譯者 |陳郭君 北京大學 B.A.
一審 |曾梓栩 萊頓大學 LL.M. Candidate
二審 |LYJ NUS LLM
編輯 | 戴 鈺 蘭州大學本科
loca. 中國社會科學院大學碩士
責編 | 馮雨萱 北京大學J.D.&J.M.
A New Approach to Enforcement of Sanctions in Ukraine: A Ticking Time Bomb for Investment Claims?
烏克蘭制裁執行新策略：投資索賠的定時炸彈？
Since 2014, Ukraine has been sustainably employing various multifaceted and creative legal strategies to recover the damages, caused by Russian aggression and increase pressure on Russia and its allies and supporters.
自2014年起，烏克蘭持續採用多種新法律措施，以彌補因俄羅斯侵略行為所蒙受的損失，並加大對俄羅斯及其支援勢力的施壓力度。
Many Ukrainian private individuals, businesses, and state-owned companies have been evaluating their options for investment disputes against Russia.
許多烏克蘭的個人、企業和國有企業一直在評估針對俄羅斯的投資糾紛解決方案。
However, Ukraine could soon face its own challenges and, possibly, even investment claims arising from its new sanctions-related initiatives, which stem from the legislature and, surprisingly, the judiciary.
不過，烏克蘭可能很快就會遇到新的法律難題，特別是最近實施的與制裁有關的法律行動，可能會讓它面臨投資索賠的風險。這些法律行動不僅在立法層面有所體現，也已經開始影響到司法實踐。
As a starting point, one shall understand that the current Law of Ukraine on Sanctions allows both freezing and, at a later stage, appropriation of frozen assets in the court proceedings initiated by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine (“MoJ”).
首先要明確的是，烏克蘭現行的制裁法規允許司法部在訴訟過程中凍結被制裁的資產，並在後續階段進行沒收。
The current mechanism for sanctions enforcement and collecting the assets by the State of Ukraine has functioned relatively well. However, there is only a limited amount of “tangible” Russian assets in Ukraine, directly or indirectly (through the companies which serve as a holding vehicle) owned by sanctioned individuals, which may be subject to sanctions-based appropriation.
目前，烏克蘭執行制裁和收繳資產的工作進行得相對順利，但國內可供執行的俄羅斯“有形”資產數量並不多。這些資產或是直接被受制裁的個人持有，或是透過控股公司間接控制，都面臨著被制裁措施沒收的風險。
Most often the assets of significant value are held by a Ukrainian subsidiary of a foreign company with a sophisticated multi-level ownership structure in foreign jurisdictions, where one of the UBOs might be a sanctioned Russian oligarch, while another one is a reputable and non-sanctioned foreign investor protected by several investment treaties. This can be well illustrated by the following scheme:
而大部分高價值的資產，往往掌握在外國公司在烏克蘭的子公司手中，這些子公司在海外構建了複雜的多層級所有權結構。在這樣的結構中，一個最終受益人（UBO）可能是受制裁的俄羅斯寡頭，而另一個則可能是非受制裁且享有多個投資條約保護的外國知名投資者。下面的圖示可以更直觀地說明這一點。
While it is a rather usual structuring approach to shielding the assets of [sanctioned] entities and individuals, Ukraine decided to resolve this issue in a somewhat surprising manner – by allowing to collect the assets, indirectly held by the non-sanctioned investors.
為受制裁實體以及個人的資產“提供保護”是一種常見的做法，烏克蘭目前還採取了一個別出心裁的策略——授權（法院）沒收非受制裁投資者間接持有的資產。
The origins of this idea, subsequently re-introduced in notorious Draft Bill No. 11195, could be traced to the case of Shell, where the assets of non-sanctioned foreign investors were first collected. While the Bill was subsequently abolished, the representatives of the Ukrainian Government made it sufficiently clear that after polishing the technicalities, the main concepts and ideas will most definitely resurface in a new legislative initiative.
這一策略的起源可以追溯到備受關注的第11195號草案法案[1]，該法案首次觸及了沒收非受制裁外國投資者資產的問題。儘管該法案後來被廢止，但烏克蘭政府代表已經明確表示，經過技術上的完善，其主要思路和構想很可能會在新的立法提案中再次出現。
[1] 2024年4月22日，烏克蘭最高議會（Verkhovna Rada）通過了第11195號《關於修改烏克蘭有關第三方產權保護機制的法律草案》（以下簡稱“11195號法律草案”）。
The Case of Shell
殼牌石油公司案例
Shell entered the Ukrainian market long ago, acting as a JV – partner in a Dutch joint venture (JV), which in its turn has been owning Ukrainian assets and running Ukrainian business. Shell was a majority shareholder with 51% of shares in the JV, while the Russian oligarch Khudainatov held 49% shares in the JV.
殼牌早已涉足烏克蘭市場，作為荷蘭合資企業的合作伙伴，該合資企業不僅擁有烏克蘭資產，亦在當地開展業務。其中，殼牌持有合資企業51%的股份，而俄羅斯寡頭胡達伊納托夫則持有剩餘的49%股份。
Following the full-fledged Russian invasion into Ukraine in February 2022, Shell’s JV partner, as a number of other Russia-linked businesses & individuals, was sanctioned by various jurisdictions (including Ukraine).
自2022年2月俄羅斯對烏克蘭發起全面軍事行動以來，殼牌的合資夥伴以及其他多個與俄羅斯有關聯的實體和個人，都受到了包括烏克蘭在內的多個司法管轄區的制裁。
The sanctions have entitled Ukraine to nationalization of the assets, owned by the sanctioned person and the respective claim was submitted by MoJ to the High Anticorruption Court of Ukraine.
這些制裁給予了烏克蘭對受制裁實體及個人資產的國有化權利，烏克蘭司法部（MoJ）也據此向烏克蘭高階反腐敗法院提交了相關申請。
MoJ asked the court to nationalize the Ukrainian assets of the sanctioned person, which, as a matter of fact, constituted the assets, indirectly (through the JV) belonging to Shell. In fact, Ukraine has claimed nationalization of the assets, which didn’t really belong to the sanctioned person but was owned by a reputable international investor.
烏克蘭司法部請求法院將屬於受制裁實體的烏克蘭資產國有化，這些資產雖然是透過合資企業間接持有的，但與殼牌存在權益關係。值得注意的是，烏克蘭意圖國有化的資產，其實際所有權並不直接屬於受制裁實體，而是由一家（非受制裁的）國際知名投資者所持有。
（圖片源於網路）
In October 2023, Shell suddenly found itself in the middle of a legal dilemma. Ukrainian claims to 49% of shares in the Ukrainian subsidiary directly held by the JV, allegedly linked to Khudainatov, raised a critical issue: what happens when third-party assets are caught in the net because one of the indirect minority shareholders is sanctioned?
2023年10月，殼牌陷入了法律糾紛：烏克蘭認為（非受制裁的）國際知名投資者持有的烏克蘭子公司49%股權與俄羅斯寡頭胡達伊納托夫有關，因此向其提出索賠。這引發了一個關鍵問題：當（非受制裁的）第三方資產因其中一位受制裁的間接少數股東而受到影響時，其法律後果會如何？
The High Anticorruption Court, as the court of first instance, resolved the case in accordance with the current laws and in line with the international obligations of Ukraine, rejecting the claims of the MoJ to the assets owned by non-sanctioned entities – the JV and, indirectly, by Shell.
作為一審法院，最高反腐敗法院根據現行法律規定和烏克蘭所承擔的國際義務，審慎作出裁決，駁回了烏克蘭司法部（MoJ）針對非受制裁實體——即合資企業及其間接歸屬於殼牌的資產所提出的索賠請求。
The Appeal Chamber, however, reversed the judgment and ruled to seize 100 % of the Ukrainian subsidiary of JV, effectively depriving the Dutch JV Cicerone of all its possessions. The Appeal Chamber allowed Shell to subsequently re-register 51% of shares in the name of Shell, while the remaining 49%, previously directly owned by the non-sanctioned JV, were appropriated by the state.
然而，這一裁決並非最終結果。上訴法院經過仔細審理後，推翻了原判，決定沒收合資企業所屬的烏克蘭子公司100%的股份，這實際上導致荷蘭合資企業Cicerone失去了其全部資產權益。同時，上訴法院還裁定，殼牌有權將其原先持有的51%股份重新登記在自己名下；而剩餘的49%股份，則由國家沒收，這部分股份原本是由非受制裁的合資企業直接持有的。
Draft Law on Enforcement Against the Third-Party Assets
關於針對第三方資產的執行措施法律草案
After the case of Shell had been resolved in the interest of the State of Ukraine, the Ukrainian Parliament decided to set in stone the logic employed by the Appeal Chamber and allow applying it in similar cases in the future, notwithstanding the very foreseeable risks.
殼牌案件最終以維護烏克蘭國家利益的方式得到解決後，烏克蘭議會經過深思熟慮，決定採納上訴庭在此案中的法律邏輯，並意圖在未來類似案件中沿用，儘管這一決定伴隨著風險與挑戰。
MPs have put forward a Draft Bill No. 11195, that would allow the courts to enforce sanctions by collecting the assets owned not only by the sanctioned individuals, but also by non-sanctioned third parties. Ukrainian lawmakers clearly have a good sense of humour, as they decided to name this bill “On the Mechanism for the Protection of Third-Party Rights”.
基於此，議員們提出了第11195號法律草案，旨在擴大制裁執行措施的範圍，允許法院不僅追回直接屬於受制裁個人的資產，還能對由非受制裁的第三方持有的資產採取執行行動。頗為諷刺的是，烏克蘭立法者將此草案命名為“關於構建第三方權利保護機制的法案”。
The Bill envisaged that court-ordered enforcement could affect any third party, which holds assets in Ukraine if a sanctioned party holds indirectly 25 + % interest in such assets. If the stake of the non-sanctioned party is lower than 25 %, the situation is even worse – the powers to collect such assets for some reason are awarded to the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, the highest executive body, which acquires unlimited discretion to decide whether the foreign investor gets to keep their property, omitting all and any standards of fair trial.
該法律草案規定，若受制裁方間接持有某項資產超過25%的權益，則法院的強制執行程式可波及在烏克蘭境內持有該資產的所有第三方。更為嚴厲的是，若非受制裁方的間接持股比例低於25%，則烏克蘭內閣——作為國家最高行政機關——將接管收回此類資產的權力。在此情況下，內閣將擁有不受限制的裁量權，決定是否允許外資投資者保留其在烏克蘭的財產權益，且此決定不受任何公正審判標準的制約。
In fact, the Draft Bill entitled/required the non-sanctioned indirect shareholders – partners with sanctioned persons, to directly apply to Ukraine to register their ownership interest in Ukrainian assets in Ukrainian domestic registers. Obviously, this approach raises a number of practical implications for investors.
實質上，該法律草案要求與受制裁方有合作關係的非受制裁間接股東，必須主動向烏克蘭相關部門提出申請，登記其對烏克蘭境內資產的所有權。這一要求無疑給投資者帶來了諸多實際操作上的難題。
For example, it seems very unlikely, that the investors, who purchased shares of a public company, listed, for instance, at NASDAQ and having Ukrainian business, will be happy to re-register their ownership rights in Ukraine, due to the fact, that there is a sanctioned investor among the shareholders of the company.
例如，投資者若購買了納斯達克上市且在烏克蘭有業務的公司股份，考慮到這些公司股東中可能存在受制裁的投資者，他們可能會因顧慮重重而不願在烏克蘭重新登記其所有權。
The practice of seizing assets without a direct link to sanctioned individuals isn’t just a legal novelty; it is a potential minefield.
將與受制裁個人不存在直接關聯的資產予以沒收，這一舉措在法律上是罕見的，也蘊含著巨大的法律風險。
Given the high pressure of civil society, the MPs withdrew the Bill from consideration. It is a local victory, but the State does not seem to abandon the idea of collecting assets owned through complicated foreign corporate structures. We expect that a new Bill will be presented soon, and the question remains open – will Ukraine be able to properly balance the rights of bona fide foreign investors and its own desire to seize assets? If the response to this question is negative, Ukraine may find itself facing multiple claims of expropriation.
在民間社會的強烈呼籲下，議員們決定暫時擱置該法案的審議。這無疑是地方層面的一次勝利，但國家層面似乎並未放棄透過複雜的外國公司架構來追回資產的打算。我們有理由預測，不久的將來可能會有新的法案出臺，而相關問題依然懸而未決——烏克蘭如何在保護誠實外國投資者權益與滿足自身沒收資產需求之間找到恰當的平衡點？若不能妥善解決，烏克蘭可能會面臨多起投資索賠的困境。
（圖片源於網路）
The Prospects of Investment Claims against Ukraine
對烏克蘭投資索賠前景的分析
While there is no doubt that a sovereign is entitled to introduce and enforce sanctions to protect its national interests, no such measures must lead to the outright expropriation of the assets owned by the non-sanctioned parties. Foreign investors are likely to use an investment protection shield against unlawful expropriations, turning to the arbitration under the applicable BITs.
儘管主權國家有權實施制裁以保護國家利益，但這些措施不應導致非受制裁方的資產被全面徵收。若發生此類情況，外國投資者可以依據投資保護機制，並引用相關的雙邊投資條約（BITs），透過仲裁途徑尋求對非法徵收的賠償。
If such disputes arise, jurisdictional and admissibility defenses with reference to the principles of transnational public policy and the doctrine of clean hands, which may be used by the state in ordinary sanctions-related cases, will be useless when the enforcement of sanctions results in the taking of property owned by non-sanctioned investors.
在涉及此類爭議的案件中，國家通常會依據跨國公共政策原則及“乾淨的手”原則[2]提出管轄權及可受理性的抗辯。然而，當制裁執行導致非受制裁投資者的財產被剝奪時，上述抗辯理由便不再成立。
[2] “乾淨的手”原則（clean hands doctrine）是英國衡平法中的一項原則，指如果一方當事人的行為違背了衡平法原則（如善意原則），該當事人即不能再衡平法院尋求衡平法上的救濟或者主張衡平法山的辯護理由。
As to the merits, judicial expropriations from non-sanctioned investors would hardly meet the customary criteria of non-discrimination, proportionality and due process. The legitimate purpose for taking non-sanctioned assets also raises significant concerns.
實質上，對非受制裁投資者的司法徵收難以符合非歧視原則、比例原則及正當程式的要求。同時，徵收非受制裁資產的目的也備受爭議。
On a case-by-case basis, the investor may also turn to the non-discrimination and FET clauses. For example, affected investors may assert they faced discriminatory treatment because they lost a significant portion of their assets in prolonged lawsuits and appropriations.
在具體案例中，投資者可以引用非歧視及公平待遇（FET）條款進行抗辯。例如，受影響的投資者可能會主張，因長期訴訟及徵收導致資產大幅損失，他們遭受了歧視性對待。
At the same time, in the most recent case, investors in a large Ukrainian telecom company with sanctioned individuals in its corporate structure, have cleared their exit with the Ukrainian competition authority and sold Ukrainian business to an international investor, effectively eliminating any risks of lawsuits and appropriation. This can hardly be considered equal treatment in very similar circumstances.
此外，在最近的一個案例中，一家大型烏克蘭電信公司因企業結構中包含受制裁個人，因此與烏克蘭競爭管理部門達成協議，將烏克蘭業務出售給國際投資者，從而有效避免了訴訟及資產徵收的風險。然而，在類似情況下，這種處理方式顯然難以被視為平等待遇。
（圖片源於網路）
Conclusion
結論
Legal and reputational stakes are high in any case concerning sanctions.
在涉及制裁的案件中，法律風險和聲譽風險都非常高。
Ukraine is understandably exploring all available avenues to keep the resistance going against the Russian invasion. However, further aggressive measures could inadvertently scare off bona fide foreign investors, potentially doing more harm than good in the long run.
烏克蘭正在積極尋求多種途徑來抵禦俄羅斯的入侵。然而，如果採取進一步的激進措施，可能會無意中嚇跑誠實的外國投資者，從而對烏克蘭的長遠發展造成更大的損害。
This story of sanctions, asset seizures, and potential expropriation is also a reminder of how politicized and complex the sanctions process can become. As Ukrainian lawmakers deliberate whether it is worth to formalize flawed practices for the sake of effective access to previously unreachable assets, they should proceed carefully. Balancing the need to enforce sanctions with the obligation to maintain a stable investment climate is quite a challenge, and the outcome will shape Ukrainian legal landscape as well as the future of Ukrainian economy.
制裁、資產沒收及其潛在風險警示我們，制裁流程可能趨向高度政治化且錯綜複雜。烏克蘭的立法機關需保持謹慎，仔細考量是否值得采取可能存有瑕疵的手段來獲取以往不易得到的資產。在制裁實施與維持一個穩定的投資環境之間尋找恰當的平衡點，是一項極為艱鉅的挑戰，其影響將對烏克蘭的法律框架及經濟前景產生長遠的影響。
原文連結：
https://dailyjus.com/world/2024/11/a-new-approach-to-enforcement-of-sanctions-in-ukraine