譯者 | 黃 堯 隆德大學研究生
一審 | LYJ NUS LLM
二審 | 李睿恆 澳門科技大學 Master of Laws
編輯 | 劉一賢 國際關係學院本科
扎恩哈爾 新疆農業大學本科
責編 | 馬語謙 武漢理工大學本科
The University of Chicago Law Review Volume 91.2, Number 10 | March 2024
《芝加哥大學法律評論》第91卷第2期第10篇
Parents in Fact
事實父母
Douglas NeJaime
The Restatement of Children and the Law, protects a child’s relationship with a “de facto parent”—a person who has “established a bonded and dependent relationship with the child that is parental in nature.” De facto parent doctrines are part of a broader category of functional parent doctrines that extend parental rights to an individual who has developed a parent-child relationship and acted as a parent to the child. Application of the de facto parent doctrine depends on a conclusion that the person formed a parental relationship, and yet debate remains over whether the person is a parent or merely a third-party nonparent.
《兒童與法律重述》（The Restatement of Children and the Law）保護兒童與“事實父母”（de facto parent）之間的關係，事實父母是“與兒童建立了親子性質的聯絡和依賴關係”的人。事實父母原則是功能父母（functional parent）原則的更廣泛類別的一部分，該原則將父母權利擴充套件到已經建立親子關係並充當兒童父母的個人。事實父母原則的應用取決於此人是否建立了父母關係的結論，但關於此人是父母還是僅僅是非父母第三人，仍然存在爭議。
This Essay examines the Restatement’s full-throated embrace of a de facto parent doctrine—an immensely important development—in the context of family law’s evolving treatment of functional parents. In the past, family law generally cast functional parents as nonparents. For example, a 1995 state court decision, on which the Restatement relies, treated a de facto parent as a third party entitled merely to visitation with the child she had raised. More recently, family law has grown to see functional parents as parents. Common law doctrines have regarded de facto parents as entitled to the rights and responsibilities of parenthood, and a growing number of states have adopted statutory provisions that treat functional parents as legal parents.
本文在家庭法對功能父母處理方式的演變背景下，探討了《重述》對事實父母原則的全力支援——這是一項極其重要的發展。過去，家庭法通常將功能父母視為非父母。例如，《重述》所依據的一項1995年州法院裁決將事實父母視為第三人，僅有權探望她撫養的孩子。最近，家庭法逐漸將功能父母視為父母。普通法原則認為事實父母有權享有為人父母的權利和責任，越來越多的州通過了將功能父母視為法定父母的法定條款。
(圖片源於網路)
The Restatement’s approach to de facto parents reflects these developments. Even as the Restatement begins by locating de facto parents in a framework designed around conflicts between legal parents and third parties, it distinguishes de facto parents in ways that render them, both conceptually and legally, like parents. In deed, the Restatement pushes well beyond the American Law Institute’s earlier endorsement of a de facto parent doctrine—the 2002 Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, which recognized de facto parents but consigned them to an inferior legal status.
《重述》對事實父母的認定方法反映了這些發展。儘管《重述》首先將事實父母置於圍繞法定父母和第三人之間的衝突而設計的框架中，但它以某種方式將事實父母作出劃分，使事實父母在概念上和法律上都像父母一樣。事實上，《重述》遠遠超出了美國法協會早先認可的事實父母原則——2002年的《家庭解體法原則》（the 2002 Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution），該原則承認事實父母，但賦予他們較低的法律地位。
After situating the Restatement’s approach to de facto parents within broader family law developments, this Essay explores how the evolving status of functional parents—from nonparent to parent—matters to constitutional understandings of the parent-child relationship. To account for the fundamental right of parents to direct their children’s upbringing, including by excluding third parties, the Restatement requires a de facto parent to show that “a parent consented to and fostered the formation of the parent-child relationship between the individual and the child.” This consent-based approach to de facto parenthood proceeds from an assumption that a functional parent is a third party who, based not only on their conduct but also on the conduct of an existing legal parent, can transcend that third-party status.
本文將《重述》對事實父母的認定方法置於更廣泛的家庭法發展中，探討了功能父母地位從非父母到父母的演變，如何影響對親子關係的憲法性理解。為了說明父母指導子女成長的基本權利，包括排除第三人，《重述》要求事實父母證明“父母同意並促進了個人與子女之間親子關係的形成”。這種基於同意的事實父母身份的認定方法，源於這樣一種假設：功能父母的第三人身份不僅基於他們的行為，還基於現有法定父母的行為，其是可以超越第三人身份的第三人。
(圖片源於網路)
Yet, seeing de facto parents as parents prompts skepticism of this constitutionally grounded consent requirement. Such skepticism is reflected in law, as courts have resisted a restrictive application of the requirement, and newly enacted statutory doctrines have explicitly softened the requirement. Further, the fact that other functional parent doctrines, including those that yield legal parentage, do not expressly require parental consent suggests that consent is not a constitutional requirement. More broadly, the focus on consent obscures the constitutional interests of the functional parent, who, like other parents, may have a constitutional claim to parental recognition.
然而，將事實父母視為父母引發了人們對這一以憲法為依據的同意要求的懷疑。這種懷疑反映在法律中，因為法院一直反對嚴格適用這一要求，而新頒佈的法定原則也明確放寬了這一要求。此外，其他功能父母原則，包括那些產生法定親子關係的原則，都沒有明確要求父母同意，這表明同意並不是一項憲法要求。更廣泛地說，對同意的關注掩蓋了功能父母的憲法利益，他們與其他父母一樣，有權要求獲得父母關係的認可。
引言
Restatement of Law: the title suggests that this document simply describes the law. Of course, this is not exactly what a restatement does. A restatement self-consciously makes choices “about how the law is restated.” It seeks to clarify the law. It chooses positions among different approaches on questions about which jurisdictions are divided. In an attempt to produce “more coherence in the law,” a restatement supplies principled reasons for supporting one or another position on a contested question. At base, a restatement purports to give the best account of the law in a particular area.
法律重述：這一標題表明該檔案只是描述了法律。當然，這並不是重述完全準確的作用。重述自覺地選擇“如何重述法律”。它試圖澄清法律。它在司法權存在分歧的問題上，從不同的認定方法中選擇立場。為了使法律“更加連貫”，重述提供了原則性的理由來支援有爭議問題上的一個或另一個立場。從根本上講，重述旨在對特定領域的法律做出最佳說明。
The Restatement of Children and the Law (Restatement) does this. It gives an account—a comprehensive and compelling one—of the law governing children. But the Restatement does more than this. It captures law in motion. Nowhere is that motion more evident than in the Restatement’s treatment of the parent-child relationship. We are in the midst of deep and important shifts in our understanding of what constitutes a parent-child relationship worthy of the law’s protection. The Restatement not only identifies these shifts; it participates in them.
《兒童與法律重述》（《重述》）就是如此。它對有關兒童的法律進行了全面而令人信服的闡述。但《重述》所做的不止於此。它捕捉了法律的動態。在《重述》對親子關係的處理中，這種動態最為明顯。我們對什麼是值得法律保護的親子關係的理解，正在發生深刻而重要的轉變。《重述》不僅確定了這些轉變，還參與其中。
(圖片源於網路)
The Restatement includes provisions that protect a child’s relationship with a “de facto parent”—a person who has “established a bonded and dependent relationship with the child that is parental in nature.” De facto parents are part of a broader category of functional parents. A range of doctrines—common law, equitable, and statutory—extend parental rights to an individual based on evidence that the individual developed a parent-child relationship and acted as a parent to the child.
《重述》包含保護兒童與“事實父母”關係的條款，事實父母是指“與兒童建立了親子性質的聯絡和依賴關係”的人。事實父母是更廣泛的功能父母類別的一部分。普通法、衡平法和成文法的一系列原則將父母權利擴充套件到個人，前提是證據顯示此個人建立了親子關係並充當了孩子的父母。
The Restatement’s embrace of de facto parenthood is immensely important. About two-thirds of all U.S. jurisdictions have a functional parent doctrine—meaning a significant number still do not. Debate over these doctrines has grown in recent years. Scholars have largely supported the doctrines, but recent work has expressed skepticism. Advocates promoting progressive family law reform have embraced functional parent doctrines, yet resistance from some family law attorneys and domestic violence advocates has arisen. In the midst of this ongoing debate, the American Law Institute’s (ALI) strong endorsement of de facto parenthood is significant.
《重述》對事實父母身份的認可是極其重要的。美國約有三分之二的司法管轄區都提出了功能父母原則，這意味著仍有相當一部分司法管轄區沒有應用這一原則。近年來，關於這些原則的爭論愈演愈烈。學者們大多支援這些原則，但最近的研究對其也表示懷疑。推動漸進式家庭法改革的倡導者已經接受了功能父母原則，但來自一些家庭法律師和家庭暴力倡導者的抵制意見也在增加。在這場持續的爭論中，美國法律協會（ALI）對事實父母身份的強烈支援非常重要。
This Essay examines family law’s evolving understanding of functional parenthood through the lens of the Restatement. Application of the de facto parent doctrine depends on a conclusion that the person formed a parental relationship. Yet, the person’s status as a parent remains in question. Is a de facto parent a parent, or a nonparent acting as a parent? In other words, is a de facto parent an imposter or the real thing?
本文透過《重述》的視角，探討了家庭法對功能父母身份不斷發展的理解。事實父母原則的應用取決於一個結論，即此人形成了父母關係。然而，此人作為父母的身份仍然存在疑問。事實父母是父母，還是充當父母的非父母？換句話說，事實父母是冒名頂替者還是真正的父母？
As this Essay shows, the Restatement’s position on the status of de facto parents reflects—and moves forward—an emergent view of functional parents as parents. In the past, family law generally cast functional parents as third parties, valuing the caregiving they provided but maintaining their identity as nonparents and limiting the rights they could claim. Over time, though, family law has grown to see functional parents more as parents—respecting the important role they play in children’s lives and treating them as equally entitled to custody as legal parents.
正如本文所述，《重述》對事實父母地位的立場反映並向前推進了一種新興的觀點，即將功能父母視為父母。過去，家庭法通常將功能父母視為第三人，重視他們提供的照顧，但維持他們作為非父母的身份，並限制他們可以主張的權利。然而，隨著時間的推移，家庭法逐漸將功能父母視為父母——尊重他們在子女生活中扮演的重要角色，並將他們視為與法定父母一樣享有同等監護權的人。
(圖片源於網路)
Indeed, the recent trend in state law has been to extend legal parentage to functional parents. While the Restatement addresses de facto parents as part of its treatment of third-party custody and visitation, it distinguishes de facto parents from ordinary third parties, both conceptually and substantively. Ultimately, it regards de facto parents as parents and grants them the rights and responsibilities of parenthood.
事實上，州法律的最新趨勢是將法定親子關係擴大到功能父母。雖然《重述》將事實父母作為其處理第三人監護權和探視權的一部分，但它在概念和實質上都將事實父母與普通第三人區分開來。最終，它將事實父母視為父母，並賦予他們為人父母的權利和責任。
In examining the Restatement’s approach to de facto parents, this Essay also revisits and reassesses constitutional assumptions that have long structured de facto parent doctrines. The Restatement begins from the well-worn premise that parents enjoy a fundamental right to direct their children’s upbringing. After the Supreme Court’s decision in Troxel v. Granville, which struck down a third-party visitation statute as applied to a grandparent petition, the entailments of parental rights have been extensively analyzed with respect to third-party custody and visitation.
在研究《重述》對事實父母的態度時，本文還重新審視和重新評估了長期以來構成事實父母原則的憲法假設。《重述》從父母享有指導子女成長的基本權利這一老生常談的前提開始。最高法院在特羅克塞爾訴格蘭維爾（Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000)）一案中推翻了適用於祖父母申請的第三人探視規定，此後，父母權利的含義在第三人監護權和探視權方面得到了廣泛分析。
Courts have distinguished disputes between legal parents and true third parties from disputes between legal parents and individuals who have functioned as parents. In the former, courts have required deference to the legal parent’s wishes. In the latter, courts have generally determined, in the words of the Washington Supreme Court, that “Troxel does not establish that recognition of a de facto parentage right infringes on the liberty interests of a [legal] parent.”
法院區分了法定父母與真正第三人之間的糾紛和法定父母與充當父母的個人之間的糾紛。在前者中，法院要求尊重法定父母的意願。在後者中，用華盛頓最高法院的話來說，法院通常裁定：“特羅克塞爾案並未確立承認事實上的親子關係權利會侵犯[法定]父母的自由權益。”
De facto parent doctrines have typically accounted for the rights of legal parents by requiring that the parental relationship between the de facto parent and the child formed with the legal parent’s consent. Accordingly, the Restatement requires a de facto parent to show that “a parent consented to and fostered the formation of the parent-child relationship between the individual and the child.” This consent-based approach to de facto parenthood proceeds from an assumption that a functional parent is a third party who, through their conduct and the conduct of the legal parent, can transcend that third-party status.
事實父母原則通常透過要求事實父母與孩子之間的親子關係是在法定父母同意的情況下形成的，來解釋法定父母的權利。因此，《重述》要求事實父母證明“父母一方同意並促進了個人與孩子之間親子關係的形成”。這種基於同意的事實父母身份認定方法源於這樣的假設，即功能父母是第三方，透過他們的行為和法定父母的行為，可以超越第三人身份。
But what if we viewed the de facto parent simply as a parent, like any other parent? What, then, is the justification for requiring another parent’s consent to the parent-child relationship? What might we learn from other functional parent doctrines, such as the “holding out” presumption of parentage, which do not expressly require parental consent? Going further, why does a functional parent not also possess interests of constitutional magnitude, including an interest in being treated as a parent? As this Essay suggests, in light of the evolving status of functional parents, these questions merit serious consideration.
但是，如果我們將事實父母僅僅視為與任何其他父母一樣的父母呢？那麼，要求另一名父母同意親子關係的理由是什麼？我們可以從其他不明確要求父母同意的功能父母原則（如“自稱型”親子關係推定）中學到什麼？更進一步說，為什麼功能父母不具有憲法層面的利益，包括被視為父母的利益？正如本文所述，鑑於功能父母地位的不斷變化，這些問題值得認真考慮。
結論
In this Essay, I have traced how the status of de facto parents has shifted from nonparent to parent. Yet, as we have seen, that shift has been partial and is incomplete. In fact, the very terms used to describe these individuals suggest as much. They are not simply parents but de facto parents or functional parents. Their status is stipulated and constructed, as if they are not truly parents.
在本文中，我追溯了事實父母身份是如何從非父母轉變為父母的。然而，正如我們所見，這種轉變是區域性的，也是不完整的。事實上，用來描述這些個體的術語本身就表明了這一點。他們不只是父母，而是事實父母或功能父母。他們的身份是被規定和建構的，彷彿他們不是真正的父母。
Yet, they are doing the critical work of parenting. Indeed, their very status as parents flows from the fact that they are parenting. That is, their legal status is being constructed in ways that emphasize parental acts—the person functioning as a parent (functional parent), the parent in fact (de facto parent), the person standing in the place of a parent (in loco parentis). It seems more appropriate to see these individuals not as imposters but as the best examples of the real thing, often stepping up to devote themselves to parenting children who are especially vulnerable.
然而，他們正在做著養育子女的重要工作。事實上，他們作為父母的身份源於他們養育子女的事實。也就是說，他們的法律地位是以強調為人父母的行為的方式建構的——作為父母發揮作用的人（功能父母）、現實中的父母（事實父母）、代替父母的人（代父母）。似乎更合適的做法不是將這些個體視為冒名頂替者，而是將他們視為真正的父母的最佳典範，他們經常挺身而出，全心全意地養育特別弱勢的孩子。
(圖片源於網路)
If one were to look solely at contemporary commentary, one might conclude that nonbiological parents in same-sex couples are the primary target of functional parent doctrines. Indeed, many of the cases that have garnered the most attention—including the Wisconsin, New Jersey, and Washington decisions discussed above—involved same-sex couples. Yet, as Joslin and I have shown in our study of functional parent decisions, same-sex couples are not the doctrines’ primary beneficiaries. Instead, the doctrines are serving families that depart from the conventional norms of the two-parent, nuclear family.
如果只看當代評論，人們可能會得出這樣的結論，即同性伴侶中的非親生父母是功能父母原則的主要目標。事實上，許多最受關注的案件——包括上文提到的威斯康星州、新澤西州和華盛頓州的裁決——都涉及同性伴侶。然而，正如喬斯林（Joslin）和我在我們對功能父母裁決的研究中所指出的那樣，同性伴侶並不是該原則的主要受益者。相反，該原則是為那些背離傳統的雙親核心家庭規範的家庭服務。
Many functional parents are family members who step in to parent a child when an existing legal parent is unwilling or unable. Of the 669 decisions in our dataset, 242 involve relatives. This constitutes 36% of the cases. Grandparents constitute two thirds of these cases. Among the seventy-two cases in which the court recognized a grandparent as a functional parent, in all but one the grandparent was serving as the child’s primary caregiver at the time the proceeding was initiated. In all but four of the seventy-two cases, no legal parent was serving as the child’s primary caregiver at the time of the proceeding. Courts routinely apply functional parent doctrines to protect the child’s relationship with the person who is in fact parenting them.
許多功能父母都是在現有的法定父母不願或不能撫養孩子時介入撫養孩子的家庭成員。在我們資料集的669項裁決中，有242項涉及親屬。這些案件佔比36%。祖父母佔這些案件的三分之二。在法院承認祖父母為功能父母的72起案件中，除一起案件外，祖父母在提起訴訟時都是孩子的主要照顧者。在這72起案件中，除4起案件外，法定父母在提起訴訟時都不是孩子的主要照顧者。法院經常適用功能父母原則來保護孩子與實際撫養他們的人之間的關係。
Given the circumstances facing these families, it seems especially critical to recognize the child’s primary caregiver as a functional parent. Individuals are forming parent-child relationships in response to their families’ struggles with substance use disorders, physical and mental health challenges, incarceration, housing insecurity, and poverty. Many of these families are subject to child welfare intervention. In such cases, courts can safeguard the child’s relationship with their primary caregiver and prevent their removal into state custody.
考慮到這些家庭面臨的情況，承認孩子的主要照顧者是功能父母似乎尤為重要。個體正在建立親子關係，以應對他們的家庭在藥物使用障礙、身體和精神健康挑戰、監禁、住房不安全和貧困方面的掙扎。許多這樣的家庭都受到兒童福利的干預。在這種情況下，法院可以保護孩子與其主要照顧者的關係，並防止他們被移交給州監護。
Ultimately, our comprehensive review of functional parent decisions shows how families that have been marginalized—both in our society and in legal commentary on the family—are shaping legal understandings of parenthood. From this perspective, we see increasing awareness that parenthood is a practice. Amid the challenges of daily life, parenthood emerges from the consistent work of care and the assumption of responsibility.
最終，我們對功能父母裁決的全面梳理表明，無論是在我們的社會中，還是在關於家庭的法律評論中，被邊緣化的家庭正如何塑造對為人父母的法律理解。從這個角度來看，我們看到人們越來越意識到為人父母是一種實踐。在日常生活的挑戰中，為人父母源於持續的照顧工作和承擔責任。
(圖片源於網路)
If we were to look only at the most prominent legal authorities—the output of the ALI and the Uniform Law Commission, legal scholarship, and cases that garner the most attention—we would not fully appreciate the vital role that functional parent doctrines, like de facto parenthood, play in the lives of vulnerable children. We would not see how many grandparents and aunts and uncles are parents. We would not see how many stepparents and unmarried partners are parents. We would not fully apprehend the ways in which courts are recognizing these parents.
如果我們只看最重要的法律權威——美國法律學會和統一法律委員會（Uniform Law Commission）的成果、法律學術和最受關注的案例——我們將無法充分認識到功能父母原則（如事實父母身份）在弱勢兒童生活中發揮的重要作用。我們不會看到有多少祖父母、姑姑和叔叔是父母。我們不會看到有多少繼父母和未婚伴侶是父母。我們不會完全理解法院承認這些父母的路徑。
In the end, we should call them what they are: parents.
歸根結底，我們應該稱他們為：父母。
原文連結：
https://lawreview.uchicago.edu/print-archive/parents-fact