翻譯｜陸銘茗 同濟大學法學院 LL.B.
一審｜曾梓栩 外交學院 LL.B.
二審｜ LYJ NUS LL.M.
編輯｜鄭梓萱 澳門科技大學LL.B.
Izzy 美國西北大學LL.M.
責編｜馮雨萱 北京大學J.D.&J.M.
GIF V. SYL and LBL
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF THE HIGH COURT OF HONG KONG [2024] HKCFI 1324
香港高等法院原訟法庭判決書 [2024] HKCFI 1324判決書[1]：
香港法院基於多份合同之間互不相容的仲裁條款撤銷仲裁裁決
判決時間：2024年5月19日
Introduction
介紹
Before me is an Originating Summons dated 11 August 2023 (“Originating Summons”) issued by the 1st Plaintiff (“P1”) and the 2nd Plaintiff (“P2”) (together “Ps”) against the Defendant (“D”).
在本庭面前的是第一原告（“P1”）和第二原告（“P2”）（統稱“二原告”）於2023年8月11日對被告（“D”）發出的原訴傳票（“原訴傳票”）。
By the Originating Summons, Ps apply to set aside an interim arbitral award dated 6 July 2023 (“Interim Award”) made by the arbitral tribunal (“Tribunal”) in an arbitration administered by the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre (“Arbitration”).
二原告透過原訴傳票申請撤銷仲裁庭（“仲裁庭”）於2023年7月6日在香港國際仲裁中心受理的一宗仲裁（“仲裁”）中作出的臨時仲裁裁決（“臨時裁決”）。
The Interim Award arose out of Ps’ jurisdiction challenge, which Ps unsuccessfully made before the Tribunal. Dissatisfied with the Interim Award, Ps made this application pursuant to Sections 34 and 81 of the Arbitration Ordinance (Cap 609).
臨時裁決源於二原告對管轄權提出的異議，二原告向仲裁庭提出異議未果。由於對該臨時裁決不滿，二原告根據《香港仲裁條例》（第609章）第34和81條[2]提出了本申請。
Unsurprisingly, D, who successfully persuaded the Tribunal to conclude that it had jurisdiction, opposes Ps’ application.
不出所料，成功說服仲裁庭認定其具有管轄權的被告反對二原告的申請。
1、案例連結：https://jusmundi.com/en/document/decision/pdf/en-gif-v-syl-and-lbl-judgment-of-the-court-of-first-instance-of-the-high-court-of-hong-kong-2024-hkcfi-1324-sunday-19th-may-2024
2、法條連結：https://www.elegislation.gov.hk/hk/cap609
Brief Procedural History
簡要程式歷程
The subject dispute arises out of the following three agreements (collectively the “Three Contracts”):
(1) A Loan Agreement dated 1 January 2020 (as amended and restated on 1 June 2020, and further supplemented on 6 July 2020 by way of a Side Agreement) entered into between D as the “Lender” and Ps as the “Borrowers” (“Loan Agreement”).
(2) A Security Deed dated 1 January 2020 entered into between D as the “Mortgagee”, P2 as the “Mortgagor”, and P1 and P2 as the “Obligors” (“January Deed”).
A Security Deed dated 6 July 2020 entered into
between D as the “Mortgagee” and Pl together with two other companies (“Other Mortgagors”) as the “Mortgagors” (“July Deed”).
本案爭議源於以下三份協議（統稱“三份合同”）：
(1) 本案被告作為“放款人”與二原告作為“借款人”於2020年1月1日簽訂的貸款協議（於2020年6月1日修訂重述，並於2020年7月6日透過附加協議進一步補充）（“貸款協議”）。
(2) 被告作為“抵押權人”、第二原告作為“抵押人”、第一原告和第二原告作為“義務人”於2020年1月1日訂立的擔保協議（“1月擔保協議”）。
(3) 被告作為“抵押權人”、第一原告連同另外兩家公司（“其他抵押人”）作為“抵押人”於2020年7月6日訂立的擔保協議（“7月擔保協議”）。
Each of the Three Contracts contains a dispute resolution clause:
(1) Clause 7.1 of the Loan Agreement provides that:
“…Each of the parties hereto irrevocably…agrees that any dispute or controversy arising out of, relating to, or concerning any interpretation, construction, performance or breach of this Agreement, shall be settled by arbitration to be held in Hong Kong which shall be administered by the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre (“HKIAC”) in accordance with the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre Administered Arbitration Rules…There shall be three (3) arbitrators, with one arbitrator to be appointed by the Borrowers and one arbitrator to be appointed by the Lender. If the aforesaid two arbitrators fail to agree on the third arbitrator, the HKIAC Council shall select the third arbitrator, who shall be qualified to practice law in Hong Kong…” (emphasis added).
(2) Clause 19.2 of the January Deed and the July Deed are identical.
They both provide that:
“The dispute resolution provision in the Loan Agreement applies mutatis mutandis to this Deed.” (collectively referred to as the “Arbitration Agreements”)
三份合同均包含爭議解決條款：
(1) 貸款協議第7.1條規定：
“……本協議各方不可撤銷地……同意，由本協議引起的、與本協議有關的或涉及本協議的任何解釋、履行或違反本協議的任何爭議或糾紛，應在香港透過仲裁解決，仲裁應由香港國際仲裁中心（“港仲”）根據《香港國際仲裁中心機構仲裁規則》進行受理。仲裁應由三名仲裁員組成，其中一名仲裁員由借款人指定，另一名仲裁員由放款人指定。如果上述兩名仲裁員未能就第三名仲裁員達成一致意見，港仲理事會應選定第三名仲裁員，該仲裁員應具有在香港執業的法律資格……”（著重強調）。
(2) 1月擔保協議和7月擔保協議的第19.2條完全相同。兩者均規定：
“貸款協議中的爭議解決條款比照適用於本協議。”（統稱“仲裁協議”）
（圖片來源於網路）
Relying on the Arbitration Agreements, by a Notice of Arbitration dated 15 October 2021 (“NOA”), D commenced the Arbitration against Ps under the auspices of the HKIAC pursuant to the HKIAC Administered Arbitration Rules 2018 (“HKIAC Rules”).
根據仲裁協議，在港仲的主持下，被告依據《2018香港國際仲裁中心機構仲裁規則》（“港仲規則”）對二原告提起仲裁，於2021年10月15日發出仲裁通知書（“NOA”）。
Under the NOA, D asked for a single arbitration under multiple contracts pursuant to Article 29 of the HKIAC Rules. D also indicated that it would nominate its arbitrator (whose nomination was eventually approved).
根據NOA，被告要求根據港仲規則第29條就多份合同進行單個仲裁。被告還表示將提名仲裁員（其提名最終獲得批准）
Ps objected to having a single arbitration under multiple contracts. Ps wrote to the HKIAC, informing the HKIAC that it did not agree to have the Three Contracts resolved in a single Arbitration.
二原告反對根據多份合同進行單個仲裁。二原告致函港仲，告知其不同意將三份合同交由單個仲裁解決。
Further correspondence ensued between Ps, D and the HKIAC.
隨後，二原告、被告和港仲之間進一步溝通。
On 10 January 2022, the HKIAC decided that the Arbitration was, prima facie, validly commenced under Article 29. The HKIAC also indicated that any jurisdiction challenge would be dealt with after the Tribunal was constituted. The HKIAC invited Ps to jointly designate an arbitrator with the Other Mortgagors.
2022年1月10日，根據港仲規則第29條的規定，港仲裁定，仲裁的初步證據確鑿。港仲還表示，任何管轄權異議將在仲裁庭組成後處理。港仲邀請二原告與其他抵押人共同指定一名仲裁員。
On 9 February 2022, Ps filed an Answer to the NOA. Ps expressly reserved the right to challenge jurisdiction. Ps also nominated a second arbitrator (“Ps’ Nominated Arbitrator”).
2022年2月9日，二原告提交了對NOA的答覆。二原告明確保留其對管轄權提出異議的權利。二原告還提名了第二名仲裁員（“二原告提名的仲裁員”）。
The Other Mortgagors did not file any Answer to the NOA. There was therefore no nomination from the Other Mortgagors.
其他抵押人並未對NOA提交任何答覆。因此，其他抵押人並未提名。
After further rounds of correspondence, the HKIAC decided not to appoint Ps’ Nominated Arbitrator. By a letter dated 16 February 2022, the HKIAC noted that there was an absence of joint designation of arbitrator by Ps and the Other Mortgagors. The HKIAC further represented that in view of the above, it would proceed to appoint a second arbitrator.
經過多輪溝通後，港仲決定不任命二原告提名的仲裁員。港仲在2022年2月16日的信函中指出，二原告和其他抵押人並未共同指定仲裁員。港仲進一步表示，鑑於上述情況，其將著手指定第二名仲裁員。
（圖片來源於網路）
Eventually, on 30 May 2022, the HKIAC appointed the second arbitrator, who was not Ps’ Nominated Arbitrator.
最終，港仲於2022年5月30日任命了第二名仲裁員，其並不是二原告提名的仲裁員。
On 25 July 2022, the HKIAC wrote to the parties and indicated that the two wing arbitrators had jointly nominated the presiding arbitrator.
2022年7月25日，港仲致函各方，表示兩名邊席仲裁員已共同提名首席仲裁員。
On 2 August 2022, the HKIAC wrote to the parties and confirmed the constitution of the Tribunal.
2022年8月2日，港仲致函各方，確認了仲裁庭的組成。
On 31 October 2022, Ps issued an application to challenge the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Ps also asked for bifurcation of the proceedings between jurisdiction and merits.
2022年10月31日，二原告提出申請對仲裁庭管轄權的異議。二原告還要求將程式分流為管轄權和實體兩個部分。
On 11 April 2023, the Tribunal directed that the jurisdiction challenge would be dealt with by way of a preliminary question.
2023年4月11日，仲裁庭指示以先決問題的方式處理管轄權異議。
This led to the Interim Award dated 6 July 2023, by which the Tribunal dismissed the jurisdiction challenge.
因此，仲裁庭於2023年7月6日做出臨時裁決，駁回了對管轄權的異議。
Dissatisfied with the results, Ps filed the Originating Summons on 11 August 2023. Ps applied for an order or declaration that the Interim Award be set aside and that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction in the Arbitration.
由於對結果不滿，二原告於2023年8月11日提交了原訴傳票。二原告申請一項命令或宣告，要求撤銷臨時裁決、以及確定仲裁庭對仲裁無管轄權。
（圖片來源於網路）
In gist, Ps advance two grounds of complaint (which were made before the Tribunal):
(1) First, Ps contend that the Arbitration Agreements are incompatible with one another. Hence, Ps say that the Arbitration should not have been commenced under Article 29 of the HKIAC Rules as a single arbitration under multiple contracts (“Compatibility Ground”).
(2) Second, Ps contend that the composition of the Tribunal was defective since it was not done in accordance with parties’ agreement under the Three Contracts (“Agreement Ground”).
簡而言之，二原告提出了兩項申訴的論證（已在仲裁庭上提出）：
(1)首先，二原告認為仲裁協議相互不相容。因此，二原告稱，根據港仲規則第29條，不應啟動多份合同下的單個仲裁（“基於相容性的論證”）。
(2)其次，二原告認為仲裁庭的組成有缺陷，因為它並未按照三份合同下各方的協議組成（“基於仲裁協議的論證”）。
D does not disagree that this Court has jurisdiction to entertain challenges concerning the constitution and composition of the Tribunal. D also fairly accepts that the Court deals with such a challenge de novo and is not bound by the findings of the Tribunal. The Court will review the evidence and make its own decision as to whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction. D, however, submits that the grounds of challenge have not been made out.
被告不反對本法院有權受理對仲裁庭的組成和構成提出的異議。被告也完全同意，法院將從頭開始處理這種異議，且不受仲裁庭裁決的約束。法院將審查證據，並自行決定仲裁庭是否具有管轄權。但被告認為，異議的論證不充分。
The Compatibility Ground
相容性論證
The Agreement in Question
所涉協議
To fully understand Ps’ Compatibility Ground, it is necessary to consider the Three Agreements in further detail.
要充分理解二原告的“相容性論證”，有必要考慮以下三項協議的細節。
In the present case, the parties to the Loan Agreement are Ps as the “Borrowers” and D as the “Lender”. As noted in paragraph 6(1) above, Clause 7.1 of the Loan Agreement expressly provides that the “Borrowers” (ie Ps) can designate a wing arbitrator in the event of dispute. It is hence rather clear that had an arbitration been commenced solely based on the Loan Agreement, Ps could have designated one of the arbitrators in the Arbitration. Ps needed not consult any other parties for such purposes.
在本案中，貸款協議的當事方是作為“借款人”的二原告和作為“放款人”的被告。正如上文第6(1)段所述，貸款協議第7.1條明文規定，“借款人”（即二原告）可在出現爭議時指定一名邊裁。因此，如果僅根據貸款協議啟動仲裁，二原告明顯可以在仲裁中指定一名仲裁員。二原告無需為此目的諮詢任何其他方。
The appointment procedures under the January Deed and July Deed are less straightforward. As noted in paragraph 6(2) above, the January Deed and July Deed contain identical provisions. On the face, the identical Clause 19.2 seeks to apply, “mutatis mutandis”, the dispute resolution provision in the Loan Agreement to the January Deed and July Deed.
1月擔保協議和7月擔保協議規定的委任程式則並非如此簡單。如上文第6(2)段所述，1月擔保協議和7月擔保協議的條文完全相同。從表面上看，相同的第19.2條旨在“比照(mutatis mutandis)”貸款協議中的爭議解決條款，以適用於1月擔保協議和7月擔保協議。
（圖片來源於網路）
In English terms, “mutatis mutandis” mean all necessary changes having been made or with the necessary changes. But what are the “necessary” changes to be effected to the January Deed and July Deed?
在英語中，“mutatis mutandis”的意思是所有必要的改動都已作出或作出了必要的改動。但1月擔保協議和7月擔保協議的“必要”修改是什麼呢？
In relation to the January Deed, the results are relatively more straightforward:
25. (1) The January Deed was entered into by the same parties as in the Loan Agreement, with D as the “Mortgagee” and P2 as the “Mortgagor”. Ps were also defined together as the “Obligors”.
(2) Ps suggest that read in context, “mutatis mutandis” could mean three things: –
(a) First, it could mean that there is no change at all, and the right is still vested in the “Borrowers”.
(b) Second, it could mean that the word “Borrowers” is replaced by the word “Obligors”.
(c) Third, it could also mean that the word “Borrowers” is replaced by the word “Mortgagor”.
關於1月擔保協議，結果相對更簡單明瞭：
(1) 1月擔保協議是由貸款協議中的相同當事人訂立的，被告為“抵押權人”，第二原告為“抵押人”。二原告也被共同定義為“義務人”。
(2) 二原告認為，從上下文來看，“比照(mutatis mutandis)”可能有三種含義：
(a) 首先，它可能意味著沒有任何變化，權利仍然屬於“借款人（Borrowers）”。
(b) 其次，這可能意味著“借款人（Borrowers）”一詞被“義務人（Obligors）”一詞所取代。
(c) 第三，也可以用“抵押人（Mortgagor）”取代“借款人（Borrowers）”。
(3) For present purposes, it is not necessary for me to resolve this apparent conflict because: –
(a) If Ps’ first suggestion is correct, the “Borrowers”, ie Ps, would have the right to designate an arbitrator.
(b) If Ps’ second suggestion is correct, the “Obligors” would have the right to designate an arbitrator. As Ps were defined as the “Obligors”, there would be no change in substance to the right of designation.
(c) If Ps’ third suggestion is correct, it would be the “Mortgagor” who would have such a right. This means that P2 would have the right to designate an arbitrator.
(4) Thus, on any of these readings, Ps (or at least P2, whose view on the choice of arbitrator does not differ from P1’s for present purposes) would have the right to designate an arbitrator, without the need to consult, or to obtain consent from, any other parties.
(3) 就目前而言，本庭並無必要解決這一明顯的矛盾，因為：
(a) 如果二原告的第一個建議是正確的，“借款人”，即二原告，將有權指定一名仲裁員。
(b) 如果二原告的第二個建議是正確的，“義務人”將有權指定一名仲裁員。由於二原告被界定為“義務人”，指定仲裁員的權利實質上不會改變。
(c) 如果二原告的第三項建議是正確的，那麼擁有這一權利的將是“抵押人”。這意味著二原告將有權指定一名仲裁員。
(4) 因此，根據上述任何一種理解，二原告（或至少是第二原告，其關於選擇仲裁員的看法就目前而言與第一原告並無不同）將有權指定一名仲裁員，而無需與任何其他當事人協商或徵得他們的同意。
However, the same cannot be said for the July Deed:
(1) Under the July Deed, the “Mortgagee” is D. The “Mortgagors” are P1 and the Other Mortgagors. The “Obligors” are also P1 and the Other Mortgagors.
(2) P2 is not a party to the July Deed.
(3) Applying the same analysis as set out above, there are, once again, three ways in which “mutatis mutandis” can be interpreted:
(a) First, it could mean that there is no change at all, and the right remains vested in the “Borrowers”.
(b) Second, it could mean that the word “Borrowers” is replaced by the word “Obligors”.
(c) Third, it could mean that the word “Borrowers” is replaced by the word “Mortgagors”.
(4) However, unlike the situation in respect of the January Deed, there will be some significant differences and repercussions arising from the three interpretations:
(a) First, if there is no change in the appointment procedure, the “Borrowers”, ie Ps, would remain to be the ones vested with the right to designate an arbitrator under the July Deed.
(b) Second, if the reference to the “Borrowers” in the Loan Agreement is to be replaced by a reference to the “Obligors”, it would mean that it is P1 and the Other Mortgagors who have a right to designate an arbitrator.
(c) Likewise, on the third possibility, if the reference to the “Borrowers” in the Loan Agreement is replaced by the “Mortgagors”, it would also be P1 and the Other Mortgagors who have a right to designate an arbitrator.
然而，7月擔保協議的情況卻並非如此：
(1) 根據7月擔保協議，“抵押權人”是被告。抵押人是第一原告和其他抵押人。義務人也是第一原告和其他抵押人。
(2) 第二原告不是7月擔保協議的當事人。
(3) 根據上述同樣的分析，“比照(mutatis mutandis)”再次有三種解釋方式：
(a) 首先，它可能意味著沒有任何變化，權利仍然屬於“借款人（Borrowers）”。
(b) 其次，這可能意味著“借款人（Borrowers）”一詞被“義務人（Obligors）”一詞所取代。
(c) 第三，也可以用“抵押人（Mortgagor）”取代“借款人（Borrowers）”。
(4) 然而，與1月擔保協議的情況不同，這三種解釋會產生一些重大的差別和影響：
(a) 首先，如委任程式不變，根據7月擔保協議，“借款人”（即二原告）仍有權指定仲裁員。
(b) 其次，如果貸款協議中對“借款人”的提法被對“義務人”的提法所取代，這意味著有權指定仲裁員的是第一原告和其他抵押人。
(c) 同樣，關於第三種可能性，如果將貸款協定中提及的“借款人”改為“抵押人”，則有權指定仲裁員的也將是第一原告和其他抵押人。
(5) In my view, the more likely and commercially sensible interpretation of the July Deed is the second and third interpretations, ie that the parties given the right to designate an arbitrator are P1 and the Other Mortgagors, and they could do so to the exclusion of P2.
(6) In coming to this view, I have regard to the following:
(a) This is the most natural interpretation. It sits well with the nature and purpose of the July Deed.
(b) Particularly, P1 and the Other Mortgagors are the counterparties of the July Deed. It would be commercially sensible to suppose that the Other Mortgagors would have wanted some rights to designate an arbitrator, should a dispute eventually arise between the parties.
(c) On the other hand, there is no reason why the parties to the July Deed would vest the right to designate an arbitrator with P2, who is not a party to the July Deed.
(d) Likewise, there is also little reason to believe that the Other Mortgagors who are parties to the July Deed would have been given no right to designate an arbitrator.
(7) In the circumstances, I reject the first interpretation, which suggests that there is no change in the appointment procedure, whereupon the “Borrowers” or Ps retain the right to designate an arbitrator.
(8) For completeness, I should add that it is unnecessary for me to resolve the conflict between the second and third interpretations. In both cases, P1 and the Other Mortgagors would have a joint right of designation.
(5) 在本庭看來，對7月擔保協議更有可能以及在商業上更合理的解釋是第二種和第三種解釋，即有權指定仲裁員的當事方是第一原告和其他抵押人，而不包括第二原告。
(6) 在得出這一觀點時，本庭考慮了以下幾點：
(a) 這是最自然的解釋。它符合7月擔保協議的性質和目的。
(b) 特別之處是，第一原告和其他抵押人是7月擔保協議的對手方。從商業角度看，如果雙方最終發生爭議，其他抵押人可能會希望獲得一些指定仲裁員的權利。
(c) 另一方面，7月擔保協議的當事方並無理由將指定仲裁員的權利賦予不是7月擔保協議當事方的第二原告。
(d) 同樣，也並無理由相信作為7月擔保協議的其他抵押人無權指定仲裁員。
(7) 在這種情況下，本庭拒絕第一種解釋，即委任程式並未改變，“借款人”或二原告保留指定仲裁員的權利。
(8) 為完整起見，需補充說明，本庭並無必要解決第二種和第三種解釋之間的衝突。在這兩種情況下，第一原告和其他抵押人都有共同的指定權。
（圖片來源於網路）
I accordingly hold that the Arbitration Agreements should be given the meanings as stated in paragraphs 25, 28(4) and 29(5) above.
因此，本庭認為仲裁協議應具有上文第25、28(4)和 29(5)段所述的含義。
Thus viewed, there is a clash in the appointment procedure in the Loan Agreement and the January Deed on the one hand, and the July Deed on the other hand:
(1) Under the Loan Agreement and the January Deed, Ps would have the right to designate an arbitrator. The Other Mortgagors have no say.
(2) However, under the July Deed, it is P1 and the Other Mortgagors who would have the right to designate an arbitrator. P2 has no say.
由此可見，貸款協議、1月擔保協議與7月擔保協議在委任程式上存在衝突：
(1) 根據貸款協議和1月擔保協議，二原告有權指定一名仲裁員。其他抵押人並無發言權。
(2) 然而，根據7月擔保協議，第一原告和其他抵押人有權指定一名仲裁員。而第二原告並無發言權。
The question then is whether this would render the Arbitration Agreements “incompatible” such that Article 29 cannot be engaged. This is the most contentious issue before me, and I shall address this in what follows.
接下來的問題是，這是否會使仲裁協議“互不相容(incompatible)”，從而無法適用第29條。這是擺在本庭面前最有爭議的問題，本庭將在下文中討論這個問題。
The Meaning of Compatibility
相容性的含義
Article 29 of the HKIAC Rules provides that:
“Claims arising out of or in connection with more than one contract may be made in a single arbitration, provided that:
(a) a common question of law or fact arises under each arbitration agreement giving rise to the arbitration; and
(b) the rights to relief claimed are in respect of, or arise out of, the same transaction or a series of related transactions; and
(c) the arbitration agreements under which those claims are made are compatible.” (emphasis added)
港仲規則第29條規定：
“源於或涉及多於一份的合同的請求可在單個仲裁
中提出，但須滿足以下條件：
(a) 導致仲裁的各仲裁協議涉及共同的法律或事實問題；且
(b) 請求救濟的權利均涉及或源於同一交易或同一系列相關聯的交易；且
(c) 請求所依據的仲裁協議彼此相容。”（強調）
Reading Article 29 as a whole, it is apparent that “compatibility” is an independent and separate requirement. In other words, all three limbs under sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) need to be satisfied before Article 29 is engaged.
從第29條的整體來看，“相容性”顯然是一個獨立和單獨的要求。換言之，(a)、(b)和(c)分段的所有三項要求都必須得到滿足，第29條才能適用。
（圖片來源於網路）
As to what is meant by “compatible”:
(1) I have been referred to the meaning of the word “compatible” in the Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, 6th ed. Essentially, it means an ability to exist or be used together without causing problems.
(2) In A Guide to the HKIAC Arbitration Rules, 2nd ed, §10.125, the learned authors explain the meaning of “compatibility” as follows:
“The arbitration agreements need not be identical in. order to meet this criterion. They must, however, be substantively compatible. Any differences must be surmountable by the parties, the tribunal, and HKIAC. Consolidation will be ordered when it will make no practical difference if the consolidated case proceeds on the basis of one or the other underlying arbitration agreements. Where, for example, two arbitration clauses provide for different rules, different seats, or a different number of arbitrators, it will be difficult in practice to consolidate the arbitrations without significantly changing those aspects in one of the cases. In these circumstances, HKIAC will typically find the agreements to be incompatible, unless the parties can agree an acceptable compromise.”
(3) The learned authors then set out in §10.126 a number of factors relevant to the determination of compatibility:
(a) Any preconditions to the commencement of arbitration.
(b) Any required qualifications of the arbitrators (eg that an arbitrator be qualified in a particular law or discipline, or speak a particular language).
(c) The procedure for appointing arbitrators.
(d) The language of the arbitrations.
(e) The governing law of the arbitration agreements.
(f) The method for determining the fees and expenses of the tribunal.
(4) Counsel for Ps have also referred me to Article 8.1(c) of the Arbitration Rules of the Singapore International Arbitration Centre, which contains a similar requirement of “compatibility”. According to Arbitration in Singapore (2nd Ed, 2018) at §7.150:
“Parties should however, bear in mind that arbitration agreements across a suite of related contracts should be ‘compatible’ in order to maximise the chances of effective joinder and/or consolidation (where this is desired). Clauses will be considered incompatible if the difference relates to a fundamental element of the arbitration agreement: the institutional or ad hoc nature of the arbitration, the seat, the number of arbitrators, or the appointment procedure. If, on the other hand, the difference relates to a secondary element (law applicable to the merits, steps to be taken before the commencement of the procedure, etc.), the clauses will generally be considered compatible.”
至於“相容”的含義：
（1）本庭借鑑了《牛津高階詞典》第6版中“相容”一詞的含義。從根本上說，它的意思是能夠一起存在或一起使用而不產生問題。
（2）在《港仲規則指南》第二版第10.125節中，博學的編撰人對“相容性”的含義作了如下解釋：
“仲裁協議不一定要完全相同才能符合這一標準。但是，它們必須在實質上相容。任何分歧都必須是當事人、仲裁庭和港仲可以克服的。如果合併後的案件根據其中一份或另一份基礎仲裁協議進行審理並無實際區別，則會下令合併。例如，如果兩份仲裁條款規定了不同的仲裁規則、不同的仲裁庭所在地或不同的仲裁員人數，實際上很難在不對其中一個案件的這些方面作出重大改變的情況下合併仲裁。在這種情況下，除非當事各方能達成可接受的折衷方案，港仲通常會認為這些協議互不相容。”
（3）博學的編撰人隨後在第10.126節中列出了與確定相容性有關的若干因素：
(a) 啟動仲裁的先決條件。
(b) 對仲裁員資格的要求（例如仲裁員必須具備特定法律或行業的資歷，或懂得特定語言）。
(c) 委任仲裁員的程式。
(d) 仲裁的語言。
(e) 仲裁協議的準據法。
(f) 仲裁庭收費的決定方式。
（4）二原告方的律師還向本庭提及《新加坡國際仲裁中心仲裁規則》第8.1(c)條，其中載有類似的“相容性”要求。根據《新加坡仲裁》（2018年第2版）第7.150節：
“然而，當事人應牢記，一系列相關合同中的仲裁協議應‘相容’，以最大限度地增加有效合併和/或合併的機會。如果分歧涉及仲裁協議的基本要素：機構仲裁或臨時仲裁、仲裁地、仲裁員人數或委任程式，則條款將被視為不相容。反之，如果分歧涉及次要因素（適用於實體的法律、程式開始前應採取的步驟等），則這些條款通常被認為是相容的。”
Are the Arbitration Agreements Compatible?
仲裁協議是否彼此相容？
Applying these observations to the present case, my view is that since the Loan Agreement and the January Deed on the one hand and the July Deed on the other hand provide for different appointment procedures, the Arbitration Agreements are not compatible with each other.
本庭的觀點是，將上述意見應用於本案，由於貸款協議、1月擔保協議與7月擔保協議規定了不同的委任程式，仲裁協議彼此不相容。
My view is based on the following.
本庭的觀點基於以下幾點。
First, it infringes party autonomy to impose on the parties a single arbitration when the underlying Arbitration Agreements adopt different appointment procedures. This offends the cornerstone of modern international arbitration, namely, the primacy of consent as enshrined in section 3(2) of the Arbitration Ordinance. In the present case, as I have found:
(1) Under the Loan Agreement and the January Deed, Ps have contracted for the right to designate an arbitrator should any dispute arise between the parties.
(2) Had D chose to commence an arbitration under the Loan Agreement and the January Deed only, Ps could have designated Ps’ Nominated Arbitrator.
(3) In my view, Ps’ willingness to arbitrate was only premised upon Ps having a right to designate an arbitrator of their choice. Without such a right, Ps could not be said to have consented to arbitrate.
首先，在相關仲裁協議採用不同委任程式的情況下，強行採取單個仲裁會侵犯當事人的意思自治。這違反了現代國際仲裁的基石，即《仲裁條例》第3(2)條所規定的合意優先原則。在本案中，本庭發現：
(1) 根據貸款協議和1月擔保協議，二原告約定，如果雙方發生爭議，有權指定一名仲裁員。
(2) 如果被告僅選擇根據貸款協議和1月擔保協議提起仲裁，那麼二原告可以指定二原告提名的仲裁員。
(3) 在本庭看來，二原告願意進行仲裁的前提是二原告有權指定自己選擇的仲裁員。如果缺乏了這種權利，就不能說二原告同意仲裁。
Second, it also infringes the parties’ contractual rights:
(1) After all, the Arbitration Agreements are contracts of their own right. The parties have negotiated for and obtained such rights as they considered that would best fit their commercial interests. Having so bargained and agreed, they must be bound by their choices, whether they eventually liked it or not.
(2) In the present case, Ps have bargained for and obtained a right to designate an arbitrator under any intended arbitration arising from the Loan Agreement and the January Deed. Ps’ right is not a right shared with the Other Mortgagors, as would be the case under the July Deed.
(3) As a matter of principle, the right to designate an arbitrator cannot be curtailed by a unilateral decision on the part of a counterparty (such as D) to commence a single arbitration based on multiple contracts.
(4) The deprivation of Ps’ contractual right is in and of itself prejudice, which is a serious issue impacting upon the integrity and sanctity of the Arbitration.
其次，單個仲裁還侵犯了當事人的合同權利：
(1) 畢竟，仲裁協議本身就是合同。雙方當事人透過談判獲得了他們認為最符合其商業利益的權利。他們既然進行了討價還價並達成了協議，那麼無論最終喜歡與否，他們必須受其選擇的約束。
(2) 在本案中，二原告透過討價還價獲得了在貸款協議和1月擔保協議引起的任何預期仲裁中指定一名仲裁員的權利。二原告的權利並不是與其他抵押人共享的權利，但根據7月擔保協議則是如此。
(3) 原則上，指定仲裁員的權利不能因交易方（如被告）單方面決定根據多份合同啟動單個仲裁而受到限制。
(4) 剝奪二原告的合同權利本身就是一種損害，是影響仲裁完整性和神聖性的嚴重問題。
Third, there are valid concerns over whether D may gain an unfair advantage in the Arbitration by refusing Ps a right to designate an arbitrator of Ps’ choice:
(1) In this Arbitration, it is not disputed that D successfully retained the arbitrator of its own choice.
(2) Again, in the counterfactual scenario where separate arbitrations were commenced, Ps could have designated Ps’ Nominated Arbitrator. In such circumstance, Ps would have been given the same right, and hence an equal opportunity, to influence the constitution of the Tribunal.
(3) However, when D chose to commence a multiple contract arbitration, it also deprived Ps’ right to designate an arbitrator of Ps’ choice. In this sense, the parties are no longer treated equally.
(4) In my view, this gives rise to justifiable concerns over whether this would give D an unfair advantage. This impeaches the integrity of the Arbitration.
第三，有理由擔心被告可藉限制二原告指定一名仲裁員的權利，以獲得不公平的利益：
(1) 在本仲裁中，被告成功地保留了自己選任的仲裁員，這一點不存在爭議。
(2) 同樣，在分別啟動仲裁的反事實情況下，二原告可以指定其提名的仲裁員。在這種情況下，二原告本應享有同樣的權利，並也有同等機會影響仲裁庭的組成。
(3) 然而，當被告選擇啟動多重合同仲裁時，也剝奪了二原告指定自己選擇的仲裁員的權利。從這個意義上說，雙方不再受到平等對待。
(4) 在本庭看來，這有理由讓人擔心是否會給被告帶來不公平的優勢。這有損於仲裁的公正性。
（圖片來源於網路）
In the course of arguments, D has raised a number of points against Ps’ case on the incompatibility of the Arbitration Agreements. For reasons given below, I am not convinced by these points and they do not alter my views as expressed above.
在辯論過程中，被告針對二原告關於仲裁協議彼此不相容的理由提出了一些觀點。基於以下理由，本庭對這些觀點並不信服，也不會改變本庭的上述觀點。
First, D contends that Ps do not in fact enjoy an absolute right of appointment under the HKIAC Rules. They merely had a right to designate an arbitrator, and this was always subject to the confirmation of the HKIAC. Whilst I agree that as a matter of general rule, parties do not have an absolute right to have their nominated arbitrator appointed, it does not mean that their express right to designate an arbitrator can be ignored, particularly in circumstances where the situation was caused by the counterparty choosing to commence a single arbitration based on multiple contracts.
首先，被告辯稱，根據港仲規則，二原告事實上並不享有絕對的指定權。他們只是有權指定一名仲裁員，而這始終需要得到港仲的確認。雖然本庭同意，作為一般規則，當事人並不享有指定其提名的仲裁員的絕對權利，但這並不意味著他們指定仲裁員的明確權利可以被忽視，特別是在由於交易方選擇根據多份合同啟動單個仲裁而造成的情況之下，指定仲裁員的權利更不應該被忽視。
Second, it is said that Ps did not simply agree to an ad hoc arbitration. Instead, Ps agreed to an institutional arbitration to be conducted in accordance with the HKIAC Rules. D contends that provided that HKIAC has acted within its power under the rules, the parties' consent has been fully respected. However:
(1) This begs the question of whether the arbitration agreements are compatible in the first place. It is only when the arbitration agreements are compatible with each other that the parties can opt for a single arbitration under multiple contracts.
(2) For reasons given above, I consider that the Arbitration Agreements are not compatible with each other.
(3) Accordingly, it was not appropriate for D to commence a single Arbitration based on the Three Contracts in the first place. As the HKIAC Rules have not been fully observed, the parties' consent have not been fully respected.
其次，據稱二原告並未簡單地同意臨時仲裁。相反，二原告同意按照港仲規則進行機構仲裁。被告辯稱，只要港仲根據規則在其權力範圍內行事，雙方的合意就得到了充分尊重。然而：
(1) 這首先提出了仲裁協議是否相互相容的問題。只有當仲裁協議相互相容時，當事人才能在多份合同下選擇單個仲裁。
(2) 基於上述論證，本庭認為仲裁協議彼此不相容。
(3) 因此，由於港仲規則未得到充分遵守，當事人的合意也未得到充分尊重，被告首先根據三份合同提起單個仲裁併不合適。
Third, D contends that the Three Contracts are interrelated, so that parties can be taken to expect that if there were disputes, they could be resolved by the same set of dispute resolution mechanism. In relation to this:
(1) Whilst I am well aware of the possible risk of fragmentation of proceedings, and the undesirability of there being inconsistent awards, I do not consider that these case management considerations would constitute sufficient justifications to override what a party has negotiated for by way of contract.
(2) Moreover, the fact that the parties have entered into the Three Contracts which contain separate Arbitration Agreements suggests that they did not agree to have a “one stop shop” if disputes arise. As arbitration is a consensual dispute resolution mechanism, the parties must be bound by their negotiated deals. Indeed, courts have recognised the paramount importance of private consent in arbitration and warned against overzealous consolidation of arbitrations for the sake of administrative convenience (see for eg Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada & Ors v The Lincoln National Life Insurance Company [2004] EWCA Civ 1660 at §68 per Mance LJ).
(3) In any event, the fact that the Three Contracts relate to the same transaction does not necessarily mean that the Arbitration Agreements are compatible. It is trite law that arbitration agreements represent separate agreements from their underlying contracts. Hence, the fact that the Three Contracts arise from the same factual matrix is neither here nor there.
第三，被告認為，三份合同是相互關聯的，因此可以認為，如果出現爭議，各方當事人都希望透過同一套爭議解決機制來解決。關於這一點：
(1) 雖然本庭很清楚可能會出現程式支離破碎的風險，也不希望出現裁決不一致的情況，但本庭並不認為這些案件管理方面的考慮足以構成推翻當事人透過合同談判達成的協議的理由。
(2) 此外，雙方簽訂的三份合同中分別包含了仲裁協議，這一事實表明，他們並未同意在出現爭議時“一站式”解決”。由於仲裁是一種協商一致的爭議解決機制，雙方當事人必須受其協商達成的協議的約束。事實上，法院已經認識到私人合意在仲裁中的重要性，並警告不要為了行政上的便利而過分熱衷於合併仲裁（例如Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada & Ors v The Lincoln National Life Insurance Company [2004] EWCA Civ 1660 at §68 per Mance LJ）。
(3) 無論如何，三份合同涉及同一交易這一事實並不一定意味著仲裁協議是相容的。仲裁協議是獨立於其基礎合同的協議，這是一條老生常談的定律。因此，三份合同產生於同一事實矩陣的事實並不相關。
Fourth, D also seeks to rely on Article 8.2(a) of the HKIAC Rules. This rule relevantly provides that where there are more than two parties to the arbitration and the dispute is to be referred to three arbitrators, then unless the parties have agreed otherwise, the group of respondents shall designate an arbitrator. D’s reliance on this rule is misplaced. The core question here is whether the threshold requirement under Article 29 has been satisfied. As explained above, it has not.
第四，被告還試圖援引港仲規則第8.2(a)條。該規則的相關規定是，如果仲裁有兩方以上當事人，爭議將提交三名仲裁員，除非當事人另有約定，否則應由被申請人集體指定一名仲裁員。被告對這一規則的依賴是錯誤的。這裡的核心問題是第29條規定的最低要求是否得到滿足。如上文所述，並未滿足。
（圖片來源於網路）
Fifth, D argues that Ps should be taken to have waived their right to designate their arbitrator. In support, D has referred me to Article 28.8 of the HKIAC Rules, which provides that “[w]here HKIAC decides to consolidate two or more arbitrations, the parties to all such arbitrations shall be deemed to have waived their right to designate an arbitrator…”. However:
(1) Article 28.8 is a sub-article within Article 28. Article 28 concerns consolidation of two or more arbitrations. This is not the scenario here because the Arbitration was commenced under Article 29 as a single arbitration under multiple contracts.
(2) In any event, the waiver of rights argument does not provide a valid answer to the threshold requirement as to whether Article 29 is satisfied. Unless the Court is satisfied that the arbitration agreements are “compatible”, Article 29 is not engaged.
第五，被告辯稱，二原告應被視為放棄了指定其仲裁員的權利。作為支援，被告向本庭提及港仲規則第28.8條，其中規定“當港仲決定合併兩個或多個仲裁，所有這些仲裁的當事人應視為已放棄提名仲裁員的權利……”。但是：
(1)第28.8條是第28條的分條。第28條涉及兩項或多項仲裁的合併。這裡的情況並非如此，因為本仲裁是根據第29條作為多份合同下的單個仲裁啟動的。
(2) 無論如何，放棄權利的論點並不能有效地回答是否滿足第29條的門檻要求。除非法院確信仲裁協議是“相容的”，否則第29條不適用。
In the circumstances, despite arguments to the contrary by D, I consider that the Arbitration Agreements, which contain differences as to a fundamental aspect of how the Arbitration should be conducted, are not “compatible” within the meaning of Article 29.
在這種情況下，儘管被告提出了相反的論點，但本庭認為，仲裁協議在進行仲裁的基本方面存在分歧，因此不屬於第29條意義上的“相容”。
As one of the threshold requirements under Article 29 has not been satisfied, I find that D was not entitled to commence the Arbitration in the present form as a single Arbitration based on multiple contracts. On this basis, the Interim Award is liable to be set aside.
由於第29條規定的門檻要求並未得到滿足，本庭認為被告無權以目前的形式啟動基於多份合同的單個仲裁。據此，臨時裁決應予撤銷。
The Agreement Ground
仲裁協議論述
Following from my ruling on the Compatibility Ground above, the Agreement Ground must also succeed.
據上述本庭對基於相容性的論證的裁決，基於仲裁協議的論證也必然成立。
In my opinion, the composition of the Tribunal was defective. D should not have commenced a single Arbitration on the basis of multiple contracts in the first place. The Tribunal purportedly constituted under Article 29 was hence not composed in accordance with the parties' agreement.
本庭認為，仲裁庭的組成存在缺陷。被告本來就不應該在多份合同的基礎上啟動單個仲裁。因此，所謂根據第29條組成的仲裁庭並不符合雙方的協議。
In view of the above, it is not strictly necessary for me to come to any concluded view as to whether, assuming that the July Deed should be interpreted in accordance with the first interpretation as set out in paragraph XXXX 29(4)(a) above, the Arbitration was nonetheless defective.
有鑑於此，假設7月擔保協議應參考上述第XXXXX條29(4)(a)段的第一種解釋，那麼關於仲裁是否仍存在缺陷的問題，已無必要再作出結論性意見。
However, had it been necessary, I would have held that even in this scenario, the Arbitration is still problematic:
(1) As mentioned above, if the July Deed was not intended to change the appointment procedure, the “Borrowers” or Ps would remain to be the ones vested with the right to designate one arbitrator.
(2) In this case, consultation with, and consent from, the Other Mortgagors would not have been necessary. The Other Mortgagors’ silence would hence have been neither here nor there.
(3) In the present case, the composition of the Tribunal was made on, amongst others, the ground that the Other Mortgagors did not jointly designate an arbitrator with Ps. Accordingly, the composition of the Tribunal was not conducted in accordance with the parties’ agreement.
但是，即使有必要，本庭會認為，即使在這種情況下，仲裁仍然是有問題的：
(1) 如上所述，如果7月擔保協議無意改變選任程式，那麼“借款人”或二原告仍然有權指定一名仲裁員。
(2) 在這種情況下，與其他抵押人協商並徵得他們的同意是沒有必要的。因此，其他抵押人的沉默就不相關。
(3) 在本案中，仲裁庭是在其他抵押人並未與二原告共同指定仲裁員的情況下組成的。因此，仲裁庭的組成並未按照雙方的協議進行。
Disposition
判決
For the reasons given above, I set aside the Interim Award.
基於上述論證，本庭撤銷了臨時裁決。
At the end of the hearing, I enquired with Counsel as to the proposed order to be made. Ps indicated that should they be successful, they would ask for an order in terms of the Originating Summons. D indicated that it had no comment on the wordings of the orders sought.
庭審結束時，本庭向律師詢問了擬作出的命令。二原告表示，如果他們勝訴，他們會要求根據原訟傳票作出命令。被告並未對所請求的命令的措辭表示意見。
In the premises, I make an order in terms of paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Originating Summons.
在此前提下，本庭根據原訟傳票第1和第2段下達命令。
I also make a costs order nisi that the costs of and incidental to the Originating Summons (including the hearing on 9 January 2024 and all costs reserved) be paid by D to Ps with Certificate for 2 Counsel, such costs to be taxed if not agreed. The costs order nisi shall become absolute 14 days from the date of handing down of this judgment.
本庭還發出一項臨時訟費令，原訟傳票的訟費及附帶訟費（包括2024年1月9日的庭審及所有保留訟費）由被告支付給二原告，並附有2名律師的證明書，如未達成一致，則對該等訟費進行評定。臨時訟費令在本判決書下達之日起14天后生效。
I thank all Counsel for their able assistance.
感謝所有律師的得力協助。