譯者｜伍雪暢 杜倫大學LLM.
一審｜俞悠悠 國際關係學院本科生
二審｜左亦惟 康奈爾大學LLM.
編輯｜蘇 桐 華中科技大學本科生
Izzy 美國西北大學LL.M.
責編｜馮雨萱 北京大學J.D.&J.M.
The University of Chicago Law Review Volume 91.4, Number 5 | October 2024
《芝加哥大學法律評論》第91.4卷第5期
The Finality of Reinstated Orders of Removal Under 8 U. S. C. § 1252
《美國法典》第八編第1252條規定的恢復驅逐令的終局性
Jonah Klausner
ABSTRACT
摘要
Federal law authorizes the reinstatement of a prior removal order when a noncitizen “reenter[s] the United States without authorization after having already been removed.” It further provides an “expedited process” for doing so, denying to such noncitizens the right to contest before an immigration judge their removability or inadmissibility. The question whether a noncitizen is removable is thus definitively settled immediately upon reinstatement. But the question to where the noncitizen will be removed is less certain. This is because noncitizens subject to reinstated orders of removal retain the right to pursue “withholding-only” relief, which precludes removal to the noncitizen’s home country when extreme dangers await them there.
聯邦法律授權在非公民“被驅逐後未經許可再次進入美國”時恢復先前的驅逐令。該法還規定了恢復驅逐令的“快速程式”，剝奪了這些非公民在移民法官面前就其可驅逐性或不可入境性提出異議的權利。因此，非公民是否可被驅逐的問題在恢復驅逐令後立即得到了最終確定。然而，非公民將被遣送到哪個國家的問題則不那麼確定。這是因為被恢復驅逐令的非公民仍有權尋求“僅暫緩驅逐”的救濟，當非公民在本國面臨極端危險時，這種救濟可以防止將他們遣送回本國。
This lag—between when removability, on one hand, and the country of removal, on the other, are determined—has exposed an ambiguity in the statute providing for judicial review of a “final order of removal,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252. Specifically, § 1252(b)(1) requires that a noncitizen file a petition for review within thirty days of the final order of removal. But when does a reinstated order of removal become final? Specifically, does finality attach when the prior removal order is reinstated (such that removability is determined) or when the administrative process for adjudicating claims for withholding-only relief has concluded (such that the country of removal is determined)? On this question, the courts of appeals are divided.
可驅逐性與確定驅逐國之間的這種時間差，暴露了《美國法典》第8篇第1252條中關於“最終驅逐令”司法審查的法律模糊性。具體而言，第1252(b)(1)條要求非公民在最終驅逐令下達後30天內提出複審申請。但是，恢復驅逐令何時成為終局驅逐令？具體而言，終局性是在恢復先前的驅逐令（從而確定了可驅逐性）時生效，還是在“僅暫緩驅逐”救濟申請的行政程式結束（從而確定了驅逐國）時生效？在這個問題上，各上訴法院存在分歧。
This Comment contends that the soundest construction of § 1252 deems reinstated orders of removal final when withholding-relief proceedings conclude. Such a construction is consistent with Supreme Court precedent, is more faithful to the statutory text, and better comports with the framework established by § 1252.
本評論認為，對第1252條最合理的解釋是，將恢復的驅逐令視為在暫緩驅逐程式結束時生效。這樣的解釋符合最高法院的判例，更忠實於法律條文，也更符合第1252條建立的框架。
(圖片源自網路）
INTRODUCTION
引言
In 2009, Jonny Vasquez-Rodriguez was allegedly suffering pervasive abuse at the hands of the state while living with his uncle in San Vicente, El Salvador. According to Vasquez-Rodriguez, local police officers began physically abusing him because of an erroneous belief that he was in a gang. His alleged plight worsened when the mayor and his allies in the police department retaliated against Vasquez-Rodriguez after he volunteered for his uncle’s mayoral campaign. This time, they not only beat him but accused him of a marijuana offense; Vasquez-Rodriguez pleaded guilty to secure his release from jail but later insisted the charge was fabricated. Vasquez-Rodriguez maintains that the police continued to attack and harass him after his release. He reported the officers, first to the police department and then to a human rights organization, but to no avail. Because the attacks were unrelenting, Vasquez-Rodriguez escaped to the United States, from which he had already been removed twice.
2009年，Jonny Vasquez-Rodriguez據稱在他與他的叔叔住在薩爾瓦多共和國聖文森特市期間，受到了國家的廣泛虐待。據Vasquez-Rodriguez的說法，當地警察因錯誤地認為他是幫派成員，開始對他進行人身虐待。在Vasquez-Rodriguez自願參加其叔叔的市長競選活動後，市長及其在警察局的盟友對Vasquez-Rodriguez進行了報復，這使得他的處境進一步惡化。這一次，他們不僅毆打了他，還指控他犯有大麻罪；Vasquez-Rodriguez為了從監獄中獲釋，認罪了，但後來堅稱這一指控是捏造的。Vasquez-Rodriguez稱獲釋後警察繼續攻擊和騷擾他。他先是向警察局舉報了這些警察，然後又向一個人權組織舉報，但都無濟於事。由於受到持續的攻擊，Vasquez-Rodriguez逃往美國，而此前他已經兩次被驅逐出美國。
In 2013, Vasquez-Rodriguez was removed to El Salvador for a third time. Because his earlier release from jail on the marijuana charge was conditioned upon his not leaving El Salvador, he was arrested upon his return to the country. The detaining officers then turned Vasquez-Rodriguez over to San Vicente officers, who Vasquez-Rodriguez claimed picked up where they left off by beating and jailing him. One of the officers even raped him. Helpless, Vasquez-Rodriguez fled to the United States yet again after spending a year in hiding in the mountains. In 2018, however, Vasquez-Rodriguez’s prior removal order was reinstated after he pleaded guilty to misdemeanor domestic battery.
2013年，Vasquez-Rodriguez第三次被遣返回薩爾瓦多。由於他之前因大麻指控獲釋的條件是不得離開薩爾瓦多，因此他在返回薩爾瓦多時被捕。拘留他的官員隨後將他交給聖文森特的官員。Vasquez-Rodriguez聲稱，這些官員繼續毆打和監禁了他。其中一名警官甚至強姦了他。無奈之下，Vasquez-Rodriguez在山區躲藏了一年後，再次逃往美國。然而，在2018年，Vasquez-Rodriguez因犯有輕微家庭毆打罪而認罪後，他之前的驅逐令被恢復。
Federal law authorizes the reinstatement of a prior removal order when a noncitizen “reenter[s] the United States without authorization after having already been removed.” It further provides an “expedited process” for doing so, limiting the substantive and procedural rights available to the removable noncitizen. Notwithstanding these limitations, noncitizens subject to reinstated orders of removal may seek either statutory withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) or withholding under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT). Statutory withholding is appropriate when the noncitizen is likely to face, in the proposed country of removal, persecution threatening their “life or freedom . . . because of the alien’s race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”
聯邦法律授權在非公民“被驅逐後未經許可再次進入美國”時恢復先前的驅逐令。該法還規定了恢復驅逐令的“快速程式”，限制了被驅逐的非公民的享有的實質性和程式性權利。儘管有這些限制，被恢復驅逐令的非公民可以根據《美國法典》第8編第1231(b)(3)(A)條尋求法定暫緩驅逐，或根據《禁止酷刑和其他殘忍、不人道或有辱人格的待遇或處罰公約》（Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 簡稱CAT）申請暫緩驅逐。當非公民在擬議的驅逐國可能因其“種族、宗教、國籍、特定社會團體成員身份或政治見解”面臨迫害，威脅到他們的“生命或自由”，那麼法定暫緩驅逐是適當的。
Withholding under the CAT, on the other hand, applies to noncitizens likely to be tortured in that country “by, or at the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of, a public official acting in an official capacity or other person acting in an official capacity.” Withholding relief, however, is “country-specific.” This means that the noncitizen may argue only against being removed to a particular country; when a reinstated order of removal is issued, the antecedent question of whether they are removable is not subject to review.
另一方面，根據CAT，暫緩救濟適用於可能在該國遭受“由公職人員或在公職人員授意、同意或默許下實施”酷刑的非公民。然而，暫緩驅逐救濟是“針對特定國家的”。這意味著非公民只能對被驅逐到某一特定國家提出異議；當恢復遣送令下達時，他們是否可被驅逐的先決問題不在審查範圍內。
(圖片源自網路）
Upon the reinstatement of his prior removal order in 2018, Vasquez-Rodriguez exercised his right to seek withholding, applying for both statutory and CAT relief in an effort to avoid being removed to El Salvador. The immigration judge (IJ) rejected both claims. Vasquez-Rodriguez’s failure to establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution owing to a protected characteristic doomed his statutory withholding claim. His CAT claim fared no better because the IJ found Vasquez-Rodriguez capable of safely relocating within El Salvador due to his abilities to “speak[ ] Spanish fluently” and “find work throughout” the country. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which sits within the Department of Justice (DOJ) and hears appeals from IJ decisions, affirmed the IJ’s denial of relief.
在2018年恢復之前的遣返令後，Vasquez-Rodriguez申請了暫緩驅逐和CAT救濟，以避免被遣返薩爾瓦多。移民法官（Immigration Judge, 簡稱IJ）駁回了這兩項申請。由於Vasquez-Rodriguez未能證實過去曾遭受迫害，或證實有充分理由擔心未來會因某種受保護的特徵而遭受迫害，這注定了法定暫緩驅逐申請的失敗。他的CAT救濟申訴也是如此，因為移民法官認為Vasquez-Rodriguez能夠“流利地講西班牙語”並“在全國各地找到工作”，因此有能力在薩爾瓦多境內安全地重新定居。隸屬於司法部（Department of Justice，簡稱DOJ）的移民上訴委員會（Board of Immigration Appeals，簡稱BIA），審理了對移民法官裁決的上訴，並維持了移民法官拒絕透過救濟申請的決定。
But the adverse IJ and BIA decisions did not seal Vasquez-Rodriguez’s fate. Because 8 U.S.C.§1252 provides for judicial review of a “final order of removal,” including “questions… arising from any” removal proceeding, Vasquez-Rodriguez could appeal his case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. This judicial review proved decisive: the Ninth Circuit vacated the BIA’s decision and remanded for further proceedings. With regard to the CAT claim, it did so because “the Board’s determination that [Vasquez-Rodriguez] is ineligible for such relief is not supported by substantial evidence.”
但是，移民法官和移民上訴委員會的不利裁決並沒有決定Vasquez-Rodriguez的最終命運。由於《美國法典》第8編第1252條規定，“最終驅逐令”和“任何驅逐程式引起的問題”都可以進行司法審查，因此Vasquez-Rodriguez可以向美國第九巡迴上訴法院提出上訴。這一司法審查起到了決定性的作用：第九巡迴法院撤銷了BIA的決定，併發回重審。關於CAT的申訴，第九巡迴法院指出“移民局關於[Vasquez-Rodriguez]沒有資格獲得此類救濟的裁定缺乏實質性證據支援”。
The court explained that the BIA’s proffered rationales for denying relief were either “contradicted” by other BIA determinations or “irrelevant.” The BIA further erred by ignoring significant evidence favoring Vasquez-Rodriguez. As for the IJ, the court found that they erroneously relied on facts that did not bear on the relevant question, which is whether Vasquez-Rodriguez could “safely reside in a place in which he was for years abused by the police.” Moreover, the IJ “identified no evidence” supporting their finding “that Vasquez-Rodriguez could safely relocate” within El Salvador—a finding which “is [ ] impossible to reconcile with Vasquez-Rodriguez’s testimony,” found credible by the BIA.
法院解釋說，BIA提出的拒絕救濟的理由要麼與移民局的其他裁定“相矛盾”，要麼“不相關”。BIA還忽視了有利於Vasquez-Rodriguez的重要證據。至於移民法官，法院認為他錯誤地依賴於與本案無關的事實，真正相關的問題是，Vasquez-Rodriguez是否可以“安全地居住在一個他多年來被警察虐待的地方”。此外，移民法官“沒有找到任何證據”支援他“認為 Vasquez-Rodriguez可以在薩爾瓦多境內安全地重新定居”的結論——這一結論“與BIA認可的Vasquez-Rodriguez的證詞並不相符”。
Judicial review thus saved Vasquez-Rodriguez from potentially life-threatening danger. And every year, thousands of others whose prior removal orders are reinstated may have a similar need for judicial review of their withholding-relief claims. In 2021, for example, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) completed eighty-nine thousand removals of noncitizens. Of these, 35% (thirty-one thousand) were based on the reinstatement of a prior removal order. When zoomed out, the decade from 2012 through 2021 saw 1.2 million noncitizen removals attributable to reinstatement of a prior removal order. Relatively speaking, reinstatements are the second-most common type of removal.
因此，司法審查拯救了面臨潛在生命危險的Vasquez-Rodriguez。而每年，成千上萬的非公民在之前的驅逐令被恢復後，（法院）可能同樣需要對其暫緩驅逐申請進行司法審查。例如，在2021年，國土安全部（Department of Homeland Security，簡稱DHS）完成了8.9萬名非公民的驅逐。其中，35%（3.1萬）是基於恢復之前的驅逐令。如果我們將時間拉長，從2012年到2021年的十年間，有120萬非公民被驅逐是因為恢復了之前的驅逐令。相對而言，恢復驅逐令是第二常見的驅逐型別。
(圖片源自網路）
But recent legal developments threaten the availability of judicial review for noncitizens similarly situated to Vasquez-Rodriguez. A circuit split has emerged regarding when a reinstated order of removal becomes “final” for purposes of § 1252—the statute providing for judicial review of a “final order of removal”—thus beginning a thirty-day window in which noncitizens may petition for federal circuit court review. The precise date of a removal order’s finality may seem trivial, but significant consequences hang on the dispute: a petition for review filed thirty-one days after the removal order becomes final will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. And because the proceedings to adjudicate withholding relief often take more than thirty days, declaring the reinstated removal order final before withholding-relief proceedings take place—as some courts have—effectively forecloses judicial review for substantial numbers of noncitizens. As one court succinctly explained, the “decision regarding when an order of removal becomes final will determine what can be reviewed.
但最近的法律發展威脅到了與 Vasquez-Rodriguez情況類似的非公民獲得司法審查的機會。關於恢復的驅逐令何時成為第1252條（該法規規定對“最終驅逐令 ”進行司法審查）所指的“最終”驅逐令，巡迴法院之間出現了分歧，這一分歧關係到非公民是否可以在驅逐令生效後的30天內向聯邦巡迴法院申請複審。驅逐令最終生效的確切日期看似微不足道，但卻隱藏著重大影響：在驅逐令生效後的第31天提交的複審申請將因缺乏管轄權而被駁回。而且，由於裁定暫緩驅逐救濟的程式往往超過30天，如果像一些法院所做的那樣，在暫緩驅逐救濟程式進行之前宣佈恢復驅逐令為最終命令，就會實質上剝奪大量非公民的司法審查權。正如一家法院簡明地解釋的那樣，“驅逐令何時生效將決定可以審查哪些內容。”
Vasquez-Rodriguez makes clear that such a denial of judicial review could have life-threatening consequences. Indeed, erroneously rejecting a CAT or statutory withholding claim means that the United States will remove a noncitizen to a country where they are likely to be persecuted or tortured. The stakes of this circuit split are further amplified by congressional dysfunction on immigration reform, making exceedingly unlikely a statutory clarification that resolves the dispute.
Vasquez-Rodriguez一案明確指出，剝奪司法審查的做法可能會帶來危及生命的後果。事實上，錯誤地駁回CAT或法定暫緩驅逐的申請意味著美國將把非公民遣返到他們可能遭受迫害或酷刑的國家。鑑於國會在移民改革方面的功能失調，極不可能透過立法來解決這一分歧，這使得巡迴法院在這一問題上的分歧所造成的影響更為嚴重。
On this question of finality, the federal courts of appeals have adopted three approaches. The Sixth Circuit has held that the determination of whether the noncitizen is entitled to withholding of removal is itself a final order of removal subject to judicial review. Somewhat similarly, the Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have held that the reinstated order of removal does not become final until the withholding-of-removal determination has been made. Under these two approaches, the thirtyday clock begins ticking at the same time, but for a different reason—either because the withholding-relief decision is itself a final order of removal (and therefore triggers its own filing window) or because finality does not attach to the earlier-issued order of removal until that decision is rendered.
關於終局性這一問題，聯邦上訴法院採取了三種方法。第六巡迴法院認為，對非公民是否有權享受暫緩驅逐的裁定本身就是一項最終驅逐令，應接受司法審查。同樣，第五、第七、第九和第十巡回法庭也認為，在作出暫緩驅逐的決定之前，恢復的驅逐令並不最終生效。根據這兩種方法，30天的計時開始於同一時間，但原因不同——一個是因為暫緩驅逐的決定本身就是最終的驅逐令（因此觸發了自己的申請視窗），另一個是因為在做出該決定之前，先前簽發的驅逐令並不具有終局性。
This distinction may appear trivial given the two constructions’ identical results, but this Comment will show that recent Supreme Court caselaw has undermined the former’s analytical foundations, leaving it untenable as an interpretation of finality. Finally, the Second and Fourth Circuits have held that reinstated orders of removal are final for purposes of judicial review when they are issued, regardless of any pending withholding-of-removal proceedings. Under this view, the thirty-day clock is likely to expire while those proceedings unfold, meaning that the window to petition for review may close before the withholding decision to be challenged exists.
儘管這兩種解釋的結果完全相同，但本文將展示，最高法院最新判例已經削弱了前一原因的分析基礎，使其作為對終局性的解釋站不住腳。最後，第二和第四巡回法庭認為，恢復的驅逐令在簽發後即最終生效，與任何正在進行的暫緩驅逐程式無關。根據這種觀點，30天的期限很可能會在這些程式進行時到期，這意味著申請複審的視窗可能會在暫緩驅逐決定被質疑之前就關閉。
The remainder of this Comment proceeds as follows. Part I provides the legal background necessary to understand and analyze the question of when a reinstated order of removal becomes final. Part II summarizes the two recent Supreme Court decisions—Nasrallah v. Barr and Johnson v. Guzman Chavez-that sparked the circuit split on finality. The federal circuit courts began diverging on the finality of reinstated orders of removal only after these two cases were handed down.
(圖片源自網路）
本文的其餘部分如下。第一部分提供了理解和分析恢復驅逐令何時成為最終決定這一問題所需的法律背景。第二部分總結了兩個最近的最高法院的判決——Nasrallah訴Barr案和Johnson訴Guzman Chavez案——這兩個判決引發了巡回法庭在終局性問題上的分歧。聯邦巡回法庭關於恢復驅逐令的終局性問題就是在這兩起案件判決後開始出現分歧。
Part III then outlines that circuit split, describing the three camps into which the federal courts of appeals have coalesced. Finally, Part IV argues in favor of the Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits’ conclusion that reinstated orders of removal do not become final until withholding-relief proceedings conclude. It does so first by demonstrating that the Sixth Circuit’s view that withholding-relief determinations are themselves final orders of removal runs counter to the Supreme Court’s holding in Nasrallah. Part IV then rejects the Second and Fourth Circuits’ view that finality attaches immediately upon reinstatement with original statutory analysis.
第三部分概述了巡迴法院的分歧，描述了聯邦上訴法院所形成的三大陣營。最後，第四部分支援第五、第七、第九和第十巡回法庭的結論，即在暫緩驅逐救濟程式結束之前，恢復的驅逐令不具有最終效力。該部分首先論證了第六巡回法庭“認為暫緩驅逐的裁定本身就是最終驅逐令”的觀點違背了與最高法院在Nasrallah案中的判決。然後，第四部分透過對原始法規的分析，駁斥了第二和第四巡回法庭關於恢復的驅逐令在重新發布後立即具有終局性的觀點。
Because most of the courts to hold that reinstated orders of removal become final upon the conclusion of withholding-relief proceedings have defended their conclusion by relying on constitutional concerns, presumptions favoring judicial review, and ordinary meaning, they left open a gap this Comment seeks to fill by engaging in thorough statutory interpretation to arrive at the same conclusion. This interpretation begins by explaining, as some courts have, that the statutory definition of finality—on which the Second and Fourth Circuits rely to hold that finality is immediate—cannot be applied to reinstated orders of removal. It then engages in an ordinary meaning analysis that, unlike those of the courts, explicitly considers questions of statutory audience.
由於大多數認為恢復驅逐令在暫緩驅逐救濟程式結束後即成為終局驅逐令的法庭都是依賴於憲法規定、支援司法審查的推定和普通含義來為其結論辯護的，因此本文試圖透過全面的解釋來填補這種解釋留下的空白，從而得出相同的結論。本文首先說明，正如一些法院所為，第二和第四巡回法庭所依賴的最終性的法定定義無法適用於恢復的驅逐令。然後，它進行了普通含義的分析，明確考慮了法規受眾的問題，而不像法院的分析那樣籠統。
(圖片源自網路）
The Comment next takes a close look at §1252, thoroughly analyzing its text and structure to determine whether immediate finality, or finality only after withholding-relief proceedings, is the sounder construction. Ultimately, this examination favors the latter approach, which more seamlessly and sensibly comports with §1252’s framework for judicial review of removal orders. In stark contrast, the immediate-finality approach throws a wrench into this scheme, severely curtailing judicial review in an arbitrary set of cases and in a manner incompatible with the broader statute.
接下來，本文審視了第1252條，對其文字和結構進行了深入分析，以確定是即時生效的最終性還是在暫緩驅逐救濟程式結束後才生效的最終性更為合理。最終，我們傾向於後一種解釋，因為它更符合第1252條關於驅逐令司法審查的框架。對比之下，即時生效的解釋在這一機制中製造了混亂，隨意地縮小了某些案件的司法審查範圍，並與該法規的整體精神不相符。
CONCLUSION
結論
What seems a simple question—when a reinstated order of removal becomes final for purposes of judicial review—turns out to be far from it. Lest the technical nature of this Comment’s arguments distract from this dispute’s grave stakes, recall the potentially life-threatening dangers that Jonny Vasquez-Rodriguez and similarly situated noncitizens hope to avoid. When the BIA makes an erroneous withholding-relief decision, it orders a noncitizen removed to a country where they are likely to be tortured or persecuted. Judicial review can correct such grave errors, and the best reading of §1252 ensures the availability of such review by tying the finality of reinstated orders of removal to the conclusion of withholding-relief proceedings. Such a construction is consistent with Supreme Court precedent, more faithful to the statutory text, and better comports with the framework established by §1252.
一個看似簡單的問題——就司法審查而言，恢復的驅逐令何時成為最終命令——實際卻遠非如此。為避免本文的技術性論點分散注意力，請回顧一下Jonny Vasquez-Rodriguez和類似處境的非公民希望避免的潛在的生命危險。當BIA做出錯誤的暫緩驅逐救濟決定時，它就會命令將非公民遣送到他們可能遭受酷刑或迫害的國家。司法審查可以糾正這種嚴重錯誤，而對第1252條的最佳解讀是，將恢復的驅逐令的終局性與暫緩驅逐救濟程式的結束掛鉤，從而確保這種審查的可行性。這樣的解釋符合最高法院的判例，更忠實於法律條文，也更符合第1252條建立的框架。
(圖片源自網路）
It is consistent with Supreme Court precedent because Nasrallah and Guzman Chavez—while making clear that a withholding-relief decision is not itself an “order of removal”—do not settle the point at which the reinstated order of removal becomes final for purposes of judicial review. It is more faithful to the statutory text because it declines to rewrite the statutory definition of finality, opting for ordinary meaning instead of forcing an inapplicable definition to apply. And it better comports with §1252’s framework for judicial review because, in stark contrast to deeming reinstated removal orders immediately final, it meshes with the statute’s context and structure.
它符合最高法院的先例，因為Nasrallah案和Guzman Chavez案雖然明確指出暫緩驅逐的決定本身並不是“驅逐令”，但並沒有解決恢復的驅逐令何時發生最終效力以進行司法審查的問題。它更忠實於法律條文，因為它拒絕改寫終局性的法律定義，選擇了普通含義，而不是強制適用一個不適用的定義。而且，它更符合第1252條的司法審查框架，因為它與將恢復的驅逐令立即成為終局驅逐令的做法截然不同，它與法律的背景和結構更為契合。
原文連結：
https://lawreview.uchicago.edu/print-archive/finality-reinstated-orders-removal-under-8-usc-ss-1252