判例譯析｜市場實踐與不可撼動的成文法間的衝突：西棕櫚灘消防員養老基金訴Moelis&公司案

譯者 | 張軒康奈爾大學 LLM

審稿 | 陳飛越愛丁堡大學

Ellen 康奈爾大學 LLM

編輯 | 崔雪天津師範大學法學本科

Izzy 西北大學 LLM

責編 | Susan 中國政法大學研究生

★

West Palm Beach Firefighters’ Pension Fund v. Moelis & Company[1]

西棕櫚灘消防員養老基金訴Moelis &公司案

Factual Background

案件背景

According to Section 141(a) of the Delaware General Corporation Law, directors have the authority to manage or direct the business and affairs of the corporation. The rights granted by this provision give rise to the obligation and responsibility of directors to manage the corporation’s business and affairs for the benefit of all investors, guided by the Business Judgment Rule. Under this principle, directors must exercise their powers with reasonable care and in good faith to ensure their decisions align with the best interests of the corporation.

根據《特拉華州公司法》(Delaware General Corporation Law)第141(a)條規定，董事有權管理或指導公司的業務和事務。該條賦予的董事權利衍生出了董事應當為了公司所有投資者的利益，以商業判斷規則(Business Judgment Rule)審慎管理公司業務和事務的義務和責任。

In 2007, Moelis formed a new boutique investment bank. He has run the business ever since as CEO and Chairman. The bank enjoyed immediate success and expanded globally. By 2013, it was generating over $400 million in annual revenue.

2007年，Moelis 成立了一家新的精品投資銀行。自成立以來，他一直擔任該公司的執行長兼董事長。該銀行迅速取得成功，並在全球範圍內擴充套件。到2013年，其年收入已超過4億美元。

In 2014, Moelis decided to raise capital by selling shares to the public. He created the Moelis & Company (the “Company”) to effectuate the IPO.

2014年，Moelis 決定透過向公眾出售股份來募集資本，並設立了Moelis &公司（以下簡稱“公司”）以實施首次公開募股。

The IPO prospectus disclosed that Moelis and the Company would enter into a stockholders agreement. One day before the Company’s shares began trading, the Company and three of Moelis’s controlled affiliates executed it (the “Stockholders Agreement”). That agreement contains the Challenged Provisions.

在IPO招股說明書中披露，Moelis 和公司將訂立一份股東協議。在公司股份開始交易的前一天，公司與Moelis控制的三家關聯公司簽署了該協議（下稱“股東協議”）。該協議包含了原告質疑的條款（下稱“爭議條款”）。

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The agreement provided Moelis and his controlled affiliates with substantial governance control over the Company. Specifically, the agreement required that the Board:

股東協議賦予了Moelis及其控制的關聯公司對公司重大治理事項的實質性控制權。具體而言，協議要求董事會：

(i) receive Moelis’ prior written consent before undertaking eighteen specified categories of corporate actions, such as incurring debt over certain amounts, issuing preferred stock or issuing equity or equity-related securities over certain amounts, removing or appointing certain officers, entering into or amending material contracts, or amending governance documents (the “Pre-Approval Requirements”);

(i) 在採取18種特定型別的公司行動之前，須事先獲得Moelis的書面同意，例如超過特定金額的債務融資、發行優先股或超過特定金額的股權或與股權相關的證券、任免特定高管、簽訂或修改重大合同，或修改治理檔案（以下簡稱“事前批准要求”）；

(ii) maintain its size at no more than 11 directors (the “Size Requirement”);

(ii) 將董事會規模維持在不超過11名董事（以下簡稱“規模要求”）；

(iii) nominate Moelis’ director designees for election to the Board (the “Nomination Requirement”);

(iii) 提名Moelis指定的董事人選參加董事會選舉（以下簡稱“提名要求”）；

(iv) recommend that the Company’s stockholders vote in favor of Moelis’ director designees (the “Recommendation Requirement”);

(iv) 建議公司股東投票支援Moelis的董事指定人選（以下簡稱“推薦要求”）；

(v) fill any vacancy in a Board seat held by a Moelis director designee with a new Moelis director designee (the “Vacancy Requirement”);

(v) 在Moelis董事指定人佔據的董事會席位出現空缺時，由新的Moelis董事指定人填補該空缺（以下簡稱“空缺要求”）；

(vi) appoint a number of Moelis director designees in proportion to the number of Moelis directors designees on the full Board to each committee of the Board (the “Committee Composition Provision”).

(vi) 在董事會的各委員會中，按Moelis董事指定人在整個董事會中的比例任命Moelis董事指定人（以下簡稱“委員會組成條款”）。

The agreement also permitted Moelis to designate directors for a majority of the Board seats (the “Designation Right”) and required that the Company use reasonable efforts to cause Moelis’ designees to be elected to the Board (the “Efforts Requirement”).

此外，該協議還允許Moelis指定佔多數董事會席位的董事（以下簡稱“指定權”），並要求公司盡合理努力促使Moelis指定的董事當選為董事會成員（以下簡稱“努力要求”）。

West Palm Beach Firefighters’ Pension Fund (the “Plaintiff”) purchased shares of the Company’s Class A common stock on November 19, 2014. He filed this action on March 13, 2023. The Plaintiff contends that the Challenged Provisions are invalid and unenforceable under Section 141(a) and, in one circumstance (the Committee Composition Provision), Section 141(c)(2) of the DGCL. The Company answered the complaint, and the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.

西棕櫚灘消防員養老基金（以下簡稱“原告”）於2014年11月19日購買了公司的A類普通股，並於2023年3月13日提起了本案訴訟。原告主張，根據《特拉華州公司法》第141(a)條、第141(c)(2)條（在關於組成董事委員會的條款規定的其中一種情形中），股東協議中的爭議條款無效且不可執行。公司對訴狀做出了答覆，雙方均提交了簡易判決動議。

Issue

爭議焦點

Is the Challenged Provisions in the Stockholders Agreement valid?

股東協議中的爭議條款是否有效？

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Reasoning

法官論述

The immovable statutory object is Section 141(a) of the Delaware General Corporation Law (the “DGCL”). That provision famously states that “the business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation.” This is the source of Delaware’s board-centric model of corporate governance. Internal corporate governance arrangements that do not appear in the charter and deprive boards of a significant portion of their authority contravene Section 141(a). The Delaware courts have regularly considered challenges to contractual governance arrangements under Section 141(a) and have frequently invalidated arrangements that improperly constrain a board’s authority.

《特拉華州公司法》第141(a)條規定：“根據本法組織的各公司的業務和事務應當由董事會管理或在董事會的指導下進行，除非本法或公司章程另有規定。” 這構成了特拉華州董事會中心主義公司治理模式的法律依據。如果公司治理安排並未在公司章程中列明，並且剝奪了董事會的重大權力，則違反了第141(a)條。特拉華州法院經常依據第141(a)條審理有關合同性公司治理安排的案件，並經常否定那些不當限制董事會權力的安排。

Crashing into this traditionally immovable object is the seemingly irresistible force of market practice. Corporate planners now regularly implement internal governance arrangements through stockholder agreements. The new wave of stockholder agreements does not involve stockholders contracting among themselves to address how they will exercise their stockholder-level rights. The new-wave agreements contain extensive veto rights and other restrictions on corporate action.

而市場實踐這股看似不可抗拒的力量與傳統中認為的不可撼動的成文法相沖突。如今，公司規劃者經常透過股東協議來實施公司治理安排。這類新興的股東協議不再僅僅是股東之間的協議，用於規範他們如何行使股東層面的權利。相反，這些新式股東協議包含了對公司行為的廣泛性否決權以及其他限制。

The plaintiff advances a straightforward argument. Under Chancellor Seitz’s seminal decision in Abercrombie v. Davies, governance restrictions violate Section 141(a) when they “have the effect of removing from directors in a very substantial way their duty to use their own best judgment on management matters” or “tend[ ] to limit in a substantial way the freedom of director decisions on matters of management policy ….” The Delaware Supreme Court has repeatedly endorsed the Abercrombie test. This court has repeatedly applied it.

原告提出了一個直接的論點。根據法官Chancellor Seitz在Abercrombie v. Davies案件中的重要判決，當對公司的治理限制“實質性地剝奪董事在管理事務中使用最佳判斷的責任”或“實質性地限制董事在管理政策事務上的決策自由”時，這些限制便違反了第141(a)條規定。特拉華州最高法院多次支援上述Abercrombie測試，本法院也多次適用這一標準。

The plaintiff says the Challenged Provisions fail that test. The Pre-Approval Requirements mean that Moelis determines what action the Board can take. The directors cannot exercise their own judgment. They must check with Moelis first and can only proceed with his approval. The Board Composition Provisions prevent the directors from using their best judgment when recommending candidates, filling vacancies, and determining the size of the Board. Instead, the directors must keep Moelis in control at the Board-level. And the Committee Composition Provision prevents the directors from exercising discretion when creating committees. Every committee must have the same proportionate number of Moelis’ designees as the full Board.

原告主張，本案中的股東協議爭議條款未能透過這一測試。事前批准要求意味著由Moelis決定董事會可以採取的行動，董事們無法自行判斷，必須先徵詢Moelis的意見，並只能在其批准後繼續進行。董事會組成條款阻止董事們在推薦候選人、填補空缺和確定董事會規模時使用最佳判斷，而是要求董事們確保Moelis在董事會層面保持控制。而委員會組成條款則限制了董事在設立委員會時行使自由裁量權，每個委員會必須與整個董事會一樣，按照相同比例安排Moelis的指定人選。

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The Company offers a one-size-fíts-all response: A contract is a contract is a contract. Delaware corporations possess the power to contract, and contracts necessarily constrain a board’s freedom of action. A corporation that has agreed to an exclusive supply contract cannot freely contract with a different supplier. No one would suggest that an exclusive supply contract violates Section 141(a).

公司提出了一個“一刀切”的回應：合同即是合同。特拉華州公司具有訂立合同的權力，而合同必然會限制董事會的行動自由。一家同意簽署排他性供應合同的公司，不能自由地與其他供應商簽訂合同。沒有人會認為排他性供應合同違反了第141(a)條的規定。

Not only that, but Delaware corporations can enter into commercial contracts that constrain specific acts otherwise entrusted to the board. Under a credit agreement, for example, declaring a dividend or buying back stock can be events of default. Both are board level decisions, so those provisions limit the board’s freedom of action.

不僅如此，特拉華州公司還可以訂立商業合同，從而限制董事會本應處理的具體事務。例如，在信貸協議下，宣佈派發股息或回購股票可能被視為違約事件。雖然這些都是董事會層面的決定，但這些條款確實限制了董事會的行動自由。

Yet both are legitimate protections for a lender to demand. The Company jumps to the conclusion that a court cannot differentiate between an internal governance arrangement and an external commercial contract. Because differentiation is impossible, either all contracts fail under Section 141(a) or none do. Contracting is critical to capitalism. To defend the citadel of contract, Section 141(a) must yield.

然而，這些都是貸款方合理要求的合法保護措施。公司得出結論，認為法院無法區分內部治理安排與外部商業合同，所以，要麼所有合同都在第141(a)條下失效，要麼沒有任何合同失效。合同的簽訂對於資本主義至關重要。為了捍衛合同這一堡壘，第141(a)條必須讓步。

The parties entered into the Stockholder Agreement just before the Company’s shares started trading publicly, after Moelis reorganized the entity structure of his business to facilitate the public offering. The only parties to the contract are the Company, Moelis, and three entities he controls. The Challenged Provisions resemble the type of governance rights associated with preferred stock. With limited exceptions, the Challenged Provisions are drafted to bind the Board, not the Company.

在公司股票開始公開交易之前，雙方簽訂了《股東協議》。此時，Moelis已經重組了其業務的實體結構，以促成此次公開發行。合同的簽署方僅包括公司、Moelis及其控制的三個實體。爭議條款類似於優先股所附帶的治理權利，除了少數例外情況外，這些條款是針對董事會而非公司的約束。

The Stockholder Agreement is not tied to any underlying commercial transaction. It is an indefinite agreement that the Board cannot terminate. The Stockholder Agreement only lapses if Moelis takes action that causes one or more conditions to fail.

該《股東協議》並未與任何基礎商業交易相關聯，而是一個無限期的協議，董事會無法終止。只有當Moelis採取行動使一個或多個條件失效時，《股東協議》才會終止。

The Challenged Provisions are therefore part of an internal governance arrangement. That makes them subject to Section 141(a). The question then becomes whether the Challenged Provisions violate the Abercrombie test. The plaintiff challenges the Pre-Approval Requirements individually and collectively. This decision only reaches the collective challenge. Taken together, the Pre-Approval Requirements force the Board to obtain Moelis’ prior written consent before taking virtually any meaningful action.

因此，爭議條款屬於內部治理安排，使其受到第141(a)條的約束。問題隨之變為這些條款是否違反了Abercrombie測試。原告分別從個體和整體上對事前批准要求提出質疑，本判決僅處理整體質疑。綜合來看，事前批准要求迫使董事會在採取任何實質性行動前，必須獲得Moelis的事先書面同意。

With the Pre-Approval Requirements in place, the Board is not really a board. The directors only manage the Company to the extent Moelis gives them permission to do so. This decision need not consider whether some lesser combination of rights might pass muster under Section 141(a). The Pre-Approval Requirements go too far.

在這種安排下，董事會實際上無法真正行使職能，董事們只能在Moelis允許的範圍內管理公司。因此，本判決無需考慮某些較輕微的權利組合是否能透過第141(a)條的測試。本案爭議條款中的事前批准要求的限制過於嚴苛。

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The Company responds that the Pre-Approval Requirements do not prevent the Board from exercising its powers because Moelis only has veto rights. That is not true. Moelis has preapproval rights. The Board cannot approve, authorize, or even plan to take a covered action without Moelis’ prior written approval. The Board cannot freely exercise its powers; it must go to Moelis first.

公司回應稱，事前批准要求並未阻止董事會行使其權力，因為Moelis僅擁有否決權。然而，這並不屬實。Moelis擁有的是事前批准權，董事會不能在未經Moelis事先書面批准的情況下批准、授權，甚至計劃採取任何涵蓋的行動。董事會無法自由行使其權力，必須首先徵求Moelis的意見。

Admittedly Moelis does not have the psychic power to control the directors’ thoughts and manipulate their actions. Thankfully, technology of that sort does not yet exist. But that does not mean the Board can freely exercise its powers. The directors can only act freely when they do what Moelis wants. Otherwise, they cannot act.

誠然，Moelis並沒有控制董事思想並操縱其行動的超能力，但這並不意味著董事會可以自由行使其權力。只有當董事們做Moelis希望他們做的事時，他們才能自由行動，否則他們將無法採取任何行動。

In any event, rewriting the Pre-Approval Requirements as vetoes would not change anything. If framed as eighteen vetoes, the provisions still would give Moelis the ability to block virtually anything the Board might do.

即使將事前批准要求改寫為否決權，也不會改變任何實質性內容。如果將其設定為十八項否決權，這些條款仍會賦予Moelis有能力阻止董事會可能做的任何事情。

The Board would be in the same position as a management team who proposes options for a board to review and approve. With Moelis holding the eighteen vetoes, the Board would propose options for Moelis to review and approve. “[T]he power to review is the power to decide.” Here, Moelis has expansive power to review, which gives him the power to decide.

董事會的地位將與管理團隊類似，提出選項供董事會審查和批准。而在這種情況下，Moelis持有十八項否決權，董事會則是提出選項供Moelis審查和批准。正如所言，“審查的權力即是決定的權力”。在此，Moelis擁有廣泛的審查權，從而賦予他決定權。

Because of the Pre-Approval Requirements, the business and affairs of the Company are managed under the direction of Moelis, not the Board. The Pre-Approval Requirements therefore violate Section 141(a).

由於事前批准要求，公司業務和事務實際上是在Moelis的指示下管理，而非由董事會管理。因此，事前批准要求違反了《特拉華州公司法》第141(a)條的規定。

Three of the Board Composition Provisions violate Section 141(a). The Recommendation Requirement improperly compels the Board to recommend Moelis’ designees for election. The Vacancy Requirement improperly compels the Board to fill a vacancy created by a departing Moelis designee with another Moelis designee. The Size Requirement improperly enables Moelis to prevent the Board from increasing the number of board seats beyond eleven.

股東協議的董事會組成條款中的三項規定違反了《特拉華州公司法》第141(a)條。推薦要求不當地強制董事會推薦Moelis的提名人選參選。空缺要求不當地強制董事會用另一位Moelis提名人選填補離任Moelis提名人選的空缺。規模要求則不當地賦予了Moelis阻止董事會將董事席位數增加到十一席以上的權力。

The Committee Composition Provision violates both Section 141(a) and Section 141(c). Determining the composition of committees falls within the Board’s authority. A stockholder cannot determine who comprises a committee. The Stockholder Agreement purports to give Moelis that power by contract.

委員會組成條款同時違反了《特拉華州公司法》第141(a)和第141(c)條規定。決定委員會的組成屬於董事會的許可權，股東無權決定委員會成員構成。《股東協議》試圖透過合同賦予Moelis該權力，這是不合法的。

The Company argues that the plaintiff’s facial challenge fails nevertheless because these provisions can operate validly as long as Moelis and the Board agree. But when Moelis and the Board agree, the provisions are not operating at all. Directors can freely decide to follow the advice of the corporation’s CEO and Chairman. That is different from being prevented from acting by a contractual provision. The Challenged Provisions only have bite when the Board wants to take action and Moelis disagrees. There is no setting where Moelis could invoke the provisions without triggering a Section 141(a) violation.

公司辯稱，原告的該等全域性性質疑並不成立，因為只要Moelis和董事會達成一致，這些條款就可以有效運作。然而，當Moelis和董事會達成一致時，這些條款根本沒有發揮作用。董事們可以自由決定是否聽從公司執行長兼董事長的建議。這與因合同條款而被阻止行動是不同的。爭議條款僅在董事會希望採取行動而Moelis不同意時才具有約束力。不存在Moelis可以援引這些條款而不觸發第141(a)條違反的情形。

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Three of the Board Composition Provisions do not facially violate Section 141(a). The Designation Right does not violate Section 141(a) because it only permits Moelis to identify a number of candidates for director equal to a majority of the Board. The Company can agree to let Moelis identify a number of candidates. What the Board or the Company does with those candidates is what matters. The Recommendation Requirement improperly compels the Board to support Moelis’ candidates, whomever they might be. But there is nothing wrong with a provision that lets Moelis identify candidates. The Nomination Requirement is also not facially invalid. Moelis could nominate his designees at a stockholder meeting, and the Company can agree through the Nomination Requirement to facilitate that process.

董事會組成條款中的三項在表面上並不違反《特拉華州公司法》第141(a)條。指定權並不違反第141(a)條，因為它僅允許Moelis提名與董事會成員數相等的候選人。公司可以同意讓Moelis提名一定數量的候選人。董事會或公司對這些候選人的處理才是關鍵。推薦要求不當地強制董事會支援Moelis的候選人，無論他們是誰。然而，允許Moelis提名候選人的條款本身並沒有問題。提名要求在表面上也並不無效。Moelis可以在股東會議上提名他的提名人選，而公司透過提名要求同意推進這一過程是合法的。

The Company likewise can agree through the Efforts Requirement to facilitate the election and continued service of Moelis’ designees. Legitimate efforts could involve including their names on a proxy card or providing disclosures about them in its proxy statement. There could be as-applied challenges to the Designation Right, Nomination Requirement, and Efforts Requirement, but not a facial challenge.

公司同樣可以透過努力要求來促進Moelis提名人的選舉和持續任職。合理的努力可以包括在委託投票卡上列出他們的姓名或在委託說明中提供有關他們的披露。雖然對指定權、提名要求和努力要求可能會存在個案適用性上的質疑，但並不存在全域性性的質疑。

Moelis did not have to frame an internal corporate governance arrangement using the Stockholder Agreement. He could have accomplished the vast majority of what he wanted through the Company’s certificate of incorporation (the “Charter”). Even now, the Board could implement many of the Challenged Provisions by using its blank check authority to issue Moelis preferred stock carrying a set of voting rights and director appointment rights. A new class of preferred stock need not upset the Company’s equity allocation; it could consist of a single golden share. The certificate of designations for the new preferred stock would become part of the Charter as a matter of law. At that point, because the provisions would appear in the Charter, they would comply with Section 141(a).

Moelis並不需要透過股東協議來構建內部公司治理安排。他可以透過公司的公司章程實現其絕大多數目的。即使在現在，董事會仍然可以利用其無限權力，發行帶有投票權和董事任命權的Moelis優先股，從而實施許多受到質疑的條款。這一類新的優先股不必影響公司的股權配置；它可以僅由一份黃金股組成。新的優先股的指定證書將依法成為章程的一部分。而因為條款會出現在章程中，它們將符合第141(a)條款的要求。

Although some might find it bizarre that the DGCL would prohibit one means of accomplishing a goal while allowing another, that is what the doctrine of independent legal significance contemplates. Delaware favors private ordering. But the ability to engage in private ordering remains subject to the limitations imposed by the DGCL. Those constraints include Sections 141(a) and (c). Except for the Designation Right, the Nomination Requirement, and the Efforts Requirement, the Challenged Provisions are facially invalid.

儘管《特拉華州公司法》禁止透過股東協議構建公司治理安排，但允許透過公司章程來達到相同的目的是奇怪的，但這正是獨立法律意義原則的意義。特拉華州支援私法秩序。然而，進行私法秩序的能力仍然受到《特拉華州公司法》所施加的限制。這些限制包括第141(a)和(c)條款。因此，除了指定權、提名要求和努力要求外，其餘爭議條款均是無效的。

（圖片源於網路）

On February 23, 2024, the Delaware Court of Chancery invalidated numerous provisions of the Stockholders Agreement between Ken Moelis and the Company. On August 16, 2024, the Company filed a Notice of Appeal, appealing the Court’s decision (among other orders and rulings issued by the Court) to the Delaware Supreme Court. The case is still in the appeal process.

2024年2月23日，特拉華州衡平法院宣佈Ken Moelis與公司的股東協議中大部分條款無效。2024年8月16日，公司向特拉華州最高法院提交了本案的上訴通知書，就衡平法院的裁決（包括法院發出的其他命令及裁決）提出上訴。本案後續仍在上訴過程中。

判決以外

特拉華州衡平法院的這一判決立刻引起了市場的強烈反響。因為類似的股東協議大量出現在風險資本和私募股權投資者間。正如Laster法官所言，這是一項“市場實踐與不可撼動的成文法間的衝突”。

市場迅速反應，美國風險投資協會立刻在公司章程範本中更新了董事會委員會的具體規定。特拉華州律師協會公司法理事會立刻對《特拉華州公司法》進行修正，5月23日相關的修正案由特拉華州參議院作為第313號法案提交給了特拉華州議會。6月20日，特拉華州議會通過了這一法案。特拉華州州長Carney於7月17日簽署，修正案將於8月1日生效。

第313號法案在《特拉華州公司法》第122條中加入了第(18)款，使得類似的股東協議有效。（下附《特拉華州公司法》第122 (18)條原文）

該修正案儘管維持了目前的市場慣例，但卻引來了法學界的擔憂。批評意見指出，第122 (18)條破壞了第141(a)條對董事會授權的傳統限制，影響了特拉華州董事會中心主義公司治理體系的核心；其次，這會導致隱性的雙重資本結構（同股不同權）。先前，希望保留公司控制權的公司創始人需要將這些條款列入公司章程並公之於眾。而第122 (18)條頒佈後，公司可以以單一的資本結構上市，再透過股東協議的方式將公司控制權授予創始人，而不需要任何股東投票。而其他股東僅能透過對董事提起受託義務訴訟(fiduciary duty suit)來保護自身利益。顯然，這對公司的長期投資者並不有利。