walt Disney World Resort is located.[7]Disney is *960 among the largest employers in Florida.[8]

被告華特迪士尼公司因向第1557號眾議院法案提供資金支援而迅速受到仔細審查。迪士尼是一家在特拉華州註冊成立、總部位於加利福尼亞州的頂級媒體和娛樂公司，在佛羅里達州有顯著的影響力，那裡坐落著華特迪士尼世界度假區。迪士尼是【*960】佛羅里達州最大的僱主之一。

On March 7, 2022, Robert Chapek—then Disney's Chief Executive Officer—circulated an internal memo to Disney employees expressing the company's “unwavering commitment to the LGBTQ+ community.”[9]Chapek noted that although the company had not made a public statement opposing HB 1557, Disney's “lack of statement” should not be mistaken “for a lack of support.”[10]He wrote: “We all share the same goal of a more tolerant, respectful world. Where we may differ is in the tactics to get there.”[11]Chapek explained that Disney would “continue to be a leader in supporting organizations that champion diversity.”[12]

2022年3月7日，時任迪士尼執行長的羅伯特·查佩克（Robert Chapek）向迪士尼員工傳閱了一份內部備忘錄，表達了公司“對 LGBTQ+ 群體堅定不移的承諾”。查佩克指出，雖然公司沒有發表反對第1557號眾議院法案的公開宣告，但迪士尼“沒有發表宣告”不應被誤認為“缺乏支援”。他寫道：“我們都有一個共同的目標，那就是建立一個更加寬容、相互尊重的世界。我們的不同之處在於實現這一目標的策略"。查佩克解釋說，迪士尼將“繼續做支援倡導多元化的組織的領導者”。

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Chapek's memo was met with pervasive disappointment and frustration from Disney employees and creative partners.[13]Some—including actors, directors, writers, and animators—called the memo “weak” and “unacceptable.”[14] Others demanded that Disney take a public stand against HB 1557.[15]

查佩克的備忘錄引起了迪士尼員工和創意合作伙伴的普遍失望和沮喪。包括演員、導演、編劇和動畫師在內的一些人稱備忘錄“軟弱無力”、“不可接受”。還有人要求迪士尼公開表明反對第1557號眾議院法案的立場。

B. Disney's Public Opposition to HB 1557

B.迪士尼對第1557號眾議院法案的公開反對

On March 8, 2022, the Florida Senate passed HB 1557 by a vote of 22 to 17.[16]The bill was then sent to Governor Ron DeSantis for his signature.[17]

2022年3月8日，佛羅里達州參議院以22票贊成、17票反對的投票結果通過了第1557號眾議院法案。

Also on March 8, Disney's Board of Directors held a special meeting about Disney's “Political Engagement and Communications.”[18]Chapek and Disney's then-Chief Corporate Affairs Officer Geoff Morrell “led a discussion with the Board members relating to the communications plan, philosophy and approach regarding Florida legislation and employee response.”[19]Chapek and Morrell “responded to Board members’ questions and comments.”[20]

同樣在3月8日，迪士尼董事會召開了一次關於迪士尼“政治參與和溝通”的特別會議。查佩克和迪士尼時任首席企業事務官傑夫·莫雷爾（Geoff Morrell）“與董事會成員討論了有關佛羅里達州立法的溝通計劃、理念和方法以及員工的回應”。查佩克和莫雷爾回應了董事會成員的問題與評論。

Disney's annual stockholder meeting was held the next day, March 9, beginning at 10:00 a.m. Pacific.[21]There, Chapek acknowledged that “many are upset that we did not speak out against the bill” and that the company's original approach to HB 1557 “didn't quite get the job done.”[22]He explained: “We were opposed to the bill from the outset, but we chose not to take a public position on it because we thought we could be more effective working behind the scenes, engaging directly with lawmakers on both sides of the aisle.”[23]Chapek announced that Disney was joining a petition against similar legislation and would be supporting efforts to protect the 【*961】 LGBTQ+ community.[24]He noted that he had spoken to Governor DeSantis that morning to express “our disappointment and concern” with HB 1557.[25]

第二天太平洋時間3月9日上午10:00，迪士尼舉辦了年度股東大會。會上，查佩克承認，“許多人對我們沒有公開反對第1557號眾議院法案感到不滿”，以及公司最初對第1557號眾議院法案採取的態度“沒有完全達到預期效果”。他解釋說：“我們從一開始就反對該法案，但我們選擇不公開表態，因為我們認為在幕後工作、直接與兩黨的立法者接觸會更有效”。查佩克宣佈，迪士尼將加入反對類似立法的請願活動，並將支援保護【*961】LGBTQ+群體方面的努力。他指出，當天上午他已與州長德桑提斯（DeSantis）通了話，表達了對第1557號眾議院法案的“失望和關切”。

In his 2023 memoir, Governor DeSantis recalls telling Chapek: “You will end up putting yourself in an untenable position. People like me will say, ‘Gee, how come Disney has never said anything about China, where they make a fortune?’ ”[26]The Governor wrote that after speaking to Chapek, he thought “this clash with Disney was over.”[27]

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德桑提斯在他2023年的回憶錄中回憶起他對查佩克說：“你最終會把自己置於難以維持的境地。像我這樣的人會說，‘哎呀，迪士尼為什麼從來沒說過有關中國的事情？那是他們賺了一大筆錢的地方’。”州長寫道，在與查佩克交談之後，他認為“與迪士尼的衝突已經結束”。

On March 9 at 11:50 a.m. Pacific, the Board held a regularly scheduled meeting.[28]Chapek “provided an update on Company matters, addressing: Company values, approach to Florida legislation and [a] planned holistic review of political engagement to be discussed at the June Board retreat.”[29]Chapek “responded to Board members’ comments and questions” throughout his presentation.[30]

太平洋時間3月9日上午11:50，董事會舉行了定期會議。查佩克“介紹了公司的最新情況，涉及公司的價值觀、對佛羅里達州立法的態度以及[一項]計劃在6月董事會務虛會上討論的對政治參與的全面審查。查佩克在整個報告過程中回應了董事會成員的意見和評論。

On March 10, DeSantis publicly criticized companies “like [ ] Disney.”[31]He stated that Florida policy should be “based on the best interest of Florida citizens, not on the musing of woke corporations.”[32]

3月10日，德桑提斯公開批評像迪士尼這樣的公司。他表示，佛羅里達州的政策應該“以佛羅里達州公民的最佳利益為基礎，而不是以那些（對社會問題）保持警惕的公司的胡思亂想為基礎。”

Chapek sent another memo to Disney employees on March 11, thanking those who reached out to share their “pain, frustration and sadness over the company's response” to HB 1557.[33]Chapek promised to “become a better ally.”[34]

查佩克在3月11日向迪士尼員工傳送另一份備忘錄，感謝那些主動聯絡迪士尼並分享其“因公司對第1557號眾議院法案的回應而感到的痛苦、沮喪和悲傷”的員工。查佩克承諾要“成為更好的盟友”。

Governor DeSantis signed HB 1557 into law on March 28.[35]The same day, Disney issued a public statement opposing the bill:

3月28日，州長德桑提斯簽署了第1557號眾議院法案使其成為法律。同日，迪士尼發表公開宣告反對該法案：

Florida's HB 1557, also known as the “Don't Say Gay” bill, should never have passed and should never have been signed into law. Our goal as a company is for this law to be repealed by the legislature or struck down in the courts, and we remain committed to supporting the national and state organizations working to achieve that. We are dedicated to standing up for the rights and safety of LGBTQ+ members of the Disney family, as well as the LGBTQ+ community in Florida and across the country.[36]

佛羅里達州第1557號眾議院法案，又被稱為“不要說同性戀”法案，根本就不應該透過，也不應該被簽署成為法律。作為一家公司，我們的目標是讓立法機構廢除或在法庭上推翻這項法律，我們將繼續支援致力於實現這一目標的國家組織和州組織。我們致力於支援和維護迪士尼大家庭中LGBTQ+成員的權利和安全，以及佛羅里達州和全國各地LGBTQ+群體的權利和安全。

In response, Governor DeSantis said that Disney had “crossed the line.”[37]

對此，州長德桑提斯表示，迪士尼已經“越界”了。

C. Effects on the RCID

C. 對蘆葦溪改善區（RCID）的影響

Disney's opposition to HB 1557 prompted Florida politicians to consider revoking 【*962 】Disney's ability to self-govern its lands within the Reedy Creek Improvement District (RCID).[38]

迪士尼對第1557號眾議院法案的反對促使佛羅里達州的政治家們考慮廢除【*962】迪士尼在蘆葦溪改善區內自行管理土地的能力。

Florida's Reedy Creek Improvement Act (RCIA) was enacted in 1967.[39]The RCIA formed the RCID, a special district consisting of 25,000 acres of land on which the Walt Disney World Resort was built.[40]The RCID was granted the same authority and responsibility as a county government.[41]For example, it is authorized to levy taxes, write building codes, and develop and maintain its own infrastructure.[42]The RCID is run by a five-member board of supervisors, who were originally selected by landowners within the district.[43]

佛羅里達州的《蘆葦溪改善法案》（Reedy Creek Improvement Act，RCIA）頒佈於1967年。RCIA使蘆葦溪改善區（RCID）得以形成，這是一個由25000英畝土地組成的特區，華特迪士尼世界度假區就建在這片土地上。蘆葦溪改善區（RCID）被賦予了與縣政府相同的權力和責任，例如，它有權徵稅、制定建築法規以及開發和維護自己的基礎設施。蘆葦溪改善區（RCID）由一個有5名成員的監事會運營，他們最初由區內的土地所有者選出。

On March 30, a Florida state representative tweeted that he had met with colleagues to discuss repealing the RCIA.[44]During a speech the following day, Governor DeSantis said that he supported a repeal of the law.[45]

3月30日，一位弗羅里達州眾議院在推特上表示他已與同事會面討論廢除《蘆葦溪改善法案》的問題。在第二天的發言中，州長德桑提斯說他支援廢除該法律。

On April 19, Governor DeSantis announced that he was expanding a special legislative session to evaluate abolishing the RCID and five other special districts unrelated to Disney.[46]Within 48 hours, the Florida House of Representatives voted 70 to 38 in favor of dissolving the special districts at issue.[47]Governor DeSantis wrote in his memoir that “[n]obody saw it coming, and Disney did not have enough time to put its army of high-powered lobbyists to work to try to derail the bill.”[48]The dissolution was scheduled to go into effect in June 2023.[49]

4月19日，州長德桑提斯宣佈他正在擴大特別立法會議以對廢除《蘆葦溪改善法案》和其他五個與迪士尼無關的特區作出評估。在48小時內，佛羅里達眾議院以70票贊成、38票反對的結果，贊成解散相關特區。州長德桑提斯在他的回憶錄中寫道：“沒有人預料到會發生這樣的事情，迪士尼也沒有足夠的時間讓其強大的遊說者團隊試圖破壞該法案。”解散計劃於2023年6月生效。

On April 22, Governor DeSantis signed the dissolution bill into law.[50]He announced that Disney would no longer control the RCID and would be held responsible for certain Florida taxes.[51]He also announced that he would release a proposal making Disney responsible for over $1 billion in debts owed by the RCID.[52]Later, during a June 5, 2022 interview, Governor DeSantis recalled warning Disney that it “shouldn't get involved” with HB 1557 because “it's not going to work out well” for the company.[53]

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4月22日，州長德桑提斯簽署瞭解散法案使其成為法律。他宣佈，迪士尼將不再控制蘆葦溪改善區並將承擔佛羅里達州的某些稅款。他還宣佈，他將釋出一項提案，要求迪士尼對蘆葦溪改善區欠下的超過10億美元的債務負責。後來，在2022年6月5日的一次採訪中，州長德桑提斯回憶說，他曾警告迪士尼“不應捲入”第1557號眾議院法案，因為這對公司而言“不會有好結果”。

Disney's stock price fell during the summer from $145.70 per share on March 1 to $91.84 on July 14.[54]On November 9—the day after Governor DeSantis was reelected—Disney's stock fell to $86.75 per *963 share.[55]

迪士尼的股價在夏季從3月1日的每股145.70美元跌至7月14日的每股91.84美元。11月9日，即州長德桑提斯連任的第二天，迪士尼的股價跌至【*963】每股86.75美元。

D. The Section 220 Demand and the First Document Production

D.第220條要求和首次檔案披露

On July 8, 2022, plaintiff Kenneth T. Simeone sent Disney a demand pursuant to 8 Del. C. § 220 to inspect corporate books and records.[56]The plaintiff has been a Disney stockholder since 1973 and lives in Kissimmee, Florida.[57]

2022年7月8日，原告Kenneth T. Simeone根據《特拉華州法典》第8編第220條向迪士尼提出查閱公司賬簿和記錄的要求。原告自1973年以來一直是迪士尼的股東，並且住在佛羅里達州的凱西米。

According to the demand, Simeone is “concerned that officers and directors of Disney may have breached their fiduciary duties to the Company and its stockholders by, inter alia, failing to appreciate the known risk that the Company's political stance would have on its financial position and the value of Disney stock.”58 He suspects that Disney officers and directors “plac[ed] their own political views ahead of their duties to act in the best interests of Disney and its stockholders.”59 The demand listed four related, purported purposes for the inspection:

根據要求，西蒙尼（Simeone）“擔心迪士尼公司的高管和董事可能違反了他們對公司及其股東的信義義務，尤其是沒有意識到公司的政治立場對其財務狀況和迪士尼股票價值造成的已知風險。他懷疑迪士尼的高管和董事將他們個人的政治觀點置於為迪士尼及其股東的最佳利益行事的職責之上。該要求列出了四項聲稱與檢查相關的目的：

1. To investigate potential wrongdoing, mismanagement and breaches of fiduciary duties by members of Disney's Board, Company executives, or others in connection with the Company's decision to publicly oppose the Parental Rights Act, despite being warned, and therefore having knowledge, that such opposition would be harmful to the Company and stockholder value;

1. 調查迪士尼董事會成員、公司高管或其他人在公司決定公開反對《家長權利法案》時可能存在的不法行為、管理不善和違反信義義務的行為，儘管他們已被警告並因此知道這種反對會對公司和股東價值造成損害；

2. To determine the extent to which the Company's opposition, or perceived opposition, to the Parental Rights Act has harmed the Company's value, including but not limited to, the loss or potential loss of favorable tax benefits or other benefits the Company has traditionally received from the State of Florida, whether in connection with the Reddy [sic] Creek Improvement District, or otherwise;

2. 確定公司反對或被認為反對《家長權利法案》在多大程度上損害了公司的價值，包括但不限於失去或可能失去有利的稅收優惠或公司傳統上從佛羅里達州獲得的其他利益，無論是與Reddy [原文如此] Creek Improvement District有關的利益，還是其他利益；

3. To assess the ability of Disney's Board to impartially consider a demand for action, including a request for permission to file a derivative lawsuit on Disney's behalf; and

3. 評估迪士尼董事會是否有能力公正地考慮訴訟請求，包括允許代表迪士尼提起衍生訴訟的請求；以及

4. To explore possible remedial measures, including, without limitation, seeking a meeting with the Board to discuss proposed reforms, communicating with other Disney stockholders, preparing a stockholder resolution for Disney's next annual meeting, and/or taking appropriate legal action in the event that members of the Board and/or Disney executives did not properly discharge their fiduciary duties.[60]

4. 探索可能的補救措施，包括但不限於尋求與董事會會面討論改革建議、與其他迪士尼股東溝通、為迪士尼下一次年度股東大會準備股東決議，以及/或在董事會成員和/或迪士尼高管未適當履行信義義務的情況下采取適當的法律措施。

Simeone sought four categories of documents pertaining to the subject matter of the demand. These include: (1) director independence questionnaires and “any other documents” reflecting ties among Disney directors; (2) Disney policies or guidelines about charitable or political contributions, or public positions on legislation or public policy issues; (3) meeting minutes and materials from the Disney Board or any Board committee about the Parental Rights Act, Disney's March 28 press release, the dissolution of the RCID, the economic benefits to Disney from the RCID, and the policies and guidelines that were the subject of request; and (4) written *964 correspondence “between or among any Disney directors (including [Chapek] in his capacity as CEO)” about the relevant issues.61 He requested these documents for a three-year time period.

Simeone試圖獲得與請求事項有關的四類檔案。這些檔案包括：（1）董事獨立性調查表和反映迪士尼董事之間關係的“任何其他檔案”；（2）迪士尼關於慈善或政治捐款的政策或指導方針，或關於立法或公共政策問題的公開立場；（3）迪士尼董事會或任何董事會委員會關於《家長權利法案》、迪士尼3月28日新聞稿、解散蘆葦溪改善區（RCID）、蘆葦溪改善區（RCID）給迪士尼帶來的經濟利益以及請求所涉及的政策和指導方針的會議記錄和材料；以及（4）“迪士尼任何董事（包括作為執行長的[查佩克]）之間”關於相關問題的書面通訊。【*964】他要求提供這些檔案的期限為三年。

On July 15, Disney's outside counsel sent Simeone a written response to the demand.[62]This response explained that Simeone had failed to state a proper purpose for inspection and that the requested documents were not necessary and essential to any such purpose.[63]The letter closed by offering to further discuss the demand.[64]

7月15日，迪士尼的外聘律師向西蒙尼傳送了一份對請求的書面答覆。該答覆解釋說，西蒙尼沒有說明檢查的正當目的，而且所要求的檔案對於任何此類目的而言都不是必要的。這封信函最後提出進一步討論該請求。

Between July 15 and October 28, the parties met and conferred on the scope of a production of Disney books and records.[65]During these negotiations, the parties agreed that Disney could redact both privileged and non-responsive content from any Board materials that Disney produced in response to the demand.[66]

在7月15日至10月28日期間，雙方就迪士尼賬簿和記錄的披露範圍進行了會談和商議。在上述談判期間，雙方同意迪士尼可以對其應要求披露的任何董事會材料中的保密內容和不相關的內容進行刪減。

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On October 28, after the parties executed a confidentiality agreement, Disney produced 73 pages of documents while “reserv[ing] all rights to challenge whether the Demand satisfie[d] the threshold requirements for an inspection under 8 Del. C. § 220.”[67]The documents were redacted for responsiveness and attorney-client privilege in accordance with the parties’ agreement.[68]The production included all Disney policies concerning charitable or political contributions that were in effect during the time period relevant to HB 1557, which were responsive to the second category of requested documents.[69]Disney also produced all formal Board documents—specifically, minutes—concerning HB 1557 in response to the third category of requests.[70]Disney declined to produce director independence questionnaires (category one) and email communications (category four).

10月28日，在雙方簽署了保密協議之後，迪士尼提供了73頁檔案，同時“保留一切質疑該請求是否滿足《特拉華州法典》第8編第220條所規定的檢查需要滿足的門檻要求的權利”。根據雙方的協議，這些檔案因回應性要求和律師與客戶保密特權而被刪減。披露的檔案包括在第1557號眾議院法案相關期間生效的所有迪士尼的有關慈善或政治捐款的政策，這些政策是對第二類請求檔案的回應。

E. The Litigation and the Second Document Production

E. 訴訟與第二次檔案披露

On December 5, 2022, Simeone filed a Verified Complaint Pursuant to 8 Del. C. § 220 to Compel Inspection of Books and Records (the “Complaint”).[71]Disney answered the Complaint on December 27.[72]

2022年12月5日，西蒙尼根據《特拉華州法典》第8編第220條提交了一份要求檢查賬簿和記錄的經核實的起訴狀（以下簡稱“起訴狀”）。迪士尼在12月27日就該訴狀進行了答辯。

Simeone served a set of document requests, interrogatories, and requests for admission on Disney.[73]He also served Disney with a notice of a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition for a corporate representative to testify about the contents of the documents at issue and the location and preservation of Board materials.[74]Disney refused to produce a Rule 30(b)(6) witness without a court order.[75]It subsequently produced Board policies about the taking and preserving *965 of meeting minutes, along with a privilege log for the previously-produced materials.[76]

西蒙尼將一系列檔案要求、質詢書和請求承認送達給迪士尼。他還將一份通知送達給迪士尼，該通知根據第30（b）（6）款規定的證人證言，要求公司代表就有爭議的檔案內容以及董事會材料的位置和儲存情況出庭作證。迪士尼拒絕在沒有法庭命令的情況下提供第30（b）（6）款規定的證人。【*965】隨後，迪士尼制定了關於記錄和儲存會議記錄的董事會政策，以及以前披露的材料的特權日誌。

Disney correspondingly served discovery on the plaintiff.[77]On February 10, 2023, Disney deposed Simeone. During the deposition, Simeone's counsel instructed him not to answer questions about the terms of his attorney engagement agreement related to the demand and this action.[78]After the deposition, Disney renewed its request for the terms of Simeone's counsel's engagement.[79]On February 28, Simeone served a verified interrogatory response about his fee and cost arrangements with counsel.[80]

迪士尼相應地與原告交換了證據。2023 年2月10日，迪士尼向西蒙尼進行取證。在取證過程中，西蒙尼的律師指示他不要回答與請求和本案有關的律師聘用協議條款。取證結束後，迪士尼再次要求瞭解西蒙尼律師的聘用條件。2月28日，西蒙尼送達了一份經核實的書面問答，內容涉及他與律師的酬金和費用安排。

A trial on a paper record was held on March 15.81 The matter was taken under advisement at that time.

3月15日進行了基於書面記錄的審理。相關事項當時已被認真考慮。

F. Additional Events

F. 額外的事件

On November 20, 2022, the Board announced that Chapek would be terminated as CEO.[82]He was replaced by former Disney CEO Bob Iger.[83]

2022年11月20日，董事會宣佈解除查佩克的執行長職務。接替他的是迪士尼前執行長羅伯特·艾格（Robert A. Iger，又稱Bob Iger）。

The Florida legislature eventually decided not to dissolve the RCID.[84]On January 8, 2023, it was reported that Governor DeSantis had proposed installing a state-appointed board of supervisors to govern the district.[85]Governor DeSantis explained that the proposal would eliminate Disney's “self-governing status” and “special legal privileges.”[86]In February, Governor DeSantis signed a bill that effectively took control of the RCID (renamed the Central Florida Tourism Oversight District) and appointed five members to a reconstituted board of supervisors.[87]

佛羅里達州議會最終決定不解散蘆葦溪改善區。據報道，2023年1月8日，州長德桑提斯曾提議設立一個由州政府任命的監事會來管理該地區。州長德桑提斯解釋說，該提案將取消迪士尼的“自治地位”和 “特殊法律特權”。2月，他簽署了一項法案，有效地控制了蘆葦溪改善區（更名為佛羅里達州中部旅遊監督區），並任命了五名成員進入重組後的監事會。

According to media reports, the newly appointed board of supervisors discovered that before DeSantis signed this bill, the prior board had passed restrictive covenants and a development agreement giving Disney certain rights.[88]On May 5, Governor *966 DeSantis signed another bill that would purportedly allow the new board of supervisors to void these agreements.[89]Litigation (both by and against Disney) regarding the district is ongoing.[90]

據媒體報道，新任命的監事會發現，在德桑提斯簽署該法案之前，前任監事會已經通過了限制性條款和一份賦予迪士尼某些權利的開發協議。5月5日，州長【*966】德桑提斯簽署了另一項法案，據稱該法案將允許新的監事會廢除這些協議。有關該區的訴訟（由迪士尼提出的和針對迪士尼提出的）仍在進行中。

Analysis｜分析

Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law provides stockholders with a qualified right to inspect corporate books and records.[91]To obtain inspection, a stockholder must satisfy the statute's form and manner requirements.[92]The stockholder must also prove, “by a preponderance of the evidence, a proper purpose entitling the stockholder to an inspection of every item sought.”[93]The stockholder must further “demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that ‘each category of books and records is essential to accomplishment of the stockholder's articulated purpose for the inspection.’ ”[94]

《特拉華州普通公司法》第220條規定，股東有查閱公司賬簿和記錄的權利。要獲得查閱權，股東必須滿足法規對形式和方式的要求。股東還必須“以優勢證據證明，有正當目的使股東有權查閱所要求的每一項內容”。股東還必須“以優勢證據證明，‘每一類賬簿和記錄對於實現股東明確提出的查閱目的至關重要’”。

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The plaintiff does not meet the standard for a Section 220 inspection for three independent reasons. First, the purposes described in the demand are not the plaintiff's own purposes. Second, the plaintiff has not provided a credible basis from which to infer possible wrongdoing. Third, the defendant has provided the plaintiff with all necessary and essential documents.

由於三個獨立的原因，原告不符合第220條所規定的檢查對應的標準。首先，請求描述的目的並非原告自己的目的。第二，原告沒有提供可信的依據來推斷可能的不當行為。第三，被告已向原告提供了所有必要的檔案。

A. Whether the Stated Purposes Are the Plaintiff's Purposes

A. 所述目的是否為原告的目的

The “propriety of the stockholder's purpose” is the “paramount factor in determining whether a stockholder is entitled to inspection of corporate books and records.”[95]Section 220 defines a proper purpose as one “reasonably related to such person's interest as a stockholder.”[96]In rare circumstances, a defendant can prove that a stockholder lacks a proper purpose where “the purposes for the inspection belong to [the stockholder's counsel]” rather than the stockholder himself.[97]Disney has prevailed in making that showing here.

“股東的目的的正當性”是“決定股東是否有權查閱公司賬簿和記錄的首要因素”。第220條將正當目的定義為“與該人作為股東的利益合理相關”的目的。在極少數情況下，如果“檢查的目的屬於[股東的律師]而非股東本人，則被告可以證明股東缺乏正當目的。迪士尼在此已經成功地展示了這一點。

*967 Simeone testified that he did not consider pursuing litigation or making an inspection demand after learning about HB 1557.[98]His reaction to Disney's opposition to HB 1557 and the subsequent legislation rescinding the RCID was concern that his property tax bill would increase.[99]Simeone was later “contacted by a lawyer” in his family—Brian McCall—who knew he was a Disney stockholder and solicited him to serve a demand.[100]After speaking to McCall, Simeone was contacted by Paul Jonna.[101]Jonna is Special Counsel to the Thomas More Society, a “public interest law firm championing Life, Family, and Freedom.”[102]The plaintiff's verified interrogatory response states that the Thomas More Society is advancing costs for this litigation.[103]

【*967】西蒙尼作證說他在瞭解第1557號眾議院法案之後沒有考慮提起訴訟或提出檢查請求。他對迪士尼反對第1557號眾議院法案以及隨後廢除蘆葦溪改善區的立法的反應是擔心他的房屋稅會增加。後來，西蒙尼家族中的一位律師——布萊恩·麥考爾（Brian McCall）“聯絡”了西蒙尼，這位律師知道西蒙尼是迪士尼的股東，並勸說他送達請求書。與麥考爾交談後，保羅·喬納（Paul Jonna）聯絡了西蒙尼。喬納是托馬斯·莫爾協會（the Thomas More Society）的特別顧問，該協會是一家“擁護生命、家庭和自由的公益律師事務所”。原告在經核實的書面質詢答覆中稱，托馬斯·莫爾協會正在為此次訴訟墊付費用。

The purposes stated in the demand are pretextual.[104]Simeone testified that his only purpose for inspection was to “know the person or persons who were responsible for making th[e] political decision” at Disney to publicly oppose HB 1557.[105]He said that he “hope[s] it becomes public and the other shareholders find out about” these identities.[106]He confirmed that he has no other purpose.[107]The only evidence indicating that the purposes listed in the demand might belong to Simeone is the testimony his counsel elicited through leading redirect questions.[108]

請求中所述的目的不過是藉口。西蒙尼作證說他查閱的唯一目的是“瞭解負責在迪士尼做出政治決定的人”以公開反對第1557號眾議院法案。他說，他“希望這些資訊被公開，其他股東能發現”這些身份。他確認他沒有其他的目的。表明請求中所列目的可能屬於西蒙尼的唯一證據是他的律師透過誘導性重定向問題獲得的證詞。

The plaintiff's limited and non-substantive involvement in the demand and litigation further reveals the lawyer-driven nature of this action.[109]Simeone testified that he could not recall reading a draft of the demand before it was sent to Disney.[110]He reviewed but made no edits to the Complaint.[111]He did not see the news articles proffered as evidence in support of his claim.[112]

原告對請求和訴訟的有限的和非實質性的參與進一步揭示了本案訴訟由律師驅動的本質。西蒙尼作證說，他不記得在將請求傳送給迪士尼之前閱讀過其草稿。他審閱了起訴狀，但沒有對起訴狀進行編輯。他沒有看到為了支援他的主張而被作為證據提出的新聞文章。

The plaintiff's counsel and the Thomas More Society are entitled to their beliefs. They are also entitled to pursue litigation in support of those beliefs. But a *968 Section 220 suit, which is designed to address the plaintiff's interests as a stockholder, is not a vehicle to advance them.[113]

原告的律師和托馬斯·莫爾協會有權維護他們的信念。他們也有權提起訴訟以支援這些信念。但是，【*968】旨在解決原告作為股東的利益問題的第220條訴訟並不是促進這些利益的工具。

B. Whether the Plaintiff Has Demonstrated a Proper Purpose

B. 原告是否已證明有正當目的

The plaintiff's demand identifies four purposes; all center around the same desire to investigate wrongdoing. The second and fourth purposes—to determine whether Disney's opposition to HB 1557 was harmful to the company and to “explore possible remedial measures”[114]—are derivative of and dependent upon whether there was mismanagement in the first place. The third purpose of assessing the impartiality of the Board if presented with a litigation demand—though proper in the abstract[115]—similarly focuses on whether the Board is interested in the alleged underlying wrongdoing.[116]Consequently, I focus on the first stated purpose: “[t]o investigate potential wrongdoing, mismanagement and breaches of fiduciary duties … in connection with the Company's decision to publicly oppose the Parental Rights Act.”[117]

原告的請求確定了四個目的；所有目的都圍繞著調查不法行為的相同願望。第二個和第四個目的——確定迪士尼反對第1557號眾議院法案是否對公司有害，並“探索可能的補救措施”——是從最初是否存在管理不善這個問題衍生出來的，並依賴於後者。第三個目的，即在提出訴訟要求時評估董事會的公正性（儘管從抽象上講是正當的），同樣側重於董事會是否與被指控的潛在不當行為有利害關係。因此，我專注於第一個宣告的目的：“為了調查潛在的不當行為、管理不善和違反信義義務的行為……與公司公開反對《家長權利法案》的決定有關。”

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“It is well established that a stockholder's desire to investigate wrongdoing or mismanagement is a ‘proper purpose.’ ”118 But “a bare allegation of possible waste, mismanagement, or breach of fiduciary duty, without more, will not entitle a stockholder to a Section 220 inspection.”119 “[A] stockholder seeking to investigate wrongdoing must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, a credible basis from which the court can infer there is ‘possible mismanagement as would warrant further investigation.’ ”120 This burden, though the lowest standard of proof in our law, is neither “a formality”121 nor “inconsequential.”122 A stockholder must present “some evidence to suggest a credible basis for wrongdoing.”123 Simeone has failed to do so.

“眾所周知，股東希望調查不當行為或管理不善是‘正當目的’。”但是，“對可能的浪費、管理不善或違反信義義務的基本指控，如果沒有更多，將無法使股東獲得第220條的查閱權。”“[A] 試圖調查不當行為的股東必須透過優勢證據證明可信的依據，法院可以從中能夠推斷出‘可能存在需要進一步調查的管理不善’。”這項舉證責任，雖然是我們法律中最低的舉證標準，但既不是“例行公事”，也不是“無關緊要的”。股東必須提供“一些證據來表明不法行為的可信依據”。西蒙尼沒有這樣做。

*969 The plaintiff's theory is that Disney's “decision to express public opposition” to HB 1557 despite “the [G]overnor's warning” amounts to a possible breach of fiduciary duty by the Board and certain Disney officers.[124]As a result of these actions, the plaintiff avers that Disney lost (or at least risked the loss of) rights and powers associated with the RCID.[125]He alleges that Disney's stock price dropped and that Disney “continues to suffer” financial harm because of its “aggressive position” on HB 1557.[126]

【*969】原告的意見是，迪士尼不顧“政府的警告”，“決定公開反對”第1557號眾議院法案，這相當於董事會和某些迪士尼高管可能違反了信義義務。由於這些行動，原告聲稱迪士尼失去了（或至少有風險失去）與蘆葦溪改善區相關的權利和權力。他聲稱，迪士尼的股價下跌，並且由於其對第1557號眾議院法案的“激進立場”，迪士尼會“繼續遭受”財務損失。

The plaintiff is not describing potential wrongdoing. He is critiquing a business decision.[127 ]“A stockholder cannot obtain books and records simply because the stockholder disagrees with a board decision, even if the decision turned out poorly in hindsight.”[128]

原告沒有描述潛在的不當行為。他在批評一個商業決策。“股東不能僅僅因為其不同意董事會的決定而獲得賬簿和記錄，即使事後看來該決定的結果很糟糕。”

Although choosing to speak (or not speak) on public policy issues is an ordinary business decision, this case exemplifies the challenges a corporation faces when addressing divisive topics—particularly *970 ones external to its business.[129]Individual investors have diverse interests—beyond their shared goal of corporate profitability—and viewpoints that may not align with the company's position on political, religious, or social matters. Yet stockholders invest with the understanding that the board is empowered to direct the corporation's affairs.[130]The board may delegate implementation to management, but it alone bears the ultimate responsibility for establishing corporate policy.[131]

儘管選擇就公共政策問題發表意見（或不發表意見）是一項普通的商業決定，但本案體現了公司在解決有爭議的話題時面臨的挑戰，尤其是【*970】與其業務無關的話題。個人投資者有著超越其希望企業盈利的共同目標的多元利益以及可能不同於公司在政治、宗教或社會事務上立場的觀點。然而，股東在投資時知曉，董事會有權指導公司的事務。董事會可以將實施工作委託給管理層，但只有它承擔制定公司政策的最終責任。

Far from suggesting wrongdoing, the evidence here indicates that the Board actively engaged in setting the tone for Disney's response to HB 1557.[132]The Board did not abdicate its duties or allow management's personal views to dictate Disney's response to the legislation. Rather, it held the sort of deliberations that a board should undertake when the corporation's voice is used on matters of social significance.[133]

本案的證據表明董事會積極為迪士尼對第1557號眾議院法案的回應定下基調，但遠不能表明董事會存在不當行為。董事會沒有放棄其職責，也沒有讓管理層的個人觀點決定迪士尼對該立法的反應。相反，它舉行了在一個公司對具有社會意義的問題發聲時董事會應當進行的那種審議。

As Chapek told stockholders during Disney's 2022 annual meeting, the company's original approach to HB 1557 “didn't quite get the job done.”[134]The company, facing widespread backlash from its staff and creative talent, changed course after the full Board held a special meeting about “Political Engagement and Communications.”[135]The Board discussed “the communications plan, philosophy and approach regarding Florida legislation and employee response.”[136]Only then did Chapek announce *971 that Disney opposed the bill.[137]

正如查佩克在迪士尼2022年年度股東大會上告訴股東的那樣，該公司最初對第1557號眾議院法案的態度“並沒有完全達到預期效果”。面對員工和創意合作伙伴的廣泛反對，該公司在全體董事會舉行了一次關於“政治參與和溝通”的特別會議後改弦更張。董事會討論了“關於佛羅里達州立法和員工回應的溝通計劃、理念和方法”。直到那時，查佩克才宣佈【*971】迪士尼反對該法案。

The Board's consideration of employee concerns was not, as the plaintiff suggests, at the expense of stockholders. A board may conclude in the exercise of its business judgment that addressing interests of corporate stakeholders—such as the workforce that drives a company's profits—is “rationally related” to building long-term value.[138]Indeed, the plaintiff acknowledges that maintaining a positive relationship with employees and creative partners is crucial to Disney's success.[139]It is not for this court to “question rational judgments about how promoting non-stockholder interests—be it through making a charitable contribution, paying employees higher salaries and benefits, or more general norms like promoting a particular corporate culture—ultimately promote stockholder value.”[140]

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不像原告所說的那樣，董事會考慮員工的擔憂並沒有以犧牲股東為代價。董事會在運用其商業判斷時可能會得出結論，認為實現公司利益相關者（例如驅動公司營利的員工）的利益與建立長期價值“合理相關”。事實上，原告承認，與員工和創意合作伙伴保持積極的關係對迪士尼的成功至關重要。本法院不應“質疑關於促進非股東利益的理性判斷（無論是透過慈善捐款、向員工支付更高的薪水和福利，還是透過促進特定企業文化等更普遍的規範）最終會促進股東價值。

The plaintiff has not put forth any legitimate basis to question the Board's impartiality in responding to the legislation.[141]He argues that Disney's directors were motivated by personal beliefs because “several Board members are actively involved with ‘political organizations such as the Human Rights Campaign’ ” that “adamantly opposed” HB 1557.[142]That some directors may be involved with a non-profit organization does not itself create a conflict of interest—much less undermine the full Board's deliberative process. In any event, there are no facts in the record to infer that the directors’ personal beliefs caused them to act contrary to the interests of Disney and its stockholders.[143 ]The *972 plaintiff cannot obtain books and records to search for hypothetical conflicts.[144]

原告沒有提出任何質疑董事會在回應立法時的公正性的正當依據。他認為，迪士尼的董事們是受個人信仰的驅使，因為“幾位董事會成員積極參與‘人權運動等政治組織’”，這些組織“堅決反對”第1557號眾議院法案。一些董事可能參與非營利組織本身不會造成利益衝突，更不用說破壞整個董事會的審議過程了。無論如何，記錄中沒有事實可以推斷董事的個人信仰導致他們的行為違背了迪士尼及其股東的利益。【*972】原告無法獲得賬簿和記錄來尋找假設的衝突。

I also find deficient the plaintiff's argument that the Board “ignored a known risk” of negative consequences from opposing the legislation.[145]Perhaps the Board could have avoided political blowback by remaining silent on HB 1557. At the same time, doing so could have damaged the company's corporate culture and employee morale. The weighing of these key risks by disinterested fiduciaries does not evidence a potential lack of due care, let alone bad faith.[146]

我還認為原告所持的董事會“忽視了”反對立法的負面後果的“已知風險”這一論點存在缺陷。也許董事會可以透過對第1557號眾議院法案保持沉默來避免政治上的不良影響。同時，這樣做可能會有損公司的企業文化和員工士氣。沒有利害關係的受託人權衡這些關鍵風險並不能證明其可能缺乏應有的謹慎，更不用說證明存在惡意了。

Moreover, even if a board's defiance of a political threat could provide a credible basis to suspect wrongdoing, there is no factual support for that conclusion here.[147]Neither the Complaint nor any of the sources relied on by the plaintiff demonstrate that Disney was warned of financial repercussions or dissolution of the RCID before Chapek's March 9 announcement.[148]According to the Complaint, it was not until March 30—three weeks after Disney first publicly opposed HB 1557 and two days after its March 28 statement—that the specter of dissolving the RCID was explicitly raised.[149]

此外，即使董事會對政治威脅的蔑視可以為懷疑不當行為提供可信的依據，但本案不存在支援該結論的事實。起訴狀和原告所依賴的任何來源均未表明，迪士尼在查佩克於3月9日宣佈之前已被警告財務影響或蘆葦溪改善區的解散。根據起訴狀，直到3月30日，即迪士尼首次公開反對第1557號眾議院法案三週後、3月28日宣告兩天後，才明確提出了明確提出瞭解散蘆葦溪改善區的擔憂。

At bottom, the plaintiff disagrees with Disney's opposition to HB 1557.[150]He has every right to do so. But “disagreement with [a] business judgment” is not “evidence of wrongdoing” warranting a Section 220 inspection.[151]Such an inspection would not be reasonably related to the plaintiff's interests as a Disney stockholder; it would intrude upon the “rights of *973 directors to manage the business of the corporation without undue interference.”[152]

歸根結底，原告不同意迪士尼反對第1557號眾議院法案。他完全有權利這樣做。但是，“不同意一項商業判斷”並不是使第220條檢查有必要的“不當行為證據”。這種檢查不與原告作為迪士尼股東的利益合理相關；它將侵犯【*973】“董事管理公司業務而不受不當干預的權利”。

C. Whether the Plaintiff Has Proven He Lacks Essential Information

C. 原告是否已證明他缺乏基本資料

Even if the plaintiff had demonstrated a proper purpose, no further inspection would be warranted. The plaintiff has not met his “burden of proving that the information [in the records sought] is essential to that purpose, taking into account the books and records [the company] has previously furnished.”[153]

即使原告人已證明其目的正當，進一步檢查也沒有必要。考慮到[公司]之前提供的賬簿和記錄，原告沒有履行其“證明[所尋求的記錄中]的資訊對其目的至關重要的責任。

“Formal board-level documents are often the beginning and end of a Section 220 production where a plaintiff aims to investigate” potential mismanagement.[154]Disney has repeatedly represented that it produced all Board-level materials related to HB 1557, Disney's response to the legislation, the potential loss or modification of the RCID, and Disney's policies on charitable and political giving.[155]Still, the plaintiff maintains that he needs three years of email and correspondence “between and among Board members and CEO Chapek” about the same topics.[156]

“在原告旨在調查”潛在的管理不善的情況下，“正式的董事會級檔案通常是第220條披露的開始和結束”。迪士尼一再表示，它出示了與第1557號眾議院法案、迪士尼對立法的回應、蘆葦溪改善區的潛在損失或調整，以及迪士尼的慈善和政治捐贈政策相關的所有董事會級材料。儘管如此，原告堅持認為，他需要“董事會成員與執行長查佩克之間”有關相同話題的三年以來的電子郵件和通訊。

The Delaware Supreme Court has instructed that “the Court of Chancery should not order emails to be produced when other materials (e.g., traditional board-level materials, such as minutes) would accomplish the petitioner's proper purpose.”[157]A deviation from this typical approach is not merited here. The Board maintained formal records of its actions, and the relevant records were provided to the plaintiff.[158]

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特拉華州最高法院已正式指示，“衡平法院不應下令在其他材料（例如，會議記錄等傳統的董事會級材料）能夠實現申請人的正當目的時要求提供電子郵件。本案沒有必要偏離這種典型的做法。董事會保留了其行動的正式記錄，並將相關記錄提供給了原告。

*974 The request for three years of documents is also “vastly overbroad.”[159]The plaintiff wishes to investigate Disney's response to one piece of legislation that was introduced and passed in 2022. That aside, the point is moot. Disney has confirmed that no other Board-level documents on these subjects exist.[160]

【*974】要求提供三年的檔案也“太過於寬泛”。原告希望調查迪士尼對2022年引入並透過的一項立法的回應。除此之外，其觀點不值得討論。迪士尼已經確認不存在關於這些主題的其他董事會級檔案。

The plaintiff also contends that Disney's production is incomplete because the Board minutes it produced were redacted.[161]The parties agreed that Disney could redact portions of documents that were not responsive to the demand.[162]Irrespective of this agreement, irrelevant information cannot be “essential” to the purpose of the demand.[163]

原告還辯稱，迪士尼的製作不完整，因為它提供的董事會會議記錄已被刪減。雙方同意，迪士尼可以刪減檔案中與請求無關的部分。無論本協議如何，不相關的資訊對請求的目的而言都不構成“必要的”。

Disney's redactions for responsiveness covered text that was also withheld as attorney-client privileged. At the plaintiff's request, Disney provided a log detailing its privilege redactions.[164]This privilege log not only substantiates Disney's privilege assertions. It also reflects that the redacted entries concern irrelevant matters: discussions about stockholder correspondence, ongoing litigation or regulatory matters that predate the passage of HB 1557, or privileged discussions concerning the directors’ duties and rules as a general matter.[165]

迪士尼為回應性要求而進行的刪減涵蓋了同樣因律師與客戶保密特權而被拒絕提供的文字。應原告的要求，迪士尼提供了一份日誌，詳細說明了其編輯特權。該特權日誌不僅證實了迪士尼的許可權宣告，它還反映出被刪減的條目涉及（與請求目的）不相關的事項：有關第1557號眾議院法案透過之前的股東通訊、正在進行的訴訟或監管事項的討論，或有關一般情況下董事職責和規則的保密討論。

The plaintiff therefore has all necessary and essential information. He would not be entitled to additional books and records had he prevailed on the other elements of his claim.

因此，原告擁有所有必要的資訊。如果他在其主張的其他要素上獲勝，他將無權獲得額外的賬簿和記錄。

*975D. Whether the Plaintiff May Depose a Disney Witness

【*975】原告是否可以向迪士尼的證人取證

Finally, the plaintiff asks that Disney be ordered to produce a Rule 30(b)(6) deponent to testify about “what type of documents exist, where they are located, and whether Disney is asserting any privilege.”[166]He has not demonstrated why a deposition would be proportionate to the needs of this case.[167]

最後，原告要求（法院）命令迪士尼出示《聯邦民事訴訟規則》（FRCP）第30（b）（6）條規定的證人，就“存在什麼型別的檔案、它們的位置以及迪士尼是否主張任何特權”提供證言。他沒有證明為什麼證詞會與本案的需要相稱。

“Books and records actions are not supposed to be sprawling, oxymoronic lawsuits with extensive discovery.”[168]“[T]he discovery obligation typically confronted by the corporate defendant is relatively minimal” and “has been described as ‘narrow in purpose and scope.’ ”[169]A deposition of a corporate representative in a books and records action is not a matter of right.[170]It is particularly uncalled for in this case since the plaintiff did not prove a proper purpose.

“賬簿和記錄的訴訟不應該是涉及廣泛的證據開示的雜亂、矛盾的訴訟。”“公司被告通常面臨的證據開示義務相對較小”，並且“被描述為‘目的和範圍狹窄’。”在賬簿和記錄訴訟中，公司代表的證言不是一個權利問題。在本案中，由於原告沒有證明其正當目的，使迪士尼的代表作證尤其沒有必要。

III

Conclusion｜結論

For the reasons described above, I decline to grant the plaintiff's request for a further inspection of Disney books and records. Judgment will be entered for the defendant.

鑑於上述原因，我拒絕批准原告進一步檢查迪士尼賬簿和記錄的請求。判決被告勝訴。

Footnotes

腳註

【1】 Exhibits jointly submitted by the parties at trial are cited according to the numbers provided on the parties’ joint exhibit list as “JX __,” unless otherwise defined. Pin cites are to the last three digits of document Bates stamps absent internal pagination.

【2】See In re Books-A-Million, Inc. S'holders Litig., 2016 WL 5874974, at *1 (Del. Ch. Oct. 10, 2016) (explaining that the court may take judicial notice of “facts that are not subject to reasonable dispute” (citing In re Gen. Motors (Hughes) S'holder Litig., 897 A.2d 162, 170 (Del. 2006))); Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 809 A.2d 1163, 1167 n.3 (Del. Ch. 2002) (“The court may take judicial notice of facts publicly available in filings with the SEC.”).

【3】Fla. HB 1557 (2022) (codified at Fla. Stat. Ann. § 1001.42(8)(c)(3)); see also Pre-trial Stipulation and Order (Dkt. 31) (“PTO”) ¶ 7; JX 14.

【4】Fla. Stat. Ann. § 1001.42(8)(c)(3); see also JX 14.

【5】Fla. Stat. Ann. § 1001.42(8)(c)(3); see also JX 12.

【6】E.g., JX 4.

【7】PTO ¶¶ 4-5; see The Walt Disney Company, https://thewaltdisneycompany.com/ (last visited June 22, 2023); Walt Disney World, https://disneyworld.disney.go.com/ (last visited June 22, 2023).

【8】See JX 10.

【9】JX 4; see JX 14.

【10】JX 4.

【11】Id.

【12】Id.

【13】See, e.g., id.

【14】E.g., id. (quoting social media posts).

E.g., id. (quoting social media posts).

HB 1557, The Florida Senate, https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2022/1557/?Tab=VoteHistory (last visited June 22, 2023).

JX 14.

JX 24 at ‘051-053.

Id. at ‘052.

Id.

See JX 5; see also The Walt Disney Company, Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) (Jan. 19, 2022).

JX 5; JX 6; see also 2022 Annual Meeting of Shareholders, The Walt Disney Company (Mar. 9, 2022), https://thewaltdisneycompany.com/app/uploads/2022/03/2022-ASM-transcript.pdf.

JX 5.

Id.; JX 6.

JX 6 (“I [Chapek] look forward to visiting with the governor with a small delegation of cast members who are involved in this movement.”).

JX 48 at 191. It is not obvious from the record when this conversation occurred, though the book describes it as happening when “the controversy over the Parental Rights in Education bill was coming to a head” and Disney was “getting a lot of pressure to weigh in against the bill.” Id. at 190-91. Given the context, it seems more likely than not that this was the conversation Chapek referenced during the March 9 annual stockholder meeting. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.

Id. at 194.

JX 24 at ‘054-055.

Id. at ‘055.

Id.

JX 7.

Id.

JX 8.

Id.

PTO ¶ 9.

Id. ¶ 10; JX 9.

JX 10.

See JX 11.

Id.; see also History, Reedy Creek Improvement District, https://www.rcid.org/about/history (last visited June 22, 2023).

JX 11.

See id.; see also About, Reedy Creek Improvement District, https://www.rcid.org/about (last visited June 22, 2023).

JX 13; see also Ch. 67-764, 1967 Fla. Laws 256.

JX 13; see also Board of Supervisors, Reedy Creek Improvement District, https://www.rcid.org/about/board-of-supervisors-2 (last visited June 22, 2023).

JX 11.

Id.

JX 14.

Id.; JX 15; Fla. SB 4-C (2022).

JX 48 at 199.

Fla. SB 4-C (2022).

Id.

JX 17.

Id.

JX 18.

See The Walt Disney Company Common Stock Historical Data, Nasdaq, https://www.nasdaq.com/market-activity/stocks/dis/historical (last visited June 22, 2023).

See id.; JX 26.

JX 19; PTO ¶ 11.

JX 19 Ex. 2 at 1; JX 36 (“Pl.’s Dep.”) at 6-8; PTO ¶ 3.

JX 19 at 3.

Id.

Id. at 4.

Id. at 5.

JX 20; PTO ¶ 12.

JX 20 at 2-3. The response also said that Simeone had failed to demonstrate he held Disney stock during the time of the alleged wrongdoing. Id. at 3-4. Simeone subsequently provided proof of continuous ownership. JX 21 at 3-5.

JX 20 at 4.

PTO ¶ 13.

Id.

JX 23 (transmittal letter); see JX 24 (production Bates labeled DIS000001-73).

PTO ¶ 14.

JX 24 at ‘072-073.

Id. at ‘001-071.

Dkt. 1 (“Compl.”).

Dkt. 5.

Dkt. 7.

Dkt. 13.

PTO ¶ 20.

JX 34 (production Bates stamped DIS0000074-116); JX 44 (privilege log). The production included Disney's bylaws, as well as charters for the Board's Audit, Compensation, and Governance and Nominating Committees.

Dkt. 8; see JX 33.

PTO ¶ 22; Pl.’s Dep. 38-39.

PTO ¶ 23.

Id. ¶ 24; JX 45.

Dkt. 35; Tr. of Mar. 15, 2023 Section 220 Trial (Dkt. 36) (“Trial Tr.”).

JX 28.

JX 29.

JX 41.

JX 30 (“The corporate kingdom has come to an end.”).

JX 35; see also JX 31.

Fla. HB 9-B (2023); see About Central Florida Tourism Oversight District, Reedy Creek Improvement District, https://www.rcid.org/ (last visited June 22, 2023); Governor Ron DeSantis Appoints Five to the Central Florida Tourism Oversight District, Ron DeSantis 46th Governor of Florida (Feb. 27, 2023), https://www.flgov.com/2023/02/27/governor-ron-desantis-appoints-five-to-the-central-florida-tourism-oversight-district/. I note that this development was not addressed at trial. It, along with the events described in the remainder of this section, are included for the sake of context and completeness. These events have no bearing on the outcome of this action.

See Joseph Ax & Dawn Chmielewski, DeSantis signs bill allowing Florida board to cancel Disney deals, Reuters (May 5, 2023), https://www.reuters.com/world/us/desantis-signs-bill-allowing-florida-board-cancel-disney-deals-2023-05-05/; Jesus Jiménez & Brooks Barnes, What We Know About the DeSantis-Disney Dispute, N.Y. Times (May 19, 2023), https://www.nytimes.com/article/disney-florida-desantis.html.

Fla. SB 1604 (2023); Ax & Chmielewski, supra note 88; Jimenez & Barnes, supra note 88.

See Compl., Walt Disney Parks and Resorts U.S., Inc. v. DeSantis, No. 4:23-cv-00163, 2023 WL 3098088 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 26, 2023); Compl., Cent. Fla. Tourism Oversight District v. Walt Disney Parks and Resorts U.S., Inc., No. 2023-CA-011818-O, 2023 WL 3178900 (Fla. Cir. Ct. May 1, 2023).

See Seinfeld v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc., 909 A.2d 117, 119 (Del. 2006); see 8 Del. C. § 220.

8 Del. C. § 220(b). Disney does not dispute that the demand complied with Section 220’s form and manner requirements. PTO ¶ 25.

Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Leviton Mfg. Co., Inc., 681 A.2d 1026, 1028 (Del. 1996).

Lebanon Cnty. Emps.’ Ret. Fund v. AmerisourceBergen Corp., 2020 WL 132752, at *6 (Del. Ch. Jan. 13, 2020) (quoting Thomas & Betts, 681 A.2d at 1035), aff'd, 243 A.3d 417 (Del. 2020).

CM & M Grp., Inc. v. Carroll, 453 A.2d 788, 792 (Del. 1982).

8 Del. C. § 220(b).

Wilkinson v. A. Schulman, Inc., 2017 WL 5289553, at *2 (Del. Ch. Nov. 13, 2017) (explaining that although “[a] stockholder obviously can use counsel to seek books and records,” the purposes for inspection must be the stockholder's own “actual purposes” rather than “counsel's purposes”); see also Pershing Square, L.P. v. Ceridian Corp., 923 A.2d 810, 817 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“A corporate defendant may resist demand where it shows that the stockholder's stated proper purpose is not the actual purpose for the demand.”); Sutherland v. Dardanelle Timber Co., 2006 WL 1451531, at *8 (Del. Ch. May 16, 2006) (“A defendant facing a Section 220 action may resist that demand by showing that the plaintiff's purpose, although a valid one, is not the actual purpose. In other words, the defendant may try to show that the plaintiff has pursued its claim under false pretenses.”).

Pl.’s Dep. 38.

Id. at 24-26.

100

Id. at 26, 31-38; see JX 39; JX 40.

101

Pl.’s Dep. 35-36. Simeone assumes that McCall gave Jonna his contact information. Id.

102

Thomas More Society, https://thomasmoresociety.org (last visited June 25, 2023); see JX 38.

103

JX 45 at 2.

104

Wilkinson, 2017 WL 5289553, at *3 (concluding that a stockholder's stated purposes were pretextual where his counsel sought “to investigate different issues than what motivated the stockholder to respond to the law firm's solicitation”).

105

Pl.’s Dep. 40-42.

106

Id.

107

Id. (“Q: So is that the piece of information that you are seeking through this case, who made the decision? A: Yes, the persons that made the decisions. Q: Is there any other information that you believe you need as part of this litigation? A: No.”). Even if identifying decision makers were a proper purpose, this information was already produced to the plaintiff. JX 24 at ‘051-52 (stating that Chapek and Morrell “led a discussion with the Board members” and listing the directors and officers in attendance at the meeting). The identities of those involved in Disney's opposition of HB 1557 were publicized when the plaintiff filed an unredacted version of the Complaint. Dkt. 3 ¶ 36.

108

See Pl.’s Dep. 67-69. I give the testimony provided in response to these leading questions no weight.

109

See Wilkinson, 2017 WL 5289553, at *3.

110

Pl.’s Dep. 43.

111

Id. at 43-44.

112

Id. at 48-49.

113

See Berkowitz v. Legal Sea Foods, Inc., 1997 WL 153815, at *2 (Del. Ch. Mar. 24, 1997) (discussing the impropriety of a personal purpose for Section 220 inspection); Lynn v. EnviroSource, Inc., 1991 WL 80242, at *2 (Del. Ch. May 13, 1991) (denying an inspection request because the plaintiff's stated purpose was not of general interest to stockholders).

114

JX 19 at 4.

115

See In re Facebook, Inc. Section 220 Litig., 2019 WL 2320842, at *16 (Del. Ch. May 30, 2019), as revised (May 31, 2019).

116

No additional conflicts are described in the demand. See Okla. Firefighters Pension & Ret. Sys. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2022 WL 1760618, at *10 (Del. Ch. June 1, 2022) (stating that a stockholder plaintiff seeking documents about director independence “must give the court credible grounds to justify an inspection”); Hoeller v. Tempur Sealy Int'l, Inc., 2019 WL 551318, at *9 (Del. Ch. Feb. 12, 2019); cf. Paul v. China MediaExpress Hldgs., Inc., 2012 WL 28818, at *4-5 (Del. Ch. Jan. 5, 2012) (finding that a stockholder could obtain books and records for the purpose of investigating whether the board could impartially consider a demand because the stockholder set forth a credible basis to infer waste or mismanagement).

117

JX 19 at 4.

118

Seinfeld, 909 A.2d at 121.

119

AmerisourceBergen, 243 A.3d at 426.

120

Id. (quoting Sec. First Corp. v. U.S. Die Casting & Dev. Co., 687 A.2d 563, 568 (Del. 1997)).

121

Haque v. Tesla Motors, Inc., 2017 WL 448594, at *4 (Del. Ch. Feb. 2, 2017).

122

Amazon.com, 2022 WL 1760618, at *6; see also Sec. First, 687 A.2d at 568 (“The threshold for a plaintiff in a Section 220 case is not insubstantial.”).

123

Seinfeld, 909 A.2d at 119; see Sec. First, 687 A.2d at 568 (“There must be some evidence of possible mismanagement as would warrant further investigation of the matter.” (quoting Helmsman Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. A & S Consultants, Inc., 525 A.2d 160, 166 (Del. Ch. 1987))); Norfolk Cnty. Ret. Sys. v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc., 2009 WL 353746, at *6 (Del. Ch. Feb. 12, 2009) (explaining that a stockholder need not “prove mismanagement actually occurred, but must make ‘a credible showing, through documents, logic, testimony or otherwise, that there are legitimate issues of wrongdoing’ ” (quoting Sec. First, 687 A.2d at 568)).

124

Compl. ¶¶ 1-2. The plaintiff's pre-trial brief suggests that he may also be interested in investigating corporate waste. This request was not raised in the demand or the Complaint. Had it been fairly presented, the argument would still fail because the plaintiff does not state anywhere in the record that Disney transferred a corporate asset of value for unreasonably small consideration. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263 (Del. 2000) (defining waste under Delaware law as “an exchange of corporate assets for consideration so disproportionately small as to lie beyond the range at which any reasonable person might be willing to trade”).

125

Compl. ¶¶ 1-2; JX 19 at 4-5.

126

Compl. ¶¶ 23, 25. No evidence is cited to support the plaintiff's conjecture that Disney's stock price suffered because of its public stance on HB 1557. See Pl.’s Dep. 15-18. The only analyst report cited in the Complaint attributes Disney's decline in stock price to other factors, including losses from the Disney+ steaming service and a general sector decline across the media and entertainment industry. Compl. ¶ 22 (citing JX 26). The drop in stock price alone is an insufficient basis from which wrongdoing can be inferred. See City of Westland Police & Fire Ret. Sys. v. Axcelis Techs., Inc., 2009 WL 3086537, at *8 (Del. Ch. Sept. 28, 2009) (stating that a plaintiff “must point the court to something other than a precipitous drop in stock price before Section 220 inspection rights may be granted”), aff'd, 1 A.3d 281 (Del. 2010).

127

Pl.’s Dep. 64 (“Q. Okay. So your view is the company and its executives and officers used poor judgment in making this business decision to speak on this bill? A. Yes.”).

128

AmerisourceBergen, 2020 WL 132752, at *9; see also Seinfeld, 909 A.2d at 120 (“The Court of Chancery properly noted that a disagreement with the business judgment of [the defendant's] board of directors … is not evidence of wrongdoing and did not satisfy [the plaintiff's] burden under section 220.”); Deephaven Risk Arb Trading Ltd. v. UnitedGlobalCom, Inc., 2005 WL 1713067, at *8 (Del. Ch. Jul. 13, 2005) (“Stockholders cannot satisfy this burden merely by expressing a suspicion of wrongdoing or a disagreement with a business decision.”); Hoeller, 2019 WL 551318, at *10 (“Disagreement with a business decision, in the absence of evidence from which the Court may infer a possible breach of fiduciary duty, does not create a credible basis from which the Court can infer mismanagement.” (quoting Marathon P'rs, L.P. v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 2004 WL 1728604, at *7 n.40 (Del. Ch. Jul. 30, 2004))); High River Ltd. P'ship v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 2019 WL 6040285, at *5 (Del. Ch. Nov. 15, 2019) (“[D]isagreeing with a board's business judgment, without more, is not enough to provide a credible basis to infer mismanagement.”).

129

See generally Elizabeth Pollman, The Making and Meaning of ESG 1 (U. Pa. Carey L. Sch. Inst. L. & Econ., Research Paper No. 22-23), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4219857 (describing the “notable trend” of “integrating ‘environmental, social, and governance’ issues” into corporate governance as one of “the largest and most contentious debates in contemporary corporate and securities law”).

130

See 8 Del. C. § 141(a). Disney stockholders were on notice that the company would engage in political speech: “[Disney] believes that active participation in the political life of the communities in which we do business is in the best interest of the Company and its shareholders. As a result, we participate in public policy debates on many issues to support the Company's positions.” JX 24 at ‘072; see The Walt Disney Company, Political Giving and Participation in the Formulation of Public Policy in the United States at 1 (July 2020), https://thewaltdisneycompany.com/app/uploads/2020/07/Political-Giving-and-Participation-in-the-Formulation-of-Public-Policy-2020.pdf.

131

See Grimes v. Donald, 1995 WL 54441, at *8 (Del. Ch. Jan. 11, 1995) (“The board may not either formally or effectively abdicate its statutory power and its fiduciary duty to manage or direct the management of the business and affairs of th[e] corporation.”), aff'd, 673 A.2d 1207 (Del. 1996).

132

See supra notes 18-20 & 28-30 and accompanying text.

133

See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Good Corporate Citizenship We Can All Get Behind? Toward a Principled, Non-Ideological Approach to Making Money the Right Way, 78 Bus. Law. 329, 366 (2023) (“If the company purports to take positions on external public policy, its positions should result from a deliberative process of the board of directors based on the direct relevance of the policy question to the company, and not just reflect the personal view of the CEO without board backing.”); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 83, 87-89, 101-102 (2010) (observing that existing law treats “a corporation's decision to engage in political speech [a]s governed by the same rules as ordinary business decisions” and advocating for additional protections, such as requiring independent directors to approve or oversee decisions about corporate political speech given the potential for diverging interests vis-à-vis stockholders).

134

JX 10.

135

JX 24 at ‘052-055.

136

Id. at ‘052 (noting that Chapek responded to questions from the Board about the topic). The Board discussed the issue again on March 9 after Chapek announced Disney's opposition to HB 1557. Id. at ‘055 (reflecting that the Board members made comments and asked questions).

137

See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.

138

Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Hldgs., Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (“A board may have regard for various constituencies in discharging its responsibilities, provided there are rationally related benefits accruing to the stockholders.”); see also Paramount Commc'ns v. Time, Inc., 1989 WL 79880, at *7 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989) (noting that though the record suggested directors acted out of concern “for the larger role of the enterprise in society,” there was an “insufficient basis to suppose … that such concerns ha[d] caused the directors to sacrifice or ignore their duty to seek to maximize in the long run financial returns to the corporation and its stockholders”), aff'd, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989); Time, 571 A.2d at 1150 (“[D]irectors, generally, are obliged to chart a course for a corporation which is in its best interests without regard to a fixed investment horizon.”); In re Trados Inc. S'holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 37 (Del. Ch. 2013) (“[T]he duty of loyalty … mandates that directors maximize the value of the corporation over the long-term for the benefit of [stockholders].”); Edward B. Rock, For Whom is the Corporation Managed in 2020? The Debate Over Corporate Purpose, 76 Bus. Law. 364, 379 (2021) (“[I]n managing the business, the board of directors may consider the interests of other stakeholders, so long as there is some ‘rational relation’ to shareholder value.”).

139

Pl.’s Dep. 26-28, 46-47.

140

eBay Domestic Hldgs., Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010).

141

Cf. Inter-Local Pension Fund GCC/IBT v. Calgon Carbon Corp., 2019 WL 479082, at *11 (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 2019) (concluding that the plaintiff had put forward a credible basis to investigate potential wrongdoing, despite the fact that a single-bidder process “may be within the ambit of reasonable Board determinations for a merger,” because the plaintiff “sufficiently portray[ed]” the process as “infected and spurred by self-interest and conflicts”).

142

Compl. ¶ 38 (quoting JX 19 at 4).

143

Disney's initial silence also undercuts the plaintiff's theory. So does the plaintiff's own testimony that he has no reason to believe any Board member (including Chapek) acted out of self-interest when Disney made comments about HB 1557. Pl.’s Dep. 63.

144

The plaintiff seeks director independence questionnaires to “determine whether any Disney [d]irector is beholden to an outside organization that might influence that director to oppose legislation, when the result of that opposition would be detrimental to Disney and its stockholders.” Pl.’s Opening Pre-trial Br. (Dkt. 18) at 30. But “[c]uriosity is an insufficient reason to grant stockholders access to documents—particularly those that might include personal information about topics such as a director's finances or family.” Amazon.com, 2022 WL 1760618, at *10; see Hoeller, 2019 WL 551318, at *9 (explaining that where a “demand seeks information regarding board interest or conflicts and yet nothing he has presented by way of evidence (or argument) provides a credible basis to suspect that [ ] fiduciaries were conflicted,” the request will be denied); see also Seinfeld, 909 A.2d at 120 (stating that inspection is not appropriate where the demand is made “merely on the basis of suspicion or curiosity”).

145

Pl.’s Opening Pre-trial Br. 26.

146

See Hoeller, 2019 WL 551318, at *10 (“When a business decision or strategy forms the basis of a Section 220 demand, and the stockholder proffers as his purpose for inspection a desire to investigate a possible breach of the duty of care, he must present some credible basis to suspect that the corporation's fiduciaries acted with gross negligence. And a poorly formulated or executed … strategy, without more, does not a gross negligence claim make.”).

147

See Matthes v. Checkers Drive-in Rests., Inc., 2001 WL 337865, at *6 (Del. Ch. Mar. 28, 2001) (denying inspection where the plaintiff's assertions of wrongdoing were “without factual support”).

148

The threats during this earlier period were vague. See supra notes 26 & 53 and accompanying text.

149

Compl. ¶¶ 13-14; see supra note 44 and accompanying text; see also JX 18 (reflecting that Disney was told public opposition would “not … work out well”); JX 48 at 191, 194, 199 (suggesting that Disney was encouraged to stay silent and was ultimately blindsided by legislation to repeal the RCIA).

150

See Pl.’s Dep. 31 (“Q: So at bottom what it boils down to is you disagree with Disney's decision to speak about HB 1557 because you believe that was not in the best interest of stockholders? A: Correct, yes.”).

151

Seinfeld, 909 A.2d at 120; see supra note 128 (citing cases).

152

Seinfeld, 909 A.2d at 122 (“The evolution of Delaware's jurisprudence in section 220 actions reflects judicial efforts to maintain a proper balance between the rights of shareholders to obtain information based upon credible allegations of corporation mismanagement and the rights of directors to manage the business of the corporation without undue interference from stockholders.”); see also Hoeller, 2019 WL 551318, at *1 (“The right to inspection is qualified out of considerations that are practical rather than equitable; if a stockholder were permitted to inspect records … to satisfy a desire to oversee matters properly within the province of corporate management or the corporate board, a considerable expense and distraction would be foisted upon the company … with likely little value in return.”); Everett v. Hollywood Park, Inc., 1996 WL 32171, at *5-6 (Del. Ch. Jan. 19, 1996) (rejecting demands to investigate business judgments where the plaintiff failed to present a credible basis from which the court could infer waste or mismanagement).

153

Espinoza v. Hewlett Packard Co., 32 A.3d 365, 372 (Del. 2011).

154

Amazon.com, 2022 WL 1760618, at *13; see also Amalgamated Bank v. Yahoo! Inc., 132 A.3d 752, 790 (Del. Ch. 2016) (“The starting point—and often the ending point—for a sufficient inspection will be board level documents evidencing the directors’ decisions and deliberations, as well as the materials that the directors received and considered.”), abrogated on other grounds by Tiger v. Boast Apparel, Inc., 214 A.3d 933 (Del. 2019).

155

See Def.’s Pre-trial Opening Br. (Dkt. 17) at 15-16, 32-34; Def.’s Pre-trial Answering Br. (Dkt. 23) at 15.

156

Pl.’s Pre-trial Opening Br. 30. As previously discussed, the plaintiff has not demonstrated his entitlement to director questionnaires. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.

157

KT4 P'rs LLC v. Palantir Techs. Inc., 203 A.3d 738, 752-53 (Del. 2019).

【158】

See id. at 758 (explaining that the production of email in a Section 220 action may be appropriate where the company “conducts formal corporate business without documenting its actions in minutes and board resolutions or other formal means”); see also In re Plains All Am. Pipeline, L.P., 2017 WL 6016570, at *5 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 2017) (declining to order the production of emails because board-level materials were sufficient to establish that the board was informed of the relevant facts); Sec. First, 687 A.2d at 570 (noting that Section 220 actions “are not the same and should not be confused” with Rule 34 discovery requests).

【159】

Amazon.com, 2022 WL 1760618, at *13 (concluding that a request for records spanning a period more than three times longer than the events at issue was “vastly overbroad”).

【160】

See Dobler v. Montgomery Cellular Hldg. Co., 2001 WL 1334182, at *9 (Del. Ch. Oct. 19, 2001) (“[I]f the records to which the Court has found the Plaintiffs are entitled do not exist, the Defendant has no duty to do the impossible.”).

【161】

Pl.’s Opening Pre-trial Br. 14-15, 31-32.

【162】

PTO ¶¶ 13-14.

【163】

Espinoza, 32 A.3d at 371-72; see Amazon.com, 2022 WL 1760618, at *13 (“[R]edactions to material unrelated to the subject matter of a demand are proper because Section 220 only entitles a stockholder to information essential to accomplishing its stated purposes for inspection.”); Plains All Am. Pipeline, 2017 WL 6016570, at *1 (permitting a defendant to redact non-responsive information from a Section 220 production); see also Def.’s Answering Pre-trial Br. 17 n.4 (“To be clear, the redacted content concerns other issues that the Board addressed during its meetings that had nothing to do with HB 1557.”). The plaintiff argues that Disney should produce unredacted versions of the minutes because the minutes reference Disney's “approach to Florida legislation.” JX 24 at ‘055. Board minutes routinely cover a variety of topics. A stockholder is not permitted to review information about every subject discussed during a board meeting just because one portion of the minutes covers a topic relevant to the stockholder's demand.

【164】See JX 44.

【165】Id. Because the material is irrelevant, the plaintiff's reliance on the Garner doctrine is misplaced. See Pl.’s Opening Pre-trial Br. 31-32; see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Ind. Elec. Workers Pension Tr. Fund IBEW, 95 A.3d 1264, 1279-80 (Del. 2014) (noting that “the Court of Chancery properly first made the predicate Section 220 finding that the privileged information was necessary and essential before it then applied the Garner doctrine”); KT4 P'rs v. Palantir Techs., Inc., C.A. No. 2017-0177-JRS, at 6, 9-10 (Del. Ch. Dec. 19, 2020) (TRANSCRIPT) (observing that a plaintiff must first establish that the material sought is necessary and essential to a proper purpose, and then show good cause under the multi-factor Garner test).

【166】Pl.’s Opening Pre-trial Br. 34; see Dkt. 13.

【167】See Giarratano v. L Brands, Inc., C.A. No. 2020-0437-JRS, at 51-57 (Del. Ch. Sept. 22, 2020) (addressing the need for proportionality in discovery in a Section 220 action); cf. Wal-Mart Stores, 95 A.3d at 1282-84 (discussing Rule 30(b)(6) depositions ordered by the Court of Chancery pertaining to discovering the locations of documents that could reside across multiple offices worldwide).

【168】Palantir Techs., 203 A.3d at 754.

【169】Ravenswood Inv. Co. LP v. Winmill & Co., Inc., 2013 WL 396178, at *2 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 2013) (rejecting a plaintiff's request to depose the defendant's directors) (quoting U.S. Die Casting and Dev. Co. v. Sec. First Corp., 1995 WL 301414, at *3 (Del. Ch. Apr. 28, 1995)); see Edward P. Welch et al., Mergers and Acquisitions Deal Litigation Under Delaware Law § 7.01[J][2], at 7-43 to 7-45 (Supp. 2022-2).

【170】See N. Gold Hldgs., LLC v. REM EQ Hldgs., LLC, C.A. No. 2022-0308-LWW, 2022 WL 4220426, at cmts. (Del. Ch. Sep. 12, 2022) (ORDER) (rejecting a request for a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition where the plaintiff had “not articulated a present need for a deposition on what documents exist” given the company's offer to produce responsive materials).