法律翻譯|Wv.AW[2021]HKCFI1707

翻譯 | 吳靚香港大學法律學院 LLM

Wendy 香港大學法律學院 MCL

章君傑華東政法大學法學院 LLB

編輯 | 賈雙銘北方工業大學法律碩士

鄭梓萱澳門科技大學 LLB

責編 | 扎恩哈爾新疆農業大學

W v. AW [2021] HKCFI 1707

Judgement Number: HCCT 70/2020

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTRUCTION AND ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS

NO 70 OF 2020

在香港特別行政區

高等法院

原訟法庭

建築和仲裁程式

2020年第70號

IN THE MATTER of the Share Redemption Agreement entered into between the Applicant and the Respondent on 15 December 2015

and

IN THE MATTER of an Arbitration in respect of the Share Redemption Agreement

and

IN THE MATTER of an application to set aside the Final Award dated 13 July 2020 under section 81 of the Arbitration Ordinance (Cap 609) and Order 73 of the Rules of the High Court (Cap 4A)

關於申請人與被申請人於2015年12月15日簽訂的《股權回購協議》

以及

關於《股權回購協議》的仲裁

以及

關於根據《仲裁條例》（第609章）第81條和《高等法院規則》（第4A章）第73條申請撤銷2020年7月13日的最終裁決

DECISION

判決

————————————————-——目錄

一、引言

二、背景

三、擔保申請

四、撤銷仲裁裁決的依據、

五、既判爭點禁止反言

六、基於明顯偏頗

七、執行是否會變得更加困難？

八、提供擔保的公正性

九、後續處理

十、傳票的處理結果

INTRDUCTION

引言

1. This is a highly unusual case.

1.這是一個非常不尋常的案件。

2. The Applicant (“W”) and the Respondent (“AW”) were parties to a Share Redemption Agreement made on 15 December 2015 (“Share Redemption Agreement”), for AW to redeem its shares held by W. W, AW, BJ AW (a company controlled by AW), Mr P (“PY”) who is the sole shareholder and director of W, and 3 other shareholders of AW and BJ AW were parties to a separate Framework Agreement made on 21 September 2015 (“Framework Agreement”). The Framework Agreement and the Share Redemption Agreement were both made in relation to the shareholding of PY/W in AW, and were part of a series of transactions leading up to an envisaged acquisition by a Mainland investor of 80% of the interests and shares in BJ AW.

2.申請人（“W”）和被申請人（“AW”）是2015年12月15日簽訂的《股權回購協議》（“《股權回購協議》”）的當事人，AW根據該協議回購了由W持有的股份。W、AW、BJ AW（由AW控制的公司）、P先生（“PY”）即W的唯一股東和董事，以及AW和BJ AW的其他三名股東是2015年9月21日簽訂的另一份《框架協議》（“《框架協議》”）的當事人。《框架協議》和《股權回購協議》都與PY/W在AW的持股有關，並且是一系列交易的一部分，這些交易最終導致一個內地投資者設想收購BJ AW 80%的權益和股份。

3.Disputes arose between the parties under the two agreements, and such matters were referred to arbitration under and pursuant to the agreements: HKIAC xxxxx being the arbitration commenced by PY and W as Claimants, and AW, BJ AW and others as Respondents, under the Framework Agreement, on 25 January 2017 (“Arbitration 1”); and HKIAC yyyyy being the arbitration commenced by AW as Claimant against W as Respondent, under the Share Redemption Agreement on 23 June 2017 (“Arbitration 2”). W and AW were parties in both arbitrations.

3. 在兩項協議下，各方之間產生了爭議，這些問題根據協議被申請仲裁：HKIAC xxxxx是由PY和W作為申請人，AW、BJ AW和其他人作為被申請人，根據《框架協議》於2017年1月25日啟動的仲裁（“仲裁1”）；HKIAC yyyyy是由AW作為申請人針對W作為被申請人，根據《股權回購協議》於2017年6月23日啟動的仲裁（“仲裁2”）。W和AW是兩次仲裁的當事人。

4. The tribunal in Arbitration 1 consisted of Mr Anthony Neoh SC, Mr Tao Xiuming and Mr Philip Yang (“Tribunal 1”). The tribunal in Arbitration 2 consisted of Ms Winnie Tam SC, Mr Tao Xiuming, and Mr Ing Loong Yang (“Tribunal 2”). The common arbitrator was Mr Tao.

4. 仲裁1的仲裁庭由資深大律師Anthony Neoh先生、Tao Xiuming先生和Philip Yang先生（“仲裁庭1”）組成。仲裁2的仲裁庭由資深大律師Winnie Tam女士、Tao Xiuming先生和Ing Loong Yang先生（“仲裁庭2”）組成。Tao先生同為仲裁1和仲裁2的仲裁員。

5. On 13 March 2020, the award in Arbitration 1 was handed down (“Award 1”). On 13 July 2020, the award in Arbitration 2 was handed down (“Award 2”). In Award 1, the tribunal found in favour of PY and W on their claims against the Respondents for breach of the Framework Agreement, and dismissed the Respondents’ Counterclaim, that the Framework Agreement had been induced by misrepresentations made by PY through W. In Award 2, the tribunal found in favour of AW’s claim of misrepresentation, and allowed AW to rescind the Share Redemption Agreement. Under Award 2, W is to repay a sum of US$3,792,558.70 to AW, with interest and costs.

5. 2020年3月13日，仲裁1的裁決書下達（“裁決1”）。2020年7月13日，仲裁2的裁決書下達（“裁決2”）。在裁決1中，仲裁庭1支援PY和W對被申請人違反《框架協議》的索賠請求，並駁回了被申請人的反請求，即框架協議是由PY透過W作出的虛假陳述所誘導的。在裁決2中，仲裁庭2支援AW的虛假陳述索賠請求，並允許AW撤銷《股權回購協議》。根據裁決2，W需向AW支付3,792,558.70美元，並附帶利息和仲裁費用。

6. On 12 October 2020, W applied in these proceedings to set aside the award in Arbitration 2, on the ground (inter alia) that Award 2 is in conflict with the public policy of Hong Kong, in that contrary to principles of fairness, due process and justice, the tribunal ignored findings on common issues which were already determined in Award 1, and instead made findings which were inconsistent with the findings made in Award 1 on the same issues between the same parties. It was highlighted that Mr Tao was a co-arbitrator in both arbitrations, and he had made findings in Award 2 which were inconsistent with the findings he had made in Award 1. The findings were essentially as to whether misrepresentations had been made by PY as to his shareholding (via his nominee W) in AW (“Shareholding Representation”), and/or that such ownership of shares was not subject to actual or potential disputes (“Disputes Representation”).

6. 2020年10月12日，W在這些程式中申請撤銷仲裁2的裁決，理由之一是，裁決2與香港的公共政策相沖突，因為裁決2的仲裁庭忽略了在裁決1中針對相同主體、就同一問題已經作出的事實認定，反而作出了不一致的裁決，這違反了公平、正當程式和公正的原則。特別的是，Tao先生是兩次仲裁中的共同仲裁員，他在裁決2中的事實認定與他在裁決1中的不一致。這些事實認定本質上是關於PY是否就其透過被提名人W持有AW股份（“持股宣告”）進行了虛假陳述，和/或這樣的股份所有權是否不受實際或潛在爭議的影響（“爭議宣告”）。

7. On 30 December 2020, AW applied by Summons for leave to enforce Award 2, for judgment to be entered in terms of Award 2, and for security to be provided by W in respect of the sums payable under Award 2, and for the costs of the proceedings (“Summons”).

7. 2020年12月30日，AW透過傳票申請執行裁決2，要求根據裁決2的條款判決、W就裁決2下應付款項提供擔保以及支付程式費用（“傳票”）。

（圖片來源於網路）

BACKGROUND

背景

8. The relationship between the parties and the disputes were summarized in the affirmation of PY filed in these proceedings, and set out in detail in the section headed “Brief Background” of Award 2, and in the section headed “Material Facts” in Award 1.

8. 各方之間的關係和爭議在PY在這些程式中提交的確認書中有所總結，並在裁決2的“簡要背景”部分和裁決1的“材料事實”部分詳細列出。

9. WG is a company registered in the British Virgin Islands, and at all material times was wholly owned and controlled by PY, a Mainland citizen.

9. WG是在英屬維爾京群島註冊的公司，並且在所有相關時間裡完全由PY控制，PY是一名內地公民。

10. BJ AW was a Mainland company which carried on a mobile advertising application business. Prior to September 2015, BJ AW was subject to a series of variable interest entity (“VIE”) contracts, through which the profits of BJ AW were channeled to AW, which is a company registered in the Cayman Islands. WG was one of the shareholders of AW.

10. BJ AW是一家在內地經營移動廣告應用程式業務的公司。在2015年9月之前，BJ AW受到一系列可變利益實體（“VIE”）合同的約束，透過這些合同，BJ AW的利潤被轉移到AW，AW是在開曼群島註冊的公司。WG是AW的股東之一。

11. In 2012, PY and W had entered into share transfer agreements with 3 individuals (“L, Wg and F”), whereby W agreed to sell part of its shareholding in AW to these individuals. On PY’s case, which was disputed by AW and the other Respondents in Arbitration 1, the share transfer and sale agreement with L were later terminated on 20 January 2013.

11. 在2012年，PY和W與三個人（“L、Wg和F”）簽訂了股權轉讓協議，W同意將其在AW的部分股份賣給這些人。在PY的案件中，AW和其他仲裁1中的被申請人對此提出異議，與L的股權轉讓和銷售協議後來在2013年1月20日被終止。

12. In around June 2015, a third party investor on the Mainland approached the management of BJ AW and negotiated for its acquisition of approximately 80% of the shareholding in BJ AW, referred to in the arbitrations as the “DGCM Transaction” (“Acquisition”). A Memorandum of Intent was signed for the Acquisition at a consideration of RMB 1.04 billion. BJ AW was valued at RMB 1.3 billion, and the proceeds of the sale of the shares were to be distributed to the shareholders based on the classes and percentage of their shareholding, pursuant to which PY was to receive a sum of RMB 152 million for the shares he held in the name of W.

12. 大約在2015年6月，一家內地第三方投資者接洽了BJ AW的管理層，並就其收購BJ AW大約80%的股份進行了談判，這在仲裁中被稱為“DGCM交易”（“收購”）。收購的意向書以10.4億人民幣的價格簽署。BJ AW的估值為13億人民幣，出售股份所得款項將根據股東的股份類別和比例分配給股東，據此，PY將以W的名義持有的股份獲得1.52億人民幣的款項。

13. A series of transactions were subsequently designed and entered into in order to pave way for the Acquisition.

13. 隨後設計並簽訂了一系列交易檔案，為收購鋪平了道路。

14. On 11 and 12 September 2015, W repurchased from Wg and F the AW shares it had sold in 2012.

14. 在2015年9月11日和12日，W從Wg和F那裡回購了它在2012年出售的AW股份。

15. Also in September 2015, the VIE contracts for BJ AW were terminated by a VIE Termination Agreement (“Termination Agreement”).

15. 同樣在2015年9月，透過VIE終止協議（“《終止協議》”）終止了BJ AW的VIE合同。

（圖片來源於網路）

16. On 21 September 2015, the Framework Agreement was signed by the shareholders of AW, whereby the parties’ rights in relation to and under the Acquisition were set out. Under the Framework Agreement, the total consideration for the shares held in the name of W was increased from RMB 152 million to RMB 175 million.

16. 在2015年9月21日，AW的股東簽訂了《框架協議》，其中規定了各方在收購下的權利。根據《框架協議》，以W的名義持有的股份的總對價從1.52億人民幣增加到1.75億人民幣。

17. On 15 December 2015, the Share Redemption Agreement was entered into between W and AW, as required under the Acquisition. Under the Share Redemption Agreement, AW agreed to redeem from W, and W agreed to sell to AW approximately 15.8 million shares at the purchase price of RMB 87.5 million. In Arbitration 2, AW claims (in paragraph 9 of the Statement of Claim) that prior to and/or at the time of the Share Redemption Agreement made in 2015, W had through PY made the Shareholding Representation (that PY owned through W 16.4% of the shareholding in AW prior to and at the time of the Termination Agreement) and the Disputes Representation (that the ownership and/or control of AW and/or BJ AW pertaining to the shares held by PY/his nominee were not subject to any actual or potential disputes).

17. 在2015年12月15日，根據收購的要求，W和AW之間簽訂了《股權回購協議》。根據《股權回購協議》，AW同意從W那裡回購，W同意向AW出售大約1580萬股股份，購買價格為8.75億人民幣。在仲裁2中，AW聲稱（在仲裁申請書的第9段）在2015年的《股權回購協議》之前和/或之時，W透過PY作出了持股宣告（PY透過W在《終止協議》之前和之時擁有AW 16.4%的股份）和爭議宣告（PY/他的提名人持有的AW和/或BJ AW的所有權和/或控制權不受任何實際或潛在爭議的影響）。

18. The Acquisition was not completed.

18. 收購沒有完成。

19. PY and W claim in Arbitration 1 that the Respondents in the arbitration, which include AW, BJ AW and their shareholders, were in breach of the Framework Agreement and in particular clause 6 thereof, which provided that if the Acquisition was not completed by 30 June 2016, the parties to the Framework Agreement would cooperate to restore the shareholding of PY in BJ AW to 34%, and restore W’s shareholding in AW to 16.4% (“Restoration Clause”). The relief sought by PY and W in Arbitration 1 were for specific performance of the Framework Agreement, and in particular the Restoration Clause, and alternatively, damages for breach of the Framework Agreement.

19. PY和W在仲裁1中聲稱，仲裁中的被申請人，包括AW、BJ AW及其股東，違反了《框架協議》，特別是條款6，該條款規定如果收購在2016年6月30日之前沒有完成，《框架協議》的各方將合作恢復PY在BJ AW的股份至34%，恢復W在AW的股份至16.4%（“恢復條款”）。PY和W在仲裁1中尋求的救濟是要求具體履行《框架協議》，特別是恢復條款，或者要求賠償違反《框架協議》的損失，作為替代方案。

20. By way of Counterclaim in Arbitration 1, AW, BJ AW and the shareholders made the claim (in paragraph 13 of the Statement of Defence and Counterclaim) that prior to and/or at the time of the Framework Agreement in September 2015, PY and/or W as PY’s nominee had made the Shareholding Representation and the Disputes Representation: that PY/W owned 16.4% of the shareholding in AW prior to and at the time of the Termination Agreement, and that such ownership was not subject to any actual or potential disputes. The pleading of representations made in Arbitration 1 and Arbitration 2 are identical. AW and BJ AW as Respondents in Arbitration 1 counterclaim for damages for misrepresentation, as well as for breach of the Framework Agreement and breach of fiduciary duties on the part of PY.

20. 作為仲裁1的反請求，AW、BJ AW和股東提出了索賠（在答辯書和反請求申請書的第13段中），即在2015年9月的《框架協議》之前和/或之時，PY和/或W作為PY的提名人作出了持股宣告和爭議宣告：PY/W在《終止協議》之前和之時擁有AW 16.4%的股份，並且這樣的所有權不受任何實際或潛在爭議的影響。在仲裁1和仲裁2中作出的陳述是相同的。AW和BJ AW作為仲裁1的被申請人，反請求要求因虛假陳述、違反《框架協議》和PY違反受託責任而造成的損害賠償。

21. In Arbitration 2, AW’s claim against W was based on misrepresentations which had been made by WG prior to and/or at the time of the Share Redemption Agreement. It was claimed that the Shareholding Representation which had induced WG to enter into the Share Redemption Agreement was false, in that: PY had in 2012 assigned a part of his shareholding in AW to Wg, F and L; that proceedings were commenced by Wg and F against BJ AW and PY in August 2016; and PY did not in fact own 16.4% of the shareholding in AW prior to and at the time of the Termination Agreement on 10 September 2015. AW claimed in Arbitration 2 that the Share Redemption Agreement had been rescinded by W’s misrepresentations, and sought damages.

21. 在仲裁2中，AW對W的索賠是基於WG之前和/或在《股權回購協議》之時作出的虛假陳述。它聲稱誘導WG簽訂《股權回購協議》的持股宣告是虛假的，因為：PY在2012年將他在AW的部分股份分配給了Wg、F和L；Wg和F在2016年8月對BJ AW和PY提起了訴訟；PY實際上在《終止協議》的2015年9月10日之前和之時並不擁有AW 16.4%的股份。AW在仲裁2中聲稱，《股權回購協議》被W的虛假陳述所撤銷，並尋求賠償。

22. Despite the fact that the agreements which were the subject matter of Arbitration 1 and Arbitration 2 were different, it can be seen from the pleadings filed in the Arbitrations that the claims of misrepresentation made against W and PY were in fact identical, focusing on the shareholding of PY prior to and at the time of the Termination Agreement, and the absence of disputes affecting such shareholding at such time.

22. 儘管仲裁1和仲裁2所涉及的協議不同，但從仲裁中提交的訴狀中可以看出，針對W和PY的虛假陳述索賠實際上是相同的，集中在《終止協議》之前和之時PY的持股情況，以及在那時沒有影響該股份的爭議。

（圖片來源於網路）

23. In its application for setting aside Award 2, W relies on various grounds. Firstly, it claims that it was unable to present its case in Arbitration 2 by virtue of the apparent bias of Ms Tam, the Presiding Arbitrator in Tribunal 2 (“Presiding Arbitrator”). Secondly, it claims that the arbitral procedure in Arbitration 2 was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, when the Presiding Arbitrator failed to make full disclosure of her relationship with Counsel representing AW, at or before the hearing of Arbitration 2 and/or before the making of Award 2. Further, it claims that it is contrary to the principles of fairness, due process and justice which are part of Hong Kong’s public policy, when there was apparent bias on the part of the Presiding Arbitrator and where the full relationship between the Presiding Arbitrator and the legal team representing AW were not disclosed to W.

23. 在申請撤銷裁決2時，W依賴於多種理由。首先，它聲稱由於仲裁庭2的首席仲裁員Tam女士（“首席仲裁員”）的明顯偏頗，它無法在仲裁2中陳述其案件。其次，它聲稱仲裁2的仲裁程式沒有按照各方的協議進行，因為首席仲裁員未能在仲裁2的庭審和/或裁決2作出之前，全面披露其與AW代表律師的利益關係。此外，它聲稱這與香港公共政策中包含的公平、正當程式、公正等原則相違背，因為首席仲裁員有明顯偏頗，而且首席仲裁員與代表AW的法律團隊之間的全部關係沒有向W披露。

24. Finally, AW claims that Award 2 is in conflict with the public policy of Hong Kong, when Tribunal 2 was bound by the findings on common issues already determined in Award 1, but chose to ignore these findings without dealing with the matter of issue estoppel. AW claims that it is contrary to the principles of fairness, due process and justice for Tribunal 2 (which includes Mr Tao) to make findings on issues which are inconsistent with the earlier findings made by Tribunal 1 (also comprising Mr Tao) on the same issues decided between the same parties in Award 1.

24. 最後，AW聲稱裁決2與香港的公共政策相沖突，因為仲裁庭2受裁決1中已經確定的共同問題的事實認定的約束，但選擇忽視這些認定，沒有處理“既判爭點禁止反言”的問題。AW聲稱，仲裁庭2（包括Tao先生）與仲裁庭1（也包括Tao先生）在裁決1中針對相同當事人、相同問題所作的事實裁定不一致，這違背了公平、正當程式、公正等原則。

25. The above grounds can be divided into the “Issue Estoppel Ground” and the “Apparent Bias Ground”. W’s claim of inability to present case is framed to be made on the basis of the Presiding Arbitrator’s apparent bias, and that it had been prevented from being able to present its case to an impartial tribunal.

25. 上述理由可以分為“既判爭點禁止反言”和“明顯偏頗”。W聲稱無法陳述案件的理由是基於首席仲裁員的明顯偏頗，並且它被阻止向公正的仲裁庭陳述其案件。

Application for security

擔保申請

26. The principles applicable to an application for security made under Order 73 rule 10A RHC are as set out in Soleh Boneh International Ltd v Government of the Republic of Uganda [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 208, as applied in Hong Kong in Weili Su v Sheng Kang Fei [2019] 2 HKLRD 1214 and X v Jemmy Chien [2019] HKCFI 2172, are undisputed by the parties, and will not be repeated here.

26. 根據《高等法院規則》第73條命令第10A條規則提出的擔保申請所適用的原則，在Soleh Boneh International Ltd v Government of the Republic of Uganda [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 208中有所規定，並在Weili Su v Sheng Kang Fei [2019] 2 HKLRD 1214和X v Jemmy Chien [2019] HKCFI 2172中被香港應用，這些原則是各方當事人沒有爭議的，這裡不再贅述。

27. AW also seeks security under section 905 of the Companies Ordinance and Order 23 rule 1 RHC, on the basis that W is incorporated outside Hong Kong. AW relies on the fact that W was maintained as a corporate vehicle of PY to hold assets in offshore jurisdictions. It does not maintain any substantive business and had never claimed to have substantial assets in Hong Kong. AW recognizes however that the Court has a discretion whether or not to order security under these provisions, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, and that the Court will consider whether there is credible evidence to establish some reason to believe that a foreign plaintiff is unable to pay costs, and whether it would be just to order security.

27. AW還根據《公司條例》第905條和《高等法院規則》第23條命令第1條規定，以W在香港境外註冊為由尋求擔保。AW依據的事實是，W被維護為PY的公司工具，用於在離岸司法管轄區持有資產。它沒有任何實質性的業務，並且從未聲稱在香港擁有大量資產。然而，AW認識到，法院在考慮案件的所有情況後，有自由裁量權決定是否根據這些規定命令提供擔保，並且法院將考慮是否有可信的證據建立一些理由相信外國原告無法支付費用，以及命令提供擔保是否公正。

（圖片來源於網路）

Merits of setting

aside application

撤銷仲裁

裁決的依據

28. As held in Soleh Boneh, the first important factor to be considered on an application for security is the strength of the argument that the arbitral award is invalid. This is as perceived on a brief consideration by the Court which is asked to enforce the arbitral award. If the award is manifestly invalid, there should be no order for security. If it is manifestly valid, there should either be an order for immediate enforcement, or else an order for substantial security.

28. 如在Soleh Boneh案中確定的原則是，在申請撤銷仲裁裁決時，法院需要考慮的首要因素是仲裁裁決的無效性論證的強度。這是法院被要求執行仲裁裁決時，透過對案件的簡要考慮來感知的。如果裁決明顯無效，則不應下令提供擔保。如果裁決明顯有效，則應下令立即執行，或者下令提供大量擔保。

29. The merits of the application to set aside the arbitral award would of course be one of the circumstances to be considered by the Court, when considering whether to exercise its discretion to order security under Order 23, on the basis that it would be just so to do.

29. 撤銷仲裁裁決申請的依據，當然是法院在考慮是否根據《高等法院規則》第23號命令第1條行使自由裁量權命令提供擔保時需要考慮的情況之一，並且是基於這樣做是公正的。

Issue Estoppel Ground

既判爭點禁止反言

Applicable legal principles適用的法律原則

30. Counsel for W relies on the principles of issue estoppel referred to by Toby Landau QC in “Arbitral Groundhog Day: The Reopening and Rearguing of Arbitral Determination” (2020) 2 SIArb J 1 at para 16:

“Issue estoppel may arise where a particular issue of fact and law forming a necessary ingredient in a cause of action has been litigated and decided by a competent forum. The concept includes the reopening of that particular issue in subsequent proceedings (a) between the same parties (or their privies) but (b) involving a different cause of action to which the same issue is relevant.”

30. W方的律師依賴Toby Landau QC在“仲裁土撥鼠節：仲裁裁定的重新審理與重新辯論”一文（第16段）中提到的既判爭點禁止反言原則：

“既判爭點禁止反言原則可能出現於作為訴因必要組成部分的某一特定事實和法律問題，已在合格的法庭上進行了訴訟並作出了裁決的情況。這一概念包括在後續程式中重新審理該特定問題（a）在相同當事人（或其有利害關係的人）之間，但（b）涉及不同的訴因，而該問題與之相關。”

31. The legal test for “issue estoppel” was helpfully summarized by Master Marlene Ng (as Her Ladyship then was) in Mohammed Amjad v John M Pickavant & Co [2013] 1 HKC 145:

31. “既判爭點禁止反言原則”的法律測試由Marlene Ng法官（當時官階）在Mohammed Amjad v John M Pickavant & Co [2013] 1 HKC 145一案中進行了有益的總結：

“52. A decision will create an issue estoppel if it determines an issue in a cause of action as an essential step in its reasoning. Issue estoppel applies to fundamental issues determined in an earlier proceeding which formed the basis of the judgment (see Spencer, Bower and Handley, Res Judicata 4th ed para.8/01 at p.103 and Hoystead & ors v Commissioner of Taxation [1926] AC 155).

“52. 如果某一裁決在其推理的必要步驟中決定了訴因中的一個問題，則會形成既判爭點禁止反言原則。既判爭點禁止反言原則適用於在在先程式中決定的基本問題，這些問題構成判決的基礎（參見Spencer, Bower和Handley, 《既判力》第4版，第8/01段，第103頁，以及Hoystead & ors v Commissioner of Taxation [1926] AC 155）。

53. In Thoday v Thoday [1964] P 181, 198, Diplock LJ said as follows:

‘… … “issue estoppel,” is an extension of the same rule of public policy. There are many causes of action which can only be established that two or more different conditions are fulfilled. Such causes of action involve as many separate issues between the parties as there are conditions to be fulfilled by the plaintiff in order to establish his cause of action; and there may be causes where the fulfilment of an identical condition is a requirement common to two or more different causes of action. If in litigation upon one such cause of action any such separate issues as to whether a particular condition has been fulfilled is determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, either upon evidence or upon admission by a party to the litigation, neither party can, in subsequent litigation between one another upon any cause of action which depends upon the fulfilment of the identical condition, assert that the condition was fulfilled if the court has in the first litigation determined that it was not, or deny that it was fulfilled if the court in the first litigation determined that it was.

But “issue estoppel” must not be confused with “fact estoppel,” which, although a species of “estoppel in pais,” is not a species of estoppel per rem judicatam. The determination by a court of competent jurisdiction of the existence or non-existence of a fact, the existence of which is not of itself a condition the fulfilment was necessary to the cause of action which is being litigated before that court, but which is only relevant to proving the fulfilment of such a condition, does not estop at any rate per rem judicatam either party in subsequent litigation from asserting the existence or non-existence of the same fact contrary to the determination of the first court. It may not always be easy to draw the line between facts which give rise to “issue estoppel” and those which do not … …’

53. 在Thoday v Thoday [1964] P 181, 198中，Diplock LJ作出瞭如下陳述：

‘… …“既判爭點禁止反言原則”是同一公共政策規則的延伸。有許多訴因只能在滿足兩個或多個不同條件的情況下成立。這些訴因涉及的分歧問題與原告為構建其訴因所需滿足的條件數量相同；而且在某些情況下，滿足相同條件是兩個或多個不同訴因的共同要求。如果在關於某一訴因的訴訟中，任何關於特定條件是否得到滿足的分歧問題由有管轄權的法院作出裁決，無論是基於證據還是當事方的承認，在後續的訴訟中對依賴滿足相同條件的任何訴因，如果初次訴訟中法院已裁定其未滿足，雙方都不能主張該條件已得到滿足；如果初次訴訟中法院已裁定其滿足，雙方也不能否認該條件已滿足。但“既判爭點禁止反言原則”不得與“事實禁反言原則”混淆，後者雖然屬於“不容否認”的一種，但不是“因判決而禁止反言”的一種。有管轄權的法院對某一事實存在與否的裁定，該事實的存在本身並不是訴訟中訴因由所依據的必要條件，只與證明該條件的滿足相關，並不會禁止任何一方在後續訴訟中否認該事實的存在或主張該事實的存在，即使與第一法院的裁定相悖。可能並不總是那麼容易區分構成“既判爭點禁止反言原則”的事實與否… …’

54. A fuller statement is set out in Dixon J’s judgment in Blair v Curran (1939) 62 CLR 464, 531-533:

‘A judicial determination directly involving an issue of fact or of law disposes once and for all of the issue, so that it cannot afterwards be raised between the same parties or their privies. The estoppel covers only those matters which the prior judgment, decree or order necessarily established as the legal foundation or justification of its conclusion, whether that conclusion is that a money sum be recovered or that the doing of an act be commanded or be restrained or that rights be declared. … … in [issue estoppel], for the purpose of some other claim or cause of action, a state of fact or law is alleged or denied the existence of which is a matter necessarily decided by the prior judgment, decree or order.

Nothing but what is legally indispensable to the conclusion is thus finally closed or precluded. In matters of fact the issue-estoppel is confined to those ultimate facts which form the ingredients in the cause of action, that is, the title to the right established. Where the conclusion is against the existence of a right or claim which in point of law depends upon a number of ingredients or ultimate facts the absence of any one of which would be enough to defeat the claim, the estoppel covers only the actual ground upon which the existence of the right was negatived. But in neither case is the estoppel confined to the final legal conclusion expressed in the judgment, decree or order. … … the judicial determination concludes, not merely as to the point actually decided, but as to a matter which it was necessary to decide and which was actually decided as the groundwork of the decision itself, though not then directly the point at issue. Matters cardinal to the latter claim or contention cannot be raised if to raise them is necessarily to assert that the former decision is erroneous.

In the phraseology of Lord Shaw, “a fact fundamental to the decision arrived at” in the former proceedings and “the legal quality of the fact” must be taken as finally and conclusively established … … But matters of law or fact which are subsidiary or collateral are not covered by the estoppel. Findings, however deliberate and formal, which concern only evidentiary matters and not ultimate facts forming the very title to rights give rise to no preclusion. Decisions upon matters of law which amount to no more than steps in a process of reasoning tending to establish or support the proposition upon which the rights depend do not estop the parties if the same matters of law arise in subsequent litigation.

The difficulty in the actual application of these conceptions is to distinguish the matters fundamental or cardinal to the prior decision or judgment, decree or order or necessarily involved in it as its legal justification or foundation from matters which even though actually raised and decided as being in the determining considerations, yet are not in point of law the essential foundation or groundwork of the judgment, decree or order. … …’ (my emphasis)

54. Dixon J在Blair v Curran (1939) 62 CLR 464, 531-533一案的判決中給出了更全面的表述：

‘直接涉及事實或法律問題的司法裁定一次性解決該問題，以便該問題不再在相同當事人或其利害關係人之間提出。禁反言原則僅涵蓋在先判決、法令或命令必要確立為作出其結論的法律基礎或理由所涉及的事項，無論該結論是判決某一金錢數額的回收、命令或限制某一行為，還是宣告某些權利… …在[既判爭點禁止反言原則]中，為一些其他申索或訴因的目的，某一事實或法律狀態被主張或否認，其存在是在先判決、法令或命令必然決定的事項。

只有對結論法律上不可或缺的內容，才最終被結束或排除。在事實問題上，既判爭點禁止反言原則僅限於作為訴因構成要素的最終事實，即所建立的權利的標題。當結論否定了在法律上依賴多個構成要素或最終事實的權利或申索的存在時，任何一個要素的缺失都足以使申索敗訴，禁反言原則僅涵蓋否定權利存在的實際依據。但在這兩種情況下，禁反言原則並不侷限於判決、法令或命令中表達的最終法律結論… …司法裁定不僅在於實際決定的要點，還在於作為決定本身的基礎而必然決定的事項，儘管當時並不是直接的爭議點。對後續申索或爭議至關重要的事項不能被提出，如果提出則必然要斷言前一裁定是錯誤的。

用Lord Shaw的話說，“在前期程式中得出的結論所依賴的基礎事實”和“該事實的法律屬性”必須被視為最終確立… …但附屬或次要的法律或事實事項不在禁反言範圍內。任何精心且正式的認定，如果僅涉及證據事項，而非構成權利標題的最終事實，不會導致排除。對法律事項的裁定，如果僅是試圖建立或支援權利所依賴的主張的說理過程中的步驟，則不產生在後續訴訟中，如果相同的法律事項再次出現，禁止當事方反言的後果。

在這些概念的實際應用中，困難在於區分在先裁定或判決、法令或命令或包含於其中的作為其法律正當性或基礎的基本或核心事項，與即便實際上被提出和決定為決定性考慮，但在法律上並非判決、法令或命令的基礎或根基的事項… …’（我的強調）

55. A more modern formulation is found in Lord Keith’s judgment in Arnold & ors v National Westminster Bank plc [1991] 2 AC 93, 105 as follows:

‘Issue estoppel may arise where a particular issue forming a necessary ingredient in a cause of action has been litigated and decided and in subsequent proceedings between the same parties involving a different cause of action to which the same issue is relevant and one of the parties seeks to re-open that issue.’”

55. Lord Keith在Arnold & ors v National Westminster Bank plc [1991] 2 AC 93, 105一案的判決中給出了更現代的表述：

‘既判事項禁止反言原則可能出現在作為訴因必要組成部分的某一特定問題已被訴訟並決定的情況下，在相同當事人之間的後續訴訟中，涉及不同的訴因，而該問題與之相關，其中一方試圖重新審理該問題。’

32. The above principles are quite settled and have not been disputed by Counsel for AW.

32. 上述原則已經十分明確，AW的律師未對其提出爭議。

33. At first blush, it may appear that as Arbitration 1 and Arbitration 2 deal with different causes of action on the basis of different agreements made on slightly different dates, the fact that the Awards produced different results may not be surprising, as findings may have been made on different facts, against different terms and conditions contained in the different agreements, involving different statements or representations claimed to have been made. However, a careful review of the pleadings served in the 2 Arbitrations, and of the findings of facts made in the 2 Awards, reveal that there were indeed inconsistencies and contradictions which cannot be reconciled on the basis of the same facts, the same terms or contents of the representations, and the dates when the representations were claimed and found to have been made. These inconsistencies in findings raise concerns as to whether it would be just to permit the 2 Awards to stand and bind the same parties in the 2 Arbitrations, namely AW and W/PY. That may turn on whether W and PY can be said to have been at fault, in failing to draw to the attention of Tribunal 2, before Award 2 was handed down, the fact that Award 1 had been made and that findings had been made on the issues between W and PY on misrepresentations.

33. 乍一看，仲裁1和仲裁2似乎處理不同的訴因，基於略有不同的日期簽訂的不同協議。因此，裁決結果不一致似乎並不令人驚訝，因為認定可能是基於不同的事實作出，涉及不同協議中的不同條款和條件，以及不同陳述或表述。然而，仔細審查這兩次仲裁中提交的仲裁申請書以及兩份裁決中的事實認定，確實發現了無法在相同事實、相同條款或表述內容及申索作出日期的基礎上調和的矛盾和不一致。這些事實認定中的不一致引發了對是否公正地允許這兩項裁決生效並約束相同當事人（即AW和W/PY）的擔憂。這可能取決於W和PY是否存在過錯，即在裁決2作出之前，未能向仲裁庭2指出裁決1已作出，並且關於W和PY之間的虛假陳述問題已作出事實認定。

34. What has to be borne in mind is that the claim made by AW in Arbitration 2, that the Share Redemption Agreement was induced by PY’s misrepresentations, and its claim in Arbitration 1 that the Framework Agreement contained representations which were false and further, that the Framework Agreement itself was induced by PY’s misrepresentations, focused and turned on the same alleged representations which were said to have been made, and which were false. The representations were that prior to and at the time of the Termination Agreement, PY/W held 16.4% of the shareholding in AW, and that such shares were not subject to any actual or potential disputes.

34. 需要注意的是，AW在仲裁2中提出的主張，即《股權回購協議》是由於PY的虛假陳述而誘導的，以及在仲裁1中聲稱《框架協議》包含虛假陳述，並且《框架協議》本身也是受到PY虛假陳述的誘導，這些主張都集中於同樣聲稱存在且被認為是虛假陳述。這些陳述是，在《終止協議》簽署之前及其時，PY/W持有AW 16.4%的股份，並且這些股份不受任何實際或潛在爭議的影響。

35. The Tribunal in Arbitration 1 found that there was no actionable misrepresentation. Various reasons were given. It found that the material time for consideration of whether there was any misrepresentation was 16 September 2015, which was the date on which PY signed the Termination Agreement. Tribunal 1 found that the Termination Agreement does not refer to any potential or anticipated litigation or arbitration, and PY did not represent or warrant his shareholding or the existence of actual or potential litigation or arbitration, whether before the execution of the Framework Agreement (which was on 21 September 2015) or in its performance. According to Tribunal 1, PY only knew of the problems concerning Wg and F on 22 April 2016, which was after the date when PY bought back the shares from Wg and F, on 11 and 12 September 2015. The Undertaking signed by PY on 22 October 2015 only represented the position of BJ AW (and not AW) and PY was justified in believing that only his title in the AW shares were at risk. At the relevant time of the Termination Agreement, there was no potential or anticipated litigation or arbitration between PY and Wg and F, and accordingly there was no misrepresentation as to disputes over PY’s shareholding in AW.

35. 仲裁1的仲裁庭認定沒有可訴的虛假陳述，並給出了多種理由。仲裁庭認為，考慮是否存在虛假陳述的關鍵時間是2015年9月16日，即PY簽署《終止協議》的日期。仲裁庭1發現，《終止協議》未提及任何潛在或預期的訴訟或仲裁，PY未對他的股權或實際或潛在的訴訟或仲裁的存在作出任何陳述或保證，無論是在《框架協議》（於2015年9月21日簽署）執行之前還是在其履行過程中。根據仲裁庭1的說法，PY僅在2016年4月22日才知曉有關Wg和F的問題，而這發生在PY於2015年9月11日和12日從Wg和F回購股份之後。PY於2015年10月22日簽署的承諾書僅代表BJ AW（而非AW）的立場，PY有理由相信他在AW股份中的所有權面臨風險。在《終止協議》的相關時間內，PY與Wg和F之間沒有潛在或預期的訴訟或仲裁，因此在PY的AW股權爭議上不存在虛假陳述。

36. Tribunal 1 considered that there was no duty on PY to make voluntary disclosure of the Acquisition to Wg and F when they negotiated the buying back of the AW shares. As Wg and F only sought damages in their litigation with PY on the Mainland, and did not seek rescission of their sale to PY, the validity of the chain of transactions required under the Acquisition would not be affected to constitute the Dispute Representation false. After PY had purchased back the AW shares from Wg and F, he was legally and factually the owner of the shares, and there was no falsity in the Shareholding Representation at the material time.

36. 仲裁庭1認為，PY在與Wg和F談判回購AW股份時，並沒有義務自願披露收購情況。由於Wg和F在與PY的內地訴訟中僅尋求賠償，而未要求撤銷對PY的出售，收購所需的交易鏈的有效性不會受到影響，以至於爭議陳述被認定為虛假。在PY從Wg和F回購AW股份後，他在法律和事實上都是這些股份的所有者，因此在關鍵時間內，股權陳述並不存在虛假。

（圖片來源於網路）

37. The relevant parts of the findings made by Tribunal 1 are set out in the following paragraphs of Award 1:

37. 仲裁庭1在裁決1中的相關發現如下：

“172. On reviewing the evidence, the Tribunal is not persuaded that there was an actionable misrepresentation in this case…

…

“172. 在審查證據後，仲裁庭並未被說服認為本案中存在可訴的虛假陳述…

…

175. As to the dates in dispute, it was mentioned in the footnote of Para.55 in that the 10 September 2015 was stated in the Agreement to be the effective date. But PY said he signed it on 16 September 2015, which is a date after the shares to Wg and F had been brought back. As was mentioned earlier, by then, PY should be considered as legally and factually owning the shares. Hence, PY maintained he did not misrepresent his shareholding.

175. 關於爭議的日期，在第55段的腳註中提到2015年9月10日被註明為協議的生效日期。但PY表示他在2015年9月16日簽署了該協議，而這個日期是在他回購Wg和F的股份之後。如前所述，到那時，PY應被視為在法律和事實上的股份所有者。因此，PY堅持認為他並沒有虛假陳述他的股權。

176. The Tribunal accepts the Claimants’ or PY’s arguments, as his evidence was not contradicted. Furthermore, it is the date of PY putting his signature on the Agreement that matters when it comes to an alleged wrong-doing of misrepresentation or an erroneous warranty.

176. 仲裁庭接受申請人或PY的論點，因為他的證據沒有被駁倒。此外，在涉及虛假陳述或錯誤保證的指控時，PY在協議上簽字的日期才是關鍵。

177. The Tribunal further holds that the buying back of shares from Wg and F must be apparent even before the dates on 11 & 12 September 2015 when the Shares Transfer Agreements were signed, which was a formality. Therefore even if the date of the VIE Termination Agreement of 10 September 2012 should be the date to measure whether PY had misrepresented or erroneously warranted the facts regarding shareholding, the Tribunal is not persuaded that the Respondents have proved that PY was in breach.

…

177. 仲裁庭進一步認為，從Wg和F處回購股份在2015年9月11日和12日簽署股份轉讓協議之前就應是顯而易見的，（簽署協議）是一個形式。因此，即使2012年9月10日的VIE《終止協議》日期應作為判斷PY是否虛假陳述或錯誤保證股權事實的依據，仲裁庭也未被說服認為被申請人們已證明PY違反了義務。

…

180. To conclude, based on what was said earlier regarding the analysis of whether PY has had any wrong-doing, especially after the Share Transfer Agreements were entered into with Wg and F, the Tribunal finds and holds that PY had not been in breach of any duty of disclosure in entering into the VIE Termination Agreement on either 10 or 16 September 2015.

…

180. 總之，根據之前關於PY是否存在任何不當行為的分析，尤其是在與Wg和F簽訂股份轉讓協議後，仲裁庭認為PY在2015年9月10日或16日簽訂VIE《終止協議》時並未違反任何披露義務。

…

185. … The Tribunal therefore accepts that PY had made no fraudulent or intentional misrepresentation or erroneous warranty in these two documents.

186. If the Tribunal has to go further and decide whether or not there was any misrepresentation at all, whether innocent or negligent, the Tribunal would still, on balance, say ‘No’ …”

185. 因此，仲裁庭接受PY在這兩份檔案中未作出任何欺詐或故意的虛假陳述或錯誤保證。

186. If the Tribunal has to go further and decide whether or not there was any misrepresentation at all, whether innocent or negligent, the Tribunal would still, on balance, say ‘No’ …”

186. 如果仲裁庭必須進一步決定是否存在任何虛假陳述，無論是無辜的還是疏忽大意的，仲裁庭仍將傾向於回答‘沒有’…”

38. It has to be highlighted, that both Award 1 and Award 2 were unanimous decisions.

38. 需要強調的是，裁決1和裁決2都是（仲裁庭）一致透過的決定。

39. Tribunal 2 reached different conclusions on various matters in the same sequence of events between the parties.

39. 仲裁庭2在雙方當事人之間相同的事件序列中的多個問題上得出了不同的結論。

40. Tribunal 2 found that the Share Redemption Agreement was rescinded by misrepresentations made by PY via W prior to and/or at the time of the Share Redemption Agreement. In reaching such decision, Tribunal 2 made findings of fact on essential ingredients of the cause of action of misrepresentation which were decided by Tribunal 1 as an essential step in Tribunal 1’s reasoning.

40. 仲裁庭2發現，《股權回購協議》因PY透過W在《股權回購協議》簽署之前和/或簽署時的虛假陳述而被撤銷。在作出這一決定時，仲裁庭2對虛假陳述的訴因的基本要素進行了事實認定，而這些要素為仲裁庭1推理過程中的關鍵步驟。

41. Tribunal 2 found that the Termination Agreement took effect on the date of its signing on 10 September 2015. It rejected PY’s evidence that the Termination Agreement was signed on 16 September 2015. Tribunal 2 found that the Termination Agreement itself contained a Disputes Representation in clause 2 thereof (which included a “guarantee” or warranty that there was no litigation, arbitration, legal, administrative or other procedural or government investigation relating to the Termination Agreement). Tribunal 2 also found that the Shareholding Representation and the Disputes Representation were contained in the Framework Agreement itself. The Shareholding Representation and the Disputes Representation were also found to be contained in the Undertakings signed by PW on 22 October 2015.

41. 仲裁庭2認定，《終止協議》在2015年9月10日簽署之日生效，拒絕了PY關於《終止協議》在2015年9月16日簽署的證據。仲裁庭2發現，《終止協議》本身在第2條中包含了一項爭議陳述（其中包括“保證”或擔保，說明不存在與《終止協議》相關的訴訟、仲裁、法律、行政或其他程式或政府調查）。仲裁庭2還發現，股權陳述和爭議陳述也包含在《框架協議》中，且股權陳述和爭議陳述同樣出現在PW於2015年10月22日簽署的承諾書中。

42. According to Tribunal 2, the relevant shareholding of PY/W in AW and BJ AW was not free from actual or potential dispute. Tribunal 2 found that PY had not informed Wg and F of the Acquisition, nor the termination of the VIE structure, which had impact on their rights. Tribunal 2 concluded that the Disputes Representation was false at the time when the Termination Agreement took effect on 10 September 2015. According to Tribunal 2, the shareholding dispute as between W/PY and Wg over the AW shares constituted serious flaws or error of lack of clarity in the title of the shares under acquisition.

42. 仲裁庭2認為，PY/W在AW和BJ AW的相關股權並未擺脫實際或潛在的爭議。仲裁庭2發現，PY並未告知Wg和F收購事宜，也未告知VIE結構的終止，這對他們的權利產生了影響。仲裁庭2得出結論，爭議陳述在《終止協議》於2015年9月10日生效時是虛假的。根據仲裁庭2的觀點，W/PY與Wg之間關於AW股份的股權爭議構成了收購股份這一主題上的嚴重缺陷或缺乏明確性的錯誤。

43. Tribunal 2 considered that the Shareholding Representation was false at the material time, and at least at the time of the Termination Agreement, by reason of the share transfers to Wg, F and L and the nominee shareholding arrangements. Materially, Tribunal 2 rejected PY’s assertion that it was only in April 2016 that he knew of the dispute over his repurchase of shares from Wg and F.

43. 仲裁庭2認為，股權陳述在關鍵時間，尤其是在《終止協議》簽署時是虛假的，這主要是由於向Wg、F和L的股份轉讓以及代名人持股安排。仲裁庭2實質上拒絕了PY的主張，即他直到2016年4月才知曉他與Wg和F回購股份有關的爭議。

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44. The decision of Tribunal 2, as summarized in Award 2, is set out below:

44. 仲裁庭2在裁決2中總結的決定如下：

“373. Having carefully considered the evidence and the arguments ably advanced by the Parties’ respective Counsel, the Tribunal finds that W/PY had made the Shareholding Representation and the Disputes Representation on multiple occasions prior to and at the time of the Share Redemption Agreement, including in the following documents-

“373. 在仔細考慮證據和雙方律師提出的論點後，仲裁庭發現W/PY在《股權回購協議》簽署之前及其時多次作出了股權陳述和爭議陳述，包括以下檔案中的陳述：

(1) at Clause 4.1.1 and 5.1 of the Share Redemption Agreement,

(1) 《股權回購協議》的第4.1.1和5.1條，

(2) at Clause 2 of the VIE Termination Agreement,

(2) VIE《終止協議》的第2條，

(3) at Clause 4.4 of the RMB 208 million Capital Increase Agreement,

(3) 2.08億人民幣增資協議的第4.4條，

(4) at Clause 8.2 and 8.3 of the 1st SIAACI Agreement,

(4) 第一份SIAACI協議的第8.2和8.3條，

(5) by the AW Undertakings signed by PY, and

(5) PY簽署的AW承諾書，以及

(6) in the Framework Agreement.

(6) 《框架協議》。

374. Given the representations were made consistently, and in the same course of dealings in different steps of an integral transaction towards one investment goal, the Tribunal accepts the Claimant’s counsel’s submissions that they are of a continuing nature and should be read as a whole.

…

374. 鑑於這些陳述是一致的，並且在導向一個投資目標的整體交易中出現在相同的交易過程的不同步驟，仲裁庭接受申請人律師的主張，認為這些陳述具有持續性，應當整體解讀。

…

380. The Tribunal accepts AW Cayman’s submission, that on the basis the VIE Termination Agreement took effect from 10 September 2015, the Respondent cannot honestly suggest that the relevant AW Cayman/AW BJ shareholding was free from dispute or potential dispute. PY did not inform Wg and F of the DGCM Transaction or the termination of the VIE structure, both of which clearly impacted on their rights. The termination would have immediately entitled F to be registered as a shareholder of AW BJ.

…

380. 仲裁庭接受AW Cayman的主張，基於VIE《終止協議》自2015年9月10日起生效，被申請人不能誠實地聲稱相關的AW Cayman/AW BJ股權沒有爭議或潛在爭議。PY未告知Wg和F關於DGCM交易或VIE結構的終止，這兩者明顯影響了他們的權利。《終止協議》將立即使F有權註冊為AW BJ的股東。

…

– The Disputes Representation

…

– 爭議陳述

…

394. The Tribunal finds that the Disputes Representation was false at all material times.

…

394. 仲裁庭發現，爭議陳述在所有關鍵時間內都是虛假的。

…

– The Shareholding Representation

– 股權陳述

399. The Tribunal is satisfied on the evidence put before it that the Shareholding Representation was false at the material times, and at least at the time of the VIE Termination Agreement, by reason of the share transfer to L and the Nominee Shareholding Arrangements.

…

399. 基於提交的證據，仲裁庭認為股權陳述在關鍵時間，至少在VIE《終止協議》簽署時是虛假的，這主要是由於向L的股份轉讓和代名人持股安排。

…

403. The Tribunal finds that the parties had agreed for the VIE Termination Agreement to take effect on the date stated to be the date of execution of the agreement, which is 10 September 2015. The Tribunal does not accept as credible the evidence of PY on the date of signing of the agreement not being 10 September 2015, but 16 September 2015, a date later than the completion of his share repurchases. The assertion has the hallmark of a theory advanced as an afterthought by PY, assisted by Feng Zhaohui, and is unsupported by any contemporaneous documentary evidence. Rather, it contradicts the clearly agreed effective date on the face of the agreement. It also contradicts the Respondent’s own pleaded case, and contemporaneous evidence.

403. 仲裁庭發現，雙方當事人已同意VIE《終止協議》自協議執行日期，即2015年9月10日起生效。仲裁庭不接受PY關於協議簽署日期不是2015年9月10日而是2015年9月16日的證據，該日期晚於他完成股份回購的日期。這一主張顯然是PY在Feng Zhaohui的協助下事後提出的理論，缺乏任何同時期的檔案證據支援。相反，它與協議表面上明確同意的生效日期相矛盾，也與被申請人自己提出的案件和同時期證據相矛盾。

404. The Tribunal is therefore satisfied that the Shareholding Representation was also false at the material times, i.e. at least at the date of the VIE Termination Agreement, in view of the share transfers made to Wg and F.”

404. 因此，仲裁庭認為，股權陳述在關鍵時間也是虛假的，即至少在VIE《終止協議》的日期時，考慮到向Wg和F進行的股份轉讓。”

45. Although the issue for determination by Tribunal 1 was whether misrepresentations had been made prior to and/or at the time of the Framework Agreement (signed on 21 September 2015), and the issue for Tribunal 2 was whether misrepresentations had been made prior to and/or at the time of the Share Redemption Agreement (signed in December 2015), the representations which were found by Tribunal 2 to have been made were found to be contained in the Framework Agreement itself and in the Termination Agreement made in September 2015 (be it 10 or 16 September), which was within the timeframe examined by Tribunal 1, when it considered whether there were misrepresentations made prior to and/or at the time of the Framework Agreement. The Framework Agreement and the Termination Agreement had both been considered by Tribunal 1 when it found that there was no misrepresentation made by PY.

45.仲裁庭1需要確定在《框架協議》（2015年9月21日簽署）之前或之時是否作出了虛假陳述，仲裁庭2需要確定在《股權回購協議》（2015年12月簽署）之前或之時，是否作出了虛假陳述。仲裁庭2認定的陳述已在《框架協議》和2015年9月份（無論是9月10日還是16日）簽訂的《終止協議》中列明，這是在仲裁庭1審查的時限內，當時仲裁庭1正在考慮在《框架協議》之前和/或期間是否存在虛假陳述。仲裁庭1在認定PY沒有作出虛假陳述時，對《框架協議》和《終止協議》都進行了審議。

46. The fact that Tribunal 1 and Tribunal 2 made inconsistent findings, on the same issues of fact and law forming a necessary ingredient in the cause of action of misrepresentation, is in my judgment clear from the Awards.

46. 根據我的判斷，仲裁庭1和仲裁庭2在構成虛假陳述訴因之要件的相同事實和法律問題上作出了不一致的裁決，這一事實在裁決中是顯而易見的。

47. On behalf of AW, it was contended that Tribunal 2 cannot be faulted when W had failed to inform Tribunal 2 that Award 1 had been handed down on 13 March 2020, and that the findings made in Award 1 were relevant to the decision of Tribunal 2 on the claims made and issues raised in Arbitration 2. Closing submissions in Arbitration 1 were made on 7 December 2019. Closing submissions in Arbitration 2 were made on 29 November 2019. Award 1 was handed down on 13 March 2020,and Counsel argued that it was open to W to refer Award 1 to Tribunal 2, before Award 2 was handed down on 13 July 2020.

47. AW方辯稱，W未能通知仲裁庭2裁決1已於2020年3月13日作出，故仲裁庭2沒有過錯。且裁決1與仲裁庭2的裁決中提出的索賠及其提出的問題有關。仲裁庭1的結案陳詞於2019年12月7日提交。仲裁2的結案陳詞於2019年11月29日提交。第一項裁決於2020年3月13日作出，律師辯稱，在2020年7月13日第二項裁決作出之前，W可以將裁決1提交給仲裁庭2。

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48. Counsel for AW argued that arbitration proceedings are adversarial. The tribunal can only decide on the issues raised and pleaded, on submissions made by the parties to the arbitration. Tribunal 2 cannot be expected to deal with the issues decided in Award 1, when issue estoppel was not pleaded, and when the Tribunal was not informed of Award 1 and the potential problems raised. Counsel argued that it would have been wrong for Tribunal 2 to deal with an issue not submitted by the parties to the arbitration. It was also highlighted that W had not at any time applied to Tribunal 2 to stay Arbitration 2 pending the outcome of Arbitration 1.

48. AW方律師辯稱，仲裁程式是對抗性的。仲裁庭只能根據仲裁各方提交的意見，對提出和辯稱的問題作出裁決。當問題不容反悔沒有得到辯護，並且仲裁庭沒有被告知裁決1和提出的潛在問題時，不能指望仲裁庭2處理裁決1中中裁決的問題。律師辯稱，仲裁庭2處理非仲裁各方提交的問題是錯誤的。同時還強調了W在任何時候都沒有向仲裁庭2申請在裁決1的結果出來之前中止仲裁庭2。

49. W argued that it was only after Award 2 was handed down that it was made aware of the findings made by Tribunal 2 and that such findings were inconsistent with those made in Award 1. W cannot dispute that it had not drawn the attention of Tribunal 2 to Award 1. However, throughout the course of the hearing in Arbitration 2, W had advised Tribunal 2 that there were concurrent arbitration proceedings between the parties, and that there was a risk of inconsistent findings being made on the issues. Counsel for W highlighted the distinguishing feature in this case, that Mr Tao on Tribunal 2 was also a member of Tribunal 1, and that Mr Tao was obviously aware of the issues decided in Award 1. Mr Tao must be aware that Award 1 contained findings on the essential ingredients and conditions necessary for the findings on misrepresentations which were made in Award 2. Mr Tao did not issue any dissenting decision in Award 1, nor in Award 2. This meant that Mr Tao himself made inconsistent findings on the same facts which called for decision in the 2 Arbitrations.

49. W辯稱，在裁決2作出後，它才意識到仲裁庭2的裁決與裁決1的裁決不一致。W不能否認它沒有提請仲裁庭2注意裁決1。然而，在仲裁庭2的整個聽證過程中，W告知仲裁庭2，雙方之間存在同時進行的仲裁程式，並且存在對這些問題作出不一致裁決的風險。W律師強調了本案的顯著特徵，即仲裁庭2的Tao先生也是仲裁庭1的成員，Tao先生顯然知道裁決1中裁定的問題。Tao先生必須知道，裁決1包含了對裁決2中虛假陳述調查結果所必需的基本要素和條件的調查結果。Tao先生在裁決1和裁決2中均未作出任何異議決定。這意味著Tao先生本人對同樣的事實作出了不一致的裁決，這需要在兩次仲裁中作出決定。

50. It is of course trite that arbitral awards are final and binding between the parties to the arbitration. In an application to set aside or oppose enforcement of an arbitral award, the Court does not sit on appeal to review the correctness of the award on either facts or law. It may be said that Tribunal 2 was wrong in law to have ignored the principles of issue estoppel, but this is not a ground to set aside Award 2.

50. 仲裁裁決是終局的，對仲裁雙方都有約束力，這當然是老生常談。在撤銷或反對執行仲裁裁決的申請中，法院不會審理上訴，以審查裁決在事實或法律上的正確性。可以說，仲裁庭2無視既判爭點禁止反言原則在法律上是錯誤的，但這不是撤銷裁決2的理由。

51.However, the Court is concerned with the structural integrity of the arbitral process and the arbitral award. If there is conduct which is serious, or egregious, such that due process is undermined (the conduct described in Grand Pacific Holdings Ltd v Pacific China Holdings Ltd (in liq) (No 1) [2012] 4 HKLRD 1 (CA) at paras 94 and 105), the Court may consider whether the award should be enforced, or set aside on the ground of public policy.

51. 然而，法院對仲裁程式和仲裁裁決的結構完整性表示關切。如果存在嚴重或惡劣的行為，以至於損害正當程式（Grand Pacific Holdings Ltd v. Pacific China Holdings Ltd (liq) (No.1) [2012]4 HKLRD 1（CA）第94和105段中描述的行為），那麼法庭有理由以公共政策為由考慮是否應執行某一裁決，或是將該裁決撤銷。

52.In this case, as Counsel for W highlighted, Mr Tao was a member on both Tribunal 1 and Tribunal 2. He did not issue any dissenting decision in either Arbitrations, meaning that he agreed with all the findings made in Award 1 and Award 2, despite their being inconsistent and/or leading to different results. Mr Tao did not explain in Award 2 why the findings on the same facts were different, or why he did not consider W and AW to be bound by the findings made in Award 1. Having submitted its dispute to Tribunal 2 for decision in Arbitration 2, W was entitled to expect Tribunal 2, including Mr Tao, to deal with the question of issue estoppel after Award 1 was handed down, when Mr Tao dealt with the same facts differently in resolving the disputes in Arbitration 2. His failure to deal with and explain the inconsistent findings constitutes injustice and grave unfairness to W (A v B [2015] 3 HKLRD 586).

52. 在本案中，正如W律師所強調的那樣，Tao先生是仲裁庭1和仲裁庭2的成員。他在任何一項仲裁中都沒有發表任何反對意見，這意味著他同意裁決1和裁決2中的所有裁決，儘管它們不一致和/或導致不同的結果。Tao先生在裁決2中沒有解釋為什麼對同一事實的調查結果不同，或者為什麼他不認為W和AW受裁決1中調查結果的約束。W已將其爭議提交仲裁庭2進行裁決，有權要求仲裁庭2（包括Tao先生）在裁決1作出後處理既判爭點禁止反言問題，因為Tao先生在仲裁庭2中以不同的方式處理了相同的事實。他未能處理和解釋不一致的調查結果，對W構成不公正和嚴重不公平（A v B [2015]3 HKLRD 586）。

53.When Mr Tao became aware of the findings made in Award 1, fairness and the justice of the case required him to invite submissions to be made by W and AW in Arbitration 2, as to the effect of Award 1 on the issues to be decided inArbitration 2. By doing so, Tribunal 2 would have the benefit of hearing submissions from the parties, as to whether the parties and Tribunal 2 were bound by the findings made by Tribunal 1, and how and the extent to which they were bound. The parties were entitled to be heard before any inconsistent findings were made against either of them.

53. 當Tao先生意識到裁決1中的調查結果時，案件的公平性和公正性要求他邀請W和AW在仲裁庭2中就裁決1對仲裁庭2中待決問題的影響提出意見。透過這樣做，仲裁庭2將有利於聽取各方的意見，即各方和仲裁庭2是否受到仲裁庭1調查結果的約束，以及他們如何和在多大程度上受到約束。在對任何一方作出任何不一致的裁決之前，雙方都有權發表意見。

54.I accept the submissions made for W, that confidentiality of Arbitration 1 and Award 1 does not prevent Mr Tao from disclosing Award 1 to the other members of Tribunal 2. As the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council explained in AEGIS Ltd v European Reinsurance Co of Zürich [2003] 1 WLR 104 1, the legitimate use of an earlier award in a later arbitration between the same parties would not raise the mischief against which confidentiality rules are directed.

54. 我接受為W提交的意見書，即仲裁1和裁決1的保密性並不妨礙Tao先生向仲裁庭2的其他成員披露裁決1。正如樞密院司法委員會在AEGIS Ltd v European Reinsurance Co of Zürich [2003]1 WLR 104 1一案中所解釋的那樣，在同一當事方之間的後續仲裁中合法使用先前裁決不會引起保密規則所針對的損害。

55. I do not consider that W can be said to be at fault simply by having appointed different arbitrators to the Arbitrations, when it knew that AW had appointed the same arbitrator, namely Mr Tao, for both. It is the right of a party to appoint any arbitrator of its choice. It is entitled to expect that whoever it appoints, the candidate would discharge his/her duty to act fairly and impartially.

55. 我不認為W僅僅因為指定了不同的仲裁員，且知道AW為兩個案件指定了同一名仲裁員，即Tao先生時，就認定其有過錯。一方有權指定其選擇的任何仲裁員，且有權期望，無論任命誰，候選人都會履行其公平公正行事的職責。

（圖片來源於網路）

56.On the facts of this case, I accept that Award 2 is manifestly invalid. It would be contrary to our conceptions of justice to enforce Award 2, and there is substantial injustice arising out of Award 2, by virtue of the findings made in Award 2 which contradicted and were inconsistent with the findings which had already been made by Tribunal 1 on the same issues, and which findings were binding on AW and W, the same parties in the two Awards. This is considered in conjunction with the lack of explanation in Award 2 as to why there were such inconsistent findings, and the failure on the part of Tribunal 2 to give W and AW the opportunity to address Tribunal 2 on Award 1, before Tribunal 2 made its award in Arbitration 2. Material to my decision on the invalidity of Award 2 is the fact that there was a common arbitrator in Tribunal 1 and Tribunal 2.

56. 根據本案的事實，我認為裁決2明顯無效。執行裁決2違背了我們的正義觀念，並且由於裁決2中的裁決與仲裁庭1就同一問題已經作出的裁決相矛盾和不一致，並且這些裁決對兩項裁決中的同一方AW和W具有約束力，因此裁決2產生了實質性的不公正。考慮到這一點，裁決2中沒有解釋為什麼會有如此不一致的裁決，而且在仲裁庭2在裁決2中作出裁決之前，沒有給W和AW機會就裁決1向仲裁庭2陳述。我關於裁決2無效的決定的重要原因是，仲裁庭1和仲裁庭2有一名共同的仲裁員。

57.Setting aside an award is an undesirable decision to make, but as emphasized in Sun Tian Gang v Hong Kong & China Gas (Jilin) Limited [2016] 5 HKLRD 221, fairness and due process underpin the arbitral process and are the prerequisites for the recognition it is afforded by the courts. Absent these underpinning factors, Award 2 cannot be enforced.

57. 撤銷裁決是一個不受歡迎的決定，但正如Sun Tian Gang v Hong Kong & China Gas (Jilin) Limited [2016]5 HKLRD221一案所強調的，公平和正當程式是仲裁程式的基礎，也是法院承認仲裁程式的先決條件。如果沒有這些基礎因素，裁決2就無法執行。

Apparent Bias Ground

基於明顯偏頗

Applicable legal principles 可適用的法律原則

58. Again, the principles are settled and are not disputed. The legal test for apparent bias was explained in Jung Science Information Technology Co, Ltd v ZTE Corporation [2008] 4 HKLRD 776:

58. 同樣，這些原則已被確定，並無爭議。明顯偏頗的法律標準在Jung Science Information Technology Co, Ltd v ZTE Corporation [2008] 4 HKLRD 776一案中得以解釋：

“The same test applies in determining an issue of apparent bias on the part of arbitrators as it does to judges…

“決定法官明顯偏頗的標準對於仲裁員也同樣適用…

The parties agree that the test is whether an objective fair-mind and informed observer, having considered the relevant facts, would conclude that there was a real possibility that the tribunal was biased…

雙方當事人都認為檢驗標準是，一個公平持正以及明智的旁觀者在考慮了相關事實後是否會認為有真實的可能性去認定仲裁庭存在偏頗…

The test is not whether the particular litigant thinks or feels that the judge has been or may have been biased…

檢驗的標準不是特定訴訟當事人是否認為或感覺法官已經或可能存在偏見…

What matters is the viewpoint of the hypothetical objective fair-minded and informed observer. Such an observer was described as follows by Kirby, J in Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488 at pp 508-509, 53, which description was cited as being worth repeating in full by Burrell J in Pacific China Holdings Ltd v Grand Pacific holdings Ltd at p 749, 16:

重要的是假設的客觀、公正和知情的觀察者的觀點。Kirby，J在Johnson v Johnson（2000）201 CLR 488第508-509，53頁中對這種觀察者進行了如下描述，Burrell J在Pacific China Holdings Ltd v Grand Pacific Holdings Ltd第749，16頁中引用了值得完全重複的描述：

The attributes of the fictitious bystander to whom courts defer have therefore been variously stated. Such a person is not a lawyer. Yet neither is he or she a person wholly uninformed and uninstructed about the law in general or the issues to be decided. Being reasonable and fair-minded, the bystander, before making a decision important to the parties and the community, would ordinarily be taken to have sought to be informed on at least the most basic considerations relevant to arriving at a conclusion founded on a fair understanding of all the relevant circumstances. The bystander would be taken also the to know commonplace things, such as the fact that adjudicators sometimes say, or do, things that they might later wish they had not, without necessarily disqualifying themselves from continuing to exercise their powers. The bystander must also now be taken to have, at least in a very general way, some knowledge of the fact that an adjudicator may properly adopt reasonable efforts to confine proceedings within appropriate limits and to ensure that time is not wasted. The fictitious bystander will also be aware of the strong professional pressures on adjudicators (reinforced by the facilities of appeal and review) to uphold traditions of integrity and impartiality. Acting reasonably, the fictitious bystander would not reach a hasty conclusion based on the appearance evoked by an isolated episode of temper or remarks to the parties or their representatives, which was taken out of context. Finally, a reasonable member of the public is neither complacent nor unduly sensitive or suspicious.’

因此，法院所尊重的虛構旁觀者的屬性有不同的說法。這樣的人不是律師。然而，他或她也不是一個完全不瞭解法律或待決問題的人。出於理性和公正的考慮，旁觀者在作出對各方和社群重要的決定之前，通常會被視為至少了解了與在公平理解所有相關情況的基礎上得出結論相關的最基本考慮因素。旁觀者也會被認為知道一些司空見慣的事情，比如裁判有時會說或做一些他們以後可能不希望自己做的事情，而不一定會剝奪他們繼續行使權力的資格。現在，旁觀者也必須至少以一種非常普遍的方式瞭解這樣一個事實，即裁決者可以適當地採取合理的努力，將訴訟限制在適當的範圍內，並確保不浪費時間。虛構的旁觀者也會意識到，裁決者在維護誠信和公正傳統方面承受著巨大的職業壓力（上訴和複審設施加強了這一壓力）。以合理的方式行事，虛構的旁觀者不會根據對各方或其代表的孤立脾氣或言論所引發的表象得出草率的結論，這些言論是斷章取義的。最後，一個理智的公眾既不會自滿，也不會過於敏感或懷疑。”

And what the objective onlooker has to decide, after having been informed of all the relevant circumstances, is not whether it would be better for another adjudicator to hear the matter but whether the adjudicator sitting to hear the matter might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the dispute…”

客觀旁觀者在獲悉所有相關情況後，必須決定的不是由另一名裁決者審理此事是否更好，而是開庭審理此事的裁決者是否可能不會為解決爭議帶來公正和無偏見的心態…”

59. Applying these principles, there is no merit in W’s complaint of apparent bias on the part of the Presiding Arbitrator. That claim appears to be a desperate manoeuvre on W’s part.

59. 根據這些原則，W關於首席仲裁員存在明顯偏頗的申訴沒有任何依據。這一說法似乎是W孤注一擲的策略。

60. It was argued for W that under section 25 of the Arbitration Ordinance, an arbitrator has a continuous duty to disclose “any circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to his impartiality or independence”. It was also argued that the Orange List of the IBA Guidelines requires disclosure of a close personal friendship between an arbitrator and the counsel of a party, and where the arbitrator and counsel for one of the parties currently act or have acted together within the past 3 years as co-counsel. The complaint was that although the Presiding Arbitrator had disclosed her relationship with Mr Kok, and later Mr Wong SC, as being members of her chambers, she failed to disclose the fact that she had acted as co-counsel with Mr Kok in at least 2 cases on 3 occasions within the past 3 years. W further complained that the Presiding Arbitrator had not disclosed the fact that she had a much closer and enduring association with Mr Wong as they had attended many marketing events together from 2016 to 2019, and that Mr Wong had attended a birthday party for the Presiding Arbitrator in 2015.

60. W辯稱，根據《仲裁條例》第25條，仲裁員有持續義務披露“任何可能對其公正性或獨立性產生合理懷疑的情況”。還有人認為，《國際律師協會準則橙色名單》要求披露仲裁員和一方律師之間的親密個人友誼，以及仲裁員和其中一方律師目前或過去3年內作為共同律師共同行事的情況。投訴的內容是，儘管首席仲裁員披露了她與Mr Kok的關係，後來又披露了資深大律師Mr Wong是其辦公室的成員，但她沒有披露在過去3年內，她曾3次在至少2起案件中擔任郭先生的聯合律師。W進一步投訴稱，首席仲裁員沒有透露她與資深大律師Mr Wong有著更密切和持久的聯絡，因為他們在2016年至2019年期間一起參加了許多營銷活動，而Mr Wong在2015年參加了首席仲裁員的生日聚會。

61. The claim of alleged close personal friendship or enduring association is tenuous, to say the least, but even leaving that aside, the reasonable and fair-minded bystander would be taken to know that barristers share chambers and that it is commonplace for professionals to associate, meet and participate jointly at conferences, and even promotional and marketing events, and that this would not influence their professional decision making in a case. There is no cogent and rational link between the association complained of between the Presiding Arbitrator and Counsel for AW, and any possible capacity to influence the impartial decision making process of the Presiding Arbitrator in Arbitration 2. As Counsel for AW pointed out, even on the IBA Guidelines, non-disclosure cannot by itself make an arbitrator partial or lacking in independence.

61. 至少可以認為，所謂的親密個人友誼或持久聯絡的說法是站不住腳的，但即使撇開這一點不談，理性和公正的旁觀者也應當知道大律師是共同租用事務所辦公室，專業人士聯合、會面和共同參加會議，甚至宣傳和營銷活動是司空見慣的，這不會影響他們在案件中的專業決策。首席仲裁員以及AW律師投訴的協會與任何可能影響首席仲裁員在仲裁2中公正決策過程的力量沒有令人信服和合理的聯絡。正如AW律師所指出的那樣，即使在IBA指南中，不披露本身也不能使仲裁員不公正或缺乏獨立性。

62. The fact that there are passages in Award 2 which were taken from the Closing Submissions of Counsel for AW cannot assist the unsubstantiated claim of bias. I reject the suggestion that the objective, fair-minded and informed observer can conclude, on the facts alleged in this case, that there was any “real possibility” that the Presiding Arbitrator was biased.

62. 裁決2中有摘自AW律師結案陳詞的段落，這一事實並不能支援未經證實的偏見主張。我反對這樣的說法，即客觀、公正和知情的觀察員可以根據本案中指控的事實得出結論，首席仲裁員有任何“真正的可能性”存在偏見。

（圖片來源於網路）

Whether enforcement

would be rendered

more difficult?

執行是否會

變得更加困難？

63. The view I have taken on the manifest invalidity of Award 2 makes the second part of the test for security for the award less significant in consideration. If Award 2 is set aside for the reasons set out in this Decision, the ease or difficulty of enforcement of Award 2 and whether enforcement will be rendered more difficult may be academic and based on a wrong premise, of Award 2 being enforceable.

63. 基於我對裁決2的明顯無效性所持的觀點，裁決擔保的標準的第二部分不很重要。如果裁決2因本決定中規定的原因被撤銷，則裁決2的執行難易程度以及執行是否會變得更加困難可能值得學術探討，並且須基於裁決2可執行的錯誤前提。

64. No date has apparently been fixed yet for the hearing of the Originating Summons to set aside Award 2. There are no enforcement proceedings taken elsewhere by AW.

64. 撤銷裁決2的原訴傳票聽證會日期尚未確定。AW在其他地方沒有采取任何執法行動。

65. In any event, W has no assets in Hong Kong and there is no evidence that it ever had assets here. According to PY, and this is not disputed by AW, Hong Kong was chosen as a neutral venue for arbitration, and neither party has assets here. Hence, there is no additional difficulty in enforcement of the award in Hong Kong. Nor is there any solid evidence (apart from the inferences which AW urged the Court to make on the basis of PY’s low commercial morality) that W had moved any assets out of Hong Kong to evade enforcement, or that there is any real risk that W would take steps in any attempt to defeat AW’s enforcement of Award 2 here in Hong Kong.

65. 無論如何，W在香港沒有資產，也沒有證據表明其曾在香港擁有資產。根據PY的說法，AW沒有對此提出異議，香港被選為中立的仲裁地點，雙方都沒有在這裡的資產。因此，在香港執行裁決並無額外困難。也沒有任何確鑿證據（除了AW敦促法院根據PY的低商業道德做出的推論）表明W已將任何資產移出香港以逃避執行，或者W將採取任何措施試圖挫敗AW在香港執行裁決2的任何實際風險。

Justice of the

case for security

提供擔保的

公正性

66. In my judgment, when W has a strong case on the merits to set aside Award 2 which I have held to be manifestly invalid, it would not be just to order security against W, under Order 23 RHC, in the interim of the hearing of the application to set aside the Award. Based on this decision, a different outcome of that hearing to set aside is highly unlikely.

66. 根據我的判斷，當W有充分的理由撤銷我認為明顯無效的裁決2時，在撤銷裁決申請的聆訊期間，根據《高等法院規則》第23號指令而命令W提供擔保是不公正的。根據這一決定，聆訊的不同結果極不可能被擱置。

Further conduct

後續處理

67. Since this Decision on the inconsistent findings in the 2 Awards has been made, primarily from review of the 2 Awards, it may be that no further hearing is required for the Originating Summons. Parties should sensibly confer on whether orders can be made by consent on the Originating Summons and on paragraph 1 of AW’s Summons: for the setting aside of Award 2, and refusing leave to enforce Award 2 as sought by AW.

67. 由於對兩項裁決中不一致的調查結果作出了這一決定，主要是透過審查兩項裁決，因此可能不需要對原訴傳票進行進一步聽證。各方應理智地協商是否可以透過同意對原訴傳票和AW傳票第1段作出命令：撤銷裁決2，並拒絕AW要求的執行裁決2的許可。

Disposition of the Summons

傳票的處理結果

68. The application for security made in paragraph 2 of the Summons is dismissed.

68. 傳票第2段中提出的擔保申請被駁回。

69. The order nisi is that AW is to pay W’s costs on indemnity basis, with certificate for one counsel.

69. 限期內無人提出反對則法庭判決生效令如下，AW應在賠償的基礎上支付W的費用，並附上一名律師的證明。

(Mimmie Chan)

Judge of the Court of First Instance

High Court

Mr Robert Whitehead SC and Mr David Fong, instructed by Gallant, for the applicant

Mr Adrian Lai, instructed by Wilkinson & Grist, for the respondent