葉漢榮（義順集選區議員）詢問副總理兼貿工部長：

(a) 貿工部如何確保在新加坡營商便利的優勢不會被意圖規避美國貿易限制的公司濫用？

(b) 能否提供美國晶片出口管制規則對我國半導體產業及整體經濟影響的評估更新？

潘麗萍（丹戎巴葛集選區議員）詢問副總理兼貿工部長：是否有措施確保在新加坡運營的實體遵守出口管制及國際法，以維護我國作為備受尊重的國際商業樞紐地位？

林志蔚副教授（盛港集選區議員）詢問副總理兼貿工部長：

(a) 是否知悉新加坡將被列為美國新人工智慧出口管制的“第二級國家”？

(b) 爭取“國家認證終端使用者”地位及“第一級”重新分類是否為政府的外交政策目標？

(c) 美方是否提出技術及監管升級作為調整層級的先決條件？

林志蔚副教授（盛港集選區議員）詢問副總理兼貿工部長：鑑於美方指新加坡成為受制裁中國AI企業晶片轉運樞紐，

(a) 政府能否說明2023年以來晶片再出口政策的外交考量及跨部門決策過程？(b) 如何修補此類報道對新加坡信譽及美新關係的損害？

陳詩龍醫生（人力部長兼貿工部第二部長）：議長先生，請允許我合併回答葉漢榮議員、潘麗萍議員及林志蔚副教授今日提出的第3至6項口頭詢問。

議長：請繼續。

陳詩龍醫生（人力部長兼貿工部第二部長）：這些問題涉及美國出口管制及新加坡的應對措施。我的答覆也將涵蓋李堅輝議員後續會議提交的類似詢問。

新加坡是穩定、可信賴、聯通全球的國際商業樞紐。我們的經濟競爭力建基於法治精神、零容忍腐敗、透明監管及開放包容的營商環境。這是我國長期積累的聲譽，因此我們對違法企業採取堅決行動。這是競爭力的根基。

關於英偉達晶片受美國出口管制問題，我們正嚴密審查。目前資料顯示，英偉達實體運抵新加坡的產品僅佔其總營收不足1%，主要用於本地大型企業及政府。其餘在星開票的營收不涉及實體運輸。

若新加坡企業蓄意規避出口管制，我們將依法調查。獲取尖端技術並維護商業誠信符合國家利益。

《戰略物品管制法令》規範戰略性貨品及技術轉移，該框架與聯合國安理會等主要多邊出口管制機制接軌。對於美國單邊出口管制，雖無法律義務執行，但我們要求企業遵守其國際業務相關規管。

我們絕不縱容企業利用新加坡規避他國出口管制。新加坡海關與包括美國在內的外國夥伴密切合作，在法律允許範圍內協助調查。

議長：有請葉漢榮議員。

葉漢榮（義順集選區議員）：感謝答覆。本人宣告任職於新加坡全球投資公司。我很高興該部強調遵守國際貿易規則，也很高興新加坡認真履行我們的義務。

陳詩龍醫生（人力部長兼貿工部第二部長）：感謝葉先生的補充提問。新加坡擁有健全的出口管制制度，並以全面的戰略物資管制法為基礎。2002年戰略物資（管制）法》及其附屬法規對戰略物資和技術的轉讓和中介活動進行管理和規範。

我想更詳細地介紹一下我們是如何管理出口的。潛在的違規行為可能包括出口、轉運、在沒有必要許可證的情況下轉運戰略物資，或提供虛假或誤導性檔案或資訊，不正確的申報，以及在沒有許可證或沒有登記的情況下代理戰略物資–有了這些，就可以實施刑事處罰。

我們如何平衡與外國同行的合作？正如我早些時候在答覆中提到的，雖然我們目前可能沒有法律義務執行其他國家的單邊出口管制（這些管制可能會不時變化），但在新加坡運營的公司如果其國際業務活動適用這些法規，則應考慮到這些法規。

外交部（MFA）和新加坡海關還與一些外國對口部門（如美國）達成了現行安排，以促進對相關公司的調查。當我們不時收到有關指控的資訊時，如果我們意識到存在違規行為，我們將承諾自行開展這些調查。

潘麗萍（丹戎巴葛集選區議員）：我有一個補充問題想問部長。我想知道是否有計劃釋出任何行業指南，以支援在新加坡經營的公司遵守出口管制和國際制裁？

陳詩龍醫生（人力部長兼貿工部第二部長）：正如我早些時候所說，各國可能會不時單方面實施出口管制。我們對在新加坡經營的公司非常明確和透明的一點是，他們應該遵守各國的出口管制，而不是利用新加坡作為繞過或規避這些出口管制的國家。

林志蔚副教授（盛港集選區議員）：議長先生。原問題提交外交部，現轉交貿工部。我理解這一轉發背後的動機，但希望外交部的部長或一位部長能夠對要求採取更多外交政策的問題作出答覆。

像我們這樣的轉口貿易中心，即使我們的增值部分很小或可以忽略不計，但收入數字卻如此誇大，這並不罕見，這也並非像部長似乎暗示的那樣真的與欺詐有關，而實際上是合法的會計做法和原產地規則的陰謀。

無論如何，標題上的不平衡會引起商業行動，就像我們所看到的那樣。那麼，請問外交部是否知道這些不平衡現象？如果知道，它的評估是，從外交政策的角度來看，促進轉口貿易對國家利益是積極的還是消極的？與此相關的是，外交部是否有正式機制對 MTI 不可避免會產生外交政策影響的貿易決定進行審查或提供意見？

議長先生：有請外交部長維文先生。 

世界上有 200 個國家。200 個國家有可能頒佈單方面的出口措施。我們已經解釋過，我們在法律上沒有義務執行 200 個國家的單方面出口措施。不過，我們會執行經協定的多邊出口管制制度。

話雖如此，但如果有公司出於某種原因，試圖規避適用於它們的單邊出口管制措施，利用它們與新加坡的聯絡–因為人們知道新加坡是一個乾淨、衛生、透明和有信譽的地方–我們不允許它們利用與我們的聯絡，採取欺騙或規避措施，規避適用於它們的單邊出口措施，這不符合我國的國家利益。

如果貿易伙伴來找我們，說 “我們有顧慮”，我們肯定會協助調查，或者至少深入檢視資料，看看是否有任何令人擔憂的原因，我們這樣做是為了保護我們自己的國家利益。特別是先進的半導體晶片。我們也需要半導體。誠然，我們也是全球半導體生產和出口鏈的一部分。

但目前在新加坡生產的並不是 H100，即用於人工智慧的高階晶片。但我們自己也需要這些晶片，因此我們必須監督這些晶片製造商的出口制度。

這位議員提到了我們的二級分類。首先，他們稱之為 “人工智慧擴散規則”。它是在拜登政府末期首次公佈的。事實上，現在該規則正在徵求意見，情況仍在不斷變化。我們不在第一梯隊，但我們在第二梯隊，與其他約 150 個國家在一起。我不想詳細談論晶片的確切數量，以及目前這是否對我們構成限制。不用說，我們將繼續與這些先進晶片的主要出口來源國接觸，以確保我們有足夠的晶片。

除了晶片和出口管制之外，我們還可以把視野放得更遠：新加坡，作為一個小島城邦和貿易樞紐，我們確實需要支援自由貿易。我們確實需要在全球供應鏈中發揮關鍵作用。

第二點，由於我們是小國，我們必須遵守國際法和多邊規則，以及使多邊規則生效的程式和機構。這也是小國的特點。

第三點，我們必須始終尋求與世界相關，對大國和中等強國有用，但我們不會被其他強國甚至追求金錢利益的公司所利用。

最後一點，在一個分化、分裂或兩極分化的世界裡，我們更應該直言不諱，我在北京和華盛頓說的都是同樣的話，而且要公平。這就是為什麼陳部長所說的一切都適用於我們所有的貿易伙伴。

我想我已經說得夠多了。我希望我已經讓這位議員和其他代表放心了。

議長先生：有請陳詩龍部長。

議長：有請李堅輝議員，最後一個問題。

李堅輝（官委議員）： 我感謝部長非常全面的答覆。部長提到，根據美國人工智慧晶片出口管制，新加坡已被列為第二級國家。我向部長提出的補充問題是：被列為第二級國家對經濟有什麼影響，這種分類是否會影響新加坡吸引人工智慧晶片投資、高階半導體研發的能力，甚至阻礙我們成為人工智慧發展中心的雄心？

陳詩龍醫生（人力部長兼貿工部第二部長）：感謝李先生的補充提問。正如我尊敬的同事維文部長所分享的，我們是150個國家中基礎較廣的國家。我認為我們是很好的夥伴。

我在剛才的回答中也提到，美國的人工智慧擴散規則尚未由現任政府最終確定；維文部長也提到了這一事實，即拜登政府在其執政的最後幾天釋出了這一規則。實際上，它是在 2025 年 1 月 13 日釋出的，也就是一個多月前。徵求意見期為 120 天，將於 2025 年 5 月 13 日結束。新政府尚未就其對該規則的政策或立場發表評論。因此，我們是處於第二級地位的 150 個國家之一。

雖然美國將 18 個國家歸為第一級，但並沒有分享分級分類的具體要求，也沒有說明一個國家從第二級重新歸為第一級需要滿足哪些要求。

目前，我們的行業參與者對先進晶片的需求大多來自總部位於美國的雲超級計算機。它們是 Meta、亞馬遜、谷歌等。我們將與他們合作，申請成為通用驗證終端使用者，允許他們向新加坡轉移一定數量的先進晶片，以滿足他們的創新和業務需求。

對於有大量人工智慧計算需求的本地公司，他們可以申請成為國家驗證終端使用者。終端使用者分為兩級：通用驗證終端使用者和國家驗證終端使用者。他們可以申請成為國家驗證終端使用者，以獲得先進的人工智慧晶片，我們將支援本地公司的申請。

通用和國家驗證終端使用者進口的晶片將不計入第二級國家的國家上限。

Mr Yip Hon Weng asked the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade and Industry (a) how does the Ministry ensure that the ease of doing business in Singapore is not exploited by companies seeking to bypass US trade restrictions; and (b) whether the Ministry can provide an update on its assessment of the effects of the US chips export control rules on our semi-conductor industry and the broader economy.

Ms Joan Pereira asked the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade and Industry whether there are measures in place to ensure that entities operating in Singapore are compliant with export controls and international laws in order to protect Singapore’s status as a well-respected international business hub.

Assoc Prof Jamus Jerome Lim asked the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade and Industry (a) whether the Ministry is aware that Singapore will be placed under the new US AI export controls' Tier Two status; (b) whether it is a specific foreign policy objective of this Government to secure (i) the National Validated End-User status and (ii) Tier One reclassification under these controls; and (c) what specific technical and regulatory enhancements, if any, have been communicated by US counterparts as prerequisites for such status changes.

Assoc Prof Jamus Jerome Lim asked the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade and Industry in light of how US agencies have flagged Singapore as a hub for illicit chip transshipments to blacklisted Chinese AI firms (a) whether the Government is able to (i) disclose the foreign policy rationales behind its regulatory stance with regard to re-exports of such chips since 2023 and (ii) detail any or all inter-agency decisions that led to this situation; and (b) how does the Government intend to rectify any damage to Singapore’s credibility and ties with the US arising from such reports.

The Second Minister for Trade and Industry (Dr Tan See Leng): Mr Speaker, may I have your permission to answer oral Question Nos 3 to 6 on today's Order Paper, filed by Members Mr Yip Hon Weng, Ms Joan Pereira and Assoc Prof Jamus Lim, together, please?

Mr Speaker: Please go ahead.

Dr Tan See Leng: These pertain to questions over the United States (US) export controls and Singapore's approach to such measures. My response today will also cover a similar Parliamentary Question that has been filed by Mr Mark Lee1, that has been scheduled for a subsequent Sitting.

Singapore is a stable, trusted, reliable and well-connected international business hub. Our economic competitiveness is based on our commitment to the rule of law, zero tolerance for corruption, transparent regulations and an open inclusive business environment. We have painstakingly built up this reputation over time. That is why we take firm and decisive action against individuals and companies that violate our laws. It is the foundation of our competitiveness.

Questions have been raised about Nvidia chips that were subject to US export controls. We are scrutinising this issue carefully and will continue to do so. So far, our checks indicate that physical delivery of products sold by Nvidia to Singapore represent less than 1% of Nvidia's overall revenue. These are mainly deployed in Singapore for major enterprises and the Singapore Government. We understand that the remainder of Nvidia's revenue billed to business entities in Singapore did not involve physical shipments into Singapore.

If a company in Singapore is engaged in deceptive or dishonest practices to evade export controls that it is subject to, we will investigate and we will take the appropriate action in accordance with Singapore laws. It is in our national interest to secure access to leading edge technology and to maintain the integrity of our business environment.

Within Singapore, the transfer and brokering of strategic goods and technology is governed by the Strategic Goods (Control) Act. This is a robust framework that is aligned with major multilateral export control regimes, including those imposed by the United Nations Security Council.

Outside of these multilateral regimes, countries sometimes impose unilateral export controls on specific items. The US' export controls on advanced semi-conductor chips are one example.

Under these rules, the US expects companies to ensure their business transactions adhere to their requirements, including doing the required Know Your Customer (KYC) on the buyers of the advanced semi-conductor chips. While we currently do not have legal obligations to enforce the unilateral export controls of other countries, we expect all companies operating in Singapore to take into account such regulations if they apply to their international business activities. Their international business activities should be conducted transparently.

We certainly do not condone businesses deliberately using their association with Singapore to circumvent or violate the export controls of other countries. At the operational level, Singapore Customs works closely with its foreign counterparts, including those from the US to address their concerns and to facilitate their investigations where appropriate and to the extent our law permits.

It is important to emphasise that this open, inclusive and transparent regulatory regime applies to all our trading partners.

Some Members also had questions about the economic impact on Singapore arising from US controls on advanced semi-conductor chips. There is limited impact, in terms of our ability to manufacture and export chips. The US' current technology controls are aimed at a narrow subset of advanced semi-conductor chips, whereas Singapore's semi-conductor industry focuses on producing mature node chips which are used globally in appliances, automotives and industrial equipment.

However, in terms of access to advanced artificial intelligence (AI) compute – for example Nvidia H100 Graphics Processing Units (GPUs), the previous US administration had introduced an AI Diffusion Rule in January 2025 aimed at managing access to H100 or equivalent GPUs on a country-level basis. Singapore, like around 150 countries, has been classified as Tier Two. The details of the US AI Diffusion Rule have not yet been finalised by the current US administration, and the US has not communicated any specific requirements as prerequisites for changes to countries' tiering classifications.

 Our objective is to ensure adequate access to AI compute by both local and international companies with operations in Singapore. We will ensure that US-headquartered cloud hyperscalers can continue to operate in Singapore as Universal Verified End Users and also support local companies that wish to apply to be National Verified End Users with access to AI compute.

 In closing, I wish to assure Members that we will continue to work with companies based in Singapore to facilitate their access to advanced semi-conductor chips and technologies from all the major source countries. We will also continue to engage the US administration to address their concerns.

Mr Speaker: Mr Yip Hon Weng.

Mr Yip Hon Weng (Yio Chu Kang): Thank you, Mr Speaker. I thank the Minister for his response. I declare that I work in a global investment firm based in Singapore. I am glad that the Ministry has emphasised compliance with international trade rules, and that Singapore takes our obligations seriously.

Could the Minister elaborate on the safeguards in place, to prevent companies from using Singapore as a conduit to bypass US export restrictions, especially in light of heightened US-China trade tensions? And how does the Ministry balance these safeguards with ensuring that we remain an attractable destination for businesses?

Dr Tan See Leng: I thank Mr Yip for his supplementary question. Singapore has a robust export control regime and this is underpinned by a comprehensive strategic goods control legislation. The Strategic Goods (Control) Act 2002 and its subsidiary legislation governs and regulates the transfer and brokering of strategic goods and technology.

Singapore's list of control goods and technologies is aligned with four multilateral export control regimes, namely the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. And as I have alluded to earlier, the enforcement action is undertaken by Singapore Customs.

I wanted to give a bit more granularity in terms of how we manage the exports. Potential contraventions can include export, transshipment, transit of strategic goods without the requisite permits or providing false or misleading documents or information, incorrect declarations and brokering of strategic goods without a permit or being registered – and with that, criminal penalties can then be enforced.

How do we balance working with foreign counterparts? As I have earlier on mentioned in my reply, while we may currently not have legal obligations to enforce unilateral export controls of other countries, which may vary from time to time, companies that are operating in Singapore are expected to take into account such regulations if these apply to their international business activities.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Singapore Customs also have existing arrangements with some foreign counterparts, such as those in the US, to facilitate the investigation of companies of interest. From time to time, when we do get information of allegations and if we are aware of breaches, we will undertake to conduct these investigations ourselves.

The approach that we take is systematic and thorough, and we want to continue to emphasise that we have an open, inclusive and transparent regulatory regime and it applies to all of our partners today. I hope that addresses Mr Yip's supplementary question.

Mr Speaker: Ms Joan Pereira.

Ms Joan Pereira (Tanjong Pagar): Thank you, Mr Speaker. I have one supplementary question for the Minister. May I know if there are plans to issue any industry guidelines to support firms operating in Singapore to comply with export controls and international sanctions?

Dr Tan See Leng: I thank Ms Joan Pereira for her supplementary question. As I have shared earlier on, countries may have export controls from time to time, unilaterally. Where we have been very clear and transparent to companies operating within Singapore is that they are expected to abide by the countries' export controls, and not use Singapore as a country to bypass or circumvent these export controls.

To this end, as the hon Member has highlighted, it would not be possible to cover every potential, probable or future export controls that countries may unilaterally impose. But those principles that have guided us through to build us up to where we are a reputable business hub, these principles will continue to be consistent and we will hold true to these principles. From time to time, when these unilateral export controls come to our attention, we will work with the relevant countries to gain clarity, to engage them, as we are actively engaging with the US, our very important partner, to see how we can better manage and better educate the businesses that are based here to make sure that they are able to comply. I hope that gives the Member the reassurance.

Mr Speaker: Assoc Prof Jamus Lim. 

Assoc Prof Jamus Jerome Lim (Sengkang): Sir, I had originally posed my two Parliamentary Questions to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) before they were redirected to the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI). I understand the motivation behind this redirection, but hopeful that the Minister or a Minister from MFA will be able to respond to questions that call for a more foreign policy approach.

Notwithstanding Minister Tan's assertions about the physical sales of Nvidia products being only around 1%, Nvidia's latest filing with the US Securities Exchange Commission states that for the nine months that ended October 2024, the company booked US$91 billion in total revenue, of which a little less than half is domestic; that is, domestic to the US. The next highest source is actually Singapore, with around $7 billion, and it is more than that for China, which includes Hong Kong, at $12 billion. This means that Singapore accounts for around 20% of Nvidia's global revenue.

It is not unusual for entrepôt hubs like us to book such inflated revenue figures, even if our value-added component is small or negligible, nor is this really about fraud, as the Minister seems to allude to, but actually legitimate accounting practices and rules of origin machinations.

Regardless, the headline imbalance invites commercial action, like what we have seen. So, if I may enquire if MFA was aware of these imbalances and if so, is it, in its assessment, that facilitating transshipment trade is positive or negative for the national interest from a foreign policy angle? And relatedly, is there a formal mechanism for MFA to review or provide input to MTI's trade decisions that have inevitable foreign policy implications?

And finally, one question directly for MTI, and given that Singapore is now being placed under Tier Two status by the US, what specific steps will the Government take or plan to take to prevent further downgrades of our status, which could jeopardise our AI hub aspirations?

Mr Speaker: Minister Vivian Balakrishnan.  

The Minister for Foreign Affairs (Dr Vivian Balakrishnan): Mr Speaker, Singapore is a transshipment hub, a vital regional and global headquarters for thousands of international companies. Our trade volume is three times our gross domestic product (GDP), and the range of activities that our companies are engaged in, and not just companies owned by Singapore and Singaporeans, but by global owners of these companies, have a regional and international footprint. So, I am not sure what Assoc Prof Jamus Lim is referring to when he says imbalances.

These unique characteristics are par for the course for the unique role that Singapore plays in the global economy. So, for instance, when, as the Member correctly said, Nvidia states in its returns that 22% of sales of chips were booked to entities with operations in Singapore, but my colleague has already explained to the Member only 1% physically came to Singapore and was deployed in data centres here, serving the Government and other major enterprises, including, I should add, hyperscalers. So, there is nothing unusual or unbalanced about that.

The nub of the question really is whether Singapore is being used by these enterprises and companies to evade unilateral export controls. And my colleague has very carefully explained to this House that Singapore, by law, through the Strategic Goods Control Act, gives effect to multilateral export control regimes. He referred to the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Australia Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime. Basically, these are focused especially on weapons or weapons of mass destruction, chemical and biological threats, and other potentially significant dual-use equipment. And these have force of law and we take our reference from the United Nations Security Council.

There are 200 countries in the world. It is possible for 200 countries to promulgate unilateral export measures. We have explained that we are not legally obliged to enforce that unilateral export measures of 200 countries. But we will enforce the multilateral agreed-upon export control regimes.

Having said that, it is not in our national interest to be made use of and for companies who, for whatever reasons, are trying perhaps to evade unilateral export control measures that apply to them, to use their association with Singapore – because people know Singapore is a clean, hygienic, transparent and reputable place – we will not allow them to use that association with us to engage in deceptive or evasive measures to avoid unilateral export measures that apply to them.

The point is the onus is on that company and we will not countenance evasion, deception, false declarations or even mis-accounting; and that we will act on.

And as and when a trading partner comes to us and says, "We have concerns", at that point, we would certainly facilitate investigations or at least, have a deeper look at the data and see whether there is any cause for concern, and we do that in order to protect our own national interest. Specifically for advanced semi-conductor chips. We too have a need for semi-conductors. It is true that we are also part of the global chains that manufacture and export semi-conductors.

But those that are currently manufactured in Singapore are not the H100s, the high-end chips which are used for AI. But we need them for our own purposes and we therefore have to monitor the export regimes of the manufacturers of these chips.

The Member referred to our Tier Two classification. Well, first of all, they call it the AI Diffusion Rule. It was first published near the tail-end of the Biden Administration. In fact, right now, the rules are up for comments and the situation is still evolving. We are not in Tier One, but we are in Tier Two, in good company with about 150 other countries. I do not want to get into detail about the exact number of chips and whether that currently poses a constraint for us. Needless to say, we will continue to engage the major exporting source of these advanced chips to ensure that we have adequate.

And I am sure Members of this House will also be aware, when dealing with sensitive topics like this, it is not in our national interest to compromise our negotiating positions when it deals with strategic items on this score. So, I hope the Member understands that the situation that has arisen is: one, because of our unique role and indeed our successful performance of this unique, global role; and two, the fact that we are a trusted, reliable and honest player.

If you zoom out, beyond chips and export controls, the point is this: Singapore, as a tiny island city-state and a trading hub, we do need to stand in favour of free trade. We do need to play a critical role in global supply chains.

Second point, because we are small, we have to subscribe to international law and multilateral rules, and processes and institutions to give effect to multilateral rules. It comes with being small.

Third point, we always have to seek to be relevant to the world, to be useful to big and middle powers, but we will not be made use of, either by other powers or even by companies pursuing pecuniary interest.

And my final point, in a world which is bifurcating, fracturing or polarising and divided, it is all the more important for us to play it straight, for me to say the same thing in Beijing and Washington, and to be fair. And that is why everything that Minister Tan has said applies to all our trading partners.

I think I have said enough. And I hope I have reassured the Member and other Members of this House.

Mr Speaker: Minister Tan.

Dr Tan See Leng: Thank you, Speaker. I want to also address Assoc Prof Lim's point about Nvidia's quarterly revenue, as he shared earlier on.

I just wanted to put it into very clear perspective for the Member: in the third quarter of 2024, the proportion of Nvidia's quarterly revenue attributed to Singapore is 22%. This reflects the location where Nvidia's customers received the bill; it does not mean that it was shipped here. So, it is independent from the physical location that Nvidia and its customers deliver the goods to.

Let me share broadly with Members of the House. It is common practice for global entities to centralise the billing for procured goods and services in their hubs, but this is separate from where the products are shipped to. So far, from our checks and the data that we have on hand, it is revealed that in that quarter, less than 1% of Nvidia's overall revenue was physically shipped into Singapore. The remainder of Nvidia's revenue billed to business entities here did not involve physical shipments into Singapore.

Mr Speaker: Mr Mark Lee, last supplementary question.

Mr Mark Lee (Nominated Member): I thank the Minister for the very comprehensive reply. The Minister has mentioned that Singapore has been classified as a Tier Two country under the US AI chip export controls. My supplementary question to the Minister is: what are the economic implications of being in Tier Two and does this classification impact Singapore's ability to attract AI chip investments, high-end semi-conductor research and development or even hinder our ambitions to be an AI development hub?

Dr Tan See Leng: I thank Mr Lee for his supplementary question. As my esteemed colleague, Minister Vivian, has shared, we are in the broader base of the 150 countries. I think we are in good company.

As I have also mentioned in my reply earlier, the US AI Diffusion Rule has not yet been finalised by the current administration; and Minister Vivian has also alluded to the fact that it was released by the Biden Administration in the final days of his administration. Actually, it is on 13 January 2025, just over a month ago. And there is a 120-day comment period, which will end on 13 May 2025. The new administration has not commented on their policy or position towards the rule. So, we are among one of the 150 countries under this Tier Two status.

Whilst the US categorised 18 countries under Tier One, it did not share specific requirements on the tiering classification nor what requirements are required for a country to be reclassified from Tier Two to Tier One.

Access to AI compute is important for our national AI ambitions. As articulated in our National AI Strategy 2.0, we are adopting a multi-prong strategy to enable industry, academia and Government to undertake high-value AI activities. Besides securing access to advanced AI hardware and compute, we will also focus on talent and infrastructure development. We will continue to support companies operating in Singapore to gain access to advanced chips, including those that are under the AI Diffusion Rule.

Presently, most of the demand for advanced chips amongst our industry players come from US headquartered cloud hyperscalers. These are: Meta, Amazon, Google and so on. We will work with them to apply to be universal verified end users, so as to allow them to transfer a certain quantity of advanced chips to Singapore for their innovation and for their business needs.

For the local companies with significant AI compute requirements, they can apply to be the national verified end user. There are two tiers: a universal verified end user and a national verified end user. They can apply for the national verified end user status to receive access to advanced AI chips and we will support our local companies in their application.

Chips that are imported by both universal and national verified end users will not count towards the national cap imposed on Tier Two countries.

We are in consultation with industry players in Singapore to gather feedback on the potential impact of the draft rules on their business activities. This will allow us to better consider appropriate measures to support our companies and we are also, as I have said earlier, engaging the US to address their concerns and to also better understand their approach to the AI Diffusion Rule.

Note(s) to Question No(s) 3-6:

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