“特朗普誤判了！中國才是擁有主導權的一方”

特朗普“關稅大棒”一通亂揮，導致中美貿易摩擦升級，結局會是怎樣？

海外一些研究者認為，最終受到更嚴重衝擊的很可能不是中國，而是美國。

彼得森國際經濟研究所所長亞當·S·波森（Adam S. Posen）在《外交事務》雜誌網站4月9日刊文，對特朗普政府對華發動關稅戰的合理性與潛在後果提出質疑。文章指出，特朗普政府是基於對現實的誤判才對中國發起關稅戰的，而這種做法實際上是在拿美國自己的經濟冒險。

特朗普政府的“升級主導權”幻覺

特朗普政府認為，其掌握了所謂的“升級主導權”（escalation dominance）——也就是說，他們相信自己能不斷加碼施壓、提高對手的成本，而對方卻無法有效反擊。

特朗普用這種策略來對付中國，乃至所有造成美國貿易逆差的國家。

The Trump administration believes it has what game theorists call escalation dominance over China and any other economy with which it has a bilateral trade deficit. Escalation dominance means "a combatant has the ability to escalate a conflict in ways that will be disadvantageous or costly to the adversary while the adversary cannot do the same in return."

美國財政部長斯科特·貝森特（Scott Bessent）也認同這種觀點，他說：“中國這次的關稅反制是個大錯誤。”

他以打牌為比喻，認為中國手裡的牌就只有一對2。“中國對我們加稅，我們又會受到多大影響呢？我們對中國的出口量只有他們對我們的五分之一，所以他們根本沒勝算。”

"I think it was a big mistake, this Chinese escalation, because they're playing with a pair of twos. What do we lose by the Chinese raising tariffs on us? We export one-fifth to them of what they export to us, so that is a losing hand for them."

然而，這個邏輯是錯的。

波森指出，貝森特用打撲克牌來比喻貿易，看似有理，實則充滿誤導。

因為撲克牌是一種零和遊戲，“你贏我就輸，你輸我才能贏”。而貿易不是這樣，貿易是正和的，是“你賺我也賺”的雙贏關係。

在牌局中，如果你輸了，你投進去的錢就沒了；但在貿易中，你花出去的錢立馬換回了商品和服務，錢並沒有白花。

Bessent's poker analogy is misleading because poker is a zero-sum game: I win only if you lose; you win only if I lose. Trade, by contrast, is positive-sum: in most situations, the better you do, the better I do, and vice versa. In poker, you get nothing back for what you put in the pot unless you win; in trade, you get it back immediately, in the form of the goods and services you buy.

真正擁有“升級主導權”的是中國

波森認為，真正擁有“升級主導權”的其實是中國。首先，單看雙邊貿易差額來判斷誰在貿易戰中更有優勢，順差的一方（中國）顯然比逆差的一方（美國）更具主動權。

But this logic is wrong: it is China that has escalation dominance in this trade war.

Even if you focus solely on the bilateral trade balance, as the Trump administration does, it bodes poorly for the United States in a trade war with China. …The advantage lies with the surplus economy, not the deficit one.

波森強調，對中國來說，減少對美出口最多隻是少賺點外匯，但美國這邊損失的卻是許多維繫經濟命脈的關鍵商品，比如藥品原材料、廉價晶片、重要礦產等。

這些商品短期內很難找到替代來源，在美國本土生產的成本也令人望而卻步，所以如果貿然切斷與中國的貿易，對美國來說將是極其危險的。

China, the surplus country, is giving up sales, which is solely money; the United States, the deficit country, is giving up goods and services it does not produce competitively or at all at home.

Given that the US economy is entirely dependent on Chinese sources for vital goods (pharmaceutical stocks, cheap electronic chips, critical minerals), it is wildly reckless not to ensure alternate suppliers or adequate domestic production before cutting off trade.

對於中國等順差國來說，錢是可以替代的：如果少了這部分收入，中國可以透過減少開支、開拓新市場、全社會共同承擔，或者動用儲蓄（比如透過財政刺激）來應對。

順差國通常儲蓄都多於投資，有一定的緩衝能力。所以即使對美出口減少，中國也不會面臨關鍵商品短缺的風險，還能透過擴大內需或出口到其他國家來彌補這一部分損失，調整起來相對比較容易。

Money is fungible: if you lose income, you can cut back spending, find sales elsewhere, spread the burden across the country, or draw down savings (say, by doing fiscal stimulus).

China, like most countries with overall trade surpluses, saves more than it invests. The adjustment would be relatively easy. There would be no critical shortages, and it could replace much of what it normally sold to the United States with sales domestically or to others.

然而像美國這樣的逆差國，通常是花的錢比存下的錢多。在貿易戰中，它們會因為關稅上升而不得不減少進口一些自己需要的商品，這些商品成本變高，也不容易找到替代品。

因此，貿易戰對美國的衝擊很可能集中體現在某些行業、地區或者家庭身上。他們可能會遇到貨物短缺的情況，有些甚至是生活或生產的必需品，短時間內根本找不到替代來源。

Countries with overall trade deficits, like the United States, spend more than they save. In trade wars, they give up or reduce the supply of things they need (since the tariffs make them cost more), and these are not nearly as fungible or easily substituted for as money.

Consequently, the impact is felt in specific industries, locations, or households that face shortages, sometimes of necessary items, some of which are irreplaceable in the short term.

另外，像美國這樣的逆差國，還依賴從其他國家引進資金。一旦國際社會對美國政府的可信度或者營商環境產生懷疑，就像特朗普政府現在這樣，隨意加稅、導致供應鏈不穩定，資本就可能撤離，美國債務的利率也會隨之上升。

而且大家也不再相信美國政府會遵守協議，這就讓透過談判來緩解緊張局勢變得更加困難。

結果是，美國的製造和生產能力不但得不到提升，反而可能會倒退。

Deficit countries also import capital—which makes the United States more vulnerable to shifts in sentiment about the reliability of its government and about its attractiveness as a place to do business. When the Trump administration makes capricious decisions to impose an enormous tax increase and great uncertainty on manufacturers' supply chains, the result will be reduced investment into the United States, raising interest rates on its debt.

Americans and foreigners would no longer trust the US government to live up to any deal, making a negotiated settlement or agreement to deescalate difficult to achieve. As a result, US productive capacity would decline rather than improve.

美國或自食其果

波森警告說，如果美國真的大幅減少甚至完全停止從中國進口商品，很可能會重演上世紀70年代和新冠疫情期間的“滯脹”（stagflation）局面——經濟萎縮與通貨膨脹加劇同時發生。

The supply shock from drastically reducing or zeroing out imports from China, as Trump purports to want to achieve, would mean stagflation, the macroeconomic nightmare seen in the 1970s and during the COVID pandemic, when the economy shrank and inflation rose simultaneously.

簡而言之，波森認為如果中美之間爆發大規模貿易戰，美國可能會承受比中國更嚴重的經濟衝擊。雖然特朗普政府在表面上看起來強硬、掌握主動，但實際上，美國的經濟很可能反而被動地受制於中國是否決定升級貿易戰。