ility—and, one day, peace.

在長達數十年的僵持衝突中，在過去
20
年的腐朽中，人們可能很難相信真正的改變是可能的。但毫無疑問的是，哈馬斯的屠殺襲擊已經打破了以色列和巴勒斯坦之間的現狀。未來幾周將決定加沙戰爭是否會使中東陷入更深的混亂，還是儘管哈馬斯犯下暴行，以色列仍能開始為地區穩定–終有一天實現和平–奠定基礎。

.
More than 1,200 Israelis, most of them civilians, many of those women
and children, were murdered in their homes, on the street, in kibbutzim,
at a music festival. Perhaps 150 more have been dragged to Gaza and
shut in makeshift dungeons. Israel’s belief that it could indefinitely
manage Palestinian hostility with money and air strikes crumpled early
on October 7th, as the first Hamas bulldozer breached the security
fence. Hamas has chosen mass murder and there is no going back.

由於哈馬斯罪行的嚴重性，改變是不可避免的。1200
多名以色列人，其中大多數是平民，許多是婦女和兒童，在家中、在街上、在集體農場、在音樂節上被殺害。也許還有 150
人被拖到加沙，關在臨時搭建的地牢裡。10 月 7
日，當哈馬斯的第一輛推土機突破安全圍欄時，以色列認為它可以用金錢和空襲無限期地控制巴勒斯坦的敵對行動的信念早早破滅了。哈馬斯選擇了大規模屠殺，而且沒有回頭路可走。

Gaza
is now awaiting a huge Israeli ground offensive. Its extent and success
will determine the legacy of Hamas’s bloody assault. So will the
fundamental choice that Israel’s politicians face after the worst
catastrophe in their country’s history: do they unite or continue to
exploit divisions for their own advantage? A third factor is the choices
of Israel’s Middle Eastern neighbours, including Iran.

加沙現在正等待著以色列的大規模地面進攻。攻勢的規模和成敗將決定哈馬斯血腥攻擊的後果。以色列的政治家們在經歷了國家歷史上最嚴重的災難之後所面臨的根本選擇也將如此：是團結一致，還是繼續利用分歧為自己謀利？第三個因素是以色列的中東鄰國，包括伊朗的選擇。

In
the weeks and months ahead Israel’s leaders carry a heavy
responsibility to temper their understandable desire for fire and
retribution with a hard-headed calculation about their country’s
long-term interests and an unwavering respect for the rules of war. They
left their people vulnerable by failing to foresee Hamas’s looming
attack. They must not compound their error by failing to see ahead
clearly for a second time.

在未來的幾周和幾個月裡，以色列領導人肩負著沉重的責任，他們必須以對國家長遠利益的冷靜思考和對戰爭規則的堅定尊重來剋制他們可以理解的開火和報復的慾望。他們沒有預見到哈馬斯迫在眉睫的攻擊，從而使自己的人民處於弱勢。他們決不能再犯同樣的錯誤。

The
need for vision begins with the imminent ground offensive. The Israel
Defence Forces will rightly strike deep and hard at Hamas. But how deep
and how hard? Israel will be tempted to unleash a spasm of briefly
satisfying violence. Its defence minister has called Hamas fighters
“human animals”, and announced a blockade of food, water and energy.
Israeli officials—and President Joe Biden—have taken to comparing Hamas
to Islamic State, or ISIS, an Islamist group that America vowed to
eradicate.

需要有遠見，首先是即將發動的地面攻勢。以色列國防軍將理所當然地對哈馬斯進行深入而猛烈的打擊。但要多深、多狠？以色列會受到誘惑，發動一場短暫滿足的暴力行動。以色列國防部長稱哈馬斯戰士為

"人獸"，並宣佈封鎖食物、水和能源。以色列官員和喬-拜登總統已開始將哈馬斯與伊斯蘭國（ISIS）相提並論，後者是一個美國發誓要剷除的伊斯蘭組織。

That
comparison is dangerous because, although Hamas deserves to be
eradicated, achieving that goal in an enclave of 2m impoverished people
with nowhere to flee will be impossible. A better comparison than ISIS
is the 9/11 attacks in 2001, not just because of Israel’s agony, but
also because America’s invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq show how
steeply the costs of invasion mount—which is precisely Hamas’s
calculation.

這種比較是危險的，因為儘管哈馬斯理應被剷除，但在一個擁有
200 萬貧困人口且無處可逃的飛地實現這一目標是不可能的。與伊拉克和黎凡特伊斯蘭國相比，2001 年的 "9-11
"襲擊事件是更好的對比，這不僅是因為以色列的痛苦，還因為美國對阿富汗和伊拉克的入侵表明入侵的代價是多麼高昂–這正是哈馬斯的算盤。

At
such a moment, self-restraint matters more than ever. It is in Israel’s
interest, because street fighting is perilous and the hostages are
defenceless. It makes the operation militarily sustainable and preserves
international support. It avoids playing into the hands of foes who
calculate that dead Palestinian women and children will further their
cause. By clinging to its identity as a state that values human life,
Israel becomes stronger.

在這種時刻，自我剋制比以往任何時候都更重要。這符合以色列的利益，因為巷戰危險重重，人質手無寸鐵。它使行動在軍事上可以持續，並保持國際支援。這樣做可以避免落入敵人的圈套，因為他們認為巴勒斯坦婦女和兒童的死亡會促進他們的事業。透過堅持其作為一個珍視人類生命的國家的身份，以色列變得更加強大。

Restraint
in the ground offensive depends on the choices of Israel’s politicians.
Before the war they were tearing the country apart over a new law
curbing the Supreme Court. For now grief and horror have brought people
back together, but the left blames the far-right government of Binyamin
Netanyahu, the prime minister, for poisoning relations with the army and
security services over the court, and neglecting security in Gaza
because of a fixation with helping Jewish settlers in the West Bank. The
right counters that calls for civil disobedience by senior officials
opposed to Mr Netanyahu were a green light for Hamas.

地面進攻的剋制取決於以色列政治家的選擇。戰前，他們曾因一項限制最高法院的新法律而導致國家四分五裂。但左派指責總理本雅明-內塔尼亞胡領導的極右翼政府在法院問題上毒化了與軍隊和安全部門的關係，並因一心幫助約旦河西岸的猶太定居者而忽視了加沙的安全。右翼反駁說，反對內塔尼亞胡先生的高階官員呼籲公民抗命是在為哈馬斯開綠燈。

Mr
Netanyahu must try to use his new war cabinet, announced this week, to
unite Israel. Only by healing its own politics will the country be able
to deal with Gaza. Mr Netanyahu will not want to help his most plausible
rivals for office. Yet he was the man in charge when Hamas struck and
his political career is ending. Having spent a lifetime seeking power at
any price, he should finally put his country before himself.

內塔尼亞胡先生必須努力利用本週宣佈的新戰時內閣來團結以色列。只有治癒以色列自身的政治創傷，該國才能應對加沙問題。內塔尼亞胡先生不會願意幫助他最有可能的競選對手。然而，在哈馬斯發動襲擊時，他是負責人，而他的政治生涯即將結束。他一生都在不惜代價地謀求權力，他最終應該把國家放在自己之前。

A
unified, centrist government would also be better placed to cope with
the last set of challenges: the politics of the Middle East. Israel will
be in grave peril if the war in Gaza spreads to its northern border
with Lebanon, where tensions with Hizbullah, a formidably armed militia,
are already growing ominously. The longer and bloodier the fighting in
Gaza, the more Hizbullah will feel it must be seen to support its
brethren. There is also a possibility of war with Iran, which has
replaced Arab governments as the sponsor of Palestinian violence. Even
Iran hawks in the West should not wish for that.

一個統一的中間派政府也將更有能力應對最後一系列挑戰：中東政治。如果加沙的戰火蔓延到以色列與黎巴嫩的北部邊境，以色列將面臨嚴重的危險，因為以色列與真主黨–一個強大的武裝民兵組織–的緊張關係已經在黎巴嫩日益加劇。加沙的戰事時間越長、越血腥，真主黨就越會覺得自己必須支援自己的兄弟。此外，還有可能與伊朗開戰，因為伊朗已取代阿拉伯政府成為巴勒斯坦暴力的贊助者。即使是西方的伊朗鷹派也不希望如此。

A
wider war would wreck the détente, built on the Abraham accords,
between Israel and its Arab neighbours, including Bahrain, Morocco, the
United Arab Emirates and potentially Saudi Arabia. This grouping stands
for a new Middle East that is pragmatic and focused on economic
development rather than ideology. It is still inchoate, but it has the
potential to become a force for moderation—and possibly even security.

更廣泛的戰爭將破壞以色列與其阿拉伯鄰國（包括巴林、摩洛哥、阿拉伯聯合大公國和潛在的沙烏地阿拉伯）在亞伯拉罕協議基礎上建立起來的緩和關係。這個集團代表著一個務實、注重經濟發展而非意識形態的新中東。它仍處於萌芽狀態，但有可能成為一股溫和的力量，甚至有可能成為一股安全的力量。

Simply
by surviving, the Abraham accords could emerge from this crisis
stronger. However, Hamas has shown that the signatories’ neglect of the
Palestinians is a mistake. Israel and its Arab partners need a new,
optimistic vision for Gaza and the West Bank, as an alternative to
Iran’s cult of violence and killing.

亞伯拉罕協議》只要能倖存下來，就能從這場危機中變得更加強大。然而，哈馬斯已經表明，簽署方對巴勒斯坦人的忽視是一個錯誤。以色列及其阿拉伯夥伴需要一個新的、樂觀的加沙和約旦河西岸願景，以替代伊朗對暴力和殺戮的崇拜。

And
that leads back to the fighting in Gaza. How does it end? Israel has no
good options: occupation is unsustainable, a Hamas government is
unacceptable; rule by its rival, Fatah, is untenable; an Arab
peacekeeping force is unattainable; and a puppet government is
unimaginable. If Israel destroys Hamas in Gaza and pulls out, who knows
what destructive forces will fill the vacuum left behind?

這又回到了加沙的戰事。如何結束？以色列沒有好的選擇：佔領是不可持續的，哈馬斯政府是不可接受的；其競爭對手法塔赫的統治是站不住腳的；阿拉伯維和部隊是無法實現的；傀儡政府是不可想象的。如果以色列摧毀加沙的哈馬斯並撤出，誰知道會有什麼破壞性力量來填補留下的真空呢？

Israeli
strategists must therefore start thinking about how to create the
conditions for life alongside the Palestinians, however remote that
seems today. All those elements may have a part: a short period of
martial law in Gaza, a search for Palestinian leaders acceptable to both
sides, and the good offices of Arab intermediaries. The only way to
eradicate Hamas is for Israel and its Arab allies to create
stability—and, one day, peace. ■

因此，以色列的戰略家們必須開始考慮如何為與巴勒斯坦人共同生活創造條件，無論這在今天看來多麼遙遠。所有這些因素都有可能發揮作用：在加沙實行短期戒嚴、尋找雙方都能接受的巴勒斯坦領導人以及阿拉伯中間人的斡旋。根除哈馬斯的唯一途徑是以色列及其阿拉伯盟友創造穩定–有朝一日，創造和平。■