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思維導圖:
Charlie,剃刀邊緣無比鋒利
翻譯組全體成員如下:
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Leaders | Trump’s foreign policy經濟學人社論| 特朗普的外交政策

Leaders | Trump’s foreign policy經濟學人社論| 特朗普的外交政策
America’s bullied allies need to toughen up被美國霸凌的盟友們需挺直腰板
To avoid being crushed, they need a better plan than flattery and concessions要想不被壓垮,只靠獻媚和妥協可不夠
For decades America has stood by its friends and deterred its enemies. That steadfastness is being thrown upside down, as Donald Trump strong-arms allies and seeks deals with adversaries. After freezing all aid to Ukraine on March 3rd, his administration restored it when Ukraine agreed in principle to a 30-day truce. It is unclear how hard the White House will press Vladimir Putin to accept this. On the same day, Mr Trump briefly slammed even more tariffs on Canada. Its new prime minister, Mark Carney, warned that a predatory America wants “our water, our land, our country”. And don’t forget Asia. The president has just raised doubts about the value to America of the US-Japan defence treaty, which Eisenhower signed in 1960. Around the world, allies fear that America First means they come second, third or even last.
幾十年來,美國始終如一地支援其盟友,威懾敵人。而如今,唐納德·特朗普卻反其道而行之——對盟友強硬施壓,並試圖與敵人達成交易,從前的堅定立場被棄之如敝履。3月3日,特朗普政府凍結了對烏克蘭的全部援助,直到烏克蘭原則上同意30天停火後才恢復。至於白宮會給普京施加多大的壓力,促使其接受停火,外界仍然不得而知。就在同一天,特朗普曾短暫宣佈將對加拿大加徵關稅。加拿大新任總理馬克·卡尼(Mark Carney)警告稱,如豺狼虎豹般的美國對“我們的水資源、我們的土地、我們的國家”虎視眈眈。與此同時,亞洲也沒能從美國的大棒下逃脫。特朗普剛剛對艾森豪威爾總統1960年簽署的《美日安保條約》的價值提出質疑。全球範圍內,美國的盟友們開始擔心,“美國優先”意味著他們只能屈居其後,甚至被被棄之不顧。
Mr Trump and his supporters believe his frenetic actions enhance American power, breaking deadlocks and shaking up deadbeat or parasitic allies. The proposed ceasefire in Ukraine is evidence that he can change countries’ behaviour. But at what cost? His trade war is panicking financial markets. The 40-odd countries that have put their security in America’s hands since 1945 are suffering a crisis of confidence. They dread Team Trump’s inconsistency and short-termism: a ceasefire in Gaza that is rather like the Ukrainian one may soon collapse. At home, Mr Trump faces checks and balances. Abroad, much less so. Allies are asking whether they are certain that Mr Trump or a President J.D. Vance would fight alongside them if the worst happens. Unfortunately, the answer is: not certain enough.
特朗普及其支持者們認為,他雷厲風行的舉措可增強美國的實力,打破僵局並震懾那些不思進取或如寄生蟲般依附於美國的盟友們。烏克蘭的停火提議正是他能改變他國行為的例證。但問題是,代價何在?他的貿易戰讓金融市場陷入恐慌。1945年二戰結束以來,40多個國家倚賴美國保障自身安全,如今他們正經歷一場信任危機。他們憂心於特朗普政府的反覆無常和短視:加沙的停火協議很可能像烏克蘭的停火提議一樣轉瞬即逝。在美國國內,尚且還有人能制衡特朗普;而在國際舞臺上,他所受的約束就要少得多了。盟友們不禁開始質疑:如果最糟糕的情況發生,特朗普總統或是未來的總統接班人萬斯真的會與自己並肩作戰嗎?遺憾的是,答案並不那麼確定。
This loss of faith also reflects a dawning realisation that coercing allies is an inevitable consequence of the MAGA value-free agenda. Allies’ interdependence means that America has more leverage over them than over foes such as Russia or China. For decades Canada, Europe and parts of Asia have trusted America’s “superpower stack”—defence treaties, trade deals, nuclear weapons, the dollar banking system—because it is mutually beneficial. Tragically Mr Trump sees it as a liability.
這種信任的流失也反映出一個逐漸清晰的現實:在“讓美國再次偉大”(MAGA)這一缺乏價值觀約束的議題下,脅迫盟友已成為不可避免的結果。盟友之間的相互依存意味著美國對他們的影響力遠超對俄羅斯或中國這樣的對手。幾十年來,加拿大、歐洲以及部分亞洲國家之所以信任美國的“超級大國體系”——包括防務條約、貿易協定、核武器以及以美元為核心的銀行體系——是因為這一體系對雙方都有利。而不幸的是,特朗普卻將其視為一種負擔。
The administration’s economic nationalism and the repudiation of its global security role may go further. Foreign firms are being bullied to shift capital to America. Some White House advisers want reciprocal tariffs, a radical form of protectionism. On Wall Street there is talk of schemes to depress the dollar. Elon Musk says America should quit NATO; although Mr Trump has not gone that far, he has not contradicted him. Europeans are exploring new, once-unthinkable risks: does America have kill switches for F-35 fighter jets? Might it refuse to maintain Britain’s nuclear deterrent?
特朗普政府所秉持的經濟民族主義及背棄其全球安全形色的做法可能會愈演愈烈。外國企業被迫將資金轉移到美國。部分白宮顧問主張實行對等關稅這種極端保護主義政策。華爾街的商人們談論美元貶值計劃。馬斯克認為美國應該退出北約。儘管特朗普還未跨出這一步,但他也沒有反駁馬斯克的觀點。歐洲正在審視一些先前看來近乎荒謬的風險:美國是否在F-35戰鬥機上內建了“致命開關”?美國是否會拒絕維護英國核威懾力量?
註釋:
美F-35戰機被爆存“關機鍵”,美國掌握“致命開關”?
source: https://www.163.com/dy/article/JQCED2QR055040N3.html
Asian allies worry that Mr Trump will turn on them next. Australia, Japan, South Korea and others hope his hostility to China runs deep enough that he will not abandon them. But his grievances over trade and defence treaties do not have geographic limits. Given his determination to avoid world war three with Russia over Ukraine, negotiations with China or North Korea could see him offering concessions that weaken allies.
亞洲盟友擔心特朗普接下來會將矛頭指向他們。澳大利亞、日本、韓國和其他國家寄希望於特朗普對中國的敵意足夠深重,不會輕易背棄自己。但是特朗普在貿易和防務條約方面的不滿並沒有地域限制。鑑於他決心避免因烏克蘭問題而與俄羅斯爆發第三次世界大戰,在未來對華和對朝談判中,特朗普可能會做出讓步,導致盟友受到削弱。
If you admire America and its transatlantic and Pacific alliances, this shift is so extreme and unfamiliar that it is tempting to deny it is happening and to assume that Mr Trump must backtrack. However, when your people’s safety is at stake, denial is not a plan. America’s allies have a GDP of $37trn, but they lack hard power. Sucking up in the Oval Office and offering to Buy American gets them only so far. Making concessions can encourage more demands, as Panama has found. If allies are unable to defend themselves, some will seek an accommodation with China or Russia.
如果你欣賞美國的跨大西洋和太平洋聯盟體系,那如今這種轉變如此極端,出人意料,你可能不願接受現實,並認為特朗普肯定會收回成命,重回從前。但是,當國民安危懸於一線,自我麻痺絕非良策。美國的盟友雖坐擁37萬億美元的GDP,但武力實在難以恭維。在白宮總統辦公室討好特朗普,並承諾購買美國產品所起的作用十分有限。巴拿馬在運河問題上的遭遇表明,退一步就會步步退。如果美國的盟友無法自衛,部分國家最終可能向中國或俄羅斯尋求妥協。
註釋:
沿著巴拿馬運河,探尋一個國家的抗爭。1903年,美國巧取豪奪,憑藉軍事幹預等多種手段,得到開鑿運河和永久使用、佔領及控制運河和運河區的權利,巴拿馬甚至不得在運河區行使國家主權。從那時起,運河區成為美國在巴拿馬乾涉控制、部署軍事力量的“國中之國”。儘管經過巴拿馬人民多年不懈的抗爭,1999年12月美國將霸佔近百年的巴拿馬運河歸還巴拿馬政府,但時至今日,在運河區沿岸仍可看到廢棄美式城鎮的影子。
source: https://www.sxdaily.com.cn/2024-12/25/content_10997397.html
America’s allies should try to avoid that dismal outcome, starting today. One idea is to deter America from mutual harm. That means identifying unconventional retaliatory measures while calibrating their use to avoid a 1930s-style downward spiral. One option is to slow co-operation on extraterritorial sanctions and export controls. Allies could use their “choke-points” in trade, which we reckon account for 27% of America’s imports, including nuclear fuels, metals and pharmaceuticals. Hidden in the semiconductor-production chain are firms such as Tokyo Electron and ASML in Europe, which are crucial suppliers to America’s tech giants. Smart retaliation against foolish tariffs worked for Europe in the first Trump term. Allies should also identify military pressure-points, such as radars and bases, though they should stop short of exploiting them except in extreme circumstances.
美國的盟友們現在就要強硬起來,避免陷入這樣的困境。其中一個思路是懾阻美國與自己相互傷害,即採取非常規反制措施,同時精準把握力度,避免重現上世紀30年代經濟大蕭條後的惡性報復迴圈。方式之一是暫緩追隨美國域外製裁和出口管制的腳步。美國的盟友們可以在核燃料、金屬和製藥等“卡脖子”領域發揮自身優勢(我們預估美國在這些領域的進口額佔到其總進口額的27%)。半導體產業鏈中不乏東京電子(Tokyo Electron)和歐洲荷蘭阿斯麥(ASML)這樣的巨擘,它們是美國科技巨頭的重要供應商。特朗普在其首個任期內對歐洲施加的關稅可謂愚蠢,但歐洲的巧妙應對起到了作用。美國盟友還應拿捏好雷達和基地等軍事施壓關鍵領域,但若非極端情況,應儘量避免訴諸此類手段。
As an insurance policy allies will have to build up their own economic and military infrastructure in parallel to America’s superpower stack. Creating this option will take years. Europe is highly likely to issue more joint debt to finance extra defence spending, and it may keep its own sanctions on Russia even if Mr Trump lifts America’s. All this could split American and European capital markets and ultimately boost the euro’s role as an international currency. In defence, Europe is scrambling to fill gaps in its forces. It is also discussing a continental nuclear deterrent involving France and perhaps Britain. In Asia, South Korea and perhaps Japan may move closer to the nuclear threshold, in order to deter China and North Korea.
作為戰略保障,盟友必須同步構建自主的經濟和軍事體系,達到與美國的超級大國體系相當的水平。構築這一體系需要經年之功:歐洲極可能增發共同債券為國防預算提供資金;即便特朗普解除對俄製裁,歐洲或仍將維持制裁。此舉或將割裂歐美資本市場,最終強化歐元的國際貨幣地位。軍事層面,歐洲正竭力彌補軍力缺口,探討構建以法國(或包含英國)核武庫為基礎的歐陸核威懾體系。亞洲方面,為制衡中朝,韓國甚至日本或將逐步逼近擁核國家門檻。
The new night watchmen
新守夜人聯盟
Last, America’s allies should seek strength in numbers. Europe needs a plan to take over the leadership of NATO, join the CPTPP, an Asian trade deal, and co-operate with Japan and South Korea more closely on military and civilian technology. That would create scale and help manage rivalries. It would also preserve an alternative liberal order, albeit vastly inferior to the original. Allies should be ready to welcome back America under a new president in 2029, though the world will not be the same. Nuclear proliferation may have been unleashed, China will have grown stronger and America’s power and credibility will have been gravely damaged. For its allies, there is no point whingeing: they need to toughen up and get to work.
最後,美國盟友當以星火之勢凝聚力量。歐洲需要計劃接手北約的領導權,加入亞洲的《全面與進步跨太平洋夥伴關係協定》(CPTPP),並與日韓深化軍事和民用技術合作。如此既可形成規模,又可管控競爭,亦能維繫另一種自由主義秩序,雖不復昔日榮光,但仍好過體系崩解。各盟友應做好準備,等待2029年白宮的新主人帶領美國重歸常態,雖然彼時世界將早已滄海桑田:核擴散閘門已開,中國國力日益強盛,美國實力與信譽恐遭重創。對盟友而言,坐而論道毫無意義,唯有躬身入局,淬礪鋒芒。
翻譯組:
Benjamin,初學翻譯,愛紅酒,愛美食
Humi,在躺平、側臥和睡夢中尋找詩和遠方
Mai,男,經濟學博士,世界那麼大,我想活得久一點
審校組:
Ithil,胡辣湯愛好者
秋秋,仰臥起坐,都很快樂
Lucian,醫學翻譯,靈魂在傑作中冒險
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本期感想:
Forest,愛樹的人,精神小花園持續耕耘中
看罷本文,覺得這篇文章的某種變式題(學生對這種題目很熟悉,就是教材上講到某種型別的問題,一般在教輔書上就會看到這種題目的變式題,題目的主旨相似,但是形式上有所變化)實在應該早就出現過了。
有兩個問題自然浮現於腦海:第一是國家之間為什麼要結盟?第二是心理學上那個人質對綁匪產生認同的模型叫什麼?哦,斯德哥爾摩綜合徵。
我想這可能是我寫的很短的一篇感想。
文章當中那些美國與其盟友的具體合作專案都可以不用去談。
可以去觀察的也許就是,美國從前在什麼內外條件或者說國際環境中與這些國家結盟的。基本的觀察應該是二戰以後吧。憑我這種記憶力非常弱的人的蒼白的歷史知識,大概可以知道,彼時的美國,在二戰之後,各種因素使其成為了這個世界上最強大的國家。比如戰爭致富啊、他國變弱啊,等等等等。
當然,也還有馬歇爾計劃這種安排,總不能自己天天看著前蘇聯,所以也需要在其近處有能力不錯的國家可以幫忙看著,然後這些國家也都還需要其他國家幫忙看著,而且歐洲本身太過於孱弱也是不太行的;亞洲的話,距離美國本土挺遠的,所以也要找合適的國家幫忙看著,邏輯或許基本相似。
再者就是,美國之外的其他國家都弱了的話,也不方便做買賣,不利於實現經濟往來中的共贏。
反正,還是等等等等許多原因,結盟,並在自己的領導下與歐洲和亞洲國家互相扶持著,對美國是比較合適的。
在世界警察這個身份之下,美國在國際上管了不少的事情,國力多多少少也有所損傷。從歷史的角度來看,當帝國的擴張超過一定範圍,就會反過來損傷帝國本身,這也是之前的帝國基本都會掉的坑,美國也不例外。而從國內來看,經濟增長、社會和諧這些方面隨著時間的延續,也開始慢慢出現問題,具體是什麼情況,就此也不方便太展開,大家都比較知道。創新力還是有的,但是大資本的各種運作導致很多社會發展成本的上升,也是眾所周知的吧。
要是挑盟友國家來做例子的話,比如可以挑法國。透過寫感想,推薦圖書是順手的好事。這本書我推薦過,不過覺得也不妨再推薦一次,網際網路上的東西看似永不消逝,淹沒遺忘其實也快。
《美國陷阱》這本書由弗雷德里克·皮耶魯齊和馬修·阿倫創作,首次出版於2019年。該書以法國明星工業鍋爐部高管皮耶魯齊的親身經歷為依據,揭露美國政府打擊美國企業競爭對手的內幕。該書不僅展現了阿爾斯通被美國企業“強制”收購的過程,也展現了美國如何利用臭名昭著的“長臂管轄”、《反海外腐敗法》等司法武器打擊美國企業商業競爭對手的內幕。不錯,這個美國企業的競爭對手是盟友國家的公司,但是對美國來說這並不會有什麼關係,美國照樣透過奇特的司法處理過程最終併購了這家法國公司,搶走了法國工業的明珠,而且遺憾的是最終也沒有能把搶過來的東西整得怎麼樣。砍伐森林所得到的好處從來都抵不上森林存在於原處所產生的價值。
對亞洲的盟友,這裡也無需贅述,邏輯基本相似吧。這篇感想已經開始不合適地變長了。
斯德哥爾摩綜合徵,說的是人質在受到綁架者所帶來的極端危險中,反而產生對其的認同,怎麼感覺用在此處,也頗為應景啊!
從美國自身來看,現實問題是如今的美國,其國力已經不再能hold住那麼多事情了,但是這個國家為自己的國家謀求利益最大化的思路也確實會始終一以貫之啊。因此川普提出歐洲應該也出錢自己搞搞自己的軍事防務,感覺作為旁觀者的我們,好像也很難覺得這有多麼突兀和離譜吧!
也許深思一下的話,令人頗為費解的反倒是這些盟友。盟友畢竟就是盟友,並不是美國內部的一個州,這種信任的基石到底是什麼?憑空的談論信任從何而來有些令人費解。為什麼一些國家就能夠覺著把自己的軍事防務交給別人,在國際關係中長期充當牆頭草這樣的角色,是一個合適的選擇呢?
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願景





46節直播課
