It needs a deeper, greener single market—not more state handouts

它需要一個更深入、更環保的單一市場，而不是更多的國家施捨

behind America’s. As we report, the worst-suffering European economies
are grappling with inflation of over 10%, rapid ageing, high public and
private debts and exposure to autocracies. This week the IMF said the
euro-zone economy would grow by only 0.7% in 2023. It expects America to
grow three times as fast.

不難理解為什麼歐洲會有模仿喬-拜登總統經濟政策的衝動。俄羅斯失去廉價化石燃料後，清潔能源轉型就像一個事關國家安全的問題。作為歐洲最大的經濟體，德國擔心其汽車工業的市場份額會被中國和美國的國家補貼電動汽車製造商奪走。歐元區的經濟正日益落後於美國。正如我們所報道的那樣，受苦最深的歐洲經濟體正在努力應對超過10%的通脹率、快速老齡化、高額的公共和私人債務以及面臨專制的風險。本週，國際貨幣基金組織表示，歐元區經濟在2023年將僅增長0.7%。它預計美國的增長速度將是歐洲的三倍。

, which will probably form its next government in 2024, also aims to spend lavishly on industry.

歐洲人越來越將拜登式的產業政策視為答案。歐盟已經放寬了限制補貼投資的國家補助規則，並旨在為集團的綠色產品生產設定目標。法國和德國在如何（而非是否）為工業使用者提供電力補貼的問題上針鋒相對。可能將於
2024 年組建下屆政府的英國工黨也打算在工業領域大肆揮霍。

Yet
copying Bidenomics is a mistake. As in America, luring manufacturing
with subsidies will waste money and, over time, encourage firms to
compete for subsidies rather than customers. And though it is true that
France, whose dirigiste economic philosophy is in the ascendant in
Brussels, has had some successes with industrial policy, the web of
institutions and norms that restrain the excesses of French
interventionism are difficult to copy—just as Germany’s economic model
could not be transplanted elsewhere when it was held up as a paragon.

然而，照搬拜登經濟學是一個錯誤。與美國一樣，用補貼吸引製造業會浪費資金，而且隨著時間的推移，會鼓勵企業爭奪補貼而不是客戶。雖然法國在工業政策方面確實取得了一些成功，但制約法國過度干預主義的制度和規範網路難以複製–就像德國的經濟模式在被奉為典範時無法移植到其他地方一樣。

for carbon pricing, incentivising the private sector to find the most efficient ways to cut emissions.

歐洲最近的經歷實際上是市場力量的一個案例研究。俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭後，德國工業界聲稱，失去俄羅斯天然氣將導致經濟災難。相反，由於企業迅速做出調整，工業生產得以維持。與美國不同，歐盟已經建立了統一的碳價格機制。在經歷了
2000 年代的艱難起步之後，排放交易計劃（ETS）近年來已成為碳定價的黃金標準，激勵私營部門尋找最有效的減排方式。

The
best policies for Europe would build on its past market-friendly
approach. The EU should foster a common and contested green single
market—including services and capital—which means restraining state aid.
It should let the carbon price for new sectors increase faster than
planned, and get serious about a climate dividend for citizens. And it
should trade freely with allies so that the vast tasks of
decarbonisation, de-risking sensitive supply chains and boosting defence
can be undertaken at the lowest cost. The EU would be neither more
secure nor richer if it had national champions producing 27 different
types of tank.

歐洲的最佳政策將以其過去的市場友好型方法為基礎。歐盟應建立一個共同的、有爭議的綠色單一市場–包括服務和資本–這意味著要限制國家援助。它應該讓新行業的碳價格比計劃的增長更快，並認真對待公民的氣候紅利。歐盟還應與盟國進行自由貿易，以便以最低成本完成去碳化、降低敏感供應鏈風險和加強國防等艱鉅任務。如果歐盟擁有生產27種不同型別坦克的國家冠軍，那麼它既不會更安全，也不會更富裕。

To
boost growth, new government spending should focus on infrastructure,
not handouts. Germany should fix a railway system that has rotted to the
point of collapse. France should stop blocking interconnectors that
could channel solar power from sunny Spain to the rest of Europe. And
governments could write procurement rules that insist on greenery or
security but which respect the single market and the principles of free
trade.

為了促進經濟增長，新的政府支出應該集中在基礎設施建設上，而不是施捨。德國應該修復已經腐爛到瀕臨崩潰的鐵路系統。法國應該停止阻撓互聯線路，因為這些線路可以將太陽能從陽光明媚的西班牙輸送到歐洲其他國家。政府可以制定採購規則，堅持綠色或安全，但要尊重單一市場和自由貿易原則。

It
might be tempting for Europeans to think that if America is
protectionist, everyone else must follow suit or be left in the dust.
Actually, America’s long-running economic advantage over the rest of the
world stems from the fact that it has been more committed to markets,
not less. That makes its recent turn towards statism an aberration
rather than an example to follow. ■

歐洲人可能很容易認為，如果美國實行保護主義，那麼其他國家也必須效仿，否則就會被甩在後面。事實上，美國長期以來對世界其他國家的經濟優勢源於它對市場的承諾更多，而不是更少。因此，美國最近轉向國家主義只是一種反常現象，而不是學習的榜樣。■