翻譯｜張   揚 中國政法大學碩士

一審｜王槐語 加州大學伯克利分校LLM

二審｜曾梓栩 萊頓大學LLM

編輯｜林   薇 西南政法大學本科

馮雨萱 北京大學J.D.&J.M.

There are two conventional methods for resolving separation of powers disputes: formalism and functionalism. Although both approaches have been around for decades, neither has proven capable of resolving the difficult separation of powers disputes that actually arise today. Such disputes—including over statutory removal restrictions, recognition, conduct of diplomacy, and executive privilege—do not involve instances where one branch is trying to exercise the other’s exclusive power, as formalism posits. Nor is it clear how one could measure, or evaluate the effect of any one dispute on, the general balance of powers between the branches that functionalism seeks to maintain. Instead, difficult separation of powers questions involve separation of powers infringements—instances where both branches have power to act, but one branch’s exercise of power infringes on or interferes with the other’s exercise of power.

This Article proposes a method built to resolve precisely such cases: interest balancing. Accepting that both branches might have power to act over a matter, interest balancing asks whether one branch’s exercise of power has infringed upon the other’s and, if so, whether such infringement is justified by a sufficiently strong interest. This mode of analysis might sound familiar, as it is the standard method of addressing infringement on constitutional entitlements in the other half of constitutional law—individual rights. When someone alleges an individual rights violation, we do not ask whether the government or individual has “exclusive power” over the matter, nor do we resolve the dispute by asking how it might affect the “general balance of power” between the individual and the government. Instead, we ask whether a right has been infringed and, if so, whether such infringement can be justified by a sufficiently strong governmental interest.

本文提出了一種專門用於解決此類案件的方法：利益衡量法。利益衡量法承認兩個分支可能都有權力就某一事項採取行動，其探究的是一個分支的權力行使是否對另一個分支的權力行使造成侵犯；如果回答是肯定的，便進而探究這種侵犯背後是否有足夠強大的利益作為正當化依據。這種分析方法聽起來可能很熟悉，因為它正是處理憲法另一半內容——即“個人權利”中權利侵犯的標準方法。當有人指控其個人權利遭到侵犯時，我們既不會看政府或個人是否對此事項擁有“專屬權力”，也不會透過探究這一糾紛如何影響個人和政府之間的“總體權力平衡”來尋求解決方案。相反，我們只會判斷一項權利是否的確受到了侵犯，如果是，那麼這種侵犯背後又是否有足夠的政府利益作為正當化依據。

Despite the long history of interest balancing in individual rights cases, scholars have failed to appreciate its utility in resolving separation of powers disputes. Yet, there is precedent for its use in the separation of powers. It was introduced in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, continues to be the standard method of resolving executive privilege disputes, and has been used, albeit never routinely, by executive branch actors and courts of appeals in various other domains. Notwithstanding this precedent, neither courts, nor scholars, have recognized interest balancing’s potential as a general framework for resolving separation of powers disputes. This Article identifies interest balancing as a coherent method of separation of powers analysis that is both conceptually and practically well suited to address the separation of powers disputes that actually arise today. It explains how interest balancing is distinct from the prevailing approaches—including formalism, functionalism, Justice Robert Jackson’s Category Three analysis in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, and recent proposals for categorical deference to statutes——and then evaluates its strengths and weaknesses relative to such approaches. Ultimately, it concludes that interest balancing is the approach best suited to resolve the difficult cases that actually arise—those of separation of powers infringements. The Article then theoretically develops how interest balancing can be operationalized and improved going forward.

儘管個人權利案件中利益衡量法的使用歷史悠久，但學者們未能認識到其在解決權力分置糾紛中的效用。利益衡量法在權力分置案件中並非沒有先例。利益衡量法在Nixon v. Administrator of General Services案中被引入，在此後成為了解決行政特權糾紛的標準方法，並且在其他不同領域中被行政分支和上訴法院使用（儘管從未成為常規方法）。儘管有這一先例，但無論法院還是學者都沒有認識到利益衡量法具有成為解決權力分置糾紛之一般框架的潛力。本文將利益衡量法認定為一種連貫的權力分置分析方法，它無論在概念上還是實踐上都非常適合解決當今出現的權力分置糾紛。本文闡釋了利益衡量法與當下主流方法（包括形式主義方法、功能主義方法、羅伯特·傑克遜大法官在Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer案中提出的行政權力“三分法”中的第三類，以及近期被提出的“法規絕對遵從說”）的區別，隨後評估了其相對於這些方法的優勢和劣勢。最後，本文得出結論：利益衡量法是最適合於解決實踐中棘手的權力分置侵權案件的方法。文章隨後從理論上闡述了未來應如何改進利益衡量法並將其付諸實施。

（圖片來源於網路）

The political branches fight. All the time. Even every day. Yet, despite an enormous amount of scholarly effort spent figuring out who should prevail in such disputes, we still lack a useful framework to resolve them. This is because the prevailing methods to resolve separation of powers disputes are ill-suited to resolve the typical disputes that actually arise today. Such disputes do not involve instances where one branch is trying to exercise—or fully deny the exercise of—the other branch’s exclusive power, as the prevailing doctrine in the Supreme Court would have it. Rather, most separation of powers disputes involve instances where both branches have constitutional power to act but one branch’s exercise of power infringes on or interferes with the other branch’s exercise of power. Take a few examples:

政治部門之間每天都在相互爭鬥。然而，儘管學者們付出了巨大的努力並試圖弄清楚究竟誰應該在這種糾紛中佔據上風，我們仍然缺乏一個實用的框架來解決這些糾紛。這是由於用以解決權力分置糾紛的主流方法實際上並不適合於當下的典型糾紛情形。這種型別的糾紛並不像最高法院的主流標準所認為的那樣，涉及一個分支試圖行使或完全否認另一個分支的專屬權力的情況。恰恰相反，在大多數權力分置糾紛中，所涉及的兩個分支都擁有憲法權力，只是其中一個分支的權力行使侵犯或干擾到了另一個分支的權力行使。舉例而言：

1. Statutory Removal Restrictions: Statutory for-cause removal restrictions on executive branch officers are typically conceived of as congressional intrusions on the President’s exclusive power to control the executive branch. But Congress has constitutional power to structure offices through its authority to create offices “by Law” and pass laws “necessary and proper” to effectuate the exercise of such power. Thus, disputes over for-cause removal restrictions can be conceived of as instances where Congress’s exclusive power to structure offices interferes with or infringes on the President’s exclusive power to control the executive branch. Conversely, the President’s attempt to ignore such statutory requirements can be conceived of as the President infringing upon Congress’s exclusive power to create and structure offices. The question is, therefore, not who has exclusive power, but who should prevail when one branch’s exercise of power interferes with the other’s.

1. 法定免職限制：對行政分支官員的法定有因免職限制通常被認為是國會對總統控制行政分支的專屬權力的侵犯。但國會的確擁有“依法”設立公職並藉助透過“必要和適當”的法律來實施此類權力的憲法授權。因此，有關有因免職限制的糾紛可以被視為國會“設立公職”之專屬權力干擾或侵犯總統“控制行政分支”之專屬權力的例子。相反，總統若試圖無視此類法定要求，則可以被視為總統侵犯了國會“設立和構建公職”的專屬權力。因此，問題並不在於誰擁有專屬權力，而在於當一個分支的權力行使干擾另一個分支的權力行使時，哪個分支的權力應當優先。

2. Conduct of Diplomacy: Presidents frequently object to congressional statutes that regulate their ability to engage in diplomacy, arguing that such legislation violates their exclusive power to conduct diplomacy. But in passing statutes that affect diplomacy, Congress often has its own exclusive power to, for example, regulate foreign commerce, approve treaties, appropriate funds, or “define and punish . . . Offences against the Law of Nations.” Again, the question is not which branch has exclusive power over the matter, but who should prevail when both branches have power to act but one branch’s exercise of power interferes with the other’s.

2. 外交行為：總統經常反對國會透過的規範其外交能力的法規，認為此類立法侵犯了其開展外交的專屬權力。但在透過影響外交的法規時，國會通常擁有其自身的專屬權力，例如，規範對外貿易、批准條約、撥款或“定義和懲罰……違反國際法的行為”。同樣，問題並不在於哪個分支擁有專屬權力，而在於當兩個分支都有權力採取行動，但一個分支的權力行使會干擾到另一個分支的權力行使時，哪個分支的權力應當優先。

3. Recognition: In Zivotofsky v. Kerry, the Supreme Court held that Congress’s attempt to require that the place of birth on U.S. passports designate Jerusalem as part of Israel violated the President’s exclusive power to recognize the territorial boundaries of foreign states. But as the majority acknowledged, Congress was exercising its own constitutional authority to regulate passports. The question, again, was which branch should prevail when both branches had power to act, but one branch’s exercise of power interfered with the other’s.

3. 承認：在Zivotofsky v. Kerry案中，最高法院認為，國會對在美國護照上的“出生地”一項中將耶路撒冷標為以色列的一部分的要求侵犯了總統承認外國領土邊界的專屬權力。但正如多數意見中承認的那樣，國會其實是在行使自身管理護照的憲法權力。問題仍然是，當兩個分支都有權力採取行動，但一個分支的權力行使會干擾到另一個分支的權力行使時，哪個分支的權力應當優先。

4. Executive Privilege: Congress and the White House frequently fight over whether the President must reveal executive branch information to Congress. Like the examples above, both branches have power to act in such disputes: the President has power to control executive branch information, and Congress has power to gather information in service of its legislative functions. Which branch should prevail when one branch’s exercise of power infringes on the other’s?

4. 行政特權：國會和白宮經常就總統是否必須向國會披露行政分支的資訊發生爭議。與上述例子一樣，兩個分支在此類糾紛中都有采取行動的權力：總統有權力掌控行政分支的資訊，而國會有權力收集該資訊以履行其立法職能。當一個分支的權力行使侵犯另一個分支權力的行使時，哪個分支的權力應當優先？

We might think of these examples—instances where both branches have power to act, but one branch’s exercise of power interferes with the other’s—as cases of separation of powers infringements. Even though these comprise most of the difficult separation of powers cases that actually arise, the prevailing modes of resolving separation of powers disputes fail to provide a coherent or satisfying method to resolve them, i.e., to answer how much infringement is permissible and how much is not.

（圖片來源於網路）

Formalism—the dominant mode of resolving separation of powers disputes on the current Supreme Court—seeks to resolve separation of powers disputes by asking which branch has exclusive power over the matter at issue. Whichever branch has such exclusive power then prevails. Formalism thus might prove useful if Congress tried to pardon an individual, or if the President sought to impeach a member of Congress. But, essentially no difficult cases involve such instances of one branch trying to exercise the other’s exclusive power. Instead, the difficult cases involve instances where both branches have power to act and come into conflict. On this question, formalism has no useful guidance.

形式主義方法——目前最高法院解決權力分置糾紛的主要方法——試圖透過探究哪個分支對所涉事項擁有專屬權力來解決權力分置糾紛。擁有這種專屬權力的分支將獲得優先地位。因此，在國會試圖赦免某人，或者總統試圖彈劾國會議員的情況下，形式主義方法可能會很有用。但是，幾乎沒有任何一個棘手案件會涉及到一個分支試圖行使另一個分支獨有之專屬權力的情況。相反，這種案件往往涉及兩個分支都有權力採取行動併發生衝突的情況。在這個問題上，形式主義方法未能提供任何有用的指引。

The typical way formalists treat cases of infringement is to claim that any infringement on an exclusive power is unconstitutional. But this cannot be the case. The Constitution clearly contemplates that the branches will interfere with each other’s exercises of power, and they do so in uncontroversial ways all the time.

For example, even if we accept the formalist claim that the President has exclusive control over the executive branch’s exercise of executive power, Congress has the power to structure the executive branch in ways that obviously interfere with or infringe upon the President’s exclusive control. For example, Congress creates the officer positions and departments that the President must rely on to execute the law, and the Senate must approve the principal officers that populate the executive branch. In exercising these powers, Congress inevitably affects the President’s control. Indeed, regardless of whether officers have statutory for-cause removal protection, the President cannot fully control executive branch officials’ exercises of power for the simple reason that no one can fully control another person’s actions.

例如，即使我們接受主張形式主義者提出的總統對行政分支的權力行使擁有專屬控制權的說法，國會也有權以明顯干涉或侵犯總統專屬控制權的方式構建行政分支。又例如，國會有權力設立總統行政時必須依賴的公職和部門，而組成行政分支的主要官員必須得到參議院的批准。在行使這些權力時，國會不可避免地會影響總統的控制權。事實上，無論官員是否享有法定有因免職保護，總統都無法完全控制行政分支官員的權力行使，原因很簡單，那就是沒有人可以完全控制他人的行為。

In short, when Congress constructs the offices and departments that make up the executive branch and decides who will populate them—as the Constitution clearly contemplates and permits—it inevitably interferes with the President’s “full control” of the executive power.

簡而言之，當國會設立組成行政分支的公職和部門並決定誰將勝任這些職位時——正如憲法明確預設和允許的那樣——它將不可避免地干擾到總統對行政權力的“全面控制”。

This is true in other domains as well. Even if we assume that the President has exclusive control over the conduct of diplomacy, it cannot be true that Congress cannot interfere with or infringe upon exercises of such authority. Congress can decline to confirm ambassadors, withhold funding for diplomatic posts, impose embargoes on foreign states, and, of course, declare war, even though all of these powers can quite obviously interfere with the President’s preferred diplomatic conduct. As a recent example, President Joe Biden cut short a diplomatic trip abroad to return to Washington, D.C., to negotiate a deal with congressional leaders to raise the debt ceiling. This “interfered” with the President’s conduct of diplomacy, but no one thinks that Congress had to pass a statute increasing the debt ceiling to avoid affecting the President’s diplomatic efforts.

在其他領域也是如此。即使我們假設總統對外交行為擁有絕對的控制權，國會也並非不能干涉或侵犯這種權力的行使。國會可以拒絕任命大使、停止為外交職位提供資金、對外國實施禁運，當然還可以宣戰；儘管所有這些權力顯然都會干涉到總統所希望進行的外交行為。最近的一個例子是，拜登總統為返回華盛頓特區與國會領導人談判有關提高債務上限的協議，被迫縮短了外交行程。這的確“干擾”了總統的外交行為，但沒有人認為國會因此必須透過提高債務上限的法規，以避免影響總統的外交工作。

In short, it is inevitable—and the Constitution clearly permits—that the political branches will use their own powers in ways that will interfere with each other’s exercises of power. It thus cannot be true that any infringement is unconstitutional. The question is how much infringement or interference is permissible. But, on this question, formalism has nothing to offer.

簡而言之，各政治部門不可避免地會以干擾彼此權力行使的方式使用自己的權力，而憲法也明確允許這種情況發生。因此，並不能認定任何侵權行為都是違憲的。問題在於多大程度的侵權或干涉是被允許的。但形式主義方法無法回答這一問題。

Formalism’s main competitor, functionalism, does no better. Although it can conceive of the branches having overlapping powers, functionalism’s mode of resolving disputes is to categorically protect each branch’s core power, and, outside of core exercises of power, to try to resolve disputes by asking which branch should prevail to maintain a general balance of powers between the branches. But, as many scholars have noted, there is no clear way to differentiate core from peripheral powers, nor any answer for what to do when two core powers come into conflict.

形式主義方法的主要對手——功能主義方法也並沒有表現得更好。儘管功能主義方法可以接受各分支間存在的權力重疊，但其解決糾紛的方式是對各分支的核心權力提供絕對保護，而在核心權力範圍之外，則試圖透過探究哪個分支獲得優先地位後有利於維持各分支之間的總體權力平衡來解決糾紛。但正如許多學者指出的那樣，其並沒有提出明確區分核心權力和邊緣權力的方法，也沒有回答核心權力之間發生衝突時的處理方式。

Moreover, the method of resolving disputes by determining their effect on the general balance of powers is inoperable. We have no means to tally up the total powers of each branch, figure out the existing balance of powers between them, or identify the effect of any one dispute on such balance. And even if these things could be calculated, there is no standard or baseline “balance of power” to compare to. This might explain why even some opinions typically deemed to be functionalist do not engage in this inquiry. But they too fail to provide any clear method to determine how much infringement is permissible and how much is not. Like formalism, functionalism thus has little to offer in resolving the key question of how much infringement is permitted and how much is not in any given dispute.

此外，透過確定糾紛對總體權力平衡的影響來解決糾紛的方法是行不通的。我們既沒有辦法統計每個分支的權力總和，找出它們之間現有的權力平衡狀態，也無法確定某場糾紛對這種平衡的影響。即便可以計算，也沒有某種標準或最低限度的“權力平衡”狀態可供比較。這或許可以解釋為什麼一些通常被認為是功能主義的觀點也沒有參與到這一話題中。但這些觀點同樣也沒有提供任何明確的方法來確定究竟允許多大程度的侵權。。因此，與形式主義方法一樣，功能主義方法在解決特定糾紛中允許多大程度的侵權這一關鍵問題上幾乎沒有什麼助益。

Other modes of resolving separation of powers disputes fare no better. Perhaps the most famous separation of powers opinion there is, Justice Robert Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, fails to offer any coherent guidance for questions of infringement. Although Justice Jackson’s opinion is typically touted as a paradigm of pragmatic reasoning, it is actually quite formalist in Category Three—the only category where the branches come into conflict. In Category Three, Justice Jackson stated that the President can only prevail in a dispute with Congress if the President’s power is “exclusive,” “conclusive,” and “preclusive” over the matter, which “disabl[es] the Congress from acting upon the subject.” But, as noted above, such formalist methods of resolving disputes by determining who has exclusive power fail to provide a method to resolve disputes where both branches have power to act, but come into conflict.

解決權力分置糾紛的其他方法也同樣表現不佳。有關權力分置的也許最為著名的觀點——羅伯特·傑克遜大法官在Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer案中持有的協同意見——也未能為侵權問題提供任何清晰的指引。儘管傑克遜大法官的意見通常被讚美為實用主義推理的典範，但該行政權力“三分法”中的第三類實際上相當形式主義——這是唯一一個存在分支間衝突的類別。在第三類中，傑克遜大法官指出，只有當總統對某事項擁有“排他性”、“決定性”和“排除性”的權力，從而“使國會無法就該事項採取行動”時，總統才能在與國會的糾紛中取得優先地位。但是，如上所述，這種透過確定誰擁有排他性權力來解決糾紛的形式主義方法無法為兩個分支都有權力採取行動但又發生衝突的糾紛提供解決方案。

Justice Jackson’s framework could be read to imply that Congress should prevail in infringement cases where both branches have power, but Justice Jackson equivocated on this in his opinion, suggesting that Congress’s power to regulate the “land and naval Forces” can “impinge” upon the President’s exclusive commander-in-chief power only “to some unknown extent.” Justice Jackson, however, failed to provide any guidance for determining the “extent” to which such “impingement” is permissible. But this is the core question at the heart of separation of powers infringements.

傑克遜大法官的框架可以被解讀為：在兩個分支同時擁有權力的侵權案件中，國會始終應該優先，但傑克遜大法官在他的意見中對此含糊其辭，暗示國會規範“陸軍和海軍”的權力只能在“某種未知的程度上”“侵犯”總統作為總司令的專屬權力。但是，傑克遜大法官未能就確定這種“侵犯”被允許的“程度”提供任何指引，而這恰是權力分置侵權的核心問題。

Justice Jackson’s framework is thus not conceptually set up to resolve most difficult separation of powers cases. It is also problematic in practice. Because the President can only prevail under Justice Jackson’s framework if their power is exclusive and of sufficiently wide scope to encompass the dispute at issue, this provides an obvious incentive to executive branch advisers—and sympathetic courts—to find that the relevant powers are exclusive and of sufficiently expansive scope to cover the dispute at issue. This is precisely what has happened—the President continues to find “exclusive” powers and their scope continues to grow.

因此，傑克遜大法官的框架原則上並不是為解決棘手的權力分置案件而創設的。它在實踐中也存在著問題。由於總統只有在其權力具有排他性且範圍足夠廣泛，足以完整涵蓋所涉糾紛的情況下才能在傑克遜大法官的框架下取得優先地位，這顯然為行政分支的顧問——以及持支援態度的法院——提供了一個動機，使之傾向於認定相關權力具有排他性且範圍足夠廣泛以涵蓋所涉糾紛。這正是現實中發生的事情——總統正不斷尋求“專屬”權力，而且這些權力的範圍還在不斷擴大。

Meanwhile, in a recent influential article, Professors Nikolas Bowie and Daphna Renan have called for resolving separation of powers disputes by requiring courts to declare that any separation of powers arrangement that is in a statute is constitutional. This form of categorical deference to statutes would provide an effective way to limit judicial supremacy over separation of powers disputes, which is Bowie and Renan’s main target. But, while their proposal is justified as a method of deferring to the political branches’ views about the constitutionality of the relevant statutory arrangement, they do not specify what method the political branches themselves ought to use to make such judgments. If we are to defer to the branches’ constitutional judgments, the branches need some means to make such decisions. Without such a method, constitutionality would be determined purely by politics or power, rather than law. Yet, we still have no method for the branches to use to resolve the difficult cases of infringement that typically arise.

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與此同時，在最近一篇頗具影響力的文章中，尼古拉斯·鮑伊和達芙娜·雷南兩位教授呼籲法院將法規中任何有關權力分置的安排均宣佈為合憲，以解決權力分置糾紛。這種“法規絕對遵從說”將提供一種有效的方式來限制司法權在解決權力分置糾紛中的主導地位，而這正是鮑伊和雷南的主要目標。然而，雖然他們建議的方法之正當性在於遵循了政治部門對相關立法安排的合憲性判斷，但他們並沒有具體說明政治部門自身應該使用什麼方法來做出這樣的判斷。如果我們要遵從這些分支的合憲性判斷，那麼這些分支就必然需要一些方法來做出這樣的決定。如果沒有這樣的方法，合憲性就將完全由政治或權力、而不是法律決定。到目前為止，我們仍然沒有方法能夠讓各分支解決通常出現的棘手侵權案件。

This Article proposes a new method built for the difficult separation of powers cases that actually arise: separation of powers interest balancing. Interest balancing can accommodate disputes in which both branches have power to act over a certain matter and one branch’s exercise of power interferes with or infringes upon the other’s. It resolves such disputes by asking (1) whether one branch’s exercise of power has infringed on the other’s, and (2) whether that intrusion can be justified by a sufficiently strong interest in service of that branch’s exercise of power.

本文提出了一種用於解決棘手的權力分置案件的新方法：權力分置利益衡量法。利益衡量法可以解決兩個分支都有權力就某一事項採取行動，而一個分支的權力行使會干擾或侵犯到另一個分支的權力行使的糾紛。它透過探究：（1）一個分支行使權力是否侵犯了另一個分支的權力，以及（2）這種侵犯背後是否有足夠強大的利益來為該分支行使權力提供正當化依據。

This method might sound familiar, as it is the standard method of resolving cases of infringement on constitutional entitlements in the other half of constitutional law: individual rights. When the government is alleged to have infringed on an individual’s constitutional rights, we do not ask who has exclusive power over the matter, nor do we try to identify the general balance of power between the individual and government. Instead, individual rights jurisprudence consists of various tests to determine whether (1) there has been an intrusion on a right, and (2) if so, whether that intrusion can be justified by a sufficiently strong governmental interest. To be sure, there are exceptions to this mode of reasoning in the rights domain, and interest balancing continues to be the subject of critique and theoretical development where it does apply. But it remains the conventional method to resolve the question of how much infringement on constitutional rights is and is not permissible.

這種分析方式聽起來可能很熟悉，因為它是處理憲法另一半內容——即“個人權利”中權利侵犯的標準方法。當政府被指控侵犯個人的憲法權利時，我們不會問究竟誰對此事項擁有專屬權力，也不會試圖確定個人和政府之間的總體權力平衡狀態。相反，個人權利法學包括各種測試，以確定（1）權利是否的確受到侵犯，以及（2）如果是，這種侵犯背後是否有足夠強大的政府利益提供正當化依據。誠然，這種推理方法在權利領域存在例外，且其適用也有待批評和進一步發展。但它仍然是解決憲法權利究竟在多大程度上可被侵犯問題的一般方法。

Despite its longstanding use in the rights domain, scholars have largely failed to appreciate interest balancing’s utility for the separation of powers. Yet, there is precedent for its use in this context. It was introduced in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, continues to be the standard method of resolving executive privilege disputes, and has been used, albeit never routinely, by executive branch actors and courts of appeals in various other domains. Notwithstanding this history, neither courts nor scholars have seemed to recognize interest balancing’s potential as a general method of resolving separation of powers disputes.

儘管它在權利領域被長期使用，但學者們大多未能認識到利益衡量法在解決權力分置糾紛中的效用。然而，利益衡量法在這一背景下並非沒有先例。該方法在Nixon v. Administrator of General Services案中被引入，在此後成為了解決行政特權糾紛的標準方法，並且在其他不同領域中被行政分支和上訴法院使用（儘管從未成為常規方法）。儘管有這一先例，但無論法院還是學者都沒有認識到利益衡量法所具有的，成為解決權力分置糾紛之一般框架的潛力。

This Article introduces interest balancing as a coherent method of separation of powers analysis that is both conceptually and practically well suited to address the separation of powers disputes that actually arise. It explains how interest balancing is distinct from the prevailing approaches—including its closest noncategorical competitor, functionalism—and then evaluates its strengths and weaknesses relative to such approaches, ultimately concluding that interest balancing is the approach best suited to resolve the difficult cases that actually arise: those of separation of powers infringements.

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本文將利益衡量法作為一種連貫的權力分置分析方法進行介紹，該方法無論在概念上還是實踐上都非常適合解決當今出現的權力分置糾紛。本文闡釋了利益衡量法與當下主流方法（包括與其最相近的對手——功能主義方法）的區別，隨後評估了其相對於這些方法的優勢和劣勢，最終得出結論：利益衡量法是最適合於解決實踐中棘手的權力分置侵權案件的方法。

After introducing and critically assessing interest balancing’s potential for resolving separation of powers disputes, the Article theoretically develops the approach. Interest balancing asks whether there has been an intrusion on one branch’s exercise of power that can be justified by a sufficiently strong interest on the part of the other branch. But which interests ought to count? Where should the default be set? And does there need to be a particular means-ends fit between the interest and the intrusion? None of these questions are simple, but we can make progress in answering them. This theoretical development can help respond to lingering doubts about interest balancing’s conceptual apparatus and practical viability and, in the process, make it easier to operationalize going forward.

在介紹和批判性地評估了利益衡量法解決權力分置糾紛的潛力之後，本文在理論上發展了該方法。利益衡量法探究一個分支的權力行使是否受到侵犯，而另一分支是否擁有足夠強大的利益以為這種侵犯提供正當化依據。但哪些利益應該考慮在內？預設狀態應該如何設定？利益和侵犯行為之間是否需要有特定的手段-目的關係？這些問題都不簡單，但我們可以在嘗試回答這些問題的過程中取得進展。這一理論發展有助於回應人們一直以來對利益衡量法的概念體系和實際可行性的懷疑，並使其未來的操作應用更加容易。

This Article proceeds as follows. Part I sets the stage by giving examples of standard separation of powers disputes and showing how they are better conceived of as instances of separation of powers infringements or interference, rather than examples of one branch trying to exercise or fully deny the exercise of the other’s exclusive power. Part II discusses the prevailing modes to resolve such disputes—including formalism, functionalism, Justice Jackson’s Category Three analysis, and recent calls for categorical deference to statutes—and explains why they fail to provide a coherent or useful method for resolving instances of separation of powers infringement. Part III then introduces separation of powers interest balancing as a competing method of separation of powers analysis that is conceptually well suited to address the separation of powers disputes that actually arise. It explains how interest balancing is distinct from its prevailing competitors and assesses its strengths and weaknesses relative to competing approaches. Part III concludes with an application of interest balancing to two case studies to show what it would look like in practice. Part IV theoretically develops how interest balancing can be operationalized and improved going forward. A brief conclusion follows.

本文內容如下：第一部分透過舉例標準的權力分置糾紛，並說明為何人們最好將它們視為權力分置侵權或干涉，而非一個分支試圖行使或完全否認另一個分支的專屬權力的例子，來為文章奠定基礎；第二部分討論瞭解決此類糾紛的主流方法——包括形式主義方法、功能主義方法、傑克遜大法官“三分法”中的第三類以及近期“法規絕對遵從說”的呼籲——並解釋了為什麼它們無法提供連貫或實用的解決方案；第三部分隨後介紹了權力分置利益衡量法，這是一種競爭性的權力分置分析方法，且原則上非常適合解決實際出現的權力分置糾紛。該部分解釋了利益衡量法與其主流對手的區別，並評估了其相對於其他方法的優勢和劣勢。第三部分以應用利益衡量法的兩個案例研究結束，以展示它的實踐樣貌；第四部分從理論上闡述瞭如何在未來實施和改進利益衡量法，其後是簡短的結論。

Before moving on, a few caveats are in order. First, in discussing formalism and functionalism, I have tried to describe what I see as the essential elements of each approach. Formalism and functionalism are well-known paradigms of separation of powers analysis used by numerous scholars, practitioners, and judges, but “no canonical form of either approach exists.” My goal is not to suggest that everyone using these approaches is subject to the critiques below, but to illuminate the flaws and potential improvements upon the standard ways of thinking of these methods. Second, my focus in this paper is on disputes between the political branches. Of course, disputes also arise between the judiciary and either Congress or the President. Because such disputes implicate a unique line of cases, practices, and dynamics, I do not explore how to resolve such disputes in this Article, although my hope is that the contributions made below can help illuminate these debates as well. Third, because my focus is on disputes, I do not evaluate how to resolve separation of powers questions involving cooperation between the branches. For example, a highly controversial separation of powers issue that is not covered in this Article is the nondelegation doctrine, which—at least typically—involves instances where the political branches cooperate, rather than come into conflict. This is undoubtedly an important issue but outside the scope of this current project. Finally, in proposing interest balancing as a method to resolve disputes between the political branches, I am largely agnostic in this Article about which institution ought to conduct the interest balancing analysis. In principle, it could be conducted by courts—depending on one’s view of when judicial resolution of separation of powers disputes is desirable—but it could also be conducted by actors within the political branches, scholars, or even interested members of the general public.

在繼續之前，需要附加說明幾點。首先，在討論形式主義方法和功能主義方法時，我試圖描述我所認為的每種方法的基本要素。形式主義方法和功能主義方法是許多學者、從業者和法官進行權力分置分析的著名範例，但“這兩種方法都不存在所謂的權威標準形式”。下文中，我並不意在批判每個使用這些方法的人，而在於闡明這些方法的標準思維方式的缺陷和潛在改進方法；其次，我在本文中關注的是政治部門之間的糾紛。當然，司法分支與國會或總統之間也會出現糾紛。但由於此類糾紛涉及到一系列獨特的案件、實踐和動態，因此我不會在本文中探討如何解決此類糾紛，儘管我希望本文所做的貢獻也能有助於闡明這些爭論；第三，由於我將重點置於糾紛之上，因此我將不會探討如何解決涉及到各分支之間合作的權力分置問題。例如，本文並未涉及到一個極具爭議的權力分置問題：“禁止授權原則”，它通常涉及政治部門合作而非發生衝突的情況。這無疑是一個重要問題，但超出了本文的討論範圍；最後，在本文提出利益衡量法作為解決政治部門之間糾紛的一種方法的同時，我對利益衡量分析應當由哪個機構進行持基本的懷疑態度。原則上，它可以由法院進行——取決於人們對權力分置糾紛是否應當由司法解決的看法——但也可以由政治部門內部成員、學者甚至利益相關的普通公眾進行。

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This Article makes three primary contributions.First, it reconceptualizes difficult separation of powers disputes as instances of separation of powers infringements or interferences. Second, it identifies interest balancing as a method built to resolve such disputes, properly conceived. Third, it draws attention to the utility of bridging the conventional divide in constitutional law between structure and individual rights by drawing on insights from rights analysis to inform separation of powers analysis.

本文有三個主要貢獻：首先，它將棘手的權力分置糾紛重新概念化為權力分置侵權或干涉的情況；其次，它認為利益衡量法是一種經過恰當構思的、專為解決此類糾紛而創立的方法；第三，它藉助個人權利領域的分析方法為權力分置分析提供靈感，從而引導人們關注彌合憲法中憲制結構領域與個人權利領域之間鴻溝的實用性意義。

These contributions all come at an important time. Separation of powers disputes are at the heart of some of the most important questions of constitutional structure today, including who gets to control the administrative state at home and who is in charge of our foreign policy abroad. The analysis we use for these disputes will determine, for example, whether administrative law judges (ALJs) or the Federal Reserve can maintain their independence, whether the civil service is constitutional,as well as how our foreign policy will be conducted. To date, we have no coherent or useful way to resolve these instances of separation of powers infringements. The prevailing modes of analysis are not built for such cases. Interest balancing is. Scholars and courts have historically tried to resolve separation of powers disputes by evaluating each branch’s powers. It is time to start focusing on their interests.

這些貢獻都正當其時。權力分置糾紛是當今憲制結構中的一些最重要的問題的核心，包括應由誰來掌控國內行政以及應由誰來負責外交政策。我們對這些爭議的分析將決定行政法官(ALJs)或美聯儲能否保持其獨立性，公務員制度是否符合憲法，以及我們的外交政策將如何實施。到目前為止，我們還沒有一種連貫或實用的方法來解決這些權力分置侵權案件。主流的分析方法並不適合於此類案件，但利益衡量法則相反。學者和法院歷來試圖透過評估每個分支的權力來解決權力分置糾紛，但現在是時候開始關注他們的利益了。

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Separation of powers conflicts are a common feature of our government. Yet, we still lack a coherent method to resolve them. This is because we have been conceiving of them in the wrong way. Separation of powers conflicts almost never involve examples where one branch is exercising or fully denying the exclusive power of the other. Rather, almost all difficult cases involve instances where both branches have power to act but come into conflict. Existing methods have failed to provide a useful means to resolve such cases of infringement.

This Article provides a method built precisely for such cases: interest balancing. Interest balancing is the default mode of assessing infringements in the other half of constitutional law involving individual rights but has somehow escaped the attention of separation of powers scholars. It turns out that interest balancing can better accommodate the separation of powers disputes that actually arise today than any of the prevailing competitors. This is because interest balancing is well suited for the difficult cases that actually arise—cases of separation of powers infringements. Like any method of constitutional decision-making, interest balancing is not perfect. But perfect is not the prevailing competitor. For too long, courts and scholars have sought to resolve disputes between the branches by examining their powers. It is time to start looking at their interests.

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