譯者 | 彭 懿 加州大學洛杉磯分校法學院 LL.M.
一審 | 劉 寅 UCLA
二審 | 趙文磊 BU
編輯 | 鍾翼飛 國際關係學院
扎恩哈爾 新疆農業大學
責編 | 劉一賢 國際關係學院
USS-POSCO Indus. v. Contra Costa Cnty. Bldg. & Const. Trades Council
AFLCIO
31 F.3d 800 (9th Cir. 1994)
美國工會權利與反壟斷法的平衡：
USS-POSCO Industries 訴 Contra Costa County 建築與建築行業工會委員會
一、基本案情
USS–POSCO Industries (“UPI”) is a joint venture between USX Corporation and Pohang Iron and Steel Co. of South Korea, formed to modernize and operate an old steel facility in Pittsburg, California, PITCAL.
USS–POSCO Industries（簡稱“UPI”）是一家由美國鋼鐵公司（USX Corporation，下稱USX）和韓國浦項制鐵公司（Pohang Iron and Steel Co.）合資成立的企業，旨在對位於加利福尼亞州匹茲堡市的一箇舊鋼鐵設施，PITCAL，進行現代化改造並運營。
Interested unions allegedly attempted to coerce UPI into awarding the general contract to a unionized contractor.After bidding, UPI nevertheless awarded the $350 million construction contract— involving over 800 jobs—to appellant BE&K, a merit-shop [i.e., non-unionized] contractor.BE&K alleges the unions then began a campaign to eliminate non-union construction in Northern California by making an example of PITCAL.
據稱，有關工會試圖強迫 UPI 將總承包合同授予一家“使用工會勞工的承包商”。然而在競標後，UPI 將總金額達3.5億美元的建設合同（涉及 800 多個工作崗位）授予了上訴方 BE&K，這是一家“優異制”（非工會化）承包商。BE&K 聲稱，工會隨後發起了一場運動，試圖將PITCAL作為典型案例，以消除北加利福尼亞州的“非工會建築活動”。
（圖片源於網路）
Although none of the unions had a collective bargaining agreement with BE&K, defendants:
-filed automatic protests to BE&K’s permits in order to cause it gratuitous expense and delay.
-lobbied for a local toxic waste disposal ordinance that would require BE&K to obtain more permits.
-sued to enforce the ordinance at the PITCAL site.
-encouraged BE&K’s subcontractors to protest non-existent safety violations.
-brought suit against BE&K for allegedly violating environmental laws (the Piledrivers suit).
-and brought numerous grievances, arbitrations and enforcement proceedings against BE&K’s partner, Eichleay Constructors, Inc. (the Eichleay actions).
儘管沒有工會與BE&K達成了集體談判協議，被告工會採取了以下行為：
-對BE&K的許可證申請提出自動反對，以造成不必要的費用和延誤；
-進行遊說，促進透過地方有毒廢物處理條例，要求BE&K申請更多許可證；
-提起訴訟，以在PITCAL工地執行上述條例；
-鼓動BE&K的分包商抗議不存在的安全違規行為；
-提起針對BE&K的訴訟，指控其違反環境法律（即“打樁工人訴訟”）；
針對BE&K的合作伙伴 Eichleay Constructors，提起眾多投訴、仲裁和執行程式（即“Eichleay行動”）。
According to BE&K, the unions’ purpose was not to organize BE&K’s employees, but to cause such delay and expense that future project owners would only hire unionized contractors and subcontractors.UPI and BE&K originally brought suit alleging unfair labor practices. But the district court found that the challenged conduct constituted valid attempts to petition the government and were therefore protected by Noerr-Pennington petitioning immunity. BE&K subsequently amended its complaint twice, and some—but not all—of the amended allegations were again dismissed under Noerr-Pennington.
據BE&K聲稱，工會的目的並不是為了組織BE&K的員工，而是為了透過製造延誤和增加費用，使未來的專案主只願意僱傭使用工會勞工的承包商和分包商。UPI 和BE&K最初提起訴訟，指控工會存在不公平的勞動行為。但地區法院裁定，該行為屬於合法的向政府請願，因此受到Noerr-Pennington原則的請願豁免保護。（注：“Noerr-Pennington原則”意指：如果企業或個人在爭取政府的立法、行政或司法行為，進行了正當遊說、請願和訴訟活動，那麼他們不應僅僅因為試圖影響公共政策結果而受到反壟斷法律的追究。換言之，即使相關行為在結果上可能產生減少競爭的效果，只要其本質是對政府部門提出請願、議案或參與公共決策過程，這種行動通常會受到豁免，不被視為《謝爾曼法》或其他反壟斷法規的違法行為。）BE&K隨後兩次修改其投訴，其中一些修改後的指控（但並非全部）再次因Noerr-Pennington 原則的豁免而被駁回。
（圖片源於網路）
The unions then advised the district court they intended to seek partial summary judgment on the antitrust claim on the ground that the surviving allegations involved activities protected by the statutory labor exemption.The court ruled that, in order to overcome the statutory exemption, BE&K would have to prove both a combination with non-labor groups and an illegitimate purpose in such combination.
工會隨後通知地區法院，他們計劃針對反壟斷指控申請部分簡易判決，理由是剩餘的指控涉及受法定勞工豁免保護的行為。
法院裁定，為了推翻法定豁免，BE&K 必須證明以下兩點：1.（工會）與非勞工團體聯合；2.該聯合具有不合法的目的。
二、爭議焦點：
是否滿足了Hutcheson案中提出的兩要素測試
In United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 232 (1941), the Supreme Court held that so long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not combine with non-labor groups, the licit and the illicit are not to be distinguished by any judgment regarding the wisdom or unwisdom, the rightness or wrongness, the selfishness or unselfishness of the end of which the particular union activities are the means.
在 United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 232 (1941) 一案中，法院指出，只要工會的行為符合自身利益，且未與非勞工團體聯合，那麼合法與非法的區分不應基於對這些行為是否明智、正當、自私或無私的判斷。
This passage has been read as establishing a two-prong test for the statutory labor exemption:
(1) Did the union combine with a non-labor group?
(2) Did the union act in its legitimate self-interest?
A key question in this case is whether these two prongs of Hutcheson are to be read in the conjunctive (i.e., that plaintiff must establish both elements in order to get around the exemption), or in the disjunctive (i.e., that plaintiff can bypass the exemption by proving either element)
這一段被解讀為確立了法定勞工豁免的兩要素測試：
(1) 工會是否與非勞工團體聯合？
(2) 工會是否以其合法的自身利益為目標行動？
本案的關鍵在於，Hutcheson案中提出的的兩要素究竟是需要“同時滿足”（即原告必須同時證明兩個要素才能推翻豁免），還是“任一滿足”（即原告只需證明其中一個要素即可推翻豁免）。
（圖片源於網路）
（一）要素一：要被視為“非勞工團體”，該實體必須在與原告相同的市場中具備足夠的獨立運作能力。即便沒有工會參與，該實體也可對原告實施違反反壟斷法的行為
The district court read the Hutcheson test in the conjunctive and granted summary judgment on the antitrust claim because BE&K was unable to establish a triable issue of fact as to the first element—whether the unions had combined with non-labor groups.What co3stitutes a non-labor group for purp3ses of the antitrust laws has never been very clearly defined. It is possible, however, to derive a fair approximation of what the term means based on certain common-sense observations.
地區法院認為Hutcheson測試下兩要素的關係是“需要同時滿足”，並在反壟斷指控作出簡易判決。原因是BE&K未能就第一個要素（工會是否與非勞工團體聯合）提出可審理的事實問題。在反壟斷法中，“非勞工團體”的含義從未被明確界定。不過，可以根據一些常識性的觀察，對這一術語的意義作出合理的推測。
On the one hand, when a labor union combines with an entity that is competing in the plaintiff’s market, this normally is deemed to be a combination with a non-labor group, stripping the union of the statutory labor exemption. Thus, in most statutory labor exemption cases, the focus has been on whether the union combined with a competitor of the targeted employer.
一方面，當工會與原告市場中的競爭者聯合時，這通常會被視為與“非勞工團體”的聯合，從而使工會失去法定勞工豁免。因此，在大多數涉及法定勞工豁免的案件中，爭議的核心在於工會是否與目標僱主的競爭對手聯合。
At the other end of the spectrum, labor unions carrying out their normal functions must be free to hire law firms, contract for lease space and negotiate with other business entities, without risking antitrust liability. Even though many of the entities that unions deal with on a daily basis cannot fairly be described as labor groups, they are not deemed “non-labor groups” for purposes of the statutory labor exemption. Were it otherwise, this requirement—which lies at the heart of the test announced by Hutcheson—would be rendered utterly meaningless in the sense that everything unions do would become a combination with a non-labor group and possibly subject to antitrust liability.
另一方面，工會在履行正常職能時，必須能夠自由地僱傭律師，簽訂租賃合同，與其他商業實體進行談判，而無需承擔反壟斷責任。儘管工會日常接觸的許多實體不能嚴格定義為“勞工團體”，但在法定勞工豁免的語境下，它們也不被視為“非勞工團體”。否則，Hutcheson案確立的這一核心要求將完全失去意義，因為工會的任何行為都可能被視為與非勞工團體的聯合，從而可能受到反壟斷責任的追究。
（圖片源於網路）
BE&K took discovery on this issue and, although the initial order seemed to restrict discovery to BE&K’s competitors, the court subsequently explained that it did not mean to cut off any discovery reasonably designed to identify contractors, manufacturers or other commercial entities with whom the defendants may have formed illegal combinations. This was sufficiently broad to allow BE&K to identify anyone falling under the definition of non-labor group as explicated above, but BE&K has been able to point to no such entity.
BE&K 就此問題進行了證據蒐集。儘管最初的法院命令似乎將證據蒐集範圍限制在BE&K的競爭對手，但法院隨後解釋，這並不意味著禁止任何合理設計的蒐集活動，這些活動旨在識別被告可能與之形成非法聯合的承包商、製造商或其他商業實體。這一範圍足夠廣泛，允許BE&K確定符合上述“非勞工團體”定義的任何實體。然而，BE&K 未能指出任何此類實體。
We therefore agree with the district court that BE&K has failed to raise a material issue of fact as to whether the unions combined with non-labor groups, and therefore did not carry its burden under this prong of the Hutcheson test.
因此，我們同意地區法院的觀點，即 BE&K 未能在工會是否與非勞工團體聯合這一關鍵事實問題上提出實質性爭議，因此未能在Hutcheson測試的這一要素下完成舉證責任。
（二）要素一與要素二的關係：要素一與要素二必須同時滿足，工會才可以獲得法定豁免的保護
In its most recent pronouncement on the subject,, the Supreme Court clearly held that a union that combines only with other labor groups may nonetheless lose the statutory exemption under the second prong of Hutcheson. H.A. Artists & Assocs. v. Actors’ Equity Ass’n, 451 U.S. 704 (1981), involved a challenge under the Sherman Act to certain rules of the Actors’ Equity Union, including the exaction of a franchising fee from theatrical agents licensed by the union.
最高法院在最近一次關於該問題的裁決中明確指出，即使工會僅與其他勞工團體聯合，根據 Hutcheson 測試的第二個要素，它仍可能失去法定豁免的保護。 在 H.A. Artists & Assocs. v. Actors’ Equity Ass’n, 451 U.S. 704 (1981) 一案中，法院審理了演員權益工會（Actors’ Equity Union）的規則是否違反《謝爾曼法》，其中包括工會向其許可的戲劇代理人收取特許費用的行為。
The Supreme Court first inquired whether there was a combination between the union and any “non-labor groups,” or persons who are not “parties to the labor dispute.” The Court found that the theatrical agents were not a “non-labor group” for purposes of the statutory exemption.Had this been sufficient to establish the union’s entitlement to the labor exemption, the Court could have stopped right there.
最高法院首先審查工會是否與任何“非勞工團體”或不屬於“勞動爭議當事方”的個人聯合。法院認定，戲劇代理人在法定豁免範圍內並不構成“非勞工團體”。如果這一點足以證明工會享有勞工豁免，法院本可以到此為止。
（圖片源於網路）
Instead, it proceeded to evaluate whether the union’s activities were undertaken in pursuit of its legitimate self-interest. While it found the union’s activity generally exempt because the regulations were clearly designed to promote the union’s legitimate self interest, it found the fees that the union levied upon the agents might not be a permissible component of the exempt regulatory system. Because no evidence had been presented at trial to show that the costs justified the fees actually levied, the case was remanded for further fact finding.
相反，法院進一步評估了工會的行為是否出於追求其合法自身利益的目的。雖然法院認定工會的活動總體上符合豁免條件，因為相關規定顯然旨在促進工會的合法利益，但法院認為工會向代理人收取的費用可能不是豁免監管體系中合理的一部分。由於審判中沒有提供任何證據證明這些費用與實際成本相符，法院將案件發回進行進一步的事實調查。
Had the Court in H.A Artists eventually approved all aspects of the arrangement between the union and the agents, its examination of the fee structure might have been explainable on a belt-and-suspenders rationale. But the Court found fault with the fee structure—or at least found that there might be fault. Since H.A Artists was an antitrust case, the only possible fault could be a violation of the antitrust laws.We read this as a clear holding that a union may violate the antitrust laws—in other words, that it may lose the benefit of the labor exemption— even when it does not combine with a non-labor group.
如果最高法院在H.A. Artists案中認可了工會與代理人之間的所有安排，那麼對費用結構的審查或許可以用“多重保障”的邏輯來解釋。然而，法院發現費用結構存在問題，或者至少認為可能存在問題。鑑於H.A. Artists是一起反壟斷案件，這一問題唯一可能的原因就是違反了反壟斷法。因此，即使工會未與非勞工團體聯合，它也可能違反反壟斷法——換句話說，工會可能因此失去法定勞工豁免的保護。
（三）要素二：工會的行為必須是為了追求其合法的自身利益，即履行其作為勞動組織的職能
In the broadest sense,everything a union does serves its self-interest. But Hutcheson requires that it act in pursuit of its legitimate self-interest. Whether the interest in question is legitimate depends on whether the ends to be achieved are among the traditional objectives of labor organizations.Thus, if a union forces employers to funnel money into a commercial enterprise from which the union derives profits; or if it forces the employer to hire the union president’s spouse;or if a union is involved in illegal activities unrelated to its mission, such as dealing drugs or gambling, those would not be objectives falling within the union’s legitimate interest. In such cases, the unions cease to act as labor groups.
從最廣泛的意義上來說，工會所做的一切都是為了服務其自身利益。然而，Hutcheson案要求工會的行為必須是為了追求其合法的自身利益。某種利益是否合法，取決於該目標是否屬於工會作為勞動組織的傳統目標範圍。因此，如果工會強迫僱主將資金匯入一個工會從中獲利的商業企業；或者強迫僱主僱傭工會主席的配偶；或者工會參與與其使命無關的非法活動，例如販毒或賭博，這些目標就不屬於工會的合法利益範圍。在這種情況下，工會不再是以勞動團體的身份行事。
The means employed by the union bear on the degree of scrutiny we will cast on the legitimacy of the union’s interest. Thus, where a union engages in activities normally associated with labor disputes, these will be presumed to be in pursuit of the union’s legitimate interest absent a very strong showing to the contrary. Where the union’s activities are farther afield, the scrutiny is more searching.
工會所採取的手段會影響我們對其利益合法性審查的嚴格程度。因此，當工會從事通常與勞動爭議相關的活動時，除非有非常有力的相反證據，否則這些活動將被推定為是在追求工會的合法利益。而當工會的活動偏離勞動爭議的傳統範疇時，審查的嚴格性會顯著提高。
（圖片源於網路）
H.A. Artists casts a highly instructive light on this issue. The activity there—collection of franchise fees from the agents for the direct benefit of union members—was not a traditional union activity; it looked like the union may have been using its bargaining power with theatrical agents to generate a collateral source of revenue. The Court did not say the franchise fees violated the antitrust laws per se, but placed a substantial burden on the union to prove why this method of collecting revenues was not merely convenient but necessary.
H.A. Artists 案對此問題提供了非常重要的指導。該行為是向代理商收取特許經營費，直接使工會成員受益，但這並不屬於傳統的工會活動。這看起來像是工會利用與戲劇代理人的談判權力來創造額外的收入來源。法院並未直接認定這些特許費用本身違反了反壟斷法，但將一項重要的舉證責任施加於工會，要求工會證明這種收入收取方式不僅僅是方便的，而是必要的。
“Without the fees,” the Court reasoned, “the dues of the union’s members would perhaps have to be increased to offset the loss of a general revenue source,”but there was “no reason to believe that any of its legitimate interests would be affected.” The Court’s concern thus seemed to be that the union may have funneled the market power granted to it by the labor laws into a money-making enterprise. That the money would then be used to finance laborrelated activities was not, in the Court’s view, exculpatory, unless the union could show it could not achieve those objectives some other way.
法院推理道：“如果沒有這些費用，工會成員的會費可能需要增加，以彌補收入來源的損失”，但“沒有理由相信這會影響工會的任何合法利益。”因此，法院關注的重點似乎在於，工會可能將勞動法賦予的市場權力引導至一個以營利為目的的業務中。即使這些資金隨後被用於資助與勞動相關的活動，法院認為這也不足以為工會開脫，除非工會能夠證明無法透過其他方式實現這些目標。
Many of the activities of which BE&K complains are traditional organizational activities, closely related to traditional union ends. For example, the unions allegedly picketed and handbilled the plaintiffs’ premises after BE&K refused to recognize them as the exclusive collective bargaining representative for the employees of BE&Kand its subcontractors, and enter into a collective bargaining agreement with the defendants. And the unions encouraged work stoppages by unionized employees because of well-founded safety concerns at the project site.
BE&K 所投訴的許多行為是傳統的組織活動，與工會的傳統目標密切相關。例如，據稱工會在BE&K拒絕承認工會為其員工及其分包商員工的獨家集體談判代表，並拒絕與被告簽訂集體談判協議後，在原告的工作場所進行糾察和分發傳單。此外，工會還因工地存在充分依據的安全問題，鼓勵加入工會的員工罷工。
That these activities were not undertaken to unionize this particular employer but in order to eliminate non-union shops altogether by making an example of BE&K does not matter. Encouraging the use of unionized labor is an objective well within the legitimate interests of labor unions and, so long as this end is pursued by activities normally associated with labor disputes, there’s a strong presumption that the unions are protected from antitrust liability by the statutory labor exemption.
這些活動並非旨在使特定僱主（如 BE&K）實現工會化，而是透過將 BE&K 樹立為典型，全面消除非工會化的企業，但這一點並不重要。鼓勵使用工會勞工是工會合法利益範圍內的目標，只要這一目標是透過通常與勞動爭議相關的活動實現的，就可以強烈推定工會在法定勞工豁免的保護下免於反壟斷責任。
（圖片源於網路）
More troublesome are certain other activities allegedly undertaken by the unions, such as pressing frivolous lawsuits, automatically protesting against permits sought by BE&K, pressing for the passage of a regulatory measure and then agitating for its enforcement against BE&K—all allegedly to make an example of BE&K and discourage use of merit-shop contractors by parties such as UPI. Taking a cue from H.A. Artists, we cannot say that pursuing legitimate labor goals through this kind of activity is per se exempted from the antitrust laws.
更具爭議的是工會據稱採取的某些其他行為，例如提起無根據的訴訟、自動反對BE&K申請的許可證、推動透過一項監管措施並隨後針對BE&K進行執行——所有這些行為據稱都是為了將BE&K樹立為反面典型，並阻止像 UPI 這樣的各方使用“優異制”承包商。借鑑H.A. Artists 案的原則，我們不能認定，透過這種方式追求合法的勞工目標可以自動免於反壟斷法的約束。
The question here, as in H.A. Artists, is whether the non-traditional means were appropriate—in other words, whether the non-traditional means were not only lawful, but necessary because the goals could not be achieved through traditional tactics. And the burden to show this lies with the unions.
這裡的問題與H.A. Artists案類似，即這些非傳統手段是否適當——換句話說，這些非傳統手段是否不僅合法，而且必要，因為這些目標無法透過傳統策略實現。證明這一點的舉證責任在於工會。
Because the district court erroneously construed Hutcheson’s two-part test in the conjunctive, it did not allow discovery on this issue. In this, we conclude, the district court erred. Plaintiff was entitled to try to raise a triable issue of fact on this point by gathering evidence in support of its allegations.
由於地區法院錯誤地將Hutcheson的雙重測試解讀為“需要同時滿足”，因此未允許就此問題進行證據蒐集。對此，我們認為地區法院存在錯誤。原告有權透過收集支援其指控的證據，嘗試在這一點上提出一個可供審理的事實爭議。