譯者 | 江至柔 中國政法大學研究生
審稿 | 左亦惟 中南財經政法大學本科生
郝林樺 西南政法大學本科生
編輯 | 陳珏雯 西南政法大學本科生
鄭梓萱 澳門科技大學LL.B
責編 | 林靖珊 中國政法大學研究生
Mutually Assured Democracy: Cooperating Under the Compact Clause to Combat Partisan Gerrymandering
相互保證的民主根據契約條款合作打擊黨派選區劃分
Samuel P. Leroy
1
摘要
Partisan gerrymandering distorts voter preferences and undermines electoral competitiveness. Independent redistricting commissions and state constitutional litigation have curtailed partisan gerrymandering, but those reforms have proved un- stable and insufficient. Single-state redistricting reform has stalled because legislators and voters alike face diminishing incentives to reallocate power to their state’s minority party as partisan polarization increases. Gerrymandering remains an arms race: one party does it because the other party does it too.
黨派選區劃分扭曲了選民偏好，削弱了選舉競爭力。獨立的選區重劃委員會和州憲法訴訟遏制了黨派選區劃分，但事實證明這些改革既不穩定也不充分。單一州的選區重劃改革停滯不前，因為隨著黨派兩極分化的加劇，立法者和選民都面臨著向本州少數黨重新分配權力的動力減弱的問題。選區劃分仍然是一場軍備競賽：一方這樣做的原因是另一方也這樣做。
In the congressional redistricting context, however, interstate compacts could replace those incentives to compete with incentives to cooperate. Under a redistricting compact, the reallocation of congressional seats toward party A in state X would not occur without a corresponding reallocation in favor of party B in state Y. This incentivizes cooperation, since many voters would trade their party’s in-state advantage for improved electoral competitiveness if the other party likewise surrendered redistricting advantages in the states they control. Coordination would transform redistricting from zero-sum competition to positive-sum collaboration.
然而，在國會重新劃分選區的背景下，州際契約可以用合作激勵取代競爭激勵。在重新劃分選區的契約下，如果沒有相應的有利於 Y 州 B 黨的重新分配，X 州 A 黨的國會席位就不會被重新分配。這樣的安排將激勵合作，因為如果另一方同樣放棄在其控制的州重劃選區的優勢，許多選民會用本黨在本州的優勢來換取選舉競爭力的提高。協調將使選區重劃從零和競爭轉變為正和合作。
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The Constitution’s Compact Clause permits states to collaborate with each other but requires congressional consent. Yet the Constitution remains silent about which interstate agreements trigger this requirement, how Congress may provide consent, and how the Compact Clause interacts with the Elections Clause. This Comment explains how states could form redistricting compacts even without affirmative congressional approval. Courts consistently interpret the Compact Clause functionally rather than formally: compacts that neither expand compacting states’ power against the federal government nor against noncompacting states do not require affirmative congressional approval.
《憲法》的契約條款（Compact Clause）[1]允許各州相互合作，但需要國會同意。然而，《憲法》對哪些州際協議將觸發這一要求、國會如何給予同意以及契約條款與選舉條款[2]如何互動等問題保持沉默。本評論解釋了即使沒有國會的肯定性批准，各州將如何形成重新劃分選區的契約。法院一貫從功能上而非形式上解釋契約條款：如果協約既不擴大締約州對聯邦政府的權力，也不擴大締約州對非締約州的權力，那麼該協約不需要國會的肯定批准。
This Comment applies that functionalist doctrine to several types of redistricting compacts, concluding that—even if they count as “compacts” under the Constitution—they would pass muster because they would neither increase the compacting states’ congressional representation nor diminish Congress’s Elections Clause power. The Comment then sensitizes that conclusion to more formalist reinterpretations of the Compact Clause and assesses how redistricting compacts could ensure compacting states’ continued commitment without requiring congressional approval.
本評論將這一功能主義理論應用於幾種重新劃分選區的契約，得出的結論是——即使它們算作《憲法》下的 "契約"——它們也能透過審查，因為它們既不會增加締約州的國會代表權，也不會削弱國會選舉條款的權力。然後，評論將這一結論與對契約條款的形式主義重新解釋聯絡起來，並評估了重新劃分選區契約如何在不需要國會批准的情況下確保締約州的持續承諾。
[1]譯者注：契約條款（Compact Clause)即美國憲法第1條第10款第3項，該條規定：未經國會同意，任何州不得與其他州或外國達成任何協議或契約。
[2]譯者注：選舉條款（Election Clause)即美國憲法第1條第4款第1項，該條規定：參議員和眾議員選舉的時間、地點和方式由各州立法機關規定；國會可以隨時立法制定或修改此類法規，但參議員選舉地點除外。
2
引言
Partisan gerrymandering subverts representative democracy. When politicians redistrict to maximize their own power at the expense of partisan fairness and competitiveness, political extremism and unrepresentative policies result. The public understands this threat, demonstrating bipartisan support for redistricting reform.
黨派選區劃分顛覆了代議制民主。當政客們以犧牲黨派公平性和競爭性為代價，重新劃分選區以最大化自己的權力時，就會導致政治極端主義和不具代表性的政策。民眾都意識到了這一威脅，倡議兩黨都支援選區重劃改革。
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Yet reform has stalled. At the federal level, partisan gerrymandering remains nonjusticiable and a statutory prohibition against partisan gerrymandering appears unlikely. At the state level, some jurisdictions have created independent redistricting commissions (often through direct democracy) or enforced state constitutional protections against partisan gerrymandering. But even these victories have often proved incomplete or transient. Partisans have captured some ostensibly independent redistricting commissions. Partisan judicial elections have influenced state constitutional litigation. And the political conditions that propelled single-state redistricting reform even just a few years ago are deteriorating.
然而，改革卻停滯不前。在聯邦層面，黨派選區劃分仍然不可審理，禁止黨派選區劃分的法律似乎不太可能出臺。在州一級，一些司法轄區成立了獨立的選區重劃委員會（通常透過直接民主的方式），或實施州憲法保護，來禁止黨派選區劃分。但即使是這些勝利也往往被證明是不完整或短暫的。黨派分子控制了一些表面上獨立的選區重劃委員會。黨派司法選舉影響了州憲法訴訟。甚至幾年前的推動單州選區重劃改革的政治條件正在惡化。
Interstate compacts can revive congressional redistricting reform. Compacts—the constitutional mechanism for interstate cooperation—have long enabled states to overcome coordination challenges and federal gridlock. But compacts can accomplish more than encouraging states to internalize spillover effects and regionalize public services, traditional functions of compacts that leverage cooperative incentives among states. Compacts can also serve as commitment devices that replace competitive incentives with cooperative ones. The redistricting context offers prime territory for compacts to play this role.
州際契約可以重振國會選區重劃改革。長期以來，州際契約——這一憲法規定的州際合作機制——使各州得以克服協調難題和聯邦僵局。但是，州際契約的作用遠不止於鼓勵各州將溢位效應（Spillover Effect）內部化和將公共服務區域化，這些都是州際契約發揮合作激勵作用的傳統功能。契約還可以作為一種承諾手段，以合作激勵取代競爭激勵。重新劃分選區為契約發揮這一作用提供了最佳場所。
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This Comment joins recent scholarship in demonstrating that states could compact to simultaneously adopt—and remain committed to—redistricting processes that promote partisan fairness and competitiveness. Without interstate coordination, each state’s majority party is incentivized to continue gerrymandering because unilateral disarmament would help the other party control the U.S. House of Representatives.
本評論與近期的學術研究共同表明，各州可以透過締結契約來同時採取並繼續致力於促進黨派公平性和競爭性的選區劃分程式。在沒有州際協調的情況下，每個州的多數黨都會受到激勵，繼續進行選區劃分，因為單方面解除選區劃分將有助於另一方控制美國眾議院。
But under an interstate redistricting compact, the partisan reallocation of congressional seats toward party A in state X would not occur without a corresponding reallocation in favor of party B in state Y. This incentivizes cooperation, since many voters would trade their party’s in-state advantage for improved electoral competitiveness if the other party likewise surrendered redistricting advantages in the states they control. Coordination would transform redistricting from zero-sum competition to positive-sum collaboration.
但在州際選區重劃協定下，如果沒有相應的有利於 Y 州 B 黨的選區重劃，X 州 A 黨的國會席位重劃就不會發生。這就激勵了合作，因為如果另一方同樣放棄其控制的州的選區重劃優勢，許多選民就會用本黨在本州的優勢來換取選舉競爭力的提高。協調將使選區重劃從零和競爭轉變為正和合作。
Redistricting compacts, capable of embracing just two states or many more, could assume one of two forms. One form would establish reciprocal independent redistricting commissions in each compacting state, where the adoption of a commission in one state triggers the enactment of a similarly constructed commission in the others. The other, more ambitious form would create a single multistate commission with representation from, and redistricting responsibility for, each compacting state.
重新劃分選區的契約既可以包括兩個州，也可以包括更多的州，可以有兩種形式。一種形式是在每個簽訂契約的州建立互惠的獨立選區重劃委員會，一個州建立委員會後，其他州也會建立類似的委員會。另一種形式則更加具有雄心，它將建立一個單一的多州委員會，由每個締約州的代表組成，並負責重新劃分選區。
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This Comment advances the conversation championing interstate redistricting compacts as a means of encouraging fair redistricting practices that increase partisan fairness and competitiveness. This Comment also offers two novel contributions in evaluating redistricting compacts’ constitutionality. First, it explains how states could constitutionally form redistricting compacts even without express congressional ratification under both the Compact Clause’s current functionalist interpretation and more formalist theories. Second, it demonstrates that reciprocal state constitutional amendments, rather than a compact’s internal provisions, would offer the most constitutionally defensible constraint to inhibit compacting states from withdrawing.
本評論推動了將州際選區重劃契約作為鼓勵公平選區重劃實踐的一種手段的討論，從而提高了黨派的公平性和競爭性。本評論還為評估選區重劃契約的合憲性做出了兩項新貢獻。首先，它解釋了在契約條款目前的功能主義解釋和更為形式主義的理論下，即使沒有國會的明確批准，各州如何能夠合憲地形成重新劃分選區的契約。其次，它證明了互惠的州憲法修正案，而不是契約的內部條款，將為抑制締約州退出提供最符合憲法的約束。
The first contribution details the current functionalist Compact Clause jurisprudence, applies that doctrine to show that states could lawfully form redistricting compacts even without express congressional approval, and asserts that even more formalist theories would support the same result. The Compact Clause provides, “No State shall, without the Consent of Congress . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State.” But despite that prohibitory language, more than a century of Supreme Court precedent permits certain interstate agreements formed without affirmative congressional approval. Under the Court’s functionalist reading, not all interstate agreements count as “Agreement[s] or Compact[s]” under the Clause.
第一章詳細介紹了目前功能主義的契約條款法理，運用該理論表明，即使沒有國會的明確批准，各州也可以合法地形成重新劃分選區的契約，並斷言即使是更形式主義的理論也會支援同樣的結果。契約條款規定，“未經國會同意，任何州不得……與另一州訂立任何協定或契約”。但儘管有這樣的禁止性措辭，最高法院一個多世紀以來的判例卻允許某些州際協議在未經國會肯定性批准的情況下達成。根據法院的功能主義解讀，並非所有州際協議都算作該條款下的 “協定或契約”。
And even if an interstate agreement counts as a compact, it requires affirmative congressional approval only if it threatens to undermine federalism. When a compact neither violates federal law nor enlarges the compacting states’ power relative to other states or the federal government, courts uphold the compact’s validity, even without a vote from Congress.
而且，即使州際協議算作契約，也只有在它有可能破壞聯邦制時才需要國會的肯定性批准。當契約既不違反聯邦法律，也不擴大締約州相對於其他州或聯邦政府的權力時，即使沒有國會的投票，法院也會支援契約的有效性。
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Interstate redistricting compacts would satisfy that functionalist test. To demonstrate, this Comment explores how states could structure redistricting agreements to avoid the Compact Clause’s definition of compacts. Next, to consider the validity of redistricting agreements even as compacts within the Constitution’s meaning, the Comment compares redistricting compacts to the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact (NPVIC), which would obligate compacting states’ presidential electors—once they collectively control a majority of Electoral College votes—to vote for the national popular vote winner. Unlike the NPVIC, which would deny noncompacting states the chance to decide presidential elections, redistricting compacts would not increase the representation of compacting states, marginalize the representation of noncompacting states, or conflict with external legal constraints.
州際選區重劃契約符合功能主義檢驗標準。為了證明這一點，本評論探討了各州如何構建選區重劃協議，以規避契約條款對契約的定義。接下來，為了考慮重新劃分選區協議即使作為憲法意義上的契約是否有效，本評論將重新劃分選區契約與《全國普選票州際協定》（NPVIC）進行了比較，後者規定締約州的總統選舉人在共同控制選舉團多數選票後，有義務投票給全國普選的獲勝者。《全國普選州際協定》剝奪了非締約州決定總統選舉的機會，而重新劃分選區協定則不同，它不會增加締約州的代表權，不會使非締約州的代表權邊緣化，也不會與外部法律約束相沖突。
Advancing the literature, this Comment insulates the constitutional analysis against doctrinal evolution. Even nonfunctionalist Compact Clause theories support the constitutionality of redistricting compacts. Redistricting compacts would satisfy sovereignty-centered Compact Clause interpretations that would find any delegation of state sovereignty unconstitutional per se. Because redistricting compacts would modify how compacting states exercise a power assigned from Congress, rather than one innate to their sovereignty, such compacts would not alter state sovereignty. Redistricting compacts would also comport with more textualist Compact Clause interpretations. The Clause’s silence about the mechanism for congressional consent, in context with the presumed validity of state redistricting laws under the Elections Clause, suggests implied congressional preapproval for redistricting compacts.
本評論推動了文獻的發展，使憲法分析免受理論演變的影響。即使是非功能主義的契約條款理論也支援重新劃分選區契約的合憲性。重新劃分選區契約符合以主權為中心的契約條款解釋，這些解釋認為任何州主權的下放本身都是違憲的。由於重新劃分選區契約將改變契約州行使國會賦予的權力的方式，而非其與生俱來的主權，因此此類契約不會改變州主權。重新劃分選區契約也符合更多文字主義的契約條款解釋。該條款對國會同意機制保持沉默，而根據選舉條款，各州重新劃分選區的法律推定有效，這表明國會對重新劃分選區契約的預先批准是默許的。
This Comment’s second contribution explains how the Constitution enables states to design compacts to ensure continued commitment across redistricting cycles. Rather than conceiving of compacts themselves as imposing binding obligations on compacting states, this Comment argues that compacts should rely on external political constraints to secure enduring participation. Specifically, redistricting compacts should require states to join by state constitutional amendment. By entering compacts in this manner, rather than through ordinary legislation, states would retain the power to withdraw while making such withdrawal—and relapse into partisan gerrymandering—politically difficult.
本評論的第二個貢獻是解釋憲法如何使各州設計契約，以確保在選區重劃週期內實現持續的承諾。本評論認為，契約應依靠外部政治約束來確保持久參與，而不是將契約本身視為對締約州施加具有約束力的義務。具體而言，選區重劃契約應要求各州透過州憲法修正案加入。透過這種方式而不是普通立法加入契約，各州將保留退出的權力，同時使這種退出——即重新陷入黨派選區劃分——在政治上變得困難。
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States vary in their constitutional-amendment processes and approval thresholds, but nearly all require citizen approval. Insulating redistricting compacts from new or emboldened legislative majorities, who would benefit from repealing the compacts, would improve (although not guarantee) a redistricting compact’s longevity. Additionally, leveraging the external political constraint of state constitutional amendments, rather than inserting withdrawal constraints within the compact itself, would avoid entrenchment issues that would endanger the compact’s constitutionality without congressional approval.
各州的修憲程式和批准門檻各不相同，但幾乎所有州都要求公民批准。如果重新劃分選區契約不受新的或有恃無恐的立法多數派的影響，他們會從廢除契約中獲益，這將提高（儘管不能保證）重新劃分選區契約的永續性。此外，利用州憲法修正案的外部政治約束，而不是在契約本身中插入退出約束，將避免在未經國會批准的情況下危及契約合憲性的 “固守成規”（entrenchment）問題。
These contributions about the constitutional issues of forming and sustaining interstate redistricting compacts serve three purposes. First, this analysis attempts to correct misconceptions about the functionality and constitutionality of redistricting compacts, which contributed to the failure of previous compact proposals. Second, the constitutional analysis of redistricting compacts lends insight into other Compact Clause issues, such as the constitutionality of the NPVIC—which continues to attract support —and how states could continue to compact without affirmative congressional approval even under more textualist Compact Clause interpretations. Finally, highlighting an underappreciated constitutional source of multistate direct democracy affirms that bipartisan cooperation remains possible despite polarization among federal and state elected officials.
這些關於形成和維持州際選區重劃契約的憲法問題的章節有三個目的。首先，這一分析試圖糾正對選區重劃契約的功能性和合憲性的誤解，這些誤解導致了以往契約提案的失敗。其次，透過對選區重劃契約的憲法分析，我們可以深入瞭解契約條款的其他問題，如《全國普選票州際協定》的合憲性——該契約仍在繼續吸引支援——以及各州如何在沒有國會肯定性批准的情況下繼續契約，即使是在更注重文字主義的契約條款解釋下也是如此。最後，強調了多州直接民主的一個未被充分重視的憲法淵源，肯定了兩黨合作在聯邦和州民選官員兩極分化的情況下的可行性。
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This Comment proceeds in five parts. Part I establishes the need for a new approach to redistricting reform. Part II recommends redistricting compacts as a viable solution. Analyzing the constitutionality of redistricting compacts, Part III describes the current doctrine governing when states can lawfully compact without affirmative congressional approval. As Part IV explains, redistricting compacts conform with that doctrine and with alternative interpretations of the Compact Clause. With the constitutionality of compact formation established, Part V analyzes how different forms of compacts could secure continued participation by overcoming entrenchment issues.
本評論分為五個部分。第一部分闡述了採用新方法進行選區重劃改革的必要性。第二部分建議將重新劃分選區契約作為一種可行的解決方案。在分析選區重劃契約的合憲性時，第三部分介紹了關於各州何時可以在未經國會批准的情況下合法締結選區重劃契約的現行理論。第四部分闡釋了重新劃分選區契約符合該理論以及對契約條款的其他解釋。在確定了契約形成的合憲性之後，第五部分分析了不同形式的契約如何透過克服“固守成規”（entrenchment）問題來確保民眾的持續參與。
3
結論
Mounting polarization and stalling reform expose the need for an innovative approach to encourage nonpartisan redistricting processes that promote partisan representation and competition. Just as compacts have long facilitated interstate coordination to solve national challenges, redistricting compacts could accelerate reform by breaking partisan incentives to gerrymander. Such compacts could take one of two forms. A multistate redistricting commission could propose maps for all compacting states, with each state’s legislature politically incentivized to adopt the commission’s draft for their state. Alternatively, reciprocal commissions in each compacting state—which would take effect only upon each state adopting identical membership selection rules and redistricting criteria—could directly implement maps for their respective states.
日益加劇的兩極分化和改革的停滯不前暴露出需要一種創新的方法來鼓勵非黨派的選區重劃程序，以促進黨派代表性和競爭。正如長期以來契約促進了州際協調以解決國家挑戰一樣，選區重劃契約可以透過打破黨派選區劃分的動機來加速改革。這種契約可以有兩種形式。一個多州選區重劃委員會可以為所有簽訂契約的州提供指引，每個州的立法機構在政治上有動力採納委員會為本州提出的草案。或者，各締約州的互惠委員會——只有在各州採用相同的成員遴選規則和選區重劃標準後才能生效——可以直接為各自州實施規劃。
The Compact Clause’s text and history support this proposal. Under the prevailing functionalist precedent, the Compact Clause permits compacts formed without affirmative congressional approval if they neither undermine federalism nor interfere with federal law. Redistricting compacts comply with both requirements because they do not expand compacting states’ political representation or violate other electoral law—or even affect state sovereignty at all. But even under more formalist theories, not all redistricting agreements would count as compacts under the Constitution. And even if they did, the Constitution’s delegation of redistricting authority to the states indicates tacit preapproval for redistricting compacts, subject to congressional veto, with the Elections Clause operating as a subject-matter exception to the Compact Clause’s “congressional negative.”
契約條款的文字本身和歷史背景都支援這一提議。根據佔據主流的功能主義先例，契約條款允許在未獲得國會肯定性批准的情況下締結契約，條件是這些契約既不破壞聯邦制，也不干涉聯邦法律。重新劃分選區的契約符合這兩項要求，因為它們既不擴大契約州的政治代表權，也不違反其他選舉法，甚至完全不影響州主權。但即使根據更形式主義的理論，並非所有重新劃分選區協議都能算作憲法規定的契約。即便如此，《憲法》將重新劃分選區的權力下放給各州，表明其對重新劃分選區契約的預先批准是默許的，但條件是須經國會否決，並且選舉條款須為契約條款 "國會否決 "的例外事項。
（圖片來源於網路）
Ultimately, establishing redistricting compacts will require policymakers to resolve interdependent issues of politics and constitutional law. The choice between a multistate commission and reciprocal interstate commissions, for example, presents practical trade-offs: multistate commissions could prove more effective but more politically challenging to form. But that choice would also inform the legal analysis of interstate redistricting agreements. Reciprocal commissions could avoid the constitutional label of a compact altogether, making the issue of congressional consent irrelevant.
最終，建立選區重劃契約制度需要決策者解決相互依存的政治和憲法問題。例如，在建立多州委員會和互惠的州際委員會之間做出選擇意味著實際的權衡：多州委員會可能更有效，但組建起來在政治上更具挑戰性。但建立多州委員會這種選擇也將為州際選區重劃協議的法律分析提供啟發思路。互惠州際委員會可以完全撕下契約的憲法標籤，使國會同意的問題變得無關緊要。
Likewise, the more a compact attempts to prevent its compacting states from withdrawing, the more likely that it would require congressional ratification. The most viable commitment device—establishing the compact through state constitutional amendment—would avoid entrenchment concerns but would trigger heightened vote thresholds to enact redistricting reform in many states.
同樣地，契約越是試圖阻止締約州退出，就越有可能需要國會批准。最可行的承諾方式——透過州憲法修正案建立契約——可以避免固化問題，但會在許多州引發更高的選票門檻，以進行選區重劃改革。
This Comment addressed legal issues to interstate redistricting cooperation, but time will answer the political questions. The vitality of democracy may depend on it.
本評論涉及州際選區重劃合作的法律問題，但政治問題將由時間來回答。民主的生命力可能取決於此。