譯者 | 沈文晏 華東政法大學
一審 | 陳飛越 愛丁堡大學
二審 | Ellen Chen 康奈爾大學
編輯 |
林靖珊 中國政法大學
蘇 桐 華中科技大學
責編 | 林靖珊 中國政法大學
一、案件背景
《聯邦仲裁法》（The Federal Arbitration Act, 以下簡稱“FAA”）規範了在聯邦法院強制執行仲裁協議的程式。該法第3條“涉及仲裁事項時訴訟程式的中止”規定：當爭議屬於仲裁範圍時，法院“應當根據一方當事人的申請，暫停審理該案，直至按照協議條款進行仲裁，前提是申請中止的當事人在進行仲裁時沒有違約。”[1]
本案中，原告史密斯（Wendy Smith）等人在州法院對被告斯皮茲裡公司（Keith Spizzirri）提起訴訟，指控其違反聯邦和州就業法。隨後，被告將案件移送至地區法院，並提出強制仲裁的動議，同時請求駁回訴訟。原告同意該案可以仲裁，但主張根據FAA第3條，地區法院應中止訴訟程式，直至仲裁結束，而非完全駁回案件。地區法院就本案發出強制仲裁命令，並在不影響以後訴訟權利的前提下予以駁回。第九巡迴法院對原判決予以維持。
二、裁判要旨
美國聯邦最高法院認為，當地區法院認定訴訟涉及可仲裁的爭議，且一方當事人請求中止訴訟時，FAA第3條強制要求法院釋出中止令，法院無權自由裁量是否駁回訴訟。法條的文字、結構及目的均支援這一結論。FAA第3條明文規定要求法院在當事人申請下應當中止訴訟。條文中的“應當”一詞“創造了一個無法透過司法裁量改變的義務。”[2]該義務指的就是中止訴訟。
首先，被告斯皮茲裡公司堅持認為，FAA第3條中的“中止”僅意味著法院必須停止平行進行的法院訴訟，而法院可以透過駁回案件來實現這一目的（被告簡報第15頁），但最高法院認為，這種解釋忽略了“中止”一詞在法律中長期確立的含義，即“暫時中止”法律程式。
其次，被告試圖將“中止”解釋為包括“駁回”的做法。然而最高法院指出，這種解釋與相關法條文字相悖。FAA第3條規定了只要“申請中止的當事人在仲裁程式中沒有違約”，法院便應當中止訴訟，直至當事人按照協議條款進行仲裁。該條款確保了在仲裁失敗或未能解決爭議時，當事人可以重返法院進行訴訟。如果法院駁回訴訟而不是中止訴訟，則無法實現這種重返法院的可能性。
(圖片源自網路）
接著，被告方還主張，儘管FAA第3條的文字如此規定，地區法院仍然保留固有權力駁回涉及仲裁的訴訟。最高法院認為此種迴避法條明確含義的主張同樣站不住腳。即便地區法院確實擁有這種固有權力，然而“法律規範可以約束或優先於法院的固有權力。[3]”FAA第3條正是如此，它排除了地區法院在當事人達成仲裁協議時駁回訴訟的自由裁量權。
最後，最高法院根據FAA的條文結構和立法目的，進一步論述中止訴訟的必要性。最高法院認為，該法第16條(a)(1)(C)款授權（當事人）對法院拒絕仲裁請求的決定進行即時中間上訴。而國會在第16條(b)款中明確指出，除非適用狹義的例外情況（本案不適用），強制仲裁的命令不能立即上訴。如果地區法院在一方當事人請求中止的情況下駁回訴訟，該駁回將觸發立即上訴的權利，但國會關於FAA的立法本意又是禁止此類上訴，即“儘可能迅速和容易地將有爭議的當事方從法院轉移到仲裁中[4]”。因此，中止訴訟而非駁回，更符合FAA設想中法院的監督角色。考慮到在FAA機制下，具備相應管轄權的法院可以協助當事人進行仲裁，法院留存訴訟卷宗是合理的做法。
三、判決書原文翻譯
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
索托馬約爾大法官發表法院意見。
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) sets forth procedures for enforcing arbitration agreements in federal court. Section 3 of the FAA specifies that, when a dispute is subject to arbitration, the court "shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until [the] arbitration" has concluded.[5] The question here is whether§3 permits a court to dismiss the case instead of issuing a stay when the dispute is subject to arbitration and a party requests a stay pending arbitration. It does not.
FAA規定了在聯邦法院強制執行仲裁協議的程式。FAA第3條規定，當爭議屬於仲裁範圍時，法院“應當根據一方當事人的申請中止訴訟，直至進行仲裁。”本案的問題在於，當爭議屬於仲裁範圍且一方請求中止時，第3條是否允許法院駁回案件而非發出中止令。答案是否定的。
I
第一部分
Petitioners are current and former delivery drivers for an on-demand delivery service operated by respondents. They sued respondents in Arizona state court, alleging violations of federal and state employment laws. Petitioners claimed that respondents misclassified them as independent contractors, failed to pay required minimum and overtime wages, and failed to provide paid sick leave. After removing the case to federal court, respondents moved to compel arbitration and dismiss the suit. Petitioners conceded that all of their claims were arbitrable, but they argued that§3 of the FAA required the District Court to stay the action pending arbitration rather than dismissing it entirely.
原告是被告運營的按需送貨服務的現任和前任送貨司機。他們在亞利桑那州州法院對被告提起訴訟，主張被告違反聯邦和州就業法。原告聲稱，被告將他們錯誤分類為獨立承包商，未支付法定最低工資和加班工資，也未提供帶薪病假。案件移送至聯邦法院後，被告提出強制仲裁的動議並請求駁回訴訟。原告承認其所有主張均可仲裁，但提出根據FAA第3條要求地區法院應當在仲裁進行期間中止訴訟，而不得完全駁回。
The District Court issued an order compelling arbitration and dismissing the case without prejudice. The court noted that "the text of 9 U. S. C.§3 suggests that the action should be stayed," but that Circuit precedent "instructed that 'notwithstanding the language of §3, a district court may either stay the action or dismiss it outright when, .. the court determines that all of the claims raised in the action are subject to arbitration.' "[6] Because "all claims raised [were] subject to arbitration," the District Court concluded that it "retain[ed] discretion to dismiss the action."
地區法院下達了強制仲裁的命令，並在不影響原告後續的訴訟權利的情況下駁回了案件。法院指出“FAA第3條表明案件應當中止”，但巡迴法院的判例指示“儘管第3條的文字如此，但……當法院認定訴訟中的所有主張均屬於仲裁範圍時，地區法院可以選擇中止或直接駁回案件。”由於“所有主張均可仲裁”，地區法院由此得出結論，認為法院應當“保留駁回案件的自由裁量權”。
The Ninth Circuit affirmed. While that court likewise acknowledged that "the plain text of the FAA appears to mandate a stay," the court explained that it was bound by Circuit precedent recognizing the District Court's "discretion to dismiss."[7] Judge Graber, joined by Judge Desai, concurred, asserting that the Ninth Circuit's position was wrong and urging this Court "to take up this question, which it has sidestepped previously, and on which the courts of appeals are divided."[8]
第九巡迴法院維持了該判決。雖然該法院同樣承認“《聯邦仲裁法》的文字本身的字面含義似乎強制要求中止”，但解釋稱其受到巡迴法院先例的約束，認定地區法院“有權駁回案件”。然而法官Graber和法官Desai一致認為，第九巡迴法院在本案中的立場是錯誤的，其敦促本院解決這一之前回避的問題，並指出上訴法院對此問題存在分歧。
This Court granted certiorari to answer the question it previously left open and resolve the Circuit split.[9]
本院受理此案，以回答之前法院未解答的問題並解決巡迴法院之間的分歧。
II
第二部分
In this statutory interpretation case, text, structure, and purpose all point to the same conclusion: When a federal court finds that a dispute is subject to arbitration, and a party has requested a stay of the court proceeding pending arbitration, the court does not have discretion to dismiss the suit on the basis that all the claims are subject to arbitration.[10]
在這起法條解釋案件中，法條文字、結構和立法目的都指向同一個結論：當聯邦法院認定爭議可仲裁，且一方當事人請求中止訴訟程式時，法院無權因為當事人的主張均可仲裁而駁回案件。
Section 3 of the FAA, entitled "Stay of proceedings where issue therein referable to arbitration," provides that, when any issue in a suit is subject to arbitration, the court "shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration."
FAA第3條（以下簡稱“第3條”）標題為“可仲裁事項下的訴訟程式中止”，其規定當訴訟中的任何問題可進入仲裁程式時，法院“應當根據一方當事人的申請中止審理，直至按照協議條款進行仲裁，前提是申請中止的當事人在仲裁程式中沒有違約”。
Here, as in other contexts, the use of the word "shall" "creates an obligation impervious to judicial discretion."[11] That plain statutory text requires a court to stay the proceeding.[12] ("'Unlike the word "may," which implies discretion, the word "shall" usually connotes a requirement'"). Indeed, this Court previously noted that the use of "shall" in neighboring sections of the FAA created a mandatory obligation that left "no place for the exercise of discretion by a district court."[13] (discussing§§2-4 and explaining that the FAA "mandates that district courts shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration agreement has been signed"). The same is true here. When§3 says that a court "shall … stay" the proceeding, the court must do so.
在此條款的上下文中，“應當”一詞“創造了一個無法透過司法裁量改變的義務”。即第3條明文要求法院中止訴訟程式。（“與‘可以’一詞暗示裁量不同，‘應當’一詞通常表示強制性要求”）。本院此前曾指出，FAA相鄰章節中的“應當”一詞創造了一項強制性義務，使地區法院沒有裁量空間。（如討論到FAA第2至第4條時，其條款解釋了FAA“強制要求地區法院指示當事人就簽署仲裁協議的事項進入仲裁”）。此處亦然。當第3條規定法院“應當中止”訴訟時，法院必須遵循。
(圖片源自網路）
Just as "shall" means "shall," "stay" means "stay." Respondents insist that "stay" in§3 "means only that the court must stop parallel in-court litigation, which a court may achieve by dismissing without retaining jurisdiction." Brief for Respondents 15. There are, however, two significant problems with that reading.
正如“應當”意味著“應當”，“中止”也意味著“中止”。被告堅持認為，第3條中的“中止”僅意味著法院必須停止平行的法院訴訟，而法院可以透過駁回訴訟來實現這一目的（被告簡報第15頁）。然而，這一解讀存在兩個顯著問題。
First, it disregards the long-established legal meaning of the word "stay". Even at the time of the enactment of the FAA, that term denoted the "temporary suspension" of legal proceedings, not the conclusive termination of such proceedings.[14]
首先，它忽略了“中止”一詞長期以來的法律意義。即便在FAA制定之時，該術語就表示“法律程式的暫時中止”，而非此類程式的完全終止。
Second, respondents' attempt to read "stay" to include "dismiss" cannot be squared with the surrounding statutory text. By directing a court to stay the proceeding "until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement," and only so long as "the applicant … is not in default in proceeding with the arbitration," §3 ensures that the parties can return to federal court if arbitration breaks down or fails to resolve the dispute. That return ticket is not available if the court dismisses the suit rather than staying it.[15]
其次，被告試圖將“中止”解讀為包括“駁回”，這一解釋與相關法條文字相悖。第3條透過要求法院“中止訴訟，直至按照協議條款進行仲裁”，並且只要“申請中止的當事人在仲裁程式中未違約”，確保了各方可以在仲裁失敗或未能解決爭議時回到聯邦法院繼續訴訟。如果法院選擇駁回訴訟而非中止，便無法實現這種返回法院的可能性。
Respondents also suggest that, notwithstanding the statutory language, district courts retain inherent authority to dismiss proceedings subject to arbitration. This attempt to evade the plain meaning of the text also falls short. Even assuming district courts have this inherent authority, "the inherent powers of the courts may be controlled or overridden by statute or rule."[16] Section 3 does exactly that. It overrides any discretion a district court might otherwise have had to dismiss a suit when the parties have agreed to arbitration.
被告方還主張，儘管有法條的明確規定，地區法院仍保留對駁回涉及仲裁的訴訟的固有權力。然而，這種試圖迴避法律條文直接含義的做法也是失敗的。即便地區法院擁有這一固有權力，“法院的固有權力也可能受到法律或規則的約束或取代。”第3條正是如此，它消除了地區法院在當事人已達成仲裁協議時駁回訴訟的裁量權。
(圖片源自網路）
If there were any doubt, the FAA's structure and purpose confirm that a stay is required. When a court denies a request for arbitration,§16 of the FAA authorizes an immediate interlocutory appeal.[17] When a court compels arbitration, by contrast, Congress made clear that, absent certification of a controlling question of law by the district court under 28 U. S. C.§1292(b), the order compelling arbitration is not immediately appealable. [18]
如果還有任何疑問，FAA的條文結構和立法目的進一步確認中止是必要的。當法院拒絕仲裁請求時，FAA第16條授權對此作出即時的中間上訴。而當法院強制要求仲裁時，國會明確表示，在地區法院未按照《美國法典》第28編第1292條第(b)款的規定對法律上有爭議的問題進行認證的情況下，關於強制仲裁的命令不能立即上訴。
The choice to "provid[e] for immediate interlocutory appeals of orders denying-but not of orders granting-motions to compel arbitration,"[19] is consistent with Congress's purpose in the FAA "to move the parties to an arbitrable dispute out of court and into arbitration as quickly and easily as possible,"[20] If a district court dismisses a suit subject to arbitration even when a party requests a stay, that dismissal triggers the right to an immediate appeal where Congress sought to forbid such an appeal.
如果地區法院在一方當事人請求中止的情況下駁回訴訟，該駁回將觸發當事人立即上訴的權利，這與國會試圖禁止此類上訴的目的相違背。
Finally, staying rather than dismissing a suit comports with the supervisory role that the FAA envisions for the courts. The FAA provides mechanisms for courts with proper jurisdiction to assist parties in arbitration by, for example, appointing an arbitrator, see 9 U. S. C.§5; enforcing subpoenas issued by arbitrators to compel testimony or produce evidence, see§7; and facilitating recovery on an arbitral award, see§9.
最後，法院中止而非駁回訴訟，這與FAA設想的法院監督角色相一致。在FAA設立的機制下，具備適當管轄權的法院可以協助當事人進行仲裁，例如任命仲裁員（第5條）、執行仲裁員發出的傳票以強制證人作證或提供證據（第7條），以及便利執行仲裁裁決（第9條）。
(圖片源自網路）
Keeping the suit on the court's docket makes good sense in light of this potential ongoing role, and it avoids costs and complications that might arise if a party were required to bring a new suit and pay a new filing fee to invoke the FAA's procedural protections. District courts can, of course, adopt practices to minimize any administrative burden caused by the stays that§3 requires.
在這種潛在的持續角色背景下，將訴訟保留在法院的卷宗上是合理的，這也避免了因當事人需要重新提起訴訟並支付新訴訟費而產生的成本和相關複雜問題。當然，地區法院可以採取措施，以儘量減少第3條所要求的中止帶來的任何行政負擔。
When a district court finds that a lawsuit involves an arbitrable dispute, and a party requests a stay pending arbitration,§3 of the FAA compels the court to stay the proceeding. The contrary judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
FAA第3條規定，當地區法院發現訴訟涉及可仲裁的爭議，且一方當事人請求中止訴訟程式時，應當中止訴訟。本院決定推翻第九巡迴上訴法院的判決，將本案發回原審法院按照本判決意見繼續審理。
It is so ordered.
判決如上。
原文連結：
https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?public=true&handle=hein.usreports/uss2201218&div=2&start_page=1&collection=usreports&set_as_cursor=0&men_tab=srchresults
參考文獻：
[1] 9 U.S.C.§3(2012)
[2] Lexecon Inc. v Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach (1998) 523 US 26, 35
[3] Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v Byrd (1985) 470 US 213, 218
[4] Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U. S. 1, 22 (1983).
[5] Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v Byrd, loc. cit.
[6] Forrest v Spizzirri (2022) 2022 WL 2191931, 1 (D Ariz, 17 June 2022), quoting Johnmohammadi v Bloomingdale's, Inc (9th Cir 2014) 755 F 3d 1072, 1074
[7] Forrest v Spizzirri (2023) 62 F 4th 1201, 1203, 1205
[8] Id., at 1206
[9] This Court has previously reserved the question presented by this case. See Green Tree Financial Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U. S. 79, 87, n. 2 (2000) ("Had the District Court entered a stay instead of a dismissal in this case, that order would not be appealable. . . . The question whether the District Court should have taken that course is not before us, and we do not address it"); see also Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 587 U. S. 176, 181, n. 1 (2019) (noting that the Court reserved this question in Randolph and that it remained unanswered).The split on the question has since deepened. Compare Arabian Motors Group W.L.L. v. Ford Motor Co., 19 F. 4th 938, 941-943 (CA6 2021) (reading §3 to mandate a stay when all claims are subject to arbitration and a party properly requests a stay); Katz v. Cellco Partnership, 794 F. 3d 341, 345-347 (CA2 2015) (same); Lloyd v. HOVENSA, LLC, 369 F. 3d 263, 269-271 (CA3 2004) (same); Adair Bus Sales, Inc. v. Blue Bird Corp., 25 F. 3d 953, 955 (CA10 1994) (same); Bender v. A.G. Edwards Sons, Inc., 971 F. 2d 698, 699 (CA11 1992) (per curiam) (same); Halim v. Great Gatsby's Auction Gallery, Inc., 516 F. 3d 557, 561 (CA7 2008) (reaching the same conclusion even where no party requested a stay), with Green v. SuperShuttle Int'l, Inc., 653 F. 3d 766, 769-770 (CA8 2011) (recognizing a district court's discretion to dismiss, rather than stay, action where all of the issues are subject to arbitration); Bercovitch v. Baldwin School, Inc., 133 F. 3d 141, 156, n. 21 (CA1 1998) (same); Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 975 F. 2d 1161, 1164 (CA5 1992) (same); Sparling v. Hoffman Constr. Co., 864 F. 2d 635, 637-638 (CA9 1988) (same).
[10] That is not to say that the court is barred from dismissing the suit if there is a separate reason to dismiss, unrelated to the fact that an issue in the case is subject to arbitration. If, for example, the court lacks jurisdiction, §3 is no bar to dismissing on that basis. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 545 U. S. 546, 552 (2005) (observing that "[t]he district courts of the United States … are 'courts of limited jurisdiction'" and " 'possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute' ").
[11] Lexecon Inc. v Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach (1998) 523 US 26, 35
[12] See Maine Community Health Options v United States (2020) 590 US 296, 310
[13] Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v Byrd (1985) 470 US 213, 218
[14] Black’s Law Dictionary (2nd edn, 1910) 1109 (‘Stay of proceedings’)
[15] It is no answer to say, as respondents do, that a party can file a new suit in federal court in those circumstances. Even if that is true as a practical matter, but see Green, 653 F. 3d, at 770 (flagging potential statute-of-limitations problem), requiring a party to file a new suit ignores the plain text of §3.
[16] Degen v. United States (1996) 517 US 820, 823
[17] See 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(C)
[18] See 9 U.S.C. § 16(b)
[19] Coinbase, Inc. v Bielski (2023) 599 U. S. 736, 740
[20] Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp. (1983) 460 US 1, 22