譯者 | 靳益群 中國政法大學碩士
一審 | 趙文磊 波士頓大學LL.M.
二審 | 曾梓栩 萊頓大學LL.M.
編輯 | 陳珏雯 西南政法大學本科
Loca. 中國社會科學院大學碩士
責編 | Susan 中國政法大學碩士
The University of Chicago Law Review Volume 91.6, Number 1| October 2024
《芝加哥法律評論》第91卷第6期第1篇
Against Associational Standing
反對團體資格
Michael T. Morley & F. Andrew Hessick
Associational standing is a widely used doctrine that has never been subject to serious academic scrutiny.It allows an organization that has not suffered any injury in fact to sue in its own name to assert its members’ causes of action. Though the doctrine is often associated with public interest groups, major corporations have usurped it to be able to sue, through trade groups or entities created solely to pursue a particular lawsuit, without becoming party litigants to the case.
團體資格是一個廣泛使用的原則，但卻並未受到過嚴格的學術檢視。它允許組織在並未遭受實際損害的情況下以自己的名義起訴，對其成員訴求予以主張。已經利用這一原則，透過貿易或專門為提起特定訴，儘管這一原則通常與公共利益團體相關，但大型企業訟而創設的實體進行起訴，而無需成為當事人。
The Supreme Court first recognized associational standing as an offshoot of third-party standing to allow an organization that had suffered institutional harm to assert its members’ rights concerning their relationship with the organization itself. The Court has since extended associational standing to allow an uninjured group to pursue any of its members’ claims relating to the group’s purpose, including claims completely unconnected to their membership in the group. The Court has likewise allowed associational standing to be invoked by both zero-member groups and compulsory groups whose members are not free to quit.
最高法院最初將團體資格定性為第三方訴訟地位的延申，允許遭受機構性傷害的組織就其成員及其自身相關權利予以主張。此後，最高法院對團體資格的範圍進行了延擴，允許未受損害的團體追索任何與其宗旨相關的成員主張，也涵括與成員身份完全無關的訴求。法院同樣允許零成員組織和成員不能自由退出的強制性組織援引團體訴訟資格。
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This anomalous exception to Article III’s injury-in-fact requirement stands in tension with the fabric of U.S. law in ways that have been generally overlooked. Statutes, procedural rules, and most judge-created requirements were not crafted with associational standing in mind, repeatedly creating unnecessary quandaries throughout the litigation process. Associational standing allows plaintiff groups to circumvent Federal Rule of Civil Procedure by enabling them to effectively craft their own classes without judicial approval or satisfying the Rule’s requirements.
這種《美國憲法》第三條“實際損害”要求的異常例外與美國法律的整體架構存在衝突，然而這一衝突通常被忽視。法規、訴訟程式規則以及大多數法官所創設的要求都並未考慮到團體訴訟資格，而這點也導致整個訴訟過程中不必要的困境反覆滋生。團體訴訟資格允許原告群體規避《聯邦民事訴訟規則》，使其能夠在未經獲得法官批准或滿足規則要求的情況下有效地組建自己的組織。
The doctrine also violates Rule 17(a)’s real-party-in-interest requirement, triggers disputes over potential asymmetric claim preclusion, and offers a backdoor method for courts to inappropriately issue nationwide defendant-oriented injunctions. Moreover, it undermines public policy goals by impacting how statutes such as the Equal Access to Justice Act apply to a rights holder’s claims, and violates traditional equitable principles. While courts may adopt ad hoc solutions to address each of these difficulties individually, such patches underscore the poor fit between associational standing and the structure of litigation in the United States.
該原則還違反了《規則》第17條(a)款的“實際利益相關方”要求，觸發了有關潛在不對稱的“一事不再理原則”的爭議，併為法院提供了不當釋出全國性針對被告禁令的後門途徑。此外，它還損害了公共政策目標，影響了《平等公義通路法》等法律對權利持有人的主張的適用，並違反了傳統的衡平原則。儘管法院可以針對每個困難單獨採取臨時性解決方案，但這些補救措施反而凸顯了組織訴訟資格與美國訴訟結構之間的不匹配。
This Article calls for the abandonment, or at least serious modification, of associational standing. Even without associational standing, groups may still sue to enforce their own rights. And they could continue to help vindicate their members’rights by providing legal representation for member plaintiffs in individual or class action suits (filed anonymously, if necessary), covering members’ litigation costs, and providing expert witnesses and other guidance.
本文呼籲廢除或至少對團體訴訟資格予以重大修改；即使沒有團體訴訟資格，組織也可以透過起訴以維護自己的權益。同時他們可以透過為身處原告位置的成員在個人或集體訴訟（如有必要，可匿名提起）中提供法律代理仲裁、承擔成員的訴訟費用、提供專家證人和其他指導來繼續幫助維護成員的權利。
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In short, associational standing is a largely unnecessary deviation from both Article III’s injury-in-fact requirement and the fundamental principles underlying our justice system. Eliminating associational standing would not limit public law and other important collective litigation, but rather ensure that such cases proceed through the proper channels (i.e., Rule 23) while preventing a range of unnecessary procedural, preclusive, remedial, and other complications.
簡而言之，團體訴訟資格與《美國憲法》第三條規定的實際傷害要求和司法體系的基本原則產生很大程度上的不必要偏離。團體訴訟資格的廢除並不會對公共法律和其他重要的集體訴訟造成限制，反而是確保此類案件按照適當的程式（即《規則》第23條）進行，同時防止一系列不必要的程式、排除、救濟和其他複雜情況的發生。
引言
On June 29, 2023, the Supreme Court decided Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College,holding that public and publicly funded colleges may not directly consider race in their admissions processes. The landmark decision overturned years of precedent permitting race-conscious admissions.Making the decision all the more remarkable is the fact that the Court should not have decided the case at all.
2023年6月29日，最高法院對Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College一案作出判決，裁定公立和公立資助的大學在招生過程中不得直接將種族因素納入考慮。這一具有里程碑意義的裁決推翻了多年來允許基於種族考慮的招生的先例。使得這一裁決更不同尋常的點在於，法院本不應該受理此案。
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The plaintiff was Students for Fair Admissions (SFFA), a membership organization devoted to challenging the consideration of race in college admissions. SFFA did not claim that it had suffered or would suffer any injury from the defendants’ consideration of race in admissions. The Court nevertheless held that the cases was justiciable based on associational standing, a doctrine that allows an organization that has not itself suffered any injury to nevertheless sue based on injuries suffered by its members.
原告學生公平錄取組織（SFFA），是一個致力於挑戰種族因素在大學生招生中考量的協會組織。SFFA並未聲稱自己因被告在招生中考慮種族而遭受或將要遭受任何損害。然而，法院仍然根據“團體訴訟資格”原則裁定此案具有可訴性，該原則允許組織即使自身未遭受傷害，也可以憑藉其成員遭受損害的緣由而起訴。
Associational standing is a surprisingly under-examined anomaly in the landscape of modern justiciability law.To sue in federal court, a plaintiff must establish both constitutional standing under Article III and prudential standing.Article III standing requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that it has suffered a concrete, particularized injury in fact. As a prudential matter, the Supreme Court has further held that a plaintiff usually may sue only for violations of its own rights.
“團體訴訟”原則是現代訴訟法可訴訟性領域一個出人意料地未經充分研究的異常現象。為了能在聯邦法院起訴，原告必須同時證明其符合憲法第三條規定的憲法訴訟適格和審慎性原告資格。第三條規定的訴訟資格要求原告證明其事實上確實遭受了具體、特定的傷害。從審慎的角度來看，最高法院還曾表示，原告通常僅能因其自身權利受到侵犯而提起訴訟。
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Traditional third-party standing principles, however, sometimes allow a plaintiff to sue for a concrete, particularized injury it has suffered through a violation of someone else’s rights.Such third-party standing is particularly appropriate where the plaintiff has a relationship with that third party—such as doctor patient or vendor-customer—and the plaintiff is better positioned than the third party to pursue litigation.
然而，傳統的第三方資格原則有時允許原告因其他人權利受到侵犯而遭受的具體、特定的傷害而起訴。這種第三方訴訟資格尤其適用於原告與該第三方存在某種關係的情況，例如醫生-病人或供應商-客戶，並且原告比第三方更有利於進行訴訟。
For example, third party standing doctrine allows a private school to challenge a law requiring parents to send their children to public school by asserting the right of its enrollees’parents to direct their children’s education.These principles likewise allow bartenders who have been prohibited from selling alcohol to 18-year-old males (but not females of that age) to enforce their customers’ right to be free of gender-based discrimination as to the legal drinking age.
例如，第三方原告資格原則允許私立學校就一項要求家長送子女去公立學校的法律提起訴訟，主張對入學者父母指導子女教育的權利予以維護。這些原則同樣允許被禁止向18歲男性（而非同年齡的女性）出售酒精的調酒師維護其顧客免受基於性別的年齡歧視的權利。
Associational standing both creates a glaring exception to Article III’s injury-in-fact requirement and goes well beyond the traditional prudential standing principles animating third-party standing. The doctrine allows an organization that has not itself suffered any legally cognizable harm to sue based solely on an injury suffered by one or more of its members.
團體資格既構成了對《美國憲法》第三條中“事實上損害”要求的明顯例外，又遠遠超出了賦予第三方訴訟資格效力的傳統審慎訴訟資格原則。該原則允許一個組織在沒有遭受任何法律上可識別的損害的情況下，僅基於其成員中的一人或多人所遭受的損害而起訴。
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It fundamentally differs from “next friend” suits in which a representative, such as a guardian, sues on behalf of someone who “cannot appear on his own behalf,” such as a child, to secure a remedy for that person.With associational standing, the association sues in its own name to assert a member’s rights in order to secure a remedy for the association. Indeed, associational standing “may be the only situation in which the titular litigant may litigate without any injury to itself.
這與“訴訟代理人”訴訟有著根本區別，在這種訴訟中，代表人（如監護人）代表無法為自己辯護的人（如兒童）起訴，以尋求為該人獲得救濟。而在團體資格中，協會以自身名義起訴，維護成員的權利，以求為協會本身尋得救濟。事實上，團體資格“可能是唯一一種名義訴訟人可以不遭受任何傷害而起訴的情況”。
Associational standing is not only the purview of labor, environmental, and civil rights groups, but also ad hoc entities formed solely for the purpose of bringing a particular case, as well as trade associations and other organizations that enable corporate behemoths and other private companies to litigate claims without becoming actual party litigants.Moreover, a large association with broad or general purposes “would seem to be able to bring any lawsuit it wanted, becoming a roving enforcer of the law.”
團體資格並不僅限於勞動、環境和民權組織，還包括僅為提起特定案件而臨時組成的組織，以及貿易協會和其他使大型企業和其他私人公司能夠在不作為實際訴訟當事人的情況下提起訴訟的組織。此外，一個擁有廣泛或一般目的的大型協會“似乎可以提起任何訴訟，成為遊走於法律之上的執法者”。
Although the Court’s associational standing rulings directly apply only to federal courts, numerous state constitutions impose justiciability restrictions analogous to Article III on their state judiciaries. Many of these jurisdictions, following the federal courts, have recognized associational standing.
儘管法院對團體資格的裁決僅直接適用於聯邦法院，但許多州憲法對其州司法部門施加了類似於憲法第三條的可訴性限制。這些司法管轄區中的許多，如聯邦法院一樣，已承認協會地位。
This doctrine is not only anomalous but historically novel. Courts did not traditionallypermit associational standing; the doctrine did not develop until the twentieth century.The earliest associational standing cases drew upon traditional third party standing principles to allow civil rights groups that had suffered institutional harms to defend their members’ interests concerning their association with the groups themselves. Over time, the doctrine expanded, evolving into an exception to both Article III and third-party standing requirements.A group could invoke this new generalized understanding of associational standing to sue even where it did not face any harm as an entity and its cause of action was unrelated to its relationship with its members.
這一學說不僅不合常規，而且在歷史上也是絕無僅有的。傳統意義上講，法院並不承認原告資格這一存在；這一學說直到二十世紀才發展起來。最早的原告資格借鑑了傳統的第三方訴訟資格原則，允許遭受機構性損害的民權團體捍衛其成員與團體自身相關的利益。隨著時間的推移，這一原則適用範圍不斷擴大，演變成為憲法第三條和第三方訴訟資格的例外。一個團體可以援引這種對社團訴訟資格的新的廣義理解來提起訴訟，即便作為一個實體它並未受到任何損害，且其訴訟事由與其和成員的關係無關。
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Associational standing stands in tension with the overall fabric of U.S. law.A core premise of our legal system is that the plaintiff in a case should be either the real party in interest—the person who suffered the harm that gave rise to the lawsuit—or a representative standing in the shoes of that real party in interest.Many statutes, procedural rules, and judge-created requirements were crafted against that background presumption.By departing from this usual practice, associational standing creates unnecessary quandaries throughout the litigation process.
原告資格與美國法律的整體架構存在一種緊張關係。我們法律體系的一個核心前提是，案件中的原告要麼是實際利益方 —— 即即因損害而提起訴訟的人，或者是實際利害方的代表人。許多法規、程式規則和法官制定的要求都是在這種背景預設下制定的。由於背離了這種常規做法，團體資格在整個訴訟過程中造成了不必要的困境。
In some cases, associational standing can change the way in which the law applies to a rightsholder’s claims, potentially frustrating important policy goals. For example, some courts have allowed wealthy global corporations that litigate their claims through sparsely funded trade associations to recover attorneys’fees from the government under the Equal Access to Justice Act(EAJA).Because of their extravagant net worth, those corporations would have been ineligible to recover such fees if they had sued in their own names.
在某些情況下，團體訴訟資格可能會改變法律適用於權利人主張的方式，這也潛在阻礙了重要政策目標的實現。例如，一些法院允許那些依託資金匱乏的貿易協會提起訴訟的富有的全球企業依據《平等公義通路法》（EAJA）從政府那裡獲得律師費。由於這些企業擁有鉅額淨資產，如果它們以自己的名義提起訴訟，原本是沒有資格獲得這類費用的。
Associational standing also exacerbates remedial problems that already plague the federal courts.Many federal courts typically issue “[p]laintiff-[o]riented” injunctions, granting relief only for the particular plaintiffs in a case. In recent years, some federal courts have been issuing greater numbers of “nationwide” or “[d]efendant-[o]riented” injunctions that go beyond such limited relief.Defendant-oriented injunctions completely prohibit a governmental defendant from enforcing a challenged legal provision against anyone, anywhere in the state or nation.Justices and scholars have questioned this practice on a variety of grounds.
團體訴訟資格也加劇了業已困擾聯邦法院的補救問題。許多聯邦法院通常釋出 “針對原告” 的禁令，僅為案件中的特定原告提供救濟。近年來，一些聯邦法院釋出了更多的 “全國性” 或 “傾向被告” 的禁令，這些禁令超出了這種有限的救濟範圍。傾向被告的禁令完全禁止政府被告在該州或全國的任何地方對任何人執行受質疑的法律條款。大法官和學者們基於種種原因對這種做法提出了質疑。
Associational standing provides a ready means of easily circumventing any limitations or prohibitions on nationwide defendant-oriented injunctions the Court or Congress may adopt.Courts often award nationwide defendant-oriented injunctions in associational standing cases, likely in part due to the difficulty of crafting more appropriate, narrower relief. Injunctions cannot readily be tailored to a plaintiff organization’s rightsholder members—who are the real parties in interest and whose rights underlie the lawsuit—when they are not party litigants in the case. Moreover, attempting to draft an injunction to protect the rights of an association’s members raises practical problems of its own, including, among other things, an organization’s reluctance to publicly disclose its member list.Restrictions on associational standing would likely be a necessary complement to reforms concerning nationwide or defendant-oriented injunctions.
團體訴訟資格提供了一種現成的手段，可以輕易規避法院或國會可能對全國性的、針對被告的禁令所設定的任何限制或禁止。經常在團體訴訟地位的案件中授予全國性的、針對被告的禁令，這可能部分是由於難以制定更合適、更有指向性的救濟措施。當原告組織的權利人成員（他們是真正的利益相關方，且他們的權利是訴訟的基礎）不是案件中的當事人訴訟方時，禁令不能輕易地針對他們進行調整。此外，試圖起草一項禁令以保護一個協會成員的權利本身會帶來實際問題，其中包括組織不願公開其成員名單等問題。對團體訴訟地位的限制可能是對涉及全國性或針對被告的禁令的改革的必要補充。
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These remedial difficulties underscore a broader problem with associational standing—it is in tension with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which governs class actions. Associational standing cases present courts with pre-formed classes that are subject to neither approval under Rule 23 nor the rule’s substantive restrictions. The doctrine allows an organization to litigate a member’s legal claims, potentially without their knowledge or consent. Courts must make ad hoc determinations of whether the association can fairly represent its members’ interests.
這些補救困難凸顯了團體訴訟地位的一個更廣泛的問題 —— 它與管轄集體訴訟的《聯邦民事訴訟規則》第 23 條存在緊張關係。團體訴訟地位的案件向法院呈現了預先形成的團體，這些群體既不受《規則》第 23 條的批准約束，也不受該規則的實質性限制。這一原則允許一個組織在可能沒有其成員的知曉或同意的情況下，對成員的法律主張進行訴訟。法院必須臨時決定該組織是否能夠公平地代表其成員的利益。
Perhaps more importantly, allowing courts to grant effectively classwide relief outside the context of class action lawsuits raises problems of asymmetric preclusion. If the plaintiff organization is successful, all of its members stand to benefit. If the organization loses, in contrast, it is unclear whether its members are bound by the adverse ruling—or if they even should be.
也許更重要的是，允許法院在團體訴訟的背景之外給予實際上的集體救濟會引發不對稱的一事不再理問題。如果原告組織勝訴，其所有成員都有望受益。相反，如果該組織敗訴，不清楚其成員是否受不利裁決的約束 —— 或者他們是否應該受約束。
While courts may adopt ad hoc solutions to address each of these difficulties individually, the need for such patches simply underscores the poor fit between associational standing and the structure of litigation in the United States. What’s more, associational standing is almost completely unnecessary. Were Congress or the Court to reject associational standing, organizations could still provide legal representation for their members to litigate their own claims, cover their litigation costs, and provide expert witnesses and other guidance.
雖然法院可以採取臨時解決方案來分別逐一解決這些困難，但應對困難補漏的需求反而僅使得團體訴訟與美國訴訟結構之間不相匹配的問題凸顯。此外，團體訴訟地位幾乎完全沒有存在的必要。如果國會或法院拒絕團體訴訟地位，組織仍然可以為其成員提供法律代表以提起他們自己的主張，支付他們的訴訟費用，並提供專家證人及其他指導。
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Since organizations asserting associational standing already must provide evidence about their members’ injuries, becoming a party plaintiff would not invade a member’s privacy to a substantially greater degree. Once a named plaintiff has been identified, litigation could proceed on a classwide basis under Rule 23.
由於主張團體訴訟地位的組織已經被要求必須提供關於其成員所受損害的證據，因此成為一方原告不會在更大程度上侵犯成員的隱私。一旦確定了一個具名原告，訴訟就可以根據《規則》第 23 條在集體基礎上進行。
In the rare cases where a rights holder would face a serious risk of violence or other harm by litigating in their own name, the court may allow them to proceed anonymously.In short, organizations can garner nearly all of the benefits of associational standing by facilitating their members’ litigation without formally taking control of their members’ claims.
在極少數情況下，如果權利持有者以自己的名義提起訴訟會面臨嚴重的暴力或其他傷害風險，法院可以允許他們匿名進行訴訟。簡而言之，組織可以透過促進其成員的訴訟而獲得團體訴訟地位的幾乎所有好處，因而無需對其成員的主張採取形式上的接管。
Associational standing doctrine has received surprisingly little academic scrutiny. Many scholars,as well as all of the major federal courts treatises,outline the requirements for asserting associational standing without considering its consequences. Those who have considered the issue have generally embraced the doctrine.Several scholars have discussed how current associational standing doctrine applies in particular contexts or urged the Court to expand it, generally to facilitate public law litigation.Some have argued that municipalities are likely to have associational standing to sue on behalf of their citizens. But very few scholars have questioned associational standing,and none have spent more than a few sentences in doing so.
團體訴訟地位原則出人意料地幾乎並未受到學術檢視。許多學者以及所有主要的聯邦法院論著在概述主張團體訴訟地位的要求時都沒有考慮其後果。而那些考慮過這個問題的人通常都接受了這一原則。一些學者討論了當前的團體訴訟地位原則在特定情境下的適用方式，或者敦促法院擴充套件這一原則的適用範圍，以上舉動通常是基於促進公法訴訟的目的而作出。一些人認為，市政當局很可能具有代表其市民提起訴訟的團體訴訟資格。但是很少有學者質疑團體訴訟，而且沒有人對此展開超過幾句話篇幅的探討。
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This Article is the first to trace the history of associational standing and examine its modern scope; identify the problems it raises for various aspects of the litigation process; and demonstrate that abandoning the doctrine would be unlikely to impede important public law or other collective litigation.Part I begins by introducing the general principles governing Article III and prudential standing. It then traces the development of associational standing from its early roots in third-party standing cases up through its modern formulation. This Part concludes by exploring the Court’s most recent expansions of the doctrine.
本文首次追溯了團體訴訟地位的歷史並考察了其現代範圍；明晰其對訴訟過程中各個方面帶來的問題；並證明廢除這一原則不太可能阻礙重要的公法或其他集體訴訟的適用。第一部分首先介紹了管轄憲法第三條和審慎性原告資格的一般原則。然後，它追溯了團體訴訟地位從其第三方訴訟地位案件中的早期根源形式一直演進至其現代形式的發展歷程。這一部分最後探討了法院對這一原則的最新擴充套件。
Part II addresses the justifications that the Court and other advocates have provided for associational standing, demonstrating that the doctrine is not well tailored to achieving these goals. Part III focuses on the tension between associational standing and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23’s standards for class actions. By circumventing Rule 23, associational standing allows plaintiffs to engage in collective litigation through pre-formed classes without judicial certification, unnecessarily generating several problems that could likely be avoided in a class action suit.
第二部分論述了法院和其他支持者為團體訴訟地位提供的正當理由，證明該原則並不能很好地實現這些目標。第三部分聚焦於團體訴訟地位與《聯邦民事訴訟規則》第 23 條關於集體訴訟的標準之間的衝突關係。透過規避第 23 條，團體訴訟地位允許原告透過預先形成的群體進行集體訴訟而無需司法認證，這不必要地產生了一些在集體訴訟中本可能避免的問題。
Part IV turns to the wide range of other difficulties that associational standing creates under the rules and doctrines governing federal litigation. This Part demonstrates that associational standing violates Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a)’s requirement that the litigants in a case be the real parties in interest. It likewise raises difficulties concerning the applicability of claim preclusion; the proper scope of injunctive relief; and the manner in which the EAJA applies to wealthy rightsholders’claims. The doctrine also violates traditional equitable principles.A brief conclusion follows. Associational standing has expanded over the decades with surprisingly little academic or judicial scrutiny; this Article fills that gap.
第四部分轉向團體訴訟地位在管轄聯邦訴訟的規則和原則下所廣泛產生的各種困難。這一部分表明，團體訴訟地位違反了《聯邦民事訴訟規則》第 17 (a) 條關於案件中的訴訟當事人應為真正的利益相關方的要求。同樣，它在一事不再理原則的適用性方面、禁令救濟的適當範圍方面、以及在《平等公義通路法》適用於富裕權利人的請求的方式方面帶來了困難。該原則也違反了傳統的衡平法原則。隨後是一個簡短的結論：團體訴訟地位在幾十年中不斷擴大，卻令人驚訝地幾乎沒有受到學術或司法審查；本文填補了這一空白。
原文連結：
https://lawreview.uchicago.edu/print-archive/against-associational-standing