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Charlie，剃刀邊緣無比鋒利
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The World Ahead| United States in 2025
英文部分選自經濟學人展望2025
展望世界的未來 | 2025年的美國
唐納德·特朗普將在2025年面臨一個動盪的世界
出於對盟友的蔑視，這位新任總統或將加劇混亂局面
To understand the forbidding world that Donald Trump will confront, open the 75-page report of a bipartisan commission on national security, published in July. “The threats the United States faces are the most serious and most challenging the nation has encountered since 1945 and include the potential for near-term major war.” America may have to fight several regional conflicts at once, which could merge into a global one. The country, the commissioners said, is not ready for such wars. Worse, Americans are scarcely aware of how the world around them is darkening.
要理解唐納德·特朗普（Donald Trump）即將面對的嚴峻世界局勢，不妨看看去年7月份釋出的一份由兩黨成員組成的國家安全委員會撰寫的報告，長達75頁。報告寫道，“當前，美國面臨的威脅是自1945年（第二次世界大戰結束）以來最嚴重、最具挑戰性的，而且近期有可能會演化成大規模戰爭。”美國可能需要同時應對多點地區衝突，而這些衝突有可能由點成面、演變成全球性衝突。委員們表示，美國還沒有準備好迎接這樣的戰爭。更糟糕的是，美國人幾乎沒有意識到他們周圍的世界正變得日益黑暗。
The new president will inherit several crises. America is supporting two friends fighting protracted wars, Ukraine and Israel; and tensions are rising in Asia, with potential for conflict ove the Koreas or the Philippines. Nuclear threats are growing, too. Whether the quartet constitute a real alliance or not, their deepening partnership is fast becoming the frame of reference for Washington’s foreign-policy debates. Every crisis is increasingly connected to broader geopolitical rivalries.
新任總統將接手數場危機。美國支援著兩個正在打持久戰的盟友——烏克蘭和以色列；亞洲的緊張局勢也在升溫，朝韓或菲律賓都可能成為潛在的衝突爆發點。核威脅也在加劇。無論這四方的所謂“聯盟”成色如何，它們日益深化的夥伴關係正越來越多地成為美國外交政策辯論的參照。每一場危機都越發與更為廣泛的地緣政治競爭相聯在一起。
During the campaign Mr Trump veered between hyperbole about an impending “world war three” and glibness about how easily he could prevent it, without saying how. In office he may add to the turmoil.
競選期間，特朗普一邊危言聳聽，說“第三次世界大戰”即將爆發，一邊信口開河，說自己可以輕而易舉地阻止這場戰爭，但沒說要如何實現。他上臺後，可能加劇世界的動盪。
But predicting what he will do is hard. Mr Trump presides over three broad schools of thought in the Republican Party. The “primacists” aim to preserve America’s leadership and the global order it created. America must prevail just about everywhere, they argue. In contrast, “prioritisers” argue that America is becoming dangerously overstretched. Better to concentrate its limited resources where they matter most, in Asia, and leave Europe and the Middle East to fend mostly for themselves. The prioritisers, in turn, merge fuzzily with “restrainers”, who generally want America to do less in the world. Mr Trump’s picks for the big national-security jobs reflect the full range. Marco Rubio, his choice for secretary of state, is a conventional Republican hawk. Mike Waltz, named as national-security adviser, wants America to turn to Asia. Peter Hegseth, the choice for defence secretary, bemoans the “woke” military and leans towards isolationism.
然而，預測他的行動並不容易。特朗普在共和黨內主導著三大思想流派。“美國首要派”主張維護美國的領導地位及其建立的全球秩序。他們堅信，美國必須在幾乎所有領域佔據上風。相反，“優先派”則認為，美國已經左支右絀，最好把有限資源集中在最重要的亞洲地區，讓歐洲和中東靠自己的力量解決問題。同時，“優先派”與“剋制派”又有所重疊，“剋制派”希望美國減少對全球事務的參與。特朗普對國家安全條線幾個要職的提名人選兼顧了這幾個不同的派別：他提名的國務卿馬爾科·盧比奧（Marco Rubio）是位傳統的共和黨鷹派人物，國家安全顧問邁克·沃爾茨（Mike Waltz）則主張美國轉向亞洲，而國防部長人選皮特·赫格塞斯（Peter Hegseth）不滿於“覺醒”軍隊，傾向於孤立主義。
當赫格塞斯被媒體問及就職後他將做什麼時，他聲稱，“首先，必須解僱參謀長聯席會議主席，”（指小查爾斯·布朗Charles Q. Brown Jr.將軍）。任何參與多元化、公平和包容性計劃或“覺醒者“的將軍、海軍上將都必須離開。
At different times in his first term Mr Trump nodded towards all three groups. But he also has his own impulses: an obsession with trade deficits and tariffs; contempt for alliances; and an attraction to autocrats and a desire to make deals with them. So expect renewed trade wars, especially with China; threats to abandon allies or renegotiate terms with them; the partial or complete end of American military support for Ukraine; greater leeway for Israel in its wars and settlement policies; more economic pressure on Iran; and growing tension with Mexico on everything from trade to migrants and drugs.
特朗普在第一個任期內的不同時期，對上述三類派別都有過好感。但他也有自己的衝動：他執著於貿易逆差和關稅；他對聯盟嗤之以鼻；他被專斷之人深深吸引，並渴望與他們達成交易。因此，大機率將發生如下事件：貿易戰硝煙再起；威脅拋棄盟友或與盟友重新談判條件；部分或完全終止美國對烏克蘭的軍事支援；讓以色列在戰爭和定居點政策方面獲得更大的迴旋餘地；加大對伊朗的經濟施壓；美國與墨西哥在貿易、移民和毒品等各方面的緊張關係加劇。
A big question is whether and how far to increase defence spending, which is close to historical lows at about 3% of GDP and projected to decline. The bipartisan commission recommended a 3-5% real-terms increase in the next fiscal year, and thereafter a “glide path” to cold-war levels of spending (5-17% of GDP). That is a big jump at a time of strained public finances. The federal deficit is expected to reach 6% of GDP, and will grow substantially under Mr Trump’s plans for tax cuts (though he hopes that tariffs on imports, and slashing wasteful spending, will fill the gap). Securocrats argue that deterrence is cheaper than war. But it is hard to imagine Mr Trump cutting benefits or raising taxes to pay for more weapons.
一個關鍵問題是，國防開支是否要增加，以及增加到什麼程度。目前，國防開支約佔GDP的3%，接近歷史低點，而且預計還會下降。國家安全委員會建議下一財政年度的實際支出增長3-5%，然後穩步提升到冷戰時期的水平（佔GDP的5-17%）。在公共財政緊張的情況下，這是一個巨大的飛躍。根據特朗普的減稅計劃，聯邦赤字預計將達到GDP的6%，並將進一步擴大（儘管他希望透過徵收進口關稅和削減浪費性支出來填補缺口）。安全官員們認為，威懾比戰爭省錢。但很難想象特朗普會削減福利或提高稅收來為更多武器買單。
翻譯組：
Jessie，女，翻譯界林黛玉，想被人叫大佬
Yuqing，女，理想主義體驗派，經濟學人讀者
Cassie，ECNU口譯小菜雞，體制內摸爬滾打教書匠
審校組：
秋秋，仰臥起坐，都很快樂
Lucian，醫學翻譯，靈魂在傑作中冒險
風箏，熱愛生活 熱愛翻譯 熱愛搞錢 熱愛貓咪
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