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May Li，男，我要去追逐心中的太陽，還要繼續努力的亞古獸
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英文部分選自經濟學人20250222期財經板塊
Finance & economics | Free exchange
財經板塊|自由交流
Donald Trump’s reciprocal tariffs are absurd
特朗普的對等關稅荒謬至極
At first glance, they are a bureaucratic nightmare. On a closer look, they are even worse
乍一看，似乎是官僚主義的噩夢。細看之後，情況更糟
“He started it,” is playground justice. It may soon be America’s trade policy. On February 13th Donald Trump announced he had decided, for what he later called “purposes of fairness”, to employ reciprocal tariffs. When the levies will go into effect, and how they will apply, is uncertain. A memorandum directs federal agencies to look into “non-reciprocal trade arrangements”, including value-added taxes (VAT) and non-tariff barriers, and to report on remedies by April 1st. Like teachers tasked with adjudicating a squabble, American officials now face the unenviable task of working out which trade partners are the worst behaved.
“他先動的手，”這是操場上的正義。但它可能很快會成為美國的貿易政策。2月13日，出於所謂的“公平目的”，特朗普宣佈實施對等關稅。這些關稅政策何時生效、如何實施尚不明確。一份備忘錄指示聯邦機構對增值稅（VAT）和非關稅壁壘等“非對等貿易機制”進行調查，並在4月1日前提交解決方案。就像負責判斷爭執雙方誰對誰錯的老師一樣，美國政府官員現在面臨著一項棘手的任務：找出哪些貿易伙伴表現最差。
They may start with, in theory, the simplest task: equalising tariffs (matching those applied to American goods by other countries). America already levies taxes on a vast range of goods brought into the country. Its harmonised tariff schedule has 13,000 categories, from “artificial flowers, foliage and fruit and parts thereof” to “swords, cutlasses, bayonets, lances and similar arms”. If America decides that fairness means going tariff-for-tariff with all 180 or so trade partners, enacting that would produce around 2.3m individual tariffs and result in outsourcing its trade policy to countries with entirely different industrial structures and interests. This could lead to absurdities: Colombia levies a tariff of 70% on coffee to protect its plantations from foreign competition. America grows negligible quantities of its own. Neither 70% tariffs nor persuading Colombia to lower levies on non-existent American exports would increase domestic production.
理論上，他們可能會從最簡單的任務開始：實施關稅對等（美國對其他國家商品徵收的關稅與其他國家對美國商品徵收的關稅一致）。美國已經對大量進口商品徵稅。其統一關稅表包含13,000個類別，包括“人造花、葉、果實及其部件”甚至還有“劍、短刀、刺刀、長矛及類似武器”。如果美國認為“公平”是指，以牙還牙，向約180個貿易伙伴對等徵收關稅，那麼實施這一政策將產生約230萬項單獨的關稅，並將其貿易政策“外包”給產業結構和利益與美國截然不同的國家。最終的結果可能荒謬至極：哥倫比亞對咖啡徵收70%的關稅，以保護其種植園免受外國競爭。美國自己種植的咖啡數量微乎其微。無論是向哥倫比亞徵收70%的關稅，還是說服哥倫比亞降低對美國並不存在的咖啡出口的關稅，都不會增加美國國內的咖啡產量。
注："Harmonised Tariff Schedule"（HTS）是指一種國際標準化的商品分類和編碼系統，用於確定進出口商品的關稅和其他貿易相關規定。它由世界海關組織（WCO）制定，通常被各國海關用來對商品進行分類，並確定相應的關稅稅率。這個系統被稱為“協調製度”（HS），並且不同國家或地區基於這一系統制定各自的關稅表。HTS通常包含商品的詳細描述和相應的稅率資訊。
Mr Trump might instead focus on the overall level of tariffs applied to American goods. Colombia levies an average tariff of 5.2% on American imports, compared with the average of 0.3% that America charges on Colombian imports. Choosing the right average, however, adds another layer of complexity. Instead of the simple average—calculated by dividing the sum of rates by the number of items—Mr Trump could base reciprocity on the trade-weighted average tariff, which adjusts for the volume of imports to which a levy applies. Doing so would avoid placing too much emphasis on high but irrelevant tariffs, such as those protecting Colombian coffee producers. At the same time, it might miss particularly egregious tariffs that prevent trade altogether.
特朗普可能之後會轉而關注美國商品所面臨的關稅總體水平。哥倫比亞對美國進口商品徵收的平均關稅為5.2%，而美國對哥倫比亞進口商品徵收的平均關稅為0.3%。然而，選擇合適的平均值進一步增加了複雜性。特朗普可以選擇基於貿易加權平均關稅這一方法，而不是簡單的平均數（透過將稅率總和除以商品數量計算得出），這樣可以根據進口量靈活調整關稅稅率。這樣做可以避免稅率高但卻無足輕重的關稅種類，比如那些為了保護哥倫比亞咖啡生產商的關稅。但與此同時，這也可能會遺漏那些完全遏制兩國貿易的惡性關稅。
Another wrinkle is VAT, which America does not levy. Although Mr Trump said other countries’ regimes would be treated as tariffs, there is no fairness argument here: VAT does not discriminate, as tariffs do, between domestic and foreign goods. A refund for VAT is offered to exports, a bugbear of some trade hawks, but this merely means that European exports to America pay as much tax as American-produced goods. It does not provide European producers with an advantage over American rivals.
另一個問題是增值稅（VAT）。美國不收增值稅。儘管特朗普揚言要將其他國家的增值稅視為關稅對待，但在這裡並沒有公平性的問題，因為與關稅不同，增值稅不會區別對待本土生產產品和外國進口產品。一些所謂貿易“鷹派”所詬病的增值稅出口退稅政策，只會讓歐洲生產、出口到美國的產品與美國本土生產的產品繳納同樣的稅率，而不會讓歐洲製造商在稅率方面擁有相對於美國本土製造商的比較優勢。
Peter Navarro, an adviser to Mr Trump, has nevertheless called the EU the “poster child” for the VAT issue. Within the bloc, each member can choose its own rate, with a floor of 15%, as well as lower ones for some goods and exemptions for small firms. America could either choose to mirror such rates for each good, country and company, tying importers up in yet more red tape, or levy a flat tariff at the standard VAT rate for each country. That would hit Hungary, which has a rate of 27%, the hardest. For their part, non-EU countries would face lower tariffs: Canada’s federal goods-and-services tax is just 5%; Australia, Japan and South Korea all have consumption taxes levied at a basic rate of 10%.
儘管如此，特朗普的顧問彼得·納瓦羅（Peter Navarro）仍將歐盟視為增值稅問題的“典型”。在歐盟內，每個成員國可以自行決定增值稅稅率，最低標準稅率是15%，部分商品可享受更低的減免稅率，小企業還可以免稅。在特朗普新政框架下，美國要麼模仿這些國家，對每個品類、成員國、企業採取類似稅率，讓進口商陷入更加繁瑣的流程，要麼根據每個歐盟成員國的增值稅標準稅率，徵收統一的關稅。假設如此，增值稅標準稅率高達27%的匈牙利將受到最嚴重的衝擊。而非歐盟國家將適用相對較低的關稅水平，例如聯邦商品服務稅率僅為5%的加拿大，以及消費稅稅率標準僅為10%的澳大利亞、日本和韓國。
Last, there are non-tariff barriers, such as food-safety standards. A White House fact sheet pointed out that the EU bans shellfish imports from 48 American states, for instance. Barriers also include things such as quotas or regulatory assessments at the border. The World Bank reckons that some 94% of European imports are subject to non-tariff barriers, compared with just 62% of those to America. Not all of them are discriminatory, as the burden of compliance can fall on both domestic and foreign producers. In any case, Mr Trump may decide to come up with his own more favourable definition. In his first term, the Office of the US Trade Representative, a federal agency, included data-protection laws and antitrust cases in a list of non-tariff barriers.
除此之外，還有食品安全標準等非關稅貿易壁壘。例如，一份白宮簡報指出，歐盟禁止從美國48個行政州進口貝類。非關稅壁壘還包括配額限制和邊檢監管評估手續等。世界銀行估計，約94%的歐洲進口商品都受到某種非關稅壁壘的限制，而美國進口商品受影響的比例僅為62%。這些壁壘並非全都是歧視性的，因為合規成本可能由本土進口商和外國製造商一同承擔。無論具體情況如何，特朗普可能會提出對自己更有利的定義。在特朗普的第一任期時，美國貿易代表辦公室（聯邦機構）將資料保護法和反壟斷案例納入了非關稅貿易壁壘清單。
The Mar-a-Lago trade round
海湖莊園貿易談判回合
Countries in Mr Trump’s line of fire will respond. The president says he will cut tariffs if other countries make the first move, pledging his levies will be “no more, no less!” than those charged by foreigners. The World Trade Organisation, a multilateral body, requires countries to adopt a “most-favoured nation” approach, meaning that, in the absence of a specific trade deal, all countries must face the same tariffs. Although America has mostly abandoned the WTO, other countries take it seriously. They would have to come up with a workaround. Alternatively, they could give in to Mr Trump and cut levies across the board, producing a wave of trade liberalisation unseen since the 1990s. Consider it unlikely.
被特朗普針對的國家必將作出回應。特朗普表示，如果其他國家率先降低關稅，他也會跟進，並承諾美國的關稅將與外國稅率完全對等，“不多也不少”。作為多邊機構的世界貿易組織要求各國採用“最惠國待遇”原則，即在沒有特定貿易協定的情況下，所有國家必須面對相同的關稅。儘管美國基本不再遵循WTO的規則，但其他國家仍在嚴肅對待WTO規則。這些國家將不得不尋找變通方案，或者索性向特朗普讓步，全面降低關稅，從而掀起自上世紀90年代以來未見的貿易自由化浪潮。不過，這種可能性微乎其微。
註釋：
1.line of fire: a situation where someone or something is directly affected, criticized or attacked, or at risk due to some actions or circumstances.
2.levy (on sth): an extra amount of money that has to be paid, especially as a tax to the government 徵收額；（尤指）稅款
3.最惠國待遇（most-favored-nation treatment）通常指的是締約國雙方在通商、航海、關稅、公民法律地位等方面相互給予的不低於現時或將來給予任何第三國的優惠、特權或豁免待遇。
4.workaround: a way in which you can solve or avoid a problem when the most obvious solution is not possible 應變方法；變通方法
All this adds up to a vast amount of uncertainty, which is just how Mr Trump likes it. Dangling the threat of tariffs over the heads of trade partners grants him a negotiating tool that he can use to address any grievance he wishes. On February 13th a meeting between Mr Trump and Narendra Modi, the prime minister of India, ended with a pledge by India to purchase more American oil and gas. Mr Trump’s strategy might not work for ever, though. Financial markets, which barely reacted to the threat of reciprocal tariffs, appear to think Mr Trump is bluffing about his willingness to go through with them. America is more open to trade than many of its partners, which benefits, rather than harms, American consumers. Actually implementing reciprocal tariffs, not just threatening them, would raise prices. Other countries may eventually test this by looking to another playground slogan: “The only way to deal with bullies is to stand up to them.”
這一切帶來巨大的不確定性，而特朗普恰恰樂見其成。他向貿易伙伴揮舞著關稅大棒，將其作為一種談判籌碼，來解決他眼中的所有“不公”。2月13日，特朗普與印度總理莫迪會晤，印度承諾將擴大美國石油和天然氣的進口。不過，特朗普的策略未必能永遠奏效。面對“對等關稅”的威脅，金融市場幾乎毫無反應，似乎認為特朗普只是在虛張聲勢，並不打算貫徹到底。相比許多貿易伙伴，美國的貿易開放程度更高，這對美國消費者有利無害。若真的實施對等關稅，而非僅口頭威脅，物價必將上漲。其他國家最終可能透過另一句操場口號來試探虛實——“對付霸凌者的唯一辦法，就是反抗。”
註釋：bluff: to try to make sb believe that you will do sth that you do not really intend to do, or that you know sth that you do not really know 虛張聲勢；唬人；吹牛
翻譯組：
Ryan，詩酒趁年華
Barry，女，被金融工作耽誤的美食博主一枚
風箏，熱愛生活熱愛翻譯熱愛搞錢熱愛貓咪
校對組：
Alexis, Less is more
Harold，不狂不放不申花
Rachel，心有懵虎，細嗅烏龜
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感想
Intro，男，政府臨時工，前理想主義者兼積極的悲觀主義者
對等關稅的破壞性肯定是不用多說的，對於打破舊規則體系，混亂和既得利益者的利益損失肯定是必然發生的事情。但所有的規則都不是一成不變的，規則所對應的執行系統也不是一成不變的，在動亂中一定孕育著新的可能性。我並不是支援打破舊有規則的支持者，也不想給他們的行為合理化（歸根結底都是政治利益的選擇），但我希望可以為國際政治經濟的變動，提供一個反向的思考角度。
新貿易關係重塑的可能性
適應經濟新格局的必然結果。在過去百年左右建立的全球貿易規則體系，是在特定的經濟格局和國家實力對比下形成的。隨著新興經濟體的崛起，世界經濟格局發生了巨大變化。美國的
“對等關稅”政策可以被看作是一種試圖適應這種變化的嘗試。例如，新興國家在一些產業領域快速發展，對傳統貿易強國的產業優勢構成挑戰。美國可能認為，原有的貿易規則沒有充分考慮到這種新的力量對比，透過 “對等關稅” 來重新塑造貿易關係，使貿易規則和關稅安排更符合當前的經濟格局。這就好比在一個不斷變化的商業市場中，當新的競爭對手出現並且市場份額逐漸擴大時，原有的市場規則制定者（如美國）想要重新調整規則，以適應新的競爭環境。
現行的全球貿易規則在某些方面可能存在滯後性，無法完全應對當前複雜的貿易問題。美國的 “對等關稅” 政策或許可以被視為一種對貿易規則理念更新的探索。例如，在智慧財產權保護、數字貿易等新興領域，原有的規則可能存在漏洞或者不夠完善。美國可能試圖透過 “對等關稅” 這種強硬手段，將這些新問題納入貿易規則的討論範疇，從而推動貿易規則從傳統貨物貿易為主向涵蓋更多新領域、新議題的方向發展。這就如同在科技飛速發展的時代，傳統的法律法規需要不斷更新以適應新的科技應用場景，美國試圖在貿易規則領域也進行類似的“更新”嘗試。
合作和和平只是週期插曲
從長遠的歷史週期來看，“對等關稅”有可能是新貿易關係重塑的一種嘗試，但在短期內，它對各國的利益和現有國際規則造成了明顯的損害。“在推動貿易關係變革的過程中，應該更加註重透過多邊協商和合作的方式來實現，而不是單純依靠單邊主義的“對等關稅” 政策，以避免對全球貿易秩序和各國經濟造成不可挽回的傷害。”這句話是一句再正確不過的話了，但在具體歷史長河和具體實踐中，所有的規則幾乎都是建立在戰爭的瓦礫上的，所以，合作和平可能只是短期的甜蜜，動盪和紛爭大概才是歷史的主題。
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願景